THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, October 5, 2023
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:29 a.m. [ET] to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
The Chair: Good morning and welcome, everyone. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Before we begin, I wish to invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves, starting on my left.
Senator Ravalia: Good morning and welcome. I am Senator Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia from Newfoundland and Labrador.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Senator Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Greene: Stephen Greene, Nova Scotia.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Mégie: Marie-Françoise Mégie, senatorial division of Rougemont, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Good morning. Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Richards: Good morning. David Richards from New Brunswick.
[Translation]
The Chair: Thank you. Welcome to you all, colleagues, and to all Canadians watching us on SenParlVu.
[English]
Colleagues, we are meeting today under our general order of reference to discuss the situation in Haiti.
For our first panel, we are pleased to welcome, from Global Affairs Canada, Lisa Vandehei, Director General, Haiti Interdepartmental Task Force; and Sébastien Sigouin, Executive Director of the Haiti Division. Welcome. We thank you for being with us today.
Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I wish to ask members and witnesses in the room to please refrain from leaning in too closely to your microphone, or remove your earpiece when doing so. This will avoid any sound feedback that could negatively impact the committee staff and our interpreters who wear earpieces for interpretation.
[Translation]
We are now ready for your opening remarks, which will be followed by a question period, as is customary here. Ms. Vandehei, you have the floor.
[English]
Lisa Vandehei, Director General, Haiti Interdepartmental Task Force, Global Affairs Canada: Good morning. We are grateful to be here to have a good conversation about what is happening in Haiti. Today, we will present an overview of the situation in Haiti and Canada’s response.
Haiti is experiencing a multifaceted and protracted crisis exacerbated by political instability; high levels of insecurity and armed violence; rampant inflation; and an ongoing cholera outbreak.
In 2023, 5.2 million Haitians live in a state of humanitarian emergency according to UN standards. Yet, the Haitian people created the first independent nation in the Caribbean. They beat Napoleon’s army. They created the second democracy in the western hemisphere and the first Black republic in the world.
Haiti’s first constitution included fundamental human rights, regardless of race, that other nations would not adopt until the next century.
We are all here because we strongly believe in the importance of a Haitian-led and Haitian-owned solution, and we are committed to supporting the Haitian authorities’ efforts to restore order and security in the country. We believe that Haiti’s stability requires a coherent international response over the short and medium term.
In response to this crisis, the Haiti Interdepartmental Task Force was formed in December 2022, and is made up of Global Affairs Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces.
The Haiti Interdepartmental Task Force of the Government of Canada works closely with a number of other departments and agencies to bring together the very best expertise across the Government of Canada.
Canada has taken a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach with four pillars: diplomatic engagement; sanctions; humanitarian and development assistance; and security assistance. Each of these four pillars is inherently interconnected and requires mutual success to create a sustainable solution to the crisis.
Within the pillar of security assistance, Canada now plays a nuanced and multifaceted leadership role on several fronts.
First, in March 2023, Canada announced a $100-million contribution in security assistance to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police, or HNP, in restoring security and order. This includes equipment, training and institutional support such as salaries. Notably, this includes programming to support community policing, shown to combat the prevalence of rape — used as a tool by gangs. This is in addition to the $10 million provided last year, which has already built and staffed a vetting office for new recruits to the HNP, will rebuild 20 commissary buildings and has restored electricity to a multitude of their offices.
In addition, 250 motorcycles are due to be delivered in the coming weeks. Radio telecommunications equipment is also under development.
A further $3 million from last year is also showing results on identifying the barriers that women face in joining the HNP, and helping them to overcome it in accordance with Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.
In June, Minister Joly announced the establishment of the international security assistance coordination group. We have reached initial operating capacity.
Over 26 countries and organizations are now working with Canada to coordinate the international efforts to ensure that the HNP have the equipment, resources and training they need to restore and maintain peace, order and the rule of law on their own — now and in the longer term. This work includes collaboration with the United Nations, and places the HNP at the forefront of determining their own needs.
[Translation]
We also welcome the decision taken earlier this week by the UN Security Council to deploy a multinational security support mission to Haiti; we believe it will play a vital role in supporting the Haitian National Police, or HNP, and we look forward to working with Kenya and other international partners under a UN Security Council mandate to ensure that our efforts are mutually complementary.
Second, we impose sanctions on those who fuel violence and instability. For decades, members of the Haitian elite have engaged in corruption, supported criminal activities and created instability for their own benefit. That’s why the Government of Canada strongly believes in putting pressure on them to encourage constructive dialogue to resolve the crisis.
[English]
Third, we are responding to the critical humanitarian and development needs of the population. Haiti is the leading recipient of Canadian aid in the Americas. Since last year alone, Canada has provided over $100 million in international assistance, including $13 million in humanitarian aid.
As a result of our efforts, women, men, girls and boys have access to health services, including for injuries from sexual and gender-based violence. Children are fed and receive an education. The most vulnerable have access to legal aid.
Finally, the Government of Canada strongly believes that the future of Haiti depends on having a stable and democratically elected government. This is why we have been actively supporting dialogue efforts between different political stakeholders in Haiti, as well as working closely with the international community, notably CARICOM, to promote Haitian-led and Haitian-owned solutions.
[Translation]
We believe that the Haitian people deserve a representative and stable government, and we will continue to call on all Haiti’s stakeholders to work together in a spirit of compromise to lead the country towards free and fair elections as soon as the security conditions allow.
[English]
In conclusion, urgent action is needed to respond to the crisis in Haiti. The Government of Canada is at the forefront of international efforts.
This concludes my remarks. I would like to thank the committee members for their attention and engagement on this important issue and our conversation today.
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Vandehei. We will open it up to questions from senators.
I want to acknowledge that Senator Woo of British Columbia has joined the meeting.
Senator Boniface: Thank you for the overview.
I’m wondering if you can give us any more information in terms of the supply for the Haitian National Police. I note you said equipment, training, salary and some work on gender-based violence. One hundred million dollars is a lot of money. I wonder how you’re addressing the corruption issues, which will complicate the money that flows into Haiti.
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for the question. To start, the HNP are the country’s sole law enforcement institution. There is no army, navy or air force. They’re the only opponent to gang insurgency following the disbandment and definancing of the Haitian army in the 1990s.
The Haitian National Police are poorly paid, and there’s a significant delta between the capabilities and equipment of the gangs and the units of the HNP. That’s a huge part of the problem. At least 54 police members were killed in 2022. The HNP officially have a force of around 15,000 members with 1,700 women, and the number of effective strength is lower at about 9,000 in reality. This corresponds to a low police-to-population ratio of 1.3 officers per 1,000 persons, which is well below the international standard of 2.2.
We are working with the United Nations Development Programme, or UNDP, Basket Fund on this front with a significant proportion of our funding going to them, and they are looking at a range of equipment, including vehicles, telecommunications equipment, computers and rehabilitation of facilitates, especially after the 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of the HNP’s infrastructure and took away their access to electricity and basic institutional supports.
By way of institutional supports, we’re also looking at salaries and life insurance as support. Right now, the HNP members make on average $200 a month, with a top-up of $150 paid through a debit card. Part of the issue is that we want to make sure they are paid and equipped properly. That includes uniforms, equipment, personal protective equipment and the ability to engage with gangs through intelligence-led operational planning, which involves computers and technological equipment. This is the full range of what we are looking at now with the basket fund.
We also sit on a committee with the UNDP Basket Fund; with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, or BINUH, cooperation; with the HNP; and with the embassy to take a regular stock of what they need urgently. Of course, this will change and be adapted with the incoming multinational security support force as well.
Senator Boniface: Thank you. I worked at the UN when they had responsibility for Haiti. What about selection? Is somebody within the basket fund looking at selection of officers to try to screen at the earliest stage?
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for that important question. Yes, they are because that is a critical element of being able to secure not only our own members potentially going out, but also the HNP from the infiltration of gang members, which is a real risk. We have established a vetting office. As part of the $10 million that Canada committed and spent last year, we have established and built a vetting office from scratch and staffed it as well, and they are still working on staffing it now. That will help take care of the vetting of new officers coming in.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you once again. On Monday, the United Nations Security Council approved a new plan to crack down on Haiti’s gang violence, green-lighting an offer from Kenya to lead a multinational armed security force in Haiti after Prime Minister Ariel Henry requested military assistance. It is expected that other nations are going to join the fight, and add forces to the 1,000 security personnel that Kenya has committed to deploy.
I have a two-part question: First, to what extent will Canada be involved? Will we be sending individuals to be part of this security force? Second, when reading the international press about the concern that Kenyan police have a history of violence, particularly in elections in Kenya, there is some cynicism as to what their behaviour may be if they go to Haiti. Can you comment on those two points?
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for these very important questions. We’re aware that since the passage of the United Nations resolution for support of the multinational security force, Kenyan officials have indicated that the requirement has been met and is now in passage through their legislature in the Parliament of Kenya. Subsequent to those two conditions being met, the Kenyan police forces are likely going to be on the condition of being able to deploy about 90 days after those two conditions are met. There are a number of outstanding questions, including rules of engagement and what they look like under the resolution that will take place. We are connected with the Canadian ambassador in Haiti — at our desks here in Canada — to make sure that Canada is closely connected with the planning process that is now fully under way after the UN resolution has been met. We are working closely with the U.S. and other colleagues to find out what the delta is in their requirement and need, and where Canada is best placed to support.
I would also offer the consideration that, at all costs, the HNP must first be enabled to provide security for the Haitian population in the long term. We know there are lessons learned in the past from every country, including Canada, with the involvement of any kind of UN security force or UN-related security force going into Canada — and it cannot be the only solution going forward. In order to create a long-term peace and stability position, we need to look at all four pillars of Canadian assistance, including diplomatic efforts; sanctions; and economic and humanitarian development. Right now, we are working on planning with the Kenyans and others to see what the requirements are, while keeping in mind those two important factors for long-term stability in Haiti.
On the question of the Kenyan police’s history of violence, we are very much attuned to that, especially when it comes to the sexual and gender-based violence already taking place in Haiti. We are looking at working with the Kenyans and the U.S. on how to bring our own lessons learned to the table from our work in Haiti as well.
Senator Greene: I was going to ask some questions on Kenya, and maybe I can think of one to ask now. In your view, or in Canada’s view, what moved Kenya to offer this potentially good thing to us, given the problems that they have, as it’s so far out of their own region?
Ms. Vandehei: I can’t speak about that because I’m not aware of what might have moved them to offer these forces. I’m grateful that they did because, at this point, we do need some type of security intervention of this sense. Applying the lessons learned of all of our recent and historical pasts in Haiti, there could be some good things that come out of this application of the multinational security support, or MSS. But I’m sorry; I can’t speak to the internal machinations of the Kenyan Parliament.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here today. You mentioned at the beginning of the conversation that the government has provided over $90 million in humanitarian and development assistance to Haiti over the fiscal year 2022-23. In a situation like this — which can be chaotic with money coming in and being spent — is it provided to international organizations like the Red Cross, or are we sending it directly to the government in Haiti? I’m trying to get a sense of what that looks like. The flip side of that is this: How are we keeping track? How do we know where the money is being designated or spent?
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for asking that question. It’s a good question to be asked. Global Affairs Canada has an extensive process by which we vet all international organizations that we work with — not just at the outset of any project or program, but also continuously throughout that project or program. The majority of our $95 million to $100 million is going to trusted partners, especially the United Nations partners who have experience working in Haiti — who are currently positioned in Port-au-Prince or throughout Haiti, and work to raise up or work with local organizations and civil society organizations that deserve assistance.
Sébastien Sigouin, Executive Director, Haiti, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much for this question. Indeed, we work through many UN and international partners. We also work with a number of Canadian partners that are well established in Haiti. As an example, we work with the organization Lawyers Without Borders, which is a trusted partner and well established, but there are others as well.
How do we ensure that we reach the results that we are expecting? We are in close contact with them. It’s not just that we provide the money and we forget about them. We have processes in place to periodically engage with them and see the progress made.
Also, particularly in the context of Haiti — where the security conditions are very difficult — it’s about how we can help them help us deliver the programming that we’re doing across the country. We have mechanisms in place. We have checks and balances in place, but we also have an ongoing dialogue to make sure that we reach the beneficiaries that we are hoping to reach. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Senator Ravalia asked a question, and I think many of us have thought the same thing. This is almost a part C to the question that was asked earlier about Kenya. It is clear that it’s not a peacekeeping-focused mission, but I wonder what the importance of that distinction is, and how it affects other UN countries and members that could assist through this mission if they wished to. This is an add-on to that question.
Ms. Vandehei: That discussion is actually quite active right now, so I wouldn’t be able to provide you with a good enough answer until a few weeks from now.
We are grateful for the UN resolution that has been passed. It provides a number of paragraphs that offer details about how that type of planning effort could go forward with other countries that have also offered supportive contributions into the range of 150 personnel who could be deployed alongside the Kenyan forces. I am pleased to say that many of them are from the same region as Haiti, which helps with socio-political and cultural backgrounds, as well as providing and creating a Haitian-led solution. We are grateful for that.
I was excited to see that the UN resolution included a number of lessons learned from past UN missions in the area from all contributing countries, including the transmission of disease and the prevalence of sexual exploitation and abuse, and how they might handle those instances. I am grateful for those lessons learned being addressed in that resolution.
We will be happy to provide regular updates on how that planning is going forward. It is going forward in earnest now with the passage of the resolution.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome to our witnesses.
I’d like to return to the lessons learned from previous missions. We know that in 2017, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or MINUSTAH, ended with a rather ambiguous balance sheet, because as much as it helped stabilize the situation initially, it also led to human rights violations — which Ms. Vandehei just mentioned — but above all the outbreak of a cholera epidemic, and everyone recognized this.
I’d like to know what safeguards we’re going to use this time. How can we ensure that the excesses observed during previous UN missions are not repeated?
Ms. Vandehei: Absolutely.
[English]
Thank you for the question. I’m grateful for this question and for the discussion on this issue. I will offer a bit of information, and then respond to the question so that I can offer context.
Right now, the reporting coming out of Haiti is on the violence that women, men, girls and boys are facing right now, in the absence of the MSS arriving, and even in light of the brave efforts that the HNP are making to protect the Haitian population. It’s well known that gangs use rape, including collective and public rapes, with the purpose of expanding and consolidating their control. The brutality with which gangs undertake sexual violence points to a clear intention to inflict severe pain and punish those considered to be supportive of a rival group, who live in a rival area or who are moving across neighbourhoods to carry out daily activities. This is the condition of Haitian women and girls, who are especially vulnerable, as well as Haitian men and boys.
In the context of this entire complexity, we have to consider both the good and the bad, as well as the potential risks that we face — addressing those risks, conscious of our history and our lessons learned, and by “our,” I mean collectively and globally. By addressing it and acknowledging it going in, it allows us to address the challenges honestly and transparently, and to look for solutions where — in the history of anyone’s engagement — it has been difficult to solve.
It is these types of issues that we need the MSS to help us solve, and the reduction of the prevalence of gang activity in Haiti will help us solve these issues first and foremost. I’m grateful for the announcement of the UN resolution, and we have lots of lessons learned to share amongst all of us, as countries, in order to build something innovative going forward to prevent the types of issues we’ve had in the past — all of us, every country — and now to safeguard the bodies, minds and souls of the Haitian population in this regard.
Senator MacDonald: Canada is the second-largest bilateral donor to Haiti. The U.S. is the first. I’m surprised that France isn’t the first.
When France left Haiti in the early 1800s, they stuck them with an enormous debt that took 122 years to pay off. It was paid off in 1947. France is the progenitor of this social and financial mess, so what is France doing? How much have they stepped up in trying to alleviate the problems in Haiti?
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for bringing up the social, cultural and historical context. It is incredibly complex with Haiti. Since the 1800s, there has been a multitude of countries’ involvement in Haiti to sometimes better and sometimes much worse effect.
Right now, we’re working through the international security assistance coordination group — that Canada is playing a leadership role in — to encourage all countries to come to the fore to donate in order to make sure that the HNP are stable and that the Haitian population is served. France is a member of the international security assistance coordination group, and they have been highly active in all efforts of our coordination front. I can’t speak to the internal machinations or decision making of the French government, but I can say they have been active in the international security assistance coordination group’s coordination mechanism, and highly suggestive of what they can come to the fore and come to the table with.
Mr. Sigouin: Thank you very much for this question. We haven’t talked about it yet, but my colleague Ms. Vandehei mentioned the issue of sanctions, and how important they are in fighting impunity for corruption and violence.
Canada has been at the forefront of imposing sanctions. We have imposed sanctions against 28 individuals so far, but we have also worked with the international community, so it is not just Canada imposing sanctions. We are sending a strong international message that impunity will not be tolerated, and France was instrumental in the sanctions framework adopted by the European Union at the end of July. They were the ones who worked with all the European Union members to advance a proposal that led the organization to adopt the sanctions regime, and I know that they are still working with the European Union to ensure that this sanctions regime will start listing particular individuals — to ensure those who are sanctioned by Canada, for example, are not free to travel across Europe or move their assets in order to run away from the impunity that Canada is trying to fight. That’s another example of the role they have been instrumental in playing.
Senator MacDonald: I think that role is important and positive, but money and military support are needed. France is a wealthy nation with a military. Are we putting enough pressure on the West — and on France — to step up and do its part? I think they have a huge responsibility in Haiti.
Ms. Vandehei: On this front, again, I’m sorry, but I can’t speak to the internal machinations of whether the country may be thinking about any historical interaction with the country of Haiti.
I can speak to their current interactions. I’m grateful for your question, and we’ll continue to work with all of the countries involved. Not to detract from your important line of questioning, but I’d like to add to something that Mr. Sigouin mentioned.
On the issue of sanctions, I’ve been working closely with all our international partners on whether the sanctions work, and whether the Haitian gang leaders are afraid of them — and they are. I’m grateful to see that there is a huge emphasis on sanctions — for the UN, the U.S. and Canada — because they’re working, and they’re creating fear amongst the elite who are causing the violence in Haiti right now. Thank you for your questions.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you for being here. My question was asked by Senator Gerba, but I’ll come at it in a slightly different way.
I would love to be more optimistic about this. You can understand why people are a little skeptical because of all the influence we have tried to put into Haiti over the last number of years.
Premier Furey wrote a great book about Haiti, and about little girls who were coming up to him and trying to get their tattoos taken off. The tattoos said they were prostitutes, and they were 11 and 12 years old.
The violent culture is endemic on the streets. I wonder if this can be alleviated by the kind of program that is coming in from the top down. It hasn’t been successful yet. I don’t want to be a contrarian here, but I’m wondering what you think about this.
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for your question. I’m glad that we’re having this conversation today. You’re right that Haiti is complex. Its history is complex, and it is unique in terms of some of the challenges we’re facing.
I’ve been working in conflict and instability for 25 years — a huge portion of that was during my life as a soldier, and now it’s as a civilian, working across government departments in doing this kind of work.
I’m hopeful because of what I’ve seen so far. The Haitian people are resilient. They have formed their resiliency over years of dealing with this complexity by relying on family, as well as appreciation of education and knowledge, religion, collective spirituality and community networks. We now have an opportunity to work with these people in partnership, and will continue to need to do so until this issue is solved.
The way we’re working on this now is based on a history of respect for the lessons learned — sometimes it’s hard won — from every country in the world in their application of support to Haiti. It’s the duality with which we approach some of the contexts of Haiti and also the long-term, endemic control of gangs and political and economic elites in the country. We’re taking on this issue with open eyes. That is why we’re creating a multifaceted solution. We would never rely on security alone to solve this issue, hence the four pillars that Canada has put together. It’s not easy, but after 25 years, I’ve looked at the situation, and I have a lot of hope here. We just need to keep working on it.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Mégie: I have two questions. Thank you to our guests for being here today. Looking at the tables published by DataDev, you talked a lot about $100 million for Haiti. I noted earlier that between 2017 and 2022, annual Canadian aid to Haiti fell from $121.7 million to $89.9 million, a 25% reduction. What criteria did Global Affairs Canada use to allocate or not allocate money to Haiti, and what percentage will go to salaries and per diems for international employees?
Secondly, on Haiti’s social networks, much of the Haitian population and diaspora here is questioning the motives of foreign countries to negotiate with a government it deems illegitimate. I know there’s a lot of talk about this. What do you think of this criticism? The gang leaders have passports from all over the place, so imposing sanctions on them seems promising, but it doesn’t get results, because their bank accounts are all over the place and they have passports from many countries. How are you going to deal with that?
[English]
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for the question. I’ll answer it in several parts. I’m grateful for this question, as always, because when we get down to the detail, we get to the interesting conversation.
In terms of how much of our funding is going to Haiti directly through our supportive partners, and how much is serving us here in Ottawa, I can tell you that I have a team of nearly four people who are doing all of this work, and Mr. Sigouin has a team of three people. We would say there are a few of us who are punching above our weight to make sure Haiti gets every single dollar that we want to send to it.
As I said, of the $100 million, a huge portion of that is going to the basket fund, and a significant portion is going directly to funding salaries, for example, for the Haitian National Police — who, on a daily basis, make much less and do much harder work than we do. I want to acknowledge their bravery and stick-to-it-iveness in light of how much they’re paid on a monthly basis, which is why we are supporting them.
Our travel is limited to Haiti. We aim to cut down on that as much as possible. Our focus is using the embassy and the brave embassy folks we have stationed in Port-au-Prince. There are only a few personnel there. They are working long hours to make sure they are communicating with the HNP and with a range of civil society members — Haitian stakeholders, the Haitian population and both bureaucrats and politicians in the Haitian government — to make sure we have a cross-section of understanding of the current conditions on the ground, as well as the reality of the situation and what all folks need from us, which includes men, women and children.
In terms of the political aspect, you’re right to ask this question because security interventions must, by their very nature, be inherently short term or medium term. They are never a long-term solution, and that’s never been their intent or mandate. We are placing heavy emphasis on finding a political resolution, leading to free and fair elections.
Canada has been encouraging this in three areas — the most important of which is the CARICOM expert working group. The group has paid several visits to Haiti and Port-au-Prince over the summer, and we’re hopeful that those efforts continue. They are working hard to encourage the political actors in Haiti to power-share, and to come to a solution for elections as quickly as possible.
In terms of the elections, we’re in a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation as well. For many of the preconditions that are required for free and fair elections, it’s difficult for them to take place.
For example, census work is currently not taking place because of the violence under way. For every Haitian to have an appropriate vote, we need to make sure they’re all accounted for, and that they can actually submit their vote.
We’re working with all elements of security coordination and planning to make sure that space is provided in our security planning to ensure those preconditions are met — because those are some of the most important things we can do.
The Chair: I have four or five questions, but I will ask two quick ones now.
You referenced our brave people at our mission. Port-au-Prince is one of the most difficult cities in the world in which to operate in terms of diplomatic missions. If memory serves, we also have the British co-located with us. I think we provide a roof for the British embassy; I don’t know if that’s still the case. What measures are you undertaking to ensure duty of care for our staff — which is obviously a very difficult situation for everyone — including any movement that they make around the city? I think it would be helpful for the committee to get a sense of just how tough it is.
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for this question. We’re grateful for the questions, and we’re grateful for the detail in the questions. I’m grateful to be part of a group that has this kind of attention from busy folks, and we need this kind of attention to work together to create solutions.
I’m part of an interdepartmental task force, so I’m working closely with the RCMP, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to bring forward expertise on what the complete range of security interventions looks like for Haiti — both the funding that we’re spending there and how we keep personnel safe — in all of the applications of our work going forward.
We are grateful for a few things: The positioning of the Haitian embassy infrastructure right now is in an area that has been less concentrated in gang activity, so we’ve had more mobility than, say, other embassies that are located there. That’s not to say that we haven’t had security restrictions. I’ll turn to my friend Mr. Sigouin to answer these questions in more detail.
Mr. Sigouin: Thank you very much for this question. It is critical for us to ensure the safety and the security of our employees abroad — not only the diplomats, but also the employees who are recruited locally. This is true for Haiti and everywhere else. In the case of Haiti, as my friend Ms. Vandehei mentioned, we take it very seriously. While the area of the mission has been less affected than, perhaps, other embassies — for example, the Americans were very much in the news — very tight and strict security protocols have been put in place for the Canadian diplomats and for our local employees. Those include restrictions in movement — areas where we go or don’t go, as well as how we go there, and armoured vehicles — but we have also had instances where we had measures such as sheltering in place, when individuals stay home, whether it’s a hotel or it’s a house; wherever home is for them, they work from there. We ensure that our employees have access to equipment so that they can telework from those locations.
It’s a very critical issue, and we’re monitoring it very closely. These are the conversations we’re having on a weekly basis with our security colleagues at Global Affairs Canada to ensure that we maintain the highest standard of security and safety for our employees. Thank you.
The Chair: Are you providing mental health counselling?
Ms. Vandehei: Yes, absolutely. As a person who has been deployed to a lot of places in the world, mental health is at the forefront of not only my mind, but also that of my entire senior staff at Global Affairs Canada, the RCMP, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The personnel who are in the embassy right now have access — on a routine and urgent basis — to counsellors, both within Global Affairs Canada and those who can be contracted outside of Global Affairs Canada, for several sessions on an immediate basis for any mental health support needs that they may require, both now and in the future.
The Chair: Thank you. I’ll continue to abuse my privilege as the chair for one quick question, and I would like a quick answer to this.
Just over two decades ago, I was our permanent representative at the Organization of American States, or OAS. We spent a lot of time on Haiti at that time. There were elections. The OAS was providing election observation. I worked closely with the Haitian permanent representative. I felt it was a responsibility for us — Canada — as the only other French-speaking country in the hemisphere, to step up. I was quite struck that, in some cases, some of the larger countries in South America were engaged and helping, whether through the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or MINUSTAH, or other means.
Is there an interest, whether it is through the OAS or separately — and when I say “separately,” we know at that time, at least, the Cubans had doctors in Haiti because Cuban Creole is similar to Haitian Creole and the like. Is there more hemispheric involvement other than the CARICOM initiative you mentioned?
Mr. Sigouin: The answer is yes. You mentioned the OAS, and they are very much engaged in the issue. Within the structure of the OAS, they have established committees to look at the issue of democracy, security and elections. Obviously, they are looking at how they could support Haiti on the path toward elections when the conditions are right. They are very much engaged in that conversation. The OAS’s Secretary General and other representatives of the OAS are engaged in discussions at the UN. We have an OAS representative who also participated in the international security assistance coordination group that Ms. Vandehei referred to. They’re very much part of the international community response to the situation in Haiti.
The Chair: Thank you very much for that. To follow up on a point that Senator MacDonald made earlier, Canada is the second-largest contributor to the OAS after the United States. We’re also providing — beyond the bilateral assistance that you cited — a lot of multilateral assistance as well.
Senator Boniface: As you would expect, I’m quite interested in the policing deployment. In my former life, I had officers deployed in Haiti for a number of years, and Canadians paid a price there too as a result of the earthquake. When you talk about the 150 personnel commitment, if I understand you correctly, or whether we put officers on the ground to train alongside — I’m assuming it’s a train-the-trainer type thing as opposed to being on the ground. You can answer that question for me. Given the issues, particularly in the RCMP — but also of many agencies not being able to staff their own detachments properly — are we thinking of a different way of doing it? For instance, would we provide funding to someone within the region? I’ll use Colombia as an example. They have lots of experience. Would we provide funding to have Colombian officers there in addition to Canadian officers, or something like that model in a different way? Don’t get me wrong, I want to see Canadians on the ground, but I’m trying to figure out how we strike a balance.
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you. We do, too. There are a couple of elements to this. First, the planning for Canada’s training mission is still under way, and we’re looking at a range of options for two things: making sure that we’re doing it safely, and making sure that we are bringing to bear the expertise that the RCMP has — at their forefront — that can help the HNP in very surgical, technical areas.
The RCMP is the best in the world in several areas of policing that the HNP need in certain elements. This is in parallel with the other training efforts that are being brought to the fore, especially through the UNDP Basket Fund. Training for all elements of the security sector is part of that basket fund. The international security assistance coordination group works in two ways. We are coordinating the stuff and things that show up in Haiti: Does it make sense? Does it work together? What does it look like? And how does it serve the HNP best? We’re also looking at a combined training calendar: Who is doing what training? Does it make sense, and does it make sense right now? The HNP are under siege, and they have 9,000 people on the ground. Training all the time means that you’re taking people off the front lines to conduct this training. What does it mean from an operational perspective? And the international security assistance coordination group is looking at all those elements.
In that context, the RCMP is looking at being focused on technical training that is a force multiplier, per se. If one person from the RCMP goes down and trains on something highly technical or highly relevant, this could mean that all of a sudden — for HNP officers — if there were 10 people before, it could now potentially have the effect of 100 people. This is the type of attitude that we’re using to approach training planning going forward. The training planning is still under way, of course.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Ravalia: Pierre Espérance, the Executive Director of the Haitian National Human Rights Defense Network, has expressed concerns about the increased political patronage of gangs in Haiti, including the notorious G9 gang. Government-connected gangs flaunt their access to state resources, including official vehicles, technology, high-powered rifles and armoured vehicles used to fight rival gangs and massacre bystanders.
Could you comment on the challenge that this poses in our efforts to establish a transitional government that’s committed to democracy?
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for the question. The relations between people living in marginalized areas and gang members are incredibly complex — exactly as your question denotes. In the absence of state presence and state services, gang leaders portray themselves as the bearers of the social and economic aspirations of these populations — who lack the most basic services and opportunities — at the same time as they are conducting unspeakable violence. And as mentioned by some victims, “Given that state authorities are not here, the gang leader is the chief, the police and the judge . . . .” We have to be incredibly nuanced in how we’re approaching this complexity.
Right now, there are more than 200 heavily armed gangs. They are often tied to a powerful few actors, and only a few with prominent leaders. They’re morphing and changing over time under the Bwa Kale movement, and now with the return home movement, it is asking the Haitian population to return to the communities that they fled to the tune of 200,000 Haitian personnel. The violence remains at extreme levels.
What we’re conscious of doing — in seeking a political solution — is acknowledging that this is at the heart and source of the violence. The Haitian population and all of the persons there are eager for the same things that we have here: a responsive government, and government services that match their lives and enable economic opportunity. We are looking at doing that via the power-sharing agreements through the various political processes, and also making sure that we are putting the pieces in place for the elections that are coming forward.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you.
Senator Greene: As we all know, the Dominican Republic shares the island with Haiti, and they have vastly different concerns than those of any other country in the world in regard to their relationship with Haiti because they have a land border. Do you get the impression — at least from reading the news up here — that the Dominican Republic is doing nothing? I just want to know if that is true or not true, and how complicated that issue is with regard to the UN and various other multi-forces that we’ve seen.
Ms. Vandehei: Thank you for the question. I can certainly start, and then I’ll rely on my friend Mr. Sébastien Sigouin to answer this as well.
They are absolutely not doing nothing, and we’ve been grateful that they are willing, able and supportive in hosting the international security assistance coordination group there. We will be deploying several personnel there to help coordinate the things I spoke to earlier, such as the equipment and training. We’re grateful to be based there because this is the same place that many countries were based after the 2010 earthquake in order to respond to earthquakes.
We’re working through our embassy in close collaboration with the folks in the Dominican Republic to look at mutual concerns, and how to work together. Often, the concerns that they have are the same as those of the Haitian population, and there is partnership to be had there. I’ll turn to Mr. Sébastien Sigouin to make sure I didn’t miss anything.
Mr. Sigouin: Thank you for this question. I mentioned earlier the sanctions that Canada has been imposing, and how we’ve worked with the international community for other countries to also implement measures. In this context, for example, the Dominican Republic imposed visa bans and restrictions on over 40 Haitian elite to try to curtail their ability to go to the Dominican Republic and, again, to fight impunity.
They’ve been engaged on a number of issues. Of course, the border issue has been in the news lately. We certainly have encouraged both parties to resolve this bilateral issue because it is having an impact on populations on both sides of the border — I think both countries are very much aware of that — but also to make sure it doesn’t negatively impact the Haitian population from a humanitarian perspective. We are working with them directly, and encouraging them to work with Haiti to resolve bilateral issues. They’re very much engaged in addressing the crisis in Haiti bilaterally through us, but also through official support for the deployment of a multinational mission in Haiti.
The Chair: Thank you. Our immediate crisis here is that we’re running out of time. We want to move on to the second panel. Colleagues, we have the names of a number of senators who want to ask questions. I’ll ask you to ask them in sequence, and then have our witnesses respond to all.
Senator MacDonald, I don’t know if Senator Greene had asked your question.
Senator MacDonald: Yes, pretty well most of it. It was about the Dominican Republic, but I have one question that hasn’t been answered.
The Chair: Let’s get them all in a row, so go ahead.
Senator MacDonald: When it comes to the border, the Dominican Republic has two thirds of the island. What exactly is going on at the border? Are people fleeing that border? Is there a large military presence on the border? What are the dynamics of that border between those two countries?
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: You mentioned the $100 million in contributions that Canada has sent to Haiti, but when you look at the situation in the country and what the Haitian people are going through, it’s hard to understand where this money is going, because it goes through partners, so it remains in control, in the fight against gangs and so on. From a practical point of view, does Canada really have a program that can concretely help Haitians in their daily lives?
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Richards: Senator Ravalia asked my question. I’ll ask it very quickly again in another way. Thousands are fleeing gang violence in Central America, and the only way they seem to be able to curtail that is through draconian measures, as we’ve seen in Honduras and other places. I wonder if there’s a chance of any stability in Haiti unless there is a real diminishment or eradication of the culture and mosaic of the gangs in Port-au-Prince and other places. If there is not, then we will be less optimistic with this present move to stop the violence.
[Translation]
Senator Mégie: Just a quick question, like everyone else. Do you have any idea, from your military experience, how many police officers it would have taken to manage this crisis: 1,000, 5,000, 10,000? I’m not sure. During the visit of the Kenyan delegation, bandits surrounded the American embassy to show that they were stronger than them. Is this calculated in numbers of police or in strategy?
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
The advantage our witnesses will have is that we’ve run out of time, but it doesn’t mean you’re off the hook. The committee would very much appreciate responses in writing, if you could, to the four questions that were asked by the senators. Please send those via our clerk, Chantal Cardinal, who is beside me here, and that would be quite helpful to us.
In listening to both the testimony and questions, I dare say we will be contacting you again at a future date to follow up on what I thought was a very interesting and rich discussion today, and I’m sure my colleagues will agree.
Director General Lisa Vandehei and Executive Director Sébastien Sigouin, we are grateful. Thank you for meeting with us today.
We will now go to our second panel, so thank you very much.
[Translation]
For our second panel, we are pleased to welcome, via video conference, Chalmers LaRose, lecturer in the Department of Political Science and co-Director of the Observatoire des Amériques at the Université du Québec à Montréal. We also welcome Renata Segura, Deputy Director of the International Crisis Group, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Welcome and thank you for accepting our invitation. We are now ready to hear your opening remarks. They will be followed by a question period from the senators.
Professor LaRose, you have the floor.
Chalmers LaRose, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Co-director, Observatoire des Amériques, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), as an individual: Greetings to all the senators here. I thank the committee for its invitation to take part in this meeting on the situation in Haiti. I am pleased to note that it has become commonplace in recent years for the Parliament of Canada to take an interest in Haitian issues.
Honourable senators, with regard to the Haitian crisis, things have changed significantly between last year and today. Last year, there was a great deal of uncertainty about setting up an international intervention mission in Haiti.
As I speak, the clouds that obscured this new adventure have dissipated. After several unsuccessful representations, the United States has succeeded in convincing Kenya to assume a leadership role in this intervention mission, which was authorized by the United Nations Security Council on October 2, through Resolution 2699.
This umpteenth intervention mission is presented as an initiative of voluntary states and, as such, will not be placed under the aegis of the UN. If all this comes to fruition, the Western community will have succeeded in its gamble of embarking on yet another interventionist adventure in Haiti. Once again, this umpteenth mission will be tasked with helping the national side to immediately extinguish the hotbed of violence in the country. At this stage, there are neither sufficient elements nor concordant clues to anticipate the future.
The general climate in Haiti has deteriorated, especially in the urban areas of Port-au-Prince. Armed groups have increased in number, the territory they control and their ability to project terror and violence. The economy is worsening. There is an erosion of the social fabric and national unity, difficulty with land communications, shrinking of trade routes, blocking off of large portions of the country, a growing exodus of Haitians to other countries, and state protection is virtually non-existent.
At the same time, the persistent political crisis, which is fuelling the spike in violence, has not yet eased. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the CARICOM mediation mission, we are still a long way from a consensus emerging among Haitians as outside actors would like to see.
In addition, we note with concern the resurgence of the border crisis between Haiti and the Dominican Republic relating to the management of the Massacre River.
Honourable senators, I would like to tell you that the security situation in Haiti could be improved by several concurrent and parallel initiatives. The first step would be to intensify security cooperation (police and national army) in order to stamp out the immediate hotbeds of urban violence.
The second step would be to resolve the political crisis, while establishing a transitional government with the mandate and means to restore political and economic institutions, which would allow for calm governance.
Finally, the state must be revived: its ability to project authority and control throughout the territory must be restored immediately. Haiti’s armed forces should play a key and defining role in this regard.
In conclusion, improving the security situation in Haiti is inseparable from resolving the institutional governance crisis in the country. While strengthening the ability of the Haitian police is indispensable for the maintenance of order within the country, that must be done in conjunction with the redeployment and effective support of a national army.
The interweaving of domestic security, under police authority, and national defence by the armed forces, through a dual and two-pronged strategy between the police and the army, could lead to the much desired stability and relieve the suffering of Haitians in the long term.
Thank you and I am available for questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor LaRose.
[English]
Now we would like to hear from Ms. Renata Segura.
Renata Segura, Deputy Director, Latin America and the Caribbean, International Crisis Group: Thank you so much for inviting me to share with you the International Crisis Group’s assessment of the situation in Haiti. Before starting, I should say that my comments today draw on the research that my colleagues do on the ground in Haiti, but also here in New York with the UN, and much of what I will be telling you today is what they have informed me throughout our work in recent times in Haiti.
The International Crisis Group welcomed the UN Security Council’s approval of a multinational security support mission to Haiti. However, as Professor LaRose just said, we continue to worry that the lack of broad agreement among most political forces will hinder the chances of success for such a mission. The increase in violence in recent months, however, has shown why it is indispensable that foreign troops help the Haitian National Police to fight gangs.
Since mid-August, offensives from the G-Pep coalition in the capital have displaced over 30,000 people. Bwa Kale, the vigilante groups that started as a self-defence movement against gangs in April, lynched over 350 suspected gang members in just over three months. While many Haitians celebrated their achievements, authorities and international partners, including us, worried about the potential excessive escalation of violence and violations of human rights.
The respite brought by Bwa Kale was short-lived, and gangs have progressively resumed their criminal activities and their drive to encroach on new territories. In fact, this self-defence movement resulted in tragedy when at least 20 civilians were shot dead by gang members on August 26, as hundreds of worshippers, led by an evangelical pastor and armed with machetes and sticks, headed toward a northern slum of the capital to fight the Canaan gang.
In recent months, we have seen how gangs have continued to strengthen their hold over the capital and expanded to regions in the north, particularly the Artibonite Valley — where most of the food in Haiti is grown — and most recently Mirebalais, where 10,000 people were displaced.
It is also important to note that some gang leaders — particularly Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, the head of the G9 gang coalition — have started to make more efforts to present their criminal groups as political organizations fighting on behalf of the Haitian people, and to hint about the possibility of negotiations.
In late September, several gang leaders belonging to the rival G9 and G-Pep coalitions announced the creation of an alliance called Viv Ansanm — “living together” in Creole — and declared that they would bring peace to the country, and that citizens would soon be free to travel throughout Haiti. This promise was short-lived, as violence ramped up days after, but it indicates that some gangs are considering medium-term scenarios, particularly now that the international force has been approved.
Meanwhile, “Barbecue” — the leader of the G9 who, in the past, has expressed his own political ambitions — said during demonstrations organized by him a few weeks ago that the common enemy of the gangs was the government, and called for the overthrow of the prime minister.
As violence deepens, the dialogues to resolve the political crisis continue to stall. CARICOM’s Eminent Persons Group visited Haiti in a third attempt to advance negotiations between the government and opposition groups. However, positions have only radicalized, with several opposition groups taking part in discussions with the government — now calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry. This includes the Montana Accord — which accused his government of being involved in crimes against humanity — and also the party of former prime minister Claude Joseph. Henry dismissed these calls, but CARICOM mediators have lamented the tone of negotiations.
In the midst of this polarization, Haitians have been united in their support of the construction of the canal on the Massacre River, which runs along the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. As you know, tensions over the construction resulted in Santo Domingo closing all borders. This has paralyzed commerce, particularly affecting local economies. It has also resulted in clinics on the Haitian side of the border having to turn back patients, as they usually get their medical supplies from the Dominican Republic. There are also concerns about future scarcity of food because a lot of the food consumed by Haiti comes through the border.
After the approval of the mission on Monday, a few public figures have expressed their disagreement. However, it is interesting to note that most have remained silent, and the general population seems to have received the news with relief. Off-the-record conversations that we’ve had in the last couple of days with sources on the ground indicate that political forces are calculating a response that will not alienate them from possible voters. Time will tell if key actors will move forward toward a compromise, but Haitian mediators told the International Crisis Group they are hopeful that the vote at the UN will help to unstick negotiations in the short term. I’m happy to answer any questions that I can.
The Chair: Thank you both for your comments. We will go right to the question period.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Ms. Segura. Considering your expertise in this area, I would like to know if it is advisable to go through the current government, which does not appear to be legitimate, to resolve the crisis.
I am asking because people on social networks in Haiti are asking why foreign governments are negotiating with that government. What do you think?
[English]
Ms. Segura: I think you are quite correct in pointing out that current Prime Minister Henry is illegitimate and highly unpopular. However, there is the problem of there not being enough of a constitutional framework for the international community to be able to engage with somebody else.
I think a goal that is realistic and that would probably move things forward would be to pressure Prime Minister Henry to fulfill commitments to create power-sharing agreements with the opposition. These are agreements that he has already committed to — both in the December 21 agreement that he made with political actors in Haiti, and also during the CARICOM meeting in Jamaica.
If Prime Minister Henry comes to the table in goodwill — which he hasn’t until now — and he is willing to create a transitional government that allows for checks and balances over his power, I think we will move forward to a place where we can then think about elections in order to elect a legitimate president and, obviously, a prime minister too.
I think the problem right now — and a lot of our international partners have expressed this — is that, given the circumstances, Prime Minister Henry is the only game in town because, legally, they cannot turn to anybody else. Getting rid of him at this point could provoke much more instability unless there is a clear path forward in terms of who would succeed him in power.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I have a question for Mr. LaRose. The first UN mission in 2017 had mixed results. While the mission did establish some stability, it also led to many problems with the violation of rights in particular, not to mention the cholera epidemic attributed to it.
Do you think things will work out this time? Are there any lessons learned that could help this second mission to be conducted by Kenya?
Mr. LaRose: At this time, it is difficult to assess a mission that has not yet begun. It has been voted on.
It will not be a UN mission or a peacekeeping mission. The mission has not yet been defined. We do not know the exact number of participants, the role they will play, or which countries will offer personnel. It is difficult to speculate on the mission right now.
All we can do is note that an international policy has led to the conclusion and adoption of a Security Council resolution, without comment from member countries such as Russia and China, leaving it up to the United States to tackle this difficult challenge.
Right now, if it is a police mission, that is, if police officers alone are involved, I do not see how that mission could succeed on the ground in Haiti. If the mission had a certain military component — because right now there is urban guerilla warfare in Haiti. It is not a mission to keep the peace, but rather a combat mission which cannot succeed unless there is a contingent of soldiers that can project superior violence.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here this afternoon; I appreciate that. My question is for Professor LaRose.
We’ve already touched on the history of foreign interference in Haiti, and the disastrous consequences that this has had for the country we see today. In your opinion, if we can reach the stage of holding what you might be able to define as free and fair elections, what is needed for Haitians to trust those who are elected? What does an elected government need to do to convince its citizens that they are independent and legitimate?
I say this knowing that it’s not fair that the onus is on those to prove their legitimacy, but it will be, I believe, the reality they may face.
Mr. LaRose: It’s very difficult to say. All the focus is on having a government and on having an election. We’re not focusing enough on the state. If a government arrives in Haiti, at the moment, I think this government’s mission would be to rebuild the state — to put the necessary institutions in place in order to control violence and also control the territory. That’s the primary mandate that a government will have to have in Haiti at the moment: restoring order and projecting authority within the state so that you can minimize the situation of violence in Haiti in order to engage what we will call social and economic development.
You need to start from the basics of a state, which is the control of violence within the territory. If Haiti cannot do it at the moment, then in the future there will be a necessity to call up an international intervention. You need to reduce the risk of calling in external interference in Haiti.
As to how to do it, you construct internal forces. What are the internal forces that Haiti needs at the moment? You need a police force capable of pacifying and bringing internal order, and you need a national army capable of maintaining sovereignty in terms of containing threats toward national security, whether those threats are internal or external. In other words, Haiti needs to be taken as a state, and it needs to be performing the functions of a state. For the moment, they are not doing it.
Senator Boniface: Thank you both very much for joining us today. My question is actually a follow-on for Professor LaRose.
You indicated the need for armed forces within Haiti. It currently doesn’t exist. If I recall correctly, one of the mandates of MINUSTAH — and the view of the governments in the UN at the time — was to build a police service, not an armed forces entity. Your argument makes some sense in terms of the armed forces, but that doesn’t exist today. Are you suggesting that they should build the armed forces with the assistance of the international community so that it has staying power into the future? Is that what you’re suggesting?
Mr. LaRose: Haiti has a long tradition of military establishment. The armed forces have been at the foundation of the state in Haiti. The army created the state in Haiti. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Haitians were used to the presence of the army as a police force. At that time, we had a military police. I’m not going to recount the process, but in 1994, the army was disbanded in Haiti, so the project of the international community at that time was to replace the army with a police force. They did that, but in 2003 and 2004, the police collapsed in Haiti.
The police collapsed, and we have what we call a security vacuum in the country. This security vacuum was replaced by the MINUSTAH, which arrived with their forces, and they built another police force to replace it. This police force is now under stress, so they need the military component to help them sustain the force. Given that the military is not there, they asked for international intervention, which will sustain them.
In order to have a sustainable security system in Haiti, you need to work on a two-pronged system: the police and an army. We have an army in Haiti, which has maybe 500 soldiers. They are not able because they are not armed enough and they are not trained enough to face this situation. If you want to remove Haiti from the international intervention scheme, you need to have a security system internally — not externally.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much.
Ms. Segura: Could I make a small point of clarification?
The Chair: Please go ahead.
Ms. Segura: I want to note the army was re-established by President Moïse in 2017. It currently has around 1,500 members, yet — as Professor LaRose said — very little equipment or funds, but the army exists again.
Senator Boniface: My question is actually for you, Ms. Segura. You made reference to the silence of politicians as a result of the announcement. I’m just wondering how you interpret what that silence means.
Ms. Segura: It’s a question that we have been pondering quite a bit, and naturally, the only thing I can tell you is a little bit of our speculation.
I think they are seeing that the great majority of Haitians are receiving this news with relief, and the possibility that this might change their daily lives. Even though there are very legitimate reasons as to why there are big concerns about the mission arriving, I think some of the politicians in the opposition are reluctant to come out very strongly at a moment when the country seems to finally be getting some of the help that is needed.
I think the key question is this: What’s going to happen in the negotiations between Prime Minister Henry and the opposition in the coming days? If the government were to come to the table with more willingness to engage, I think there could be a turnaround in terms of welcoming the mission. But if this feels like a win for Prime Minister Henry, and he thinks he doesn’t have to engage further with the opposition, we might be seeing a more radicalized process in the months to come — which would be very unfortunate in terms of the success of the mission needing support from the wider public in Haiti. I think the last thing we would want to see is this mission, for example, having to face massive demonstrations against them. That would be very unfortunate just because of how things can get out of control. It is already a very tricky mission in operational terms, and that would just make it even harder.
Senator Boniface: Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to both of our witnesses. Senator Boniface actually asked the premise of most of my question, but there was just a slight point I wanted to add, and that is for Ms. Segura.
Given the fact that you have information on the ground, what is the impression of the gangs with respect to this multinational force arriving? Do you get a sense that they may feel they’re being intimidated by this process, and that they are willing to take on a more political role now? Where does this kind of fit into this equation?
Ms. Segura: There are over 200 gangs in Haiti, so we’re talking about a very different set of groups. From what we’re hearing, the smaller gangs — those that are more local and don’t have quite an infrastructure — are looking at this news with a lot of concern. We have heard from people on the ground that they expect some of these people will just demobilize as soon as they hear that the forces are coming. Just the threat of the force will be sufficient.
That’s not going to be the case, unfortunately, with the bigger gangs, such as G-Pep, G9 and others.
What we’re seeing right now is a very fluid moment in that the gangs are dividing. There is a lot of division within the two big coalitions that we have seen in the last few years — G9 on the one side and G-Pep on the other. Some of the leaders on both sides have made new pacts to try to bring peace, and I think that sector is going to want to present itself as a political force, particularly by leading that move. I think they’re looking toward a peace negotiation eventually, but it is very likely that they will ramp up the violence so that they come very strong to that eventual negotiation. Others are not going that route, and they will probably wait and see how strong the force is, and try to keep control of their territories.
It is important to note that the sanctions that Canada and the U.S. applied to those political and economic leaders — that had traditionally been sponsoring the gangs — have worked very much in cutting the ties between the elites and the groups, but it has left the groups needing to find new ways of financing. They still have men whom they need to pay. There are still expenses that they have. So they’ve turned toward the community, and that’s why we’ve seen quite an increase in extortions and kidnappings in recent months. We fear that is going to increase even more until the forces arrive because these gangs are going to have to prepare themselves for the arrival of the troops, which we imagine will be at the very end of this year or the beginning of next year.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you. Do I have time for a follow-up?
The Chair: You do. I was wondering if you wanted to ask Professor LaRose for his views on that, but I don’t want to put words in your mouth, senator.
Senator Ravalia: Professor LaRose, I was going to ask you to elaborate on that, but there was another question I had for you.
In your preamble, you alluded to the situation at the border, and the potential tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. I was wondering if you might be able to elaborate on that a little further.
Mr. LaRose: A couple of weeks ago, a conflict materialized between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The situation of the canal on the Massacre River, which Haiti and the Dominican Republic share, has been the central question between the two countries. It’s a very long story in terms of how it started because Haiti needed to create a canal through the river in order to irrigate many pieces of land in the northwest of the country. The Massacre River is the river that was chosen at the time to do that. It started in 2018 and has continued up to now. There was a pause with the government of Jovenel Moïse, and there was an agreement within the two countries at the time. The revival of the project was three or four weeks ago, and the Dominican Republic objected to it and sent the army to the border with Haiti.
As we speak, the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is militarized. In the Government of the Dominican Republic’s view, Haiti doesn’t have the legal right to construct the canal because it will have repercussions on national security. The Government of Haiti’s view is that the construction of the canal is a question of survival and of legal rights because the border agreement between them, which dates back to 1929, allows the Government of Haiti to do so, but with prior consultation with the Dominican Republic, which they have done.
It’s a conflict that — the way I see it — needs international mediation. If not an international mediation, it could be an international arbitration between the two countries, which is also stated in the border agreement of 1929. This is the way forward.
Militarizing the border, which the Dominican Republic has done, is very excessive. It’s a projection of force, which will be counterproductive because it has galvanized the Haitian people to construct the canal. We’re having confrontation between two national entities — Haiti and the Dominican Republic — and this situation makes it very difficult to find a middle ground in order to solve this problem.
What I mentioned in my introduction is you have this situation in Haiti in which Port-au-Prince is totally controlled by gangs, and the country is very ingrained in gang violence.
You have a situation where the United Nations just passed a resolution to allow an international intervention in Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is very important, and you have a militarized border where the Dominican Republic, which is a neighbour, has sent troops in order to threaten the Haitian people. That’s the situation we have on the ground in Haiti.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
We will go to the second round in just a moment, but I was going to use my privilege as the chair to also ask a question, and it’s really for Dr. Segura because I know you are looking at Latin America and the Caribbean also in a more general sense for the International Crisis Group. I asked something similar during the last panel. As a former ambassador to the OAS, I have always thought the OAS could be doing more. I realize there are some paralytic issues in that organization, but it is also a situation where traditionally — and there have been ups and downs; you will know this better than I do — some of the larger countries in South America have participated and have done things. You have the CARICOM Eminent Persons Group, so some of the Caribbean countries are stepping up. In the past, Cuba — a non-OAS member — has also been quite involved, particularly on the side of the doctors and medical nurses.
I’m wondering if you sense that there is a greater willingness in the hemisphere to really engage more on Haiti, or are they just going to say, “Well, that’s more for the U.S. and Canada and some of the donor community”? I would be interested in your views.
Ms. Segura: Unfortunately, no, from what we’ve spoken about with our contacts — in the South American foreign ministries — there is not an ample wish to engage in Haiti at the moment.
The obvious country would have been Brazil because of its strength in their military, as they have trained SWAT teams that have dealt with gangs in Rio and other cities — that would give them the technical capacity, but the government of Lula said they were not interested at this moment in engaging in an international force of any kind, particularly because of the difficulties they’ve had with the military in the previous administration of Bolsonaro, as well as the tension that there has been with the transition to Lula’s new mandate.
Colombia is in a particularly complicated place because of the engagement of the previous Columbian soldiers in the assassination of President Moïse, and President Petro has also said they are not interested in being a part of the force. A lot of the other countries that may have been interested, like Uruguay, Argentina and Chile — those that have contributed forces to MINUSTAH — also feel that they have internal issues that they should be attending to as a priority.
Since CARICOM has stepped up quite a bit, both in engagement on the political negotiations and also offering troops, South America and all the Americas are thinking that they are going to let them lead the way. Unfortunately, we’re not seeing much of an engagement on the topic.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I was afraid of that, but thank you for confirming my concerns.
Senator M. Deacon: I’m coming back to a question that I asked during the first panel, and it had to do with aid and supply — I did receive a response, but I just want to give you an opportunity to respond also around the area of international aid and where the money is going. I believe that everybody is doing their best with the systems that we have, but I want to get your opinion on this as well. We know a lot of aid was intended and sent after the 2010 earthquake. It did not get to the intended recipients, as the goals were set. Have we fixed this error? Is it better? Is money going to where it is needed today, in your opinion?
In fact, I’m going to open that question up to both of you. If you could, give us your thoughts on that.
Mr. LaRose: The issue of international aid to Haiti has been a problem — a very controversial issue — because of the strategy used to streamline aid to Haiti. The strategy is to go through non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, but not to deal directly with the Government of Haiti for many reasons, such as the question of political legitimacy, the question of corruption and everything. You have all kinds of reasons that have been raised not to deal directly with the Government of Haiti.
The aid goes through NGOs, and every country has its own NGOs and prioritizes its own NGOs. In the case of Canada, I don’t have any knowledge of how it works, and what the ramifications are, as well as how the Government of Canada uses its money and how they control that money. What I could say is that on the ground, you don’t feel and you don’t see the effects of international aid that manifests itself — how it has structural and material change in Haiti. You don’t have it. You feel that as the world and as the international donors donate, Haiti becomes poorer. Is there an effect? I don’t know exactly the correlation between aiding Haiti and also impoverishing Haiti.
I would say the aid impoverishes more than the contrary. That’s the effect of that. I’m not saying that the aid has not been given, but I’m saying that the misuse of the aid may be the problem.
The Chair: Thank you. This is a subject that we could go on about at length, I think, but I would like Dr. Segura to respond.
Ms. Segura: I don’t have much knowledge about how the humanitarian aid is getting to Haiti at this point, so I don’t feel free to speak about if they were able to fix those problems that they had after the earthquake in 2010. What I do know is that the gangs have been a big problem in actually allowing some of the aid that is in the country to reach the communities that they have been controlling. Usually during combat or when they’re trying to encroach in a territory, they are not allowing the humanitarian actors to come in — and we’re speaking about the UN and also international humanitarian organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders and others, that are trying to give immediate aid.
In some cases, we have seen negotiations between the gangs and the humanitarians to allow for corridors to bring the aid to people, but the gangs are definitely trying to make both economic and political gains out of allowing the distribution. Sometimes they steal the humanitarian supplies and resell them. I know that was not the nature of your question, but that is the information that we do have about how difficult it has been to distribute the aid that does get there. In particular, it has been very difficult to go to the south of the country, which was seriously affected by the earthquake and other natural disasters, because the gangs have closed those roads connecting Port-au-Prince with the south. That has been a particularly difficult effort for the humanitarians on the ground.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Professor LaRose. In April 2023, the UN Secretary-General made the following statement in his monthly report: “Solutions to the crisis must be owned and led by the people of Haiti.”
What do you think of that statement?
Mr. LaRose: That is an agreed upon statement, a conventional one. It is true in the sense that the people of Haiti must take charge of their destiny and of the terms of the transition in Haiti. The problem is that when the Haitian people speak and propose something to the decision makers, it is not accepted.
Negotiations are currently under way on the establishment of a new transition mechanism. The problem is that there have been sectors in Haiti, especially in political life, that have put forward a certain formula. That is an entirely legitimate sector in the country, since it includes various political and civil society organizations; proposals have been put on the table.
The question is whether that formula includes the government or not. Who makes that decision? Who decides whether the proposal on the table is good or not? Who is the observer, the guardian? We do not know.
Does the proposed transition or the choice of a political transition in Haiti have to include a prime minister who is completely illegitimate, illegal and incompetent, and a government that does not deliver services? If the proposal has to include that government, at what level? At the executive level or at some other level?
It is also CARICOM’s mandate to make sense of all of that. I say this often and will continue saying it: the security situation in Haiti cannot be resolved with resolving the political crisis. You have to understand that the security crisis in Haiti is very closely linked to the current political crisis.
The consolidation of gangs in Haiti is also closely related to this political crisis, given the link between the gangs and the political actors on the ground — not just political actors but also economic actors. This whole landscape creates major problems that cannot be resolved by military or police intervention. Political, police or military intervention might stamp out the fire, but building the new structure will have to involve all actors on the ground, and in particular Haitians themselves.
In that sense, I agree with the UN secretary general that Haitians must take ownership. The problem is that when they do take charge of the situation, we have to give them the opportunity to say what they want, and accept what they want, they way they said it and not necessarily rectifying what they said.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor LaRose.
[English]
We have reached the end, as it were. Obviously, there is much more to discuss, but, on behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Professor LaRose and Dr. Segura for being witnesses today. You’ve enriched our deliberations. I think we’ve learned a lot, and I dare say that since the situation in Haiti and the crisis therein, and all of its implications, will continue to be on the global agenda, we will welcome you back to meet with us again.
Thank you very much.
(The committee adjourned.)