THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, February 12, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET] to examine, and report on, such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good morning, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
I will now ask the committee members to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator Ravalia: Good morning. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Wilson: Good morning. Duncan Wilson, British Columbia.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: I dare say, a few more senators are going to join us. We have some competing meetings. I’d like to introduce Senator Woo from British Columbia, who is just joining us right now.
I’d like to welcome everyone who may be watching us across the country on ParlVu. They’re not watching us, sorry. It’s an audio feed today because there are so many committee meetings at the same time, and there are limitations to the video capacity, which is already considerable, but the video capacity can only handle four committees at once, so we are being broadcast in audio. Those other committees, I should say, are looking at government business.
I’d like to acknowledge that Senator MacDonald of Nova Scotia has also just joined the proceedings today.
Colleagues, we’re meeting today under our general order of reference to discuss the ongoing situation in Gaza. Alexandre Lévêque, the Assistant Deputy Minister from Global Affairs Canada, was supposed to be with us today, but due to unforeseen circumstances, he could not join us and had to cancel. We will, of course, welcome Mr. Lévêque at a later date. He is one of our frequent and excellent witnesses.
Today, we have the pleasure of welcoming, as individuals, Costanza Musu, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa; Peter Jones, Professor, University of Ottawa; and Mira Sucharov, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. Thank you for joining us today.
Before we hear your opening statements and we move to questions and answers, I would just like to remind everyone present to please turn off audible notifications on your devices.
We are ready for opening remarks. Professor Musu, you have the floor to be followed by Professor Jones and Professor Sucharov. Then we’ll move to questions and answers.
Costanza Musu, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Good morning, everyone. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the members of the committee for this invitation.
I would like to begin by starting with the framing of this conversation today and stating that Gaza is not only a humanitarian emergency but also, in my view, a foreign policy stress test because it tests things on multiple levels, such as the resilience of international humanitarian law, the credibility of the rules-based order and, lastly — importantly for this committee, of course — Canada’s ability to remain principled while, at the same time, managing alliance politics, particularly with the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump.
My first point will be to acknowledge the horrors of October 7 and the attack on Israel and civilians. I would like to say that there was broad international support for Israel responding to this attack and defending itself. The issue that we’re discussing today is not whether Israel had the right to respond, but rather, how the war unfolded and what it is doing, in my view, to civilian protection norms and to the institutions that, generally speaking, Canada relies on.
I will make three points around this. First of all, Gaza has become a very visible example of the erosion of civilian protection norms in contemporary warfare. We still have reliance on the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. These principles remain intact, but the question that we need to address is the way those principles are applied and whether they still hold. This matters particularly for Canada because we rely on the same principles to condemn violations elsewhere, like in Ukraine and in other conflicts. If those principles become elastic in one theatre, do they become elastic elsewhere?
Of course, Gaza is particularly visible as a conflict. It sits in a region that is the cradle of the three great monotheistic religions. It has importance and elicits an emotional response from the public everywhere around the world.
The second point is that there is an absence of a credible political horizon. In this absence, we have a reshaping of both the humanitarian space and the proposal for post-war governance.
In this respect, we have seen that humanitarian action and governance are increasingly politicized, and this challenges the model of humanitarian diplomacy that Canada has traditionally relied on, which supports humanitarian action but also insulates it from political bargaining. We’ve seen this model erode aggressively.
There is no widely accepted political end state for Gaza. This is creating a space in this vacuum for external governance proposals. The Board of Peace proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump very much reflects a transactional approach, where reconstruction and economic redevelopment are in the front, and political sovereignty and negotiated settlements take a back seat.
When Jared Kushner presented this at Davos, we saw that some regional actors demonstrated interest, and other, more traditional supporters were actually quite skeptical. What remains completely unclear is the space for Palestinian aspirations in this particular framework.
My third point is that both domestic dynamics and alliance politics shape the outcomes on multiple levels. Domestically, Benjamin Netanyahu is headed into an election, particularly contentious with a lot of instability internally. He might even anticipate an election — this is not clear yet — but there is clearly deep polarization. While there is support for, of course, increasing the security of Israel, there is much less agreement on what to do not only with Gaza but also with the West Bank.
On the Palestinian side, equally, the Palestinian Authority is deeply unpopular, so this doesn’t necessarily bode well for its role in Gaza.
Finally, Canada-U.S. relations, of course, matter. We’ve all seen the disinvitation of Mr. Carney from the Board of Peace. I would say there is a narrowing of space for disagreement among allies. Canada has joined numerous allies in recognizing a Palestinian state, so we see a fracture in the Western alliance, if we can call it that. On these issues, Canada’s position itself has, traditionally, been partly supportive of U.S. positions but also, on other occasions, more aligned with other allies. In a way it reflects this fragmented space.
To conclude, I would say that, again, Gaza is not just a humanitarian crisis, but it’s a test for Canada and for the rest of the world on whether international norms, political legitimacy and multilateral governance can endure the stress and the pressure of fractured agreements.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Musu. Professor Jones.
Peter Jones, Professor, University of Ottawa, as an individual: Thank you for inviting me to appear today. In the short time that I have available, I’d like to make three points.
First, though the conflict may be formally over in Gaza, fighting and suffering continue. Hundreds of people have died since the ceasefire came into effect, and many more have been injured. Food and medical supplies are entering Gaza, but not in anything like the amounts required to seriously alleviate suffering, let alone begin rebuilding.
Neither side, Hamas or Israel, is fully living up to its commitments on withdrawal or disarmament, and each says the other must take irreversible steps before it will do so. Most importantly, the technocratic Palestinian government and the international forces, which are both supposed to stabilize Gaza and rebuild it, exist mostly on paper, as does the Board of Peace, which is supposed to oversee all of this.
I note that yesterday, Indonesia said it will send 8,000 troops, but the details are still not very clear. The Board of Peace is meeting next week, so we will see, but neither development gives one much confidence right now.
It seems very unlikely that progress will be made on any of this, absent continued pressure from the Americans on both parties, and perhaps most importantly, from President Trump directly on Prime Minister Netanyahu. This personalization of the process is very much in line with Trump’s “everything is ultimately about me” style, but it does make the process vulnerable if his attention wanders, say, to a new conflict with Iran or perhaps a bridge somewhere.
Second, Israel is now in pre-election mode. The next general election must take place on or before October 27, as my colleague Professor Musu said, but there is speculation that Netanyahu will want to go earlier, perhaps as early as May, as I’ve heard from some people in Israel, to get to the polls before real investigations into the events leading up to October 7 can gather steam. But an election will not necessarily return a strong Israeli government that can push the peace process ahead. Mr. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition is showing signs of great strain over issues such as the requirement for ultra-Orthodox Israelis to serve in the military.
But the opposition is not much better off. If the various “anyone but Netanyahu” parties can unite and also rely on tacit support from Israel’s Arab voters, they could form a majority, but both of those developments are far from certain. Any number of outcomes are thus possible, including — I’ve been told by several Israelis — a return to power for Netanyahu at the head of a new coalition, from which his more extreme right-wing partners could be excluded. The prospects for the elections to return a stable Israeli government committed to the implementation of the Gaza peace deal are far from certain.
My final point, though this committee is rightly focused on Gaza, is that we cannot neglect the crisis on the West Bank. In many respects, the bulk of Israeli-Palestinian fighting that is going on today is happening there, and it is likely to get worse in the coming months.
Mr. Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners look like they will suffer in the coming elections, though much can happen between now and then. Indeed, one of them, Bezalel Smotrich, may not be returned to Parliament at all. His poll numbers are hovering around the threshold for parliamentary representation. If this is true, Mr. Smotrich, who presently controls settlement expansion in the West Bank and has ordered security forces to turn a blind eye to increasing settler violence against Palestinians, will have no reason not to try to accomplish as much of a land grab as he can while he still can. New legislation was introduced a few days ago to that end. He may even want to provoke a violent Palestinian reaction to try to shore up electoral fortunes.
In short, the situation on the West Bank will become more violent in the next few months. While increased attention on the problem from Canada, the EU and others is essential, the only way to stop it in the short term seems, once again, to lie with personal pressure from Mr. Trump on Mr. Netanyahu to rein in the settlers. This affects Gaza in that most moderate Arab states say they will not get fully behind plans to rebuild it unless there is a path to two states, the very path Israel’s right wing seeks to foreclose.
We are confronted with a paradox. While Trump’s peace plan, such as it is, is chaotic and ill-structured as a vehicle for longer-term progress, he himself remains the essential factor for keeping the lid on things in the short term.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Professor Sucharov, please go ahead.
Mira Sucharov, Professor of Political Science, Carleton University, as an individual: Thank you. We are multiple academics looking at many fires over there. You will hear a convergence, in some cases, of thought, so please bear with me. Thank you for the invitation. Let me outline what is going on and what needs to be done.
Despite Israel and Hamas having reached a formal ceasefire in October 2025, the violence in Gaza continues. As of this week, over 570 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire, and over 1,500 have been wounded. Less than half the amount of aid, commercial and fuel trucks that were promised as part of the agreement have entered the strip.
The understandable urgency of the situation in Gaza should not eclipse our attention on the West Bank, as my colleagues have said. Since October 7, 2023, over 1,000 Palestinians in the West Bank have been killed. This week, the Israeli cabinet passed legislation that will intensify its efforts to entrench its hold on the territory. All of this is in violation of international law.
Amidst, or because of, these challenges, I believe that Canada faces an unprecedented opportunity. We must harness our strategic partnerships in the Middle East, including our renewed and existing relationships with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt and, of course, our long-standing, deep and close friendship with Israel.
We should be doing all of this to press the Netanyahu government on three things: one, to end the violence in Gaza; two, to cease its annexation efforts in the West Bank and rein in settler and IDF violence there; and, finally, to pursue a serious effort at peace with the Palestinians.
Canada’s long-standing commitment to a two-state solution is laudable, but it must be backed by action. Prime Minister Carney’s recognition of the State of Palestine was an important start. So is our government’s condemnation this week of Israel’s West Bank annexation-related moves. Now, Canada must use the remaining levers available to it to enable reconstruction in Gaza and to push for permanent change.
Canada should increase transparency and public reporting on the relationship between existing arms sales, including components, and the government’s January 2024 commitment not to approve any further arms export permits to Israel. And Canada, dare I say, should publicly reconsider its free trade agreement with Israel.
Alongside the conventional two-state solution, we should also consider other versions of it, such as the confederal approach being promoted by the joint Israeli-Palestinian organization called A Land for All: Two States. One Homeland. This vision would see a Palestinian State be established in the West Bank and Gaza alongside the current State of Israel, but unlike the conventional two-state solution, a confederal approach would allow for freedom of movement and residence. Settlers, according to this plan, could stay in their homes in the West Bank as residents of the State of Palestine, provided that they respected the laws of the Palestinian State. They would remain citizens of Israel and would, accordingly, continue to vote in the Knesset.
Palestinian refugees, for their part, could return to their towns and cities, living as residents of Israel and citizens of the new State of Palestine. Palestinian citizens of Israel would not lose their current citizenship rights as Israeli citizens.
To this end, the Canadian government should engage community stakeholders here in Canada, convincing them of the importance of supporting not just any peace but a just peace. There will be no peace at all between Israelis and Palestinians as long as the occupation continues and as long as civilians are in the crosshairs of violence. There cannot, and will not, be a just and lasting peace without freedom of movement, full safety, broad dignity and true equality for all, and this includes a reckoning with 1948 and the Nakba.
To ensure hope over despair among the people who need it most, there must be clear, time-bound benchmarks. The end game must be clear; Gaza and the West Bank must be treated as an indivisible whole. Reconstruction, as it comes along on the horizon, must be accompanied by rights. The time is now. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Colleagues, we will move to questions. I’d like to acknowledge that Senator Hébert of Quebec has joined us.
As per usual, three minutes for the question and the answer. Please keep your preambles short, your questions concise, and the responses should be concise as well on the part of our witnesses.
Senator Woo: Thank you to our witnesses. Let me start with Professor Sucharov.
You remind us of the need to not forget about the number and to have a reckoning with it. Can you say more about it and why it’s so important to understand the current situation?
Ms. Sucharov: Thank you for this question.
Senator Woo: By the way, some say even talking about Nakba is an anti-Semitic trope. This is a sensitive topic, but I’m glad you brought it up.
Ms. Sucharov: Thank you, and I’m glad you added the addendum.
There are so many ways of addressing this. One of the things I like to say is I’m Jewish, and my children and I have the right, as we should, and we currently have the right, and it’s a right that is practicable and can be fulfilled in the current order, of gaining citizenship to the European countries from which their grandparents were pushed out. Their grandfather was a Holocaust survivor. They are entitled to citizenship from various European countries of my grandparents and my husband’s parents.
If you Google the international Claims Conference, what will you find? You will find a very just and right attempt to reunite people, Jews, with the property that was looted in the Holocaust and during World War II. Palestinians deserve these very same rights.
The note I added toward the end of my remarks was about a joint Israeli-Palestinian NGO that is working to repair 1948 in light of the current rights of residents living in Israel and Palestine. No one pursuing a just agreement, in my view — and certainly this group would agree — is trying to push Israelis out or from their property. No injustice should be brought forward as a way of righting injustice of the past.
As for Israelis or Jews or others who say talking about the Nakba is anti-Semitic, I would say it is Nakba’s denial that is anti-Palestinian racism, just as any denial of the violence of October 7 could be construed as anti-Semitic, certainly anti‑Israeli. Holocaust denial, as we know, is obviously anti-Semitic, so denying the facts of the past and the historical record is very clear about what happened in 1948. Thank you.
Senator Woo: If I could ask Professor Musu, you pose as a question that this is a foreign policy stress test for Canada and whether or not Canada may have been practising — you didn’t use this word, I’m using it — double standards in our treatment of conflicts in different places. Ukraine and Gaza, of course, are the starkest examples.
Have we been practising a double standard? Can you be a little more definitive and scholarly about it? In what ways have we been duplicitous if I can put it that way?
Ms. Musu: I think one of the main issues is that the initial support for Israeli action and reaction to October 7 is actually more complicated than it looks, I think, because the arguments were quite controversial. Some argued that October 7 was the culmination of the preceding years, whereas others argued that October 7 must be looked at on its merits.
I think it has taken time to then reformulate and find ways to reformulate the criticism of the way the war has been conducted and to separate it from the support for the right of a country to defend itself under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much to our witnesses. I’ll address my question to Professor Jones.
How might Israel’s suspension and restriction of humanitarian assistance to Gaza continue to affect the civilian population? Furthermore, the legal responsibilities of the parties to the conflict, international humanitarian law and the broader regional and diplomatic landscape, including the prospects for an ongoing ceasefire and long-term stability?
Mr. Jones: Thank you. I would leave the legal aspect of this to my colleague Professor Musu, who is more involved in that.
In terms of the political side of what’s going on, it’s not that Israel is denying aid. It’s just restricting it in a significant way. It’s not enough to alleviate the suffering and really commence the rebuilding.
It’s clear that Prime Minister Netanyahu leads a government that does not believe in the two-state solution. It’s clear that there is a desire to maintain the situation in Gaza as an open sore, which can be used politically in Israel for a variety of purposes.
I think that in terms of the broader regional situation, if you think about the Abraham Accords, if you think about the idea of Israel finding acceptance in the region and creating a new regional reality, any number of Arab countries have said — principally Saudi Arabia — that they will not go down that path formally until such time as there is progress toward the two-state solution.
At the same time, we have to be blunt. Any number of them have gone down that path very informally for a variety of reasons that have to do with their own interests and defence and deterring Iran. It’s not as black and white of a situation as you might like.
For some people in Israel, that’s enough. They don’t really want or need formal recognition by Arab countries. They’re content with practical recognition and a practical relationship, as long as it doesn’t do damage to their desire to also frustrate the two-state solution. I think that’s the situation we’re in now. We’re in a sort of situation where there’s a declared policy of a number of countries, and then there’s what’s really going on behind the scenes.
Cutting through that is going to take a few things. First of all, an Israeli election is going to have to return a government that is at least willing to begin resurrecting the idea of two states, and I think that will take, in itself, years. People think of the return to the two-state solution as something that’s going to happen magically in six months. It’s not going to happen. Israeli public opinion and other things are against it. I think it’s a process of rehabilitating the two-state solution.
On the other hand, for a number of countries in the region, it’s a process of calibrating their relationship with Israel in such a way that some of the benefits that Israel has accrued through these tacit relations with countries like Saudi Arabia and others are held back a little bit and put in abeyance until there’s progress. Thank you.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much to each of our witnesses. This has been a very helpful briefing for us.
I’d like to interrogate a little further on this confederal version of the two-state solution. I’d like, if I could, to hear from whomever would like to speak to it, first Dr. Sucharov. Where do you see the hope in this? Where do you see the support? What would it take to build that support? I think perhaps Professor Jones might also want to weigh in on this.
Ms. Sucharov: The support I see as emanating from the fact that the joint Israeli-Palestinian board was inaugurated right before October 7 and had its first board meeting on, I think, October 9 or 10. They were able to proceed, and they’ve proceeded and grown, and the support in Israeli and Palestinian spaces is growing. When I say “Palestinian spaces,” the West Bank, Israel proper and some representation from Gaza, those representatives who might currently live abroad.
The support is growing. The hope that I see is two things. It’s a two-state solution, as they call it. There’s an article in Foreign Affairs by the past co-chairs; an Israeli Jew and a Palestinian. A two-state solution that can work and a two-state solution that honours Palestinian, Israeli and Jewish connections to all of the land, which is why the subtitle is “Two States. One Homeland.” It wouldn’t necessitate the expulsion of settlers, and it wouldn’t necessitate forcing Palestinians to give up their right of return.
Mr. Jones: There are a variety of ideas, plans, and thoughts as to what a resumption of the peace process could look like. This is one of them. It deserves further consideration and thought. As part of the process of, as I say, rehabilitating the idea of the peace process, all of these ideas are going to need to be fleshed out and considered.
We’re in a very strange situation. If you look at public opinion polling in Israel and in Palestine — such as it is in Palestine, it is much more difficult — but nevertheless the polling that we have by people like Khalil Shikaki and so on. It’s quite clear that a majority of the people on both sides believe in two states: a confederal state, some sort of an arrangement, but a growing majority over the last decade believe that people on the other side don’t. We’re in this strange situation where we believe it, but we think they don’t. Therefore, that leads to hopelessness, and that is something that has been inculcated by people on both sides deliberately as policy, to try to create this sense of hopelessness.
As I say, I use this phrase rehabilitating the peace process, rehabilitating the two-state solution — whatever you want to call it. It is going to have to take a long, slow process of recreating in the public mind on both sides the idea that there are people over there who feel the same way we do. Countries like Canada have a role to play in this, in terms of encouraging discussion and so on. We should be very careful to keep ourselves limited in our belief of what can happen quickly. This is going to take time, and stabilization is important.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Wilson: Mr. Jones, you referred to this in your remarks, the structure of the Board of Peace and its governance, if you will call it that, is clearly and inherently a significant risk. I was very interested in the discussion around the confederal approach. How does that get oxygen in the context of this Board of Peace and the president’s unique position in this whole situation?
Mr. Jones: If you look at the proposal that Jared Kushner put forward in Davos for rebuilding Gaza, it’s essentially a real estate development program. I have very little faith that the Board of Peace will amount to much. I think the effort that Mr. Trump has made to try to create it into something as an alternative to the Security Council that he can run for the rest of his life even after he leaves his office — in terms of its actions in Gaza, I think the proof will be in the pudding, and the next few weeks are going to be very important in the sense it’s supposed to meet next week, and there are efforts under way to begin putting troops on the ground and so on.
I am inherently suspicious, though, because the Trump administration and Mr. Trump himself is so completely in control of it and so dominant in the way it runs that this real estate development idea of how we’re going to solve the problem is going to be the dominant one. My fear of the Board of Peace is that it will divert attention from things that could be done, and it will take us down a path for the next six or eight months until Mr. Trump hopefully — this is editorializing — loses control of Congress, and other options come forward that will really waste time in terms of really trying to rebuild Gaza.
Ms. Sucharov: I don’t know if this is editorializing or the expert opinion, but as someone who went through middle school and high school, his disinvitation of our Prime Minister very much undermined what he is trying to do with it. He delegitimizes himself in the way he’s situating it as a party — as a bar mitzvah party — that some people aren’t invited to, just to continue the Jewish theme.
Canada, as we are, has to pivot more and more away from our neighbour to the South and more toward Europe. There is a lot of goodwill among European countries right now to help do what needs to be done. In terms of how to filter these ideas, right now we’re on the eve of the Munich Security Conference. I know these ideas will be discussed; I have it on good authority. We have to sideline as much as possible those who don’t have the best interests of the region in mind.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Adler: I want to thank everyone for bringing their scholarship to this important meeting. Most scholars have no trouble with the idea that people, regular people, can believe in two things at the same time even though they’re contradictory. People can believe in a two-state solution, while, at the same time, those same people will support political parties that do not believe in a two-state solution.
It’s true that the Netanyahu government — the Netanyahu coalition — is not a believer and a supporter of the two-state solution. But isn’t it also true that the party that, according to the polling data, if there were elections, both in the West Bank and in Gaza, the party that would dominate easily and win is Hamas? Can anyone on the panel come up with a single sound bite from any political leader, military leader or religious leader of Hamas that would be a supporter of the two-state solution?
Ms. Musu: No. Hamas does not support the two-state solution. One of the challenges is that while all the parties to the conflict want to exclude Hamas — rightly so, because it does not have a role in any kind of future plan — at the same time, though, the same parties themselves seem to be working against the two-state solution.
One of the issues — to address the idea of the confederation aspect — is that any kind of solution at any point in time before October 7, after October 7, requires a large number of sacrifices from both sides. This has actually not changed with October 7; there are flashpoints of conflict that remain the same. Even in a confederation scenario, you still have those issues around Jerusalem, around governance, around all that.
The main issue is that, at this time, there are no signals that any side is really ready to approach any of those conversations. Even if they were, it is not clear to me that they would have the popular support to make those concessions. That is the crux of the matter.
The Board of Peace — I very much agree with my colleagues — is a huge distraction, while, at the same time, it will present some optics that might be quite enticing. For example, the fact that they’ve started removing some rubble and the fact that they’re going to start clearing out a path is going to be optically quite attractive, while not addressing any issues like “Will Palestinians own any of those houses or the land? Where is the money going? Who will benefit from any of this?” So it creates a kind of mirror and smoke situation.
The Chair: I’m sorry. I know, Professor Jones, you want to intervene on this. We’re over the point, but we will come back to you on that because I know it’s an area you’re very much involved in.
Senator MacDonald: It’s great to have three knowledgeable witnesses here today.
For somebody like myself who has been following this for the last two-plus years, I recall when the attack first happened, we found out that there were people who worked for UNRWA who were involved in the attack itself. On this side of the globe, when it comes to gaining knowledge that we can believe in and information that we can trust, how do you separate the wheat from the chaff? How do you do it?
Ms. Sucharov: In terms of actors who are trustworthy?
Senator MacDonald: No, in terms of information that we’re getting because so much is contradictory. What do you lean on to do it?
Mr. Jones: Multiple sources, BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN, a number of different sources, and Israeli media such as Haaretz. You have to understand that most of the things you read will have an editorial slant, and you have to just take a variety and put it together in your own mind and try to sort through, as you say, the wheat and the chaff. Over time, you develop a sense of the editorial position of different organizations. You say, okay, they have this editorial position; therefore, I don’t completely trust what they’re saying, but there is something in it. Then you go to the next one, and from that you build up a picture. I’m not aware of any single source that I can go to understand what is really going on in the region.
Senator MacDonald: You mentioned BBC, CNN, I’m skeptical of all of those sources.
Mr. Jones: I agree. I wouldn’t trust any one of them or any two or three of them. I trust half a dozen, seven or eight, and I wouldn’t discount things like Al Jazeera and other sources, which we don’t tend to rely on much in this part of the world, but which I don’t completely agree with, but they have a very important point of view that needs to be thought about at least and also Jewish and Israeli sources.
Senator MacDonald: I’m just curious about this. I’ve been to Ramallah on the West Bank, but I haven’t been to Gaza. Have any of you been to Gaza? And have you been there since the invasion or before?
Ms. Sucharov: Can I add sources?
Senator MacDonald: Sure.
Ms. Sucharov: One additional source I would add is +972 Magazine. That’s the country code of Israel. It’s Israeli and has very careful reportage. One of the most important reporters there during the war was Yuval Abraham, and you might know him as one of the Oscar winners of the documentary No Other Land. He has a very good interview on the +972 Podcast, where he explains his process and the number of sources he uses before he confirms, before he puts anything in print, and his reporting on “Lavender”. Just look up Lavender and you’ll see. That was a tactic that the Israeli military was using to wipe out presumed Hamas leaders, and the civilian count was very high due to that tactic.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: I just wanted to say I agree with the suggestion you made about Professor Jones’ having a chance to answer the question as well. My first question will be based on that. I’d like to hear what he has to say.
[English]
The Chair: Professor Jones, what we’re suggesting is it looks like we’re getting into two-track ideology here, and I know that’s something you have done sort of off the side of your desk. To the extent you would like to elaborate, I think we would like to hear that.
Mr. Jones: Okay. Thank you. I run an organization at the University of Ottawa called the Ottawa Dialogue, and we run what is sometimes called Track Two and Track 1.5 dialogues around the world. For many years, we’ve run an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue; it was suspended after October 7. It was impossible for them to meet.
We had been looking at what would the security relationship of an independent Israel and Palestine look like if a two-state solution could be agreed? How would the borders work? How would the airspace be governed over Palestine? We have been doing a series of studies and preparing expert commentaries and documents over these sorts of topics because one of the things that the opponents of the two-state solution will always say is, well, it can’t work. Security-wise, it can’t work. So we were deliberately putting forward proposals for how the airspace could be governed and how the border controls could work, but that all stopped.
In the last month, we’ve commenced again. We had a meeting in Helsinki early in January to see if we can restart these discussions. The participants are people who are retired Israeli generals and people from the Palestinian side who worked in the Palestinian Authority. One of the things we’ve learned is that Israel and Palestine — whether it’s a confederal state or two states or how it’s going to be — cannot secure the country themselves. They’re going to have to work with Jordan and Egypt and other countries in the region.
Our next series of meetings — we’re hoping to start later this year — will regather this group of people who were looking at these questions, but also bring in the Egyptians, Jordanians, possibly Saudis and others, to consider a regional approach to securing an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
But there are many of these kinds of informal dialogues going on — this is just one — that have been going on for many years. There is a very famous one that has since stopped, but for many years was run by a group of Canadians on the future of the Old City of Jerusalem. They did very successful work, which informed thinking about how, if there is ever going to be a solution to the situation in Jerusalem, that could be done. So that’s another example.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: You can let me know whether this is irrelevant or whether you discussed it before I got here. My apologies; I had a personal emergency.
I’d like to hear your thoughts on the Board of Peace the U.S. President created. How is it perceived? How will it all work in relation to the existing mechanisms? Is the board going to take the place of another body? How do you see the situation?
The Chair: We talked about the Board of Peace, but I think there are other comments.
[English]
Ms. Musu: If I may, this initiative takes the space and is made possible by that void of actual concrete proposals that was already evident during the first phases of the war that followed October 7, when there was no clear endgame or — some might argue more cynically — the endgame was clear but was not stated. That endgame would possibly lead to a reduction of the Gaza space, so the removal of Palestinians, concentration of Palestinians on one side and then a renewed Israeli control.
In this space, President Trump, with his rather characteristic approach of “I’ll fill the void with a number of ideas,” started with an idea that would create an alternative track that he would preside over. Of course, as we have seen, initially it was supposed to be about Gaza, but more recently it does not seem to be about Gaza, but it seems to be about some kind of alternative forum parallel to the formal one on which Canada relies and the rest of the world relies on to address issues. However, I would argue that the entire structure of the Board of Peace makes everything rather transactional, and it’s really meant to create some kind of mechanism to then allow a redevelopment that has itself no real political endgame. It’s a space for investment. It’s a space for that kind of growth. It’s not a space for a political solution. It’s a technocratic solution, you could say, in the absence of a political solution.
Senator Woo: If I could go back to Professor Musu. You were in the middle of talking about the foreign policy test that Canada is in now. I wonder if you could fast-forward. You were giving a very nuanced explanation of October 7, how we calibrated and recalibrated.
Have we failed the test, and what does that mean for foreign policy at a time when Prime Minister Carney says values-based realism, seeing the world as it is, veritable geometry, what does it mean for our foreign policy if we failed the test on Gaza?
Ms. Musu: Well, if we failed the test, we are —
Senator Woo: Have we failed?
Ms. Musu: I am going to be nuanced again: Yes and no. There was an appropriate response on October 7, and that response has slowly changed, which has led to important steps that might be diplomatic but also have value, like the recognition of a Palestinian state.
There are two sides to this. One side is the general position that Canada needs to maintain on the conflict as a whole and reliance on international law, and the other side is what can Canada do, and where is the space for Canadian action?
Now, the list of things that this panel has raised is too much even for a superpower, as we have seen. I mean, no superpower has been able to address this. In the context of having a more, broadly speaking, principled approach that puts emphasis on humanitarian norms and conflict, et cetera, I personally think Canada needs to choose, possibly, an area in which it wants to concentrate and invest time, diplomatic effort and resources.
It might sound not very ambitious, but it’s a better use of Canadian resources rather than trying to do everything.
Senator Woo: Professor Sucharov has come out with some specific areas of intervention that you believe Canada can participate. Can you elaborate on that?
Ms. Sucharov: The ones I mentioned were re-evaluating the free trade agreement. We’re not supposed to use adverbs when we write — good writers know that — but I did add the word “publicly” because it’s the threat of re-evaluating, that would be the first step. To reiterate, Canada and Israel enjoy a free trade agreement that could be publicly re-evaluated and partly to assuage the great domestic frustration about the difference between action and promise in the January 2024 promise no longer to allow arms export permits to Israel by Canada. How feasible it is to restrict the use and sale of parts that then go into F-35s and other munitions systems, that’s for others to determine, but at least it should be publicly discussed.
In terms of what my colleague suggested, even a superpower cannot do it. The superpower, in my view, does have the capability, but it is the resolve and the willingness that are lacking. We saw that not only with President Trump but with Biden.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Ravalia: I would like to address my question to Professor Jones. You alluded to an international stabilization force and Indonesia’s potential commitment of 8,000 troops. How realistic do you feel that this international stabilization force will be, and what will be the potential barriers, challenges and outcomes?
Mr. Jones: Thank you. I think, in my mind, at least for the next short time, the key question is disarming Hamas, and which countries will be prepared to commit themselves to go in and take that action. Frankly, I see very few. Also, in theory at least, if you believe in what’s written in the peace agreement between Israel and Hamas or the ceasefire agreement — requiring Israel to withdraw from Gaza, which force is going to do that — again, I don’t see much evidence that there will be a force willing to do those things.
In a way we’re back to — I wouldn’t use classic — peacekeeping of the kind we saw in Cyprus, but you’re in an environment where the parties themselves have to agree to do what it is they said they would do. Then the force goes in to oversee that and to deal with maybe some small recalcitrant elements who don’t want to, but will not fight its way in and make parties do things they don’t want to do.
In the absence of a willingness on the part of either Hamas or Israel — and I said in my comments, they’re both demanding the other side go first before they will take irreversible steps — I think this force is not going to succeed. That’s where we get back to the idea of pressure on both sides to live up to the commitments they made in the ceasefire agreement.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Coyle: We could keep you all day. This is very helpful to us. Professor Musu, as you mentioned, this foreign policy test for Canada and us as a principled nation, a signatory to international humanitarian law, the rules-based order. We’ve just had the statement at Davos, where we’re no longer going to go along to get along, and we see countries who have done that and joined the Board of Peace, for example.
Professor Sucharov, you talk about our friends, who are Canada’s friends and who we can work with, including Israel. So I would love to hear from anybody here who would talk about who those people are and who those nations are. You’ve given some examples, and how would that look, and what’s going on already as the parallel to this Board of Peace?
Ms. Sucharov: There is a lot of desire on the part of the EU and its constituent members, on the part of many states in the Middle East, including the ones I mentioned who have ties with Canada and who enjoy strategic partnerships with Canada. I had said in addition to Israel — which, of course, is the target here of the action — I had said the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. We can leverage these partnerships. The example of the Abraham Accords that were unfolding, there was a reason why normalization with Israel is sought: countries in that region want stability, but that stability needs to come with some incentives and both carrots and sticks. So that’s the kind of thing Canada can do morally, sort of moral suasion.
Can I say something quickly about UNRWA employees, Senator MacDonald? I just checked to make sure my memory was correct — and my memory was correct — which shows that it is easy to find that, beyond the headlines of UNRWA employees — I remember right at the time as soon as you read beyond the headline or read a couple of sources — you find the facts. The facts are that 13,000 UNRWA employees are employed in Gaza, and a maximum of 19 — a dozen and a half — were involved in October 7. That’s the other thing is just to look at the facts. I don’t think the facts are as much contested as optics and headlines and attention.
Ms. Musu: I want to go back to a point my colleague Ms. Sucharov made about the free trade agreement. I have to say I disagree on the free trade agreement. I believe that one of the great problems right now is that Israel is extremely isolated. If Canada were to join in suggesting freezing the free trade agreement, the feeling of isolation, actually, paradoxically, would give more space to more extreme positions in Israel, by heightening this sense of double standards, where Israel is held to standards when it responds, and the narrative might not be accurate, but it is there.
I am much more supportive on the idea of the arms sale, which I think is much more surgical — it’s a horrible term, nevertheless — and targeted at a specific issue. So it kind of plays on the ability of Canada to still maintain positive relations with Israel while saying, no, we draw the line here.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Musu.
Professor Jones, you’re going to get the last word.
Mr. Jones: I just wanted to go back to Senator Adler’s question about Hamas. The answer is no, I can’t think of any Hamas person who spoke in favour of two states.
If we step back a little bit and look more broadly at the relationship between Hamas and the Netanyahu government, one of the things Prime Minister Netanyahu fears about the coming investigations is that they will reveal the extent to which his government colluded to keep Hamas in power in Gaza for many years as a way of preventing the two-state solution from happening and a way of preventing a unified Palestinian government.
On both sides, one of the problems we have — I spoke a little while ago about people wanting something, but increasingly are of the view the other side does not want it — is that both sides are governed or have been governed by groups who are opposed to two states and are prepared to work together to prevent two states from happening. One of the ideas of rehabilitating this idea of a workable peace process is to cut through that and to show that it is possible. Hopefully, the Israeli elections coming up and hopefully the creation of a new Palestinian governance structure in Gaza, whatever it will be, will go some way toward that, but it will take a very long time.
The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I just want to say what a pleasure it was for us to listen to your expertise and your views. We appreciate the work that you’re doing.
I dare say, having looked at the delegation list for the Munich Security Conference, there is a lot of Middle Eastern participation this year, so something might be going on in Munich. Something is happening in Washington with Prime Minister Netanyahu meeting President Trump. With all of that in mind, we would love to have you back on a future occasion so we can deepen our discussions and get caught up on what is happening.
(The committee adjourned.)