THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, February 6, 2023
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. I am Tony Dean, senator from Ontario, chair of the committee, and I’m joined today by several of my fellow committee members with more to follow. Jean-Guy Dagenais is representing Quebec. Senator Dagenais is the deputy chair of the committee. We have Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, representing Quebec; Victor Oh, representing Ontario; and Hassan Yussuff, representing Ontario. As I said, others will follow.
For those watching today’s session, we are continuing our study on security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities.
The focus of today’s meeting is the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, in the Arctic. We are pleased to welcome, by video conference from Brussels, Ambassador David Angell, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Joint Delegation of Canada to NATO; and Vice-Admiral Scott Bishop, Military Representative of Canada to NATO with the Canadian Armed Forces.
Thank you both very much for joining us today. We’re looking forward very much to hearing from you. We will begin by inviting you to provide your opening remarks to be followed by questions from our members. Ambassador Angell, you may begin when you are ready.
David Angell, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Joint Delegation of Canada to NATO: Thank you, chair, and good afternoon.
[Translation]
Thank you, chair, for this opportunity to appear before the committee as you consider NATO’s role in the Arctic.
I am joined by my colleague, Vice-Admiral Scott Bishop, Canada’s military representative to NATO.
The Far North is an area of growing interest at NATO, spurred both by the geostrategic consequences of climate change and the anticipated accession of Finland and Sweden as allies.
Canada appreciates NATO’s focus on this region and its growing awareness of strategic competitors’ capabilities and ambitions.
The Far North is a region significantly affected by the larger issues NATO is faced with, namely renewed tensions with Russia and increasingly assertive Chinese ambitions that affect Euro-Atlantic security.
Mr. Chair, viewed from the vantage point of NATO, the Far North comprises two distinct regions. One is the “High North,” or “European High North,” the region within and immediately adjacent to the Area of Responsibility (or “AOR”) of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This is the part of the Far North where NATO plays a direct role. Geographically, it comprises Greenland, the North Atlantic, the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap (GIUK) and the Norwegian Sea, and, of course, the northern part of Europe.
The second is the Arctic region in North America. This is not a region where NATO plays a direct role. It instead comes under the commands of the two North American allies via the binational North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the U.S. Northern Command, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command. This distinction is important, in command terms, but also because the two regions have different characteristics.
The European High North is becoming more contested militarily whereas the North American Arctic is comparatively stable in strategic terms. However, the Arctic region is not tension-free and Canada remains alert to the impact of ongoing geopolitical conflict and the activities of our adversaries, and is taking actions where necessary.
In other words, we seek an approach that is clear-eyed on the challenges and threats we face while avoiding inadvertently raising tensions.
We do not see any need for NATO to take on an operational role in the North American Arctic. But we do encourage situational awareness at NATO with regard to this region. For example, Prime Minister Trudeau hosted NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Nunavut in August, and key allies are often invited to the NANOOK exercises in the Canadian Arctic. And we also support NATO further strengthening its operational role in the European High North.
[English]
Chair, allow me to emphasize four points.
The first is to reiterate that the European High North is a more contested space than the North American Arctic. The European High North is home to Russia’s Northern Fleet, which is of enormous strategic importance to Russia. In times of crisis, the Northern Fleet could be used to threaten the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe.
The new Strategic Concept, adopted by leaders at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, recognizes this strategic challenge. In paragraph 8, it states that:
In the High North, [Russia’s] capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance.
More generally, Russia’s continued military buildup and weapons testing in the High North remains troubling.
Second, given the strategic importance of the High North to Russia, we can expect Russia to maintain its military focus and investment there. Russia’s Arctic is critical to the Russian economy. Approximately 20% of Russia’s GDP and 30% of its exports come from its Arctic. Russia’s military capabilities in the High North also support Moscow’s efforts to develop the Northern Sea Route and exploit natural resources.
In addition, the general weakening of Russia’s conventional forces due to the war in Ukraine is leading, at least rhetorically, to a greater reliance on nuclear deterrence. Many of the Russian nuclear capabilities operate in the High North.
I would also stress that despite its battlefield challenges against Ukraine — the challenges it is experiencing, in other words — most of the Russian higher-end capabilities in the High North, such as submarines, remain largely intact.
Third, climate change is opening up the High North to more economic and military activities. This will also exacerbate vulnerability of the North American Arctic. The new Strategic Concept acknowledges climate change as a defining challenge and a threat multiplier that can exacerbate conflict, fragility and geopolitical competition and affect the way our Armed Forces operate. That impact is especially acute in the Far North, which, despite remaining a harsh operational environment, will become more accessible to Arctic and non-Arctic countries alike.
This is one of the reasons why Canada has offered to host a NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence to be located in Montreal and to become operational in 2023 or 2024. Climate change impacts on the Arctic and High North security environments will be among the topics Canada and our allies and partners could address through this centre. NATO Centres of Excellence operate outside military chains of command, and so the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence will provide a benign platform through which the geostrategic implications of climate change, including in the North, can be more closely tracked and better understood.
Fourth, China is a self-styled near-Arctic state, according to its Arctic policy of 2018. This week’s balloon incident is a reminder of China’s keen interest in our continent — the Arctic included. In the new Strategic Concept, NATO leaders committed to working together to address the systemic challenges posed by China to the Euro-Atlantic security.
As the Strategic Concept also notes, China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO’s interests, security and values. The deepening of the strategic partnership between China and Russia also runs counter to our values and interests. Of note, there are signs of growing collaboration between Russia and China in the North. Given Russia’s increased isolation as a result of its war of aggression in Ukraine, and as China continues to look for opportunities to enhance its influence in the region, it is a possibility that this cooperation may increase.
Chair, NATO’s five Arctic allies — Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the United States — collectively play the leading role within the alliance in protecting the High North. This is consistent with NATO’s overall approach, whereby allies are looked to to play leading roles within their immediate environments. NATO’s five Arctic allies will soon become seven with the anticipated accession of Finland and Sweden. The addition of Finland and Sweden will further strengthen NATO’s defences in the High North, as these two countries offer very capable armed forces with considerable cold weather expertise and capabilities. Their accession will bolster NATO capabilities in the High North, thereby strengthening NATO’s capacity to ensure security in this critical region for Canada.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, ambassador, for those remarks. I know they will prompt a great deal of interest and questions from our members around the table.
[Translation]
Vice-Admiral Scott Bishop, Military Representative of Canada to NATO, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Thank you, chair. I am pleased to be here today to answer your questions concerning NATO and the High North.
The High North is how NATO refers to the portion of the Arctic that it focuses on, that is under the responsibility of SACEUR, i.e., the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. NATO’s High North does not include the Canadian Arctic.
NATO has a longstanding interest in the European High North and has been conducting military activities there for several decades.
As Ambassador Angell mentioned, a sizable amount of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence forces are located in the area of the Kola Peninsula, which borders Northern Finland. And the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet is based in the area, in Murmansk, more specifically.
[English]
Given this, NATO has always recognized the strategic importance of the northern sea and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. These sea lanes provide Russian naval forces with avenues of approach to threaten NATO’s strategic lines of communication between North America and Europe.
Over the last several years, NATO’s interest in the High North region has continued to grow, given Russia’s significant investments to improve its own military capability within its Arctic region. Of course, Russia’s illegal and unprovoked attacks on Ukraine have only heightened concerns about Russia’s longer-term intentions, including in the Arctic.
In recent years, the alliance has undertaken a number of measures to bolster its deterrence and defence posture in the High North, principally by increasing its military presence and its exercise cycle. For example, NATO standing naval forces routinely patrol the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap and the Norwegian Sea. NATO also routinely deploys air defence capabilities to the region, including air policing missions based from Iceland and a Quick Reaction Alert force that is based in Norway.
NATO conducts regular exercises in the High North to demonstrate its capabilities to deter Russia but also to build up the alliance’s own expertise in operating in this challenging environment. Most recently, the alliance mounted its largest exercise in the High North since the end of the Cold War. Hosted by Norway, this exercise called Cold Response 2022 included the participation of over 32,000 NATO sailors, air personnel and troops, including a small contingent from Canada. NATO has also taken steps to improve its command and control capabilities in the High North.
In 2019, a new Joint Force Command was created in Norfolk, Virginia, which is responsible for a large area comprised of the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, the British Isles, Greenland, Iceland and Norway. Joint Force Command Norfolk is also responsible for establishing military plans to ensure that NATO can quickly respond to any threat in the European High North.
Finally, NATO is working on a new family of deterrence and defence plans that will include the NATO’s High North region. These plans will eventually incorporate Sweden and Finland when they become full members of the alliance.
We are confident that Sweden and Finland’s accession to the alliance will significantly enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. These nations will bring significant military capabilities to NATO, and, like Canada, both have significant experience operating in the very challenging conditions found in the High North region.
I would conclude by stating that although the High North is an important region for NATO, it is not NATO’s sole focus area. The alliance has consistently emphasized that it needs to maintain a 360-degree view of the threat it faces from Russia and terrorist groups. The High North is only one of many areas that NATO is focused on.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss NATO’s interest in Europe’s High North region, and I look forward to answering any questions that you might have on the subject.
Thank you, chair. I stand ready to answer any questions that you or your committee may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Vice-Admiral.
I would note that we’ve now been joined by Senator Donna Dasko, representing Ontario; Senator Marty Deacon, representing Ontario; and Senator Clement Gignac, representing Quebec.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you to our two witnesses. My first question is for Ambassador Angell.
Your Excellency, China has been repeatedly accused of spying. I’m not too impressed with that because I believe that the Americans, the British, the French and the Germans are also conducting espionage — and I hope that Canada is also spying and has the capacity to do so.
That said, in July 2021, NATO was supporting a group of countries that argued that China was conducting a global cyberespionage campaign. Eighteen months later, what kind of information do you have about that? Do you think Canada is as well equipped as other NATO countries to counter cyberespionage?
Mr. Angell: Mr. Chair, thank you for the question.
I can’t speak to the study that was done in July, but I can see, first of all, that NATO takes cyberespionage very seriously. It is among the five strategic areas of the alliance and is as important as navy, field and space now.
Canada is among the countries with the most capabilities in this area and plays a very important role. China, of course, is one of the players that we follow, but Canada is fully engaged in the important NATO effort in the area of cyberespionage.
Thank you.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, ambassador. My question is now for Vice-Admiral Bishop.
Vice-Admiral Bishop, you will understand that the incident of the Chinese balloon that passed over Canada and then ended up in Montana, and crossed the United States before being shot down over the Atlantic, raises many questions regarding security or the lack or it.
Did the Chinese just demonstrate how ineffective our system is at detecting enemies that may be coming in from the Arctic?
VAdm. Bishop: Thank you for the question, senator.
I believe the situation with the balloon is well understood by NORAD command, our aerospace defence command.
[English]
I think it is always a challenge dealing with these issues, but I am confident that our Northern American Aerospace Defense Command is well situated to be able to understand and maintain situational awareness of what’s going on over our region.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Now, to continue on the same subject, Vice-Admiral, was it the Americans or the Canadians who reported its presence? Why was it not shot down before it entered American territory? What I want to know is whether our current equipment is good enough for Canada to act on its own.
[English]
VAdm. Bishop: Again, that’s a very good question. This is something that Canada and the United States are studying closely. It’s part of our efforts to modernize North American air defence systems. This modernization will look at a whole new suite of sensors and ensure that we have the capabilities to be able to defend the North American continent.
We are taking this very seriously. The defence of North America and the airspace over North America is a binational responsibility shared equally between the United States and Canada. We work closely together to make sure that we are maintaining awareness of the threats that are presenting themselves to North America.
The surveillance by balloons is probably not something that people think of very often, but, for commanders working this problem space, this is something that they’re well attuned to.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I would like to return to Ambassador Angell, specifically on the issue of the Arctic. We have heard reports of greater Russian deployment in the High North. Given western reactions to the invasion of Ukraine and the possible threats to Canada, are there still contacts with the Russians on the Arctic, and if so, where do we stand?
Mr. Angell: Thank you for the question. As far as I know, there is very little contact with the Russians since the invasion of Ukraine. There was a dialogue about security issues in the Far North, but for almost all the allies, there is now very little contact with the Russians. As far as I know, there is no contact with the Russians regarding our Arctic region.
[English]
I’d like to add to the previous question. There was extremely close cooperation between Canada and the United States in response to the balloon incident. Of course, the decision was taken to shoot down the balloon once it was no longer over a land mass, once we were no longer in the situation where debris could injure individuals. That occurred only after the balloon had travelled through U.S. airspace.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I’ll have other questions during the second round. Thank you very much, ambassador.
[English]
The Chair: I would welcome additional comments from each of you if you would like to add to comments that have been made by your counterparts. We’ll make that a pattern, if you wish.
Senator Oh: My question is for you both. Either one of you can answer this question. First, thank you, witnesses, for being here.
How has NATO’s role in managing the security environment in the Arctic changed in recent years? Is there any specific change that the committee should know about? Can you update us on that particular situation?
Mr. Angell: I think the Military Representative may be able to answer this more directly than I can. I want to stress that NATO’s role with regard to the North is certainly increasing and becoming more robust, but, on the NATO side, that’s with regard to the European High North, not the North American Arctic. However, we are seeing more exercises and much more discussion. I think the Military Representative, or MILREP can walk us through some of the additional military activities that we’re seeing.
VAdm. Bishop: Thank you for the question. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, NATO has done a lot to plus up its game in the High North. As I mentioned, in 2019, they created a new Joint Force Command that is charged with looking after not only the North Atlantic but also the High North region, which is critically important to NATO. Part of their work at Joint Force Command Norfolk is to build a regional plan, which is part of the Supreme Allied Commander’s suite or family of plans to be able to provide deterrence and defence to the alliance. A significant portion of that is obviously focused on the North.
Another area which NATO has focused on to increase its capabilities in the North is through more exercises. NATO is working with nations to build exercise programs to give troops, air personnel and sailors more experience operating in the Far North region by being able to operate ships and aircraft in those challenging environmental conditions and by practising other aspects of military operations in the Arctic, like logistics and sustainment, and being able to support those forces who are operating far away from logistics bases. This exercise regime will continue in the future. That’s part of this new deterrence and defence planning that NATO is undertaking.
One other area that NATO is working on to improve is Centres of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations, which was created in Norway a number of years ago. Canada regularly works with this Centre of Excellence to share lessons and experience what it means to work in the Arctic.
That’s a very good question, but NATO is focused very much on the Arctic. There are a number of nations within the alliance who are northern-focused nations, including Canada, and those nations tend to work together to make sure NATO is paying appropriate attention to that region.
Senator Oh: I want to follow up on a question that Senator Dagenais asked about the balloon. I made a search on Google and on the internet and found out that during World War II, 5,000 balloons were sent by the Japanese over to North America. Obviously, over 2,500 probably reached land over North America.
Is the balloon that came into our airspace a spy balloon or just a meteorological surveillance balloon?
VAdm. Bishop: That’s a good question. I think it’s premature to speculate on exactly what the purpose of the balloon was. Efforts are under way to try to verify what the payload was on the balloon.
As was mentioned, sending balloons across North America is not a new thing. This is an idea that’s been around for quite some time. It’s cheap and relatively effective, although you’re at the mercy of the winds, et cetera. It’s not a precision means of being able to gather information. This is something that, obviously, we need to pay attention to, as we have been in NORAD for many years.
Mr. Angell: I might complement Vice-Admiral Bishop’s response by pointing out that the information was absolutely correct. However, in the United States, Secretary Blinken has rejected the characterization of the balloon as meteorological.
The Chair: Thanks for that addition.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our guests for being here today. My question, which I will direct to Ambassador Angell first, concerns Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids. I’d like to get a sense of our military cooperation in those countries right now and how, outside of Article 5, NATO membership would change this dynamic from your perspective.
VAdm. Bishop: Thank you. I can start on that. I would say that we have always had an excellent relationship with Finland and Sweden. Even though they have not been members of the alliance, they have cooperated closely with a lot of the alliance commands as we work through defence and security problems. Both of these nations bring extremely good capabilities to the alliance. We understand each other. We have worked together in training and in operations elsewhere in the world for many years.
In terms of changing the dynamics, I think overall this will make the alliance stronger. There are a lot of advantages to having the Scandinavian peninsula all within the NATO alliance. From a military standpoint, I think this is a really positive development. I won’t speak to the political aspects; I’ll leave that to the ambassador.
One of the challenges that we have had in the alliance from a military planning point of view, particularly in the Baltic region, is there has not been strategic depth there. There has been nowhere to be able to provide support from the rear to the Baltic states. With Finland and Sweden in the alliance, it will make these problems a lot easier to deal with, and it’ll make Russia’s challenges operating in the Baltic Sea region a lot more complex.
Mr. Angell: Just to round off the Vice-Admiral’s response, both Finland and Sweden are highly capable in terms of their own forces and very like-minded in terms of their foreign policy and their approach to, for example, supporting the rules-based international order.
Within NATO, Canada has been extremely focused on the Baltic region. We have led the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group since its inception in Latvia. We have been conscious of the enormous feeling of vulnerability of Baltic allies for reasons of geography, so the addition of Finland and Sweden will further nestle, if you will, the Baltic allies and reinforce the defensive nature of NATO in that region. Also, the accession of the two countries would mean that seven of the eight Arctic nations are allies, and that increases the scope to exchange information, for example, and ensure the defence of the region.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. If I could just proceed with that — I appreciate it — maybe we could talk a little bit about Turkey’s blocking of Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. Before I ask the question, we all need to acknowledge the terrible earthquake in Turkey and Syria and the terrible loss and suffering there. I’m pleased to see Canada offering some support.
Concerning my question, I’m wondering if the delayed acceptance of Sweden and subsequently Finland has any strategic consequences in the Arctic with these nations. I’m going to ask the ambassador first, if I could.
Mr. Angell: Mr. Chair, I did not hear the question in its entirety, but I can certainly answer the first part. I would, first of all, join the senator in expressing condolences, of course, to our allied Turkey in the face of the horrific earthquake of the past 24 hours.
I only caught part of the question, but the accession —
The Chair: We’ll restate the question, ambassador, and make it easier for you.
Mr. Angell: You might get a more accurate answer. Thank you, chair.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you very much. My question concerns Turkey’s blocking of Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. I am wondering if the delayed acceptance of Sweden and subsequently Finland has any strategic consequences in the Arctic with these nations.
Mr. Angell: Thank you very much. We remain very confident that Finland and Sweden will accede to the alliance before too long. There is a process under way, a very active negotiation involving both invitees. The secretary general has been very actively engaged.
Turkey, I should point out, is an absolutely vital ally in its own right. It has the second-largest military in NATO, and it deploys that military very effectively. It’s also an ally situated in an extremely tough neighbourhood.
There is an enormous effort under way by Finland and Sweden to respond to Turkish concerns. There is no set timetable for this sort of thing. Ideally, both or at least one would accede by the next summit in Vilnius, but if not, then I’m sure by the summit after that. What’s important is that they do become members of NATO soon.
The question of vulnerability is one that is certainly front and present. A number of individual allies have indicated that they will in extremis take measures to support Finland and Sweden should they find themselves in a position of vulnerability between them being invited to join the alliance and them formally coming under Article 5. In fact, they are such close partners, and for reasons of geography, it’s very difficult to imagine a situation where if they were attacked, the alliance would not feel that it itself was under attack. That’s theoretical, of course, but we do hope that they will be allies before very long.
The Chair: Anything to add, Vice-Admiral?
VAdm. Bishop: No, chair. I think Ambassador Angell has characterized it very well.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: My first question is for Ambassador Angell. Thank you for your testimony. I look forward to meeting you, as does Senator Boisvenu, on February 20 in Brussels. I will be part of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association delegation.
You made it clear that NATO does not really have an operational role in the Canadian Arctic; it works with NORAD. You also mentioned that the Canadian Arctic is not as contested as Northern Europe.
What are the conditions that could lead to an operational change that would suddenly cause NATO to take on more of the NORAD operations right now? Would this happen in the event of a global conflict? At that point, will the chain of command be clear and will NATO decide? I ask because if there were an attack by Russia, it would not just be against Canada or the United States, but probably all NATO countries. Since you are familiar with the Arctic, is there already a protocol in place that the chain of command could change in the event of a conflict?
Mr. Angell: Thank you for your question. I will answer in English to be more precise.
[English]
There is a very clear command arrangement for the North American Arctic, and that command arrangement comes under NORAD and under the two North American allies, Canada and the United States. It’s theoretically possible that we could transfer responsibility — and I will defer to the military representative on that — but there is a strong command and control arrangement and military command arrangement for the North American Arctic under NORAD.
The region, of course, comes under Article 5. If ever there was a requirement for forces outside of those two Arctic allies, the assistance could be requested. The point I would like to stress is there is no absence of clear command arrangements. There is a very clear command arrangement under NORAD, but perhaps the military representative can expand on that.
VAdm. Bishop: Yes. Again, that’s an accurate characterization. Obviously, these would be two big theatres, the European theatre and North America. It would be really difficult for one commander to manage that large of a battle space.
With the arrangements we have right now in Europe, that would be Supreme Allied Commander Europe in the NATO command architecture. For North America, we have North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, which is aerospace defence. The maritime and land domain is a shared responsibility between the commander of U.S. Northern Command and the commander of our Canadian Joint Operations Command. So I would not see the two areas — Europe and North America — being merged into one giant command under NATO. As Ambassador Angell said, it’s possible theoretically, but in practical terms, it would not work.
Clearly, there would be a lot of collaboration and coordination between those two theatres, and we could see forces move back and forth across those theatres, including in the maritime and air domain areas.
Thank you, chair.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: Thank you, Ambassador and Vice-Admiral, your answers are very clear. That reassures us. My second question is more specific.
Vice-Admiral Bishop, since Russia invaded Ukraine, have you been able to notice a reduction in personnel or activities in northern Russia, in the northern Canadian Arctic, or, on the contrary, an increase? Are there things you are comfortable sharing publicly with us?
VAdm. Bishop: What I can say on the subject is that we have observed decreased Russian operations in most of its territories, because the bulk of Russia’s forces are focused on the war in Ukraine and consequently are concentrated there.
[English]
Because of that, we have seen a reduction in some activities. I think Russia is being very careful to send a message to all the NATO allies that it is still capable of defending itself, and it does conduct other exercises in other areas of Russia to make us understand that. But overall, with the number of forces they have had to commit to Ukraine, there has been an inevitable reduction in activity in the northern region.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: I would like to thank both witnesses. Just like my colleague, senator Gignac, I am looking forward to meeting with the ambassador over the next few weeks at the NATO meetings that I have been attending for six years now. The committee is pleased to welcome you, Ambassador Angell.
I have two questions: a political question for you, Ambassador, and a military one for the Vice-Admiral, so as keep to his strengths.
Mr. Ambassador, over the past few months, many people here in Canada have been calling for our armed forces to be modernized and for more investments in the army, so as to boost both the quantity and the quality of our material. The global situation has caught up with us and has underlined even more starkly how much Canada is lagging behind. I am sure that you have read the Auditor General’s recent report, which was unsparing.
I regularly attend discussions with the NATO parliamentary delegations and we often talk about the 2% of GDP which should be spent on the military, a target that Canada is not yet hitting.
Mr. Ambassador, have you had any discussions with the Canadian government as to timelines and when we could meet the 2% of GDP target? Have your colleagues and our NATO allies put pressure on Canada so that it can act accordingly and try to hit the 2% target?
Mr. Angell: Thank you for the question. What I can say is, firstly...
[English]
— the Defence Investment Pledge that leaders entered into in Wales in 2014 included three components. One of them was a commitment to work toward 2%. Canada, under the Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy, has increased defence expenditure by 70% in a ten-year period. In addition to that, very recently — in fact in June — a very substantial additional funding for continental defence and NORAD modernization was announced. So we have had an extraordinary increase in Canadian defence expenditure.
There are two other metrics. One is capabilities: a requirement to spend 20% of defence expenditure on high-end kit. This year, Canada is meeting that, and we’ll be increasing expenditure in that area threefold, I think, over a five- or six-year period.
Of course, the third metric is commitments, and Canada shows up, and we have extraordinarily strong Canadian Armed Forces personnel. In my time here, for example, we have led since its inception the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia and have done it extremely well. We are now involved in building up to a brigade level. We were also the framework nation from the inception of the NATO mission in Iraq. We commanded the Standing NATO Maritime Group. In general, we have a reputation for showing up, doing heavy lifting and doing it very well.
In terms of defence expenditure, even though the 2% metric doesn’t necessarily work for us, we are, I think, the sixth-largest defence contributor to NATO. In terms of the additional defence expenditure since the Wales investment pledge was entered into in 2014, we are one of the handful of allies that have spent the most new additional money.
So we are more than carrying our weight, and I am not under pressure, chair, as regards to any suggestion that Canada is doing otherwise. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: We recently went on a tour of the Arctic and no one can say that Canada is doing a tremendous job if we compare our investments in the region to Russia’s. If we were to invest more in military infrastructure, whether it be in terms of aircraft, naval equipment or other materiel, would these investments count towards the 2% of GDP?
Mr. Angell: Thank you for the question. Such investments could count, but only if the applications were solely military in nature. If there is a possibility that the equipment could be used for military or civilian purposes, only the military use would count. There is a very strict, multi-page definition of what is eligible.
Senator Boisvenu: When we talk about the supporting infrastructure, whether it be for military aircraft or ships, or the acquisition of surveillance aircraft in the Arctic, those expenses could be included in the 2%, no?
Mr. Angell: Indeed, that kind of military expense in the Arctic could count towards it.
Senator Boisvenu: Vice-Admiral Bishop, I see that you have spent most of your career in the navy, which is most interesting. You served in Canada for the majority of your career, and not with NATO. The big problem that I see is our submarines. When we go to the Royal Canadian Navy’s website, it talks about our submarines being a covert force, a hidden resource, and that the submarines are well armed and capable of carrying out patrols. And yet if I look at the state of our submarines, I see that the Victoria class submarines have been in operation 9% of the time. The HMCS Corner Brook clocks in at 9% and the HMCS Chicoutimi at 3%, and three other submarines have been in dry dock for 10 years now.
My question is clear: when it comes to submarines, is Canada lagging behind and shouldn’t its current fleet be decommissioned and replaced with much more modern submarines? I am thinking of nuclear submarines, for example.
[English]
VAdm. Bishop: Thank you, chair.
I think what I would do is confine my comments to the importance of submarines as part of a modern navy. As was mentioned, Mr. Chair, submarines are extremely potent naval weapons and sensors. They are very important for the kinds of defence missions that we are undertaking in the Canadian Armed Forces, and I think the navy is focused on making sure that we’re able to operate the submarines that we currently own and, clearly, in the future, would see a continued need for submarines.
I think for an adversary, just the idea that there are submarines in the area causes a lot of concern for their own operations, and they have to treat that concern very seriously when they are planning. Even just the threat that the submarine is in the area can significantly increase the complexity of your operations. These are fundamentally important to navies. This is why most western navies have submarines and want to continue having submarines in the future.
Thank you, chair.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you to the witnesses for being here.
The Arctic Council has always envisioned, of course, including Russia, but since the aggression in Ukraine — would any one of the two witnesses that we have care to comment? Now, with the expansion of NATO with Sweden and Finland, do you see any value of maintaining Russia’s membership in the Arctic Council, given, of course, its aggression but, more importantly, its hostility towards NATO allies in the region and, of course, our own sovereignty and security in the region?
The Chair: Let’s hear from both of you.
If we could start with you, ambassador.
Mr. Angell: Thank you, chair.
A decision was taken by the other seven members of the Arctic Council to no longer engage with Russia in that format after the renewed Russian aggression war of choice against Ukraine. There is, however, ongoing consultation amongst the like-minded Arctic countries. For example, the Chief of the Defence Staff convened the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff recently, I think, for the first time since 2013. And ministers are looking for opportunities to engage like-minded countries.
The Arctic Council, when it was created, very deliberately excluded things military, and one hopes that eventually we will be in a situation where all of the Arctic countries can jointly engage on things Arctic. The underlying construct, the logic, has not changed. The circumstances have, but one hopes that at some point we will be able to resume cooperation with Russia on things Arctic. Of course, enormous change in regard to Ukraine would be necessary before that.
VAdm. Bishop: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would only add that the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff conference that was recently convened excluded Russia. They were not invited to participate.
Thank you, chair.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Yussuff: As you are both aware, of course, climate change is changing the Canadian Arctic and the North American Arctic very rapidly, and, of course, all countries are going to want to seek access to this waterway and passage to it.
How can we guard against this threat, and, more importantly, what are some of the things that you would recommend that we need to do, given the probability is fading very fast in terms of access? More importantly, we certainly see Chinese aggression in wanting to have greater access to the Canadian Arctic.
Of course, our defence is highly challenged, should Russia and China, of course, continue their collaboration. This poses a very serious threat to the Canadian Arctic and, more importantly, the North American Arctic.
The Chair: This question, again, goes to both of you.
Ambassador, if you would start us off.
Mr. Angell: Thank you, chair.
The government is undertaking enormous steps to respond to a situation where there may be greater activity in the Arctic. It’s doing so under the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework but also under the Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy.
As I mentioned, there has been enormous investment recently — $38.6 billion over 20 years — in continental defence. That includes, of course, NORAD modernization. We’re seeing the acquisition by the Royal Canadian Navy — and the military representative may say more about this — of new ice-capable Arctic and offshore patrol vessels. We’re seeing the construction of polar icebreakers for the Coast Guard. We’re seeing work towards the Nanisivik Naval Facility near Arctic Bay. These are very large-scale investments in order to give Canada greater capability to enforce sovereignty in the Arctic.
We also see significant ongoing exercises under Operation NANOOK with its four components, but I defer to the vice-admiral.
VAdm. Bishop: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think, again, Ambassador Angell has given a very good summary here.
I think the first thing with climate change is that we need to understand its potential impact on the region, and I think it’s been very positive — from a NATO standpoint — that Canada is going to stand up and lead a Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Canada that will have representatives from the alliance working in that centre to understand climate change.
In terms of how we need to prepare, I would say that we’re working hard to undertake those preparations. We need, obviously, to understand what’s going on in the region and have better situational awareness of who is up there and what they are doing. I think this is a key component of NORAD modernization and the investments that are going to be made there.
We need to be present in the Arctic, and you have seen investments in the Royal Canadian Navy in Arctic offshore patrol ships and all of our aviation capabilities in the Royal Canadian Air Force. We consider the ability to have new aircraft able to operate in the Arctic region. Training, all the exercises we’re doing to build experience for all of our men and women in uniform to be able to operate in that environment. All the things that we need to do we are undertaking.
I think there is recognition that the Arctic space is changing, that its geostrategic importance is evolving here as a result of climate change, and we need to be able to understand and be able to respond in that region if we’re required to.
Thank you, chair.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Yussuff: Just one more quick question.
Not all of the Arctic nations have an Indigenous population, but for Canada and a number of the other Arctic countries, there is a real presence of those communities. In the context of our security needs, but also the need to respect traditional ways of doing things within those communities, is this a priority within the context of NATO? Equally, are there things we can learn from other nations in regard to how we will respect our Aboriginal community in our own North and how we work with others, of course, to enhance our understanding and be able to beef up our relationships with those communities? Are there ways to continue to strengthen the resolve that we will respect their traditional way of doing things but equally incorporate their engagement in the efforts to protect our sovereignty and participate in the incredible good work that’s been going on within the North?
Mr. Angell: To begin with, I’d like to underscore the importance the Canadian government gives to working closely with communities in the North. Certainly, that was the case in developing the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. I believe I can say that all of the Arctic allies take seriously the obligation to work closely with local communities.
In the case of Canada, of course, the Rangers play an extremely important role in northern defence and that really is the mobilization of local communities. The secretary general described them, I think, as “eyes and ears,” and he met with representatives of the Rangers when he was in Nunavut in August. They play a crucial role. One of the roles they play is assisting the Canadian Armed Forces in ensuring that it operates in a tightly knit manner with local communities.
VAdm. Bishop: I would just reinforce that everything that the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence hope to do in Canada’s Arctic region has to be done in close collaboration with our Indigenous peoples. That’s critically important. We have had a long-standing commitment to work with Indigenous peoples when we operate in the Arctic region. We collaborate with local communities when we exercise there. The Rangers are our footprint in the North. Not all Rangers are from Indigenous communities, but many are. They understand how to operate in the Arctic, and they have valuable lessons for us to learn in terms of what it’s like to be there and how we need to conduct ourselves in our training and in our operations. I think it’s essential.
Within the NATO alliance, there are opportunities to work with other countries who are also interested in working with their own Indigenous peoples. Obviously, Denmark and Greenland have significant Indigenous communities. Our two chiefs of defence have had conversations about working with Indigenous communities in both of our northern regions. I think it is an area of focus. It’s certainly an area of focus for the Department of National Defence and for the Canadian Forces in our operations. It’s critical.
The Chair: Senator Dasko, representing Ontario, is the final senator on the first round.
Senator Dasko: My first question builds on Senator Gignac’s questions about the Russian activity in the North. We certainly know that the Russians have built up their military infrastructure in their north. But we also know — and we heard from you earlier and also on our trip to the Arctic — that because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they are less preoccupied with the North and there seems to be less activity on the part of the Russians in the North.
In light of this heightened concern about Russia — obviously, because they’ve invaded Ukraine, but at the same time perhaps there’s less activity on their part in the North — how do we, or did we, or are we responding to this very peculiar situation? Is there a need for special measures? Have we taken special measures either as NORAD or as Canada alone? Have we taken any special measures outside of the modernization of NORAD that we had been committed to undertake even before the Russians invaded Ukraine? I hope my questions make sense. This is for either of the witnesses.
VAdm. Bishop: Again, I think this is a really good question. From the NATO perspective, SACEUR, or Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is actively managing our deterrence and defence posture. He’s regularly redirecting units, aircraft and ships where they need to be, in the right place, to be able to demonstrate that we are aware and that we’re deterring Russia from thinking about any kind of aggression towards any part of the alliance’s territories. That is done on a day-in-and-day-out basis by Supreme Allied Commander Europe. That’s all done under the supervision or guidance of the North Atlantic Council.
I think we feel pretty confident. It’s pretty clear that Russia’s war on Ukraine is not going very well for them. They have had to funnel a lot of military equipment and a lot of military capability and people to the Ukraine area in support of that war. Obviously, that has an impact in other areas where Russia operates.
From the alliance point of view, we’re cognizant that that’s a temporary thing. At some point, the war in Ukraine will be over and then we’ll be dealing with a different kind of Russia. There’s the possibility that Russia could learn from its mistakes in Ukraine and we could be faced with a bigger, stronger Russia. These are the ongoing conversations in the alliance now.
Our thinking and our planning is looking ahead not only to ensure that we’re good now but also to ensure that the alliance is going to be postured properly in three or five years when, potentially, the Russian forces could be reconstituted and be posing a threat to the alliance in different areas. That is prudent military planning and prudent military preparations.
In terms of NORAD modernization, again, this is Canada and the United States recognizing that the threat has been evolving, that Russia is building new capabilities — many of which we’re seeing the Russians use to some effect in Ukraine — and making sure that we are taking measures to be able to understand what’s going on in the Arctic area and then to be able to respond appropriately if there was a threat posed to North America.
Mr. Angell: I would just amplify the MILREP’s answer. I agree that while Russian personnel were moved to Ukraine, the heavy kit, for example, the Northern Fleet, has not moved so the Russian very hard capability in the High North has not diminished, and the Russian strategic interest in the High North has not diminished. I can’t imagine NATO taking any medium- or longer-term decisions that assumed any lessening of the importance of the High North to Russia.
Again, though, I would reinforce the difference in the strategic environments between the European High North, on the one hand, and the North American Arctic on the other. The offensive capability is largely based in the European High North. There is a rejuvenation of bases and other infrastructure in the Russian Arctic across from the North American Arctic but, on the whole, that is largely defensive. The strategic situation in the two parts of the North is not uniform. In the geographical part that corresponds with the North American Arctic, I think we are seeing a degree of prudence on the part of the Russians and a wish not to cause instability in what is still a relatively stable region.
Senator Dasko: Of course, the Russians could emerge from this quite diminished at home — well, their north is part of their home — as a result of their activities in Ukraine. That’s another scenario, of course.
Vice-Admiral Bishop, I want to go back to this balloon story, which has obviously captured the public imagination. I want to pick up on your comment that we still don’t know what was in the balloon. I find this rather interesting and I wonder: Can you confirm that this balloon was in Canadian airspace? Can you confirm that Canadians were aware of the balloon? I’d like to know that.
I wonder if you could comment. If we still don’t know what it was — obviously, it could be something dangerous, right? Did you know that it was Chinese? Were there any communications with the Chinese, for example? Did you ask, “What is this thing?” I’ll leave that question with you. I’m a little puzzled because the thing has now been taken down, but we still don’t know what it was or what was in it, if it was a danger. Just a bit of concern on my part. Thank you.
VAdm. Bishop: Again, this is a tough question for me to answer because I’m here at NATO headquarters, and this is really in the space of NORAD, Joint Operations Command in Canada and the U.S. Northern Command, or NORTHCOM. The information I have is that the balloon did travel through Canadian airspace and U.S. airspace and that NORAD was aware of it.
In terms of the payload, I know work is being done to try to verify exactly what payload the balloon was carrying. I don’t know what the status of that work is. I am aware that the U.S. has publicly stated that it’s not a meteorological or a scientific instrumented balloon, but beyond that, I’m kind of following this from the media reporting myself. I think those questions would be better directed to NORAD and NORTHCOM.
Senator Dasko: Ambassador, do you know anything about it?
Mr. Angell: I would just confirm that Minister Anand issued a statement confirming that the balloon did transit through Canadian airspace and indicated that steps were taken to track the object and to ensure the security and safety of our airspace and of Canada.
In terms of engagement with the Chinese, I believe that Global Affairs Canada did confirm that the Chinese ambassador had been called in, so certainly there has been at least that degree of communication, and I suspect there will have been communication in Beijing as well.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: My question is for Ambassador Angell.
We had the honour of hosting Mr. Stoltenberg from NATO, who visited the Canadian Arctic region. He stated that we need a greater presence in the Arctic. A few weeks later, Russia countered by saying that it would strengthen its presence in the Arctic.
We have two countries, Canada and Russia, that are not at all comparable in terms of presence, military or other, in the region. There is just no comparison.
The Russians have really bolstered their military presence over the last 10 years, especially in terms of their military bases, but also their submarines that can navigate under the Arctic ice. We have no such submarines. None of the submarines in our current fleet can go under the Arctic ice; it would be too dangerous for the equipment.
Given this state of play, can we be content with what I am going to call a “half-hearted” effort in the Arctic, or should we be counting on our American partners who have a bigger military presence in Alaska?
Keeping in mind NATO’s wishes, should Canada seriously look to the Arctic and invest in air and naval infrastructure and mobile equipment, as I was saying earlier?
Should Canada be making substantial efforts to increase its presence in the Arctic and occupy the region, given Russia’s increased military presence?
Mr. Angell: Thank you for the question, Senator.
The vice-admiral may have something to add. I would say, however, that in terms of Canada’s investments in North American defence, the amount announced in June is the biggest in 40 years. Part of that envelope is for NORAD, but there is some for the Arctic, too, which is really important in terms of building our capacity.
There are the F-35 jets that the vice-admiral mentioned; of course all 88 will not be used exclusively in the Arctic, but they do contribute in a significant way to our capacity. Then there are the icebreakers and the construction of the Nanisivik naval facility, proof of our commitment to boost our presence in the region.
These are the biggest investments made in 40 years. The Secretary General encouraged Canada to be more ambitious and that is what we are doing.
Senator Boisvenu: Mr. Ambassador, all the experts agree that we will be stuck with our fleet’s aging aircraft for 10 years yet. Even the navy will only get its ships late in 2026 and delivery will go on between 2040 to 2050. So over a period of 10 years, very little will be invested in the Arctic.
Isn’t it worrying to know that the Russians are gaining an almost insurmountable lead because they continue to invest in the Arctic? And yet all the projects announced by the Government of Canada... I am thinking of NORAD, where the Americans basically strong-armed us to invest because, let’s be frank, our equipment was absolutely ancient. This means we will have to wait about 10 years during which time our situation will be very precarious, wouldn’t you agree?
Mr. Angell: There are two essential points to remember. Firstly, Canada is investing tremendous amounts of money in the region. Secondly, Canada is obviously not alone, and Finland and Sweden will become allies. All our allies and their partners who will become allies are making huge investments.
I would say that we can compare Canada’s commitment to Russia’s, but what is really important is to compare Russia’s commitment to that of our allies and those who have been invited to become allies. That is what is vital.
Thank you.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: My question may be very quick. I listened carefully to the words of my colleague Senator Yussuff when he was talking about the climate. I heard in the answers quite a bit of the “what,” such as what are we doing, what we have done and money that has been dedicated.
What I would like to know about, if anything else is to be said, is the challenge of making these decisions in the North on things like infrastructure and equipment when the terrain, as we’re learning, both on land and water are changing so quickly and sometimes unpredictably. I heard you talk about the Centre of Excellence and the Rangers, but I’m trying to understand not the “what” but how you can plan so far out with these constant changes and shifts.
Mr. Angell: Perhaps I can make a first response and the MILREP can follow.
In providing the earlier response, I should perhaps have situated what we are trying to do on climate in the North in terms of what NATO is doing on climate in general.
We have a Secretary-General who is not only a former Norwegian environment minister and prime minister but also UN Special Envoy on Climate Change. He has exerted extraordinary leadership in ensuring that NATO fully addresses issues of climate change as they relate to security. There’s a recognition that we are not a first responder on climate change, but there is a stated wish on the part of the Secretary-General — which is largely endorsed by leaders in the Strategic Concept — that NATO should lead in understanding the nexus between climate and security.
Leaders have adopted an action plan, for example, that seeks to ensure that NATO does its bit on adaptation and mitigation as well. There’s a recognition that, for example, armed forces are major emitters. There’s a recognition that military operations can have a significant impact on the environment in which they operate.
There has been almost a transformation in NATO’s approach on climate in the past two or three years. This was an issue that was pushed hard by a panel of experts — of which a prominent Canadian, Greta Bossenmaier, was a member — and the Secretary-General has embraced that.
We’re very conscious that the Arctic and the High North are regions that are particularly susceptible to climate change, and so we’re conscious that there is a particular urgency. But the alliance as a whole is seeking to become a much more effective actor with regard to climate adaptation and mitigation and working more closely with partners.
The Centre of Excellence has many advantages, but one is that it will provide a venue where we can do creative thinking about what we can do to try to address the link between climate and security. But the Centre of Excellence is only one quite small piece of a much broader NATO engagement endorsed at the level of leaders.
VAdm. Bishop: I might add specifically on the issue of infrastructure and what kind of infrastructure we need to look at in the future in the Northern region and in the Arctic.
Within NATO, Supreme Allied Commander Europe is identifying all of the requirements that are needed to be able to execute these military plans that are being worked up. Part of that is identifying what infrastructure is required by the alliance to be in place for those plans to work. So there is a process there.
NATO also has a defence planning process, where it goes through a process to figure out what capabilities it requires, which will also drive infrastructure requirements.
We do a similar thing at National Defence headquarters in Ottawa. We have a defence planning process that is looking at what requirements we are going to need in terms of capability, but also what infrastructure is required to operate those capabilities in the North. That gets worked up in terms of our overall investments going forward in the future. There is a process in Ottawa to understand, with the changing space in the North, what kind of infrastructure we’re going to have to look at to be able to support our operations in Canada’s Arctic region.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: Let’s get back to the balloon. We may get more answers later this week, when our committee will go to the NORAD headquarters in Colorado.
My question is for Vice-Admiral Bishop. I did a lot of reading this weekend and I learned that airspace used by aircraft is set at a maximum altitude of 20 kilometres, and that upper airspace is between 20 and 100 kilometres in altitude.
[English]
In English, I think it’s “aerospace operation.” They have no rules and no agreement. It’s more or less freefall. It’s up to each country to decide what they will do.
[Translation]
I understand that there is no international agreement governing this part of space compared to the traditional airspace used by airplanes, and it is up to each country to decide if the balloon constitutes a threat or not. It could be a case of espionage. Some countries have satellites, but satellites go around the Earth, whereas a balloon can remain stationary.
My question is the following: to your knowledge, does Canada have a protocol to make decisions in such cases, or do we have to wait for the Americans, in which case it will be NORAD that makes the call? This is apparently not the first instance of a balloon being noticed and it will probably not be the last. At the end of the day, is it up to individual countries, whether that be in Europe or North America, to make the decision to leave the balloon alone or to shoot it down? Thank you.
[English]
VAdm. Bishop: As with many folks who are being confronted with this balloon issue, this is not something that I deal with on a day-in-and-day-out basis. Honestly, I would say the best entity positioned to be able to answer this question is NORAD and our National Defence headquarters in terms of the approach to dealing with these objects.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: There is no equivalent to NORAD in Europe. It would be up to the European countries to decide if, say, there was a balloon floating over Germany, Finland or Norway. Am I right in saying that the same chain of command isn’t the same?
[English]
VAdm. Bishop: I think it would probably fall to individual countries. I think Supreme Allied Commander Europe might have advice to offer if we were confronted with that. It’s not something we have encountered, to my knowledge, within the NATO Alliance.
The Chair: Ambassador Angell and Vice-Admiral Bishop, first, on behalf of the National Security and Defence Committee, thank you so much for taking the time to join us today to share your helpful perspectives and to respond to our questions. You have weighty responsibilities, to say the least.
You opened in talking about a geostrategic perspective. This discussion, I think more than any other we’ve had, took us broader and talked about the interactions between the two spheres: North American and European defence theatres. You’ve also been helpful in drilling down into and answering questions on each of those spheres and the particular intricacies, vulnerabilities and opportunities in each of them.
On behalf of our committee and on behalf of the Senate of Canada, I thank you very sincerely for the important work that you do every day — and often through the night, I know — on behalf of Canadians and those who in many respects live beyond Canada. We wish you all the very best in the difficult and challenging months — and possibly years — ahead in dealing with the current crisis in Ukraine, given Russia’s incursion. Thank you very much again. You’ve been very helpful.
It’s an end point to our hearings today, actually. This is particularly important and particularly helpful to us, so we’re very grateful. Thank you again. We wish you all the very best.
Colleagues, later this week, the committee will embark on a fact-finding mission to NORAD Command Centre in Colorado Springs, Colorado. This wraps up our work on Arctic security.
I will note that in terms of the breadth and scope of our study, we have now heard from 59 witnesses during 12 meetings. We have travelled across the Arctic to five communities and met with over 20 groups representing communities, local government, the RCMP and DND. We will come back from Colorado thinking about, working on and talking about our report and recommendations coming out of this very significant study.
Thank you. We will travel later this week. We will be back meeting here on Monday, February 13, at our usual time of 4 p.m. eastern. With that, I thank you all and wish you all a good evening.
(The committee adjourned.)