THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, March 26, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 10:29 a.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good morning, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I will now invite the committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Good morning. Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
Senator Ravalia: Good morning. Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Ataullahjan: Good morning. Senator Salma Ataullahjan, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Youance: Suze Youance from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Woo: Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Wilson: Good morning. Duncan Wilson, British Columbia.
Senator Coyle: Good morning. Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario. Welcome.
Senator Al Zaibak: Mohammad Al Zaibak, Ontario.
The Chair: Thank you. Senator Al Zaibak, that was a very impressive entrance.
Welcome, senators. I wish to welcome all of you as well as those who may be watching us across the country on ParlVU today.
We are meeting under our general order of reference to discuss the situation in Iran. There can be no more timely topic for us to address today than that one.
Today, we have the pleasure of welcoming, from Global Affairs Canada, Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch, who is no stranger to this committee — welcome back; Eric Laporte, Acting Director General, International Security Policy and Strategic Affairs Bureau; and Rebecca Netley, Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Adviser and International Law Bureau, if I have that right.
Welcome to you all. Before we hear your opening remarks and go to questions and answers, I would like to ask everyone in the room to please ensure that your devices are muted so we will not be interrupted.
I would also ask everyone to observe the best practices listed on the card with respect to the use of the microphone and earpiece so we can avoid any difficulties in that respect as well.
Without further ado, Mr. Lévêque, you have the floor.
Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Middle East and Arctic Branch, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, as always.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, I want to begin by thanking you for giving us the opportunity to present Canada’s position on the conflict in Iran and the Middle East and how Canada is responding to that conflict.
[English]
The gravity of this moment cannot be overstated. The conflict has triggered far-reaching implications across a region already marked by fragility, sending shock waves through global security, economic and humanitarian systems.
Allow me to reiterate the many public pronouncements made by the government on the tragic loss of life and injuries resulting from this conflict. We extend our sincere sympathies to all affected.
[Translation]
Today, I will present Canada’s position on the conflict and its response, which is guided by a firm commitment to protecting civilians and supporting de-escalation. Let’s begin with Canada’s position.
[English]
Canada has long held that Iran’s nuclear ambitions and export of terrorism are one of the gravest threats to regional and international peace. We firmly condemn Iran’s unlawful strikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including oil and gas facilities, as well as its de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
[Translation]
Canada stands in full solidarity with the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan. These partners did not choose to participate in the conflict, yet they are paying the price of Iran’s attacks.
Canada will continue to support them and to determine how it can contribute in a way that upholds its values, partnerships and international obligations.
[English]
As the region faces the prospect of further escalation and prolonged instability, Canada is working with partners to support de-escalation, restore stability and pursue political solutions that address Iran’s unacceptable actions.
Canada will continue to address Iran’s malign and destabilizing behaviour, including its brutal repression of peaceful assembly, nuclear and ballistic missile programs, support for terrorist groups, transnational repression and support to Russia in its illegal war against Ukraine.
[Translation]
Canada has imposed sanctions on 222 Iranian individuals and 256 Iranian entities involved in gross human rights violations, destabilizing activities in the region and around the world, nuclear and weapons proliferation and terrorism. We are continuing to strengthen those measures to address evolving threats.
[English]
We have listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis as terrorist organizations under the Canadian Criminal Code.
We have reconfirmed Iran as a state supporter of terrorism under the State Immunity Act.
We have made thousands of IRGC officers and senior regime officials inadmissible to enter Canada by listing Iran as a regime engaged in terrorism and gross human rights violations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[Translation]
Canada remains unequivocal on the need for Iran to be held to account for human rights abuses and violations.
For the past 23 years, Canada has successfully led the UN General Assembly resolution on the situation of human rights in Iran, which condemns the regime’s systemic repression of women and girls, the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities and retaliation against human rights defenders, journalists and political opponents. We will continue to publicly condemn Iran’s abhorrent and dangerous behaviour.
[English]
Since the war started, Canada has co-sponsored a UN Security Council resolution condemning Iranian attacks against Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan.
We have released joint statements with partners expressing readiness to contribute to safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz, imploring all parties to protect civilians and prioritize democracy, and committing to take the necessary measures to support global energy supply, including in a G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement issued five days ago.
[Translation]
Finally, I would like to point out that the safety of Canadians is the top priority for Canada and the government in responding to this conflict.
[English]
We have deployed consular teams throughout the region to assist Canadians. Block bookings on commercial flights, a charter flight and buses have been arranged. Support is provided at border crossings and via our 24-7 Emergency Watch and Response Centre. We have helped over 1,200 Canadians safely depart the region. We will continue to safeguard our citizens.
I know, Mr. Chair, you recently had as a witness on this committee my colleague Sébastien Beaulieu, who provided you a lot more details on Canada’s consular response.
In closing, Canada will continue to oppose the Iranian regime and prioritize the safety and security of Canadians abroad. We are committed to working with partners to reduce tensions, prevent further escalation and mitigate spillover effects. We will continue to engage diplomatically, coordinate with partners and advocate for measures that encourage dialogue and restraint.
[Translation]
Thank you for your attention. I will now be pleased to answer your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque. I wish to remind members that they will each have a maximum of three minutes for the first round. This includes questions and answers.
[English]
So I would ask you, senators, to please be concise with your questions. I know we have a lot of them. We will have a second round if there is time.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you for being here. I don’t know if you will be able to answer this. Do you think what is happening has strengthened the Iranian regime? The dissent we were hearing about — the feeling that one has is that Iranians are kind of united, but then I don’t know what to believe about all the news coming out of different channels. I really don’t know what the truth is.
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you very much, senator and Mr. Chair.
This is one of the most difficult questions to answer for a couple of reasons. First and foremost, it is because of the extreme limitations on information coming out of Iran and the limitations on freedom of information inside Iran, but also the control that the regime has held on all forms of communication, including shutting down the internet and therefore limiting contact with the outside world that ordinary Iranians have.
Canada also doesn’t have a presence in Iran, so we rely on external sources and various options for collecting intelligence.
The future will tell whether this will have weakened the resolve of the regime, of the very well-entrenched oppressive system that we know has governed Iran for 46 or 47 years.
One thing is for sure: The war of the past almost four weeks has weakened a number of security-related state institutions. There is a definite conclusion on the ballistic missile program, including its launchers. Iran had hundreds of launcher sites around the country, and those have been enormously debilitated with enormous destruction. The nuclear program has been weakened. A great part of Iran’s navy has been weakened. So the institutions, particularly the security apparatus that supports the regime’s actions internationally, have been weakened.
What is not clear, because of the succession of senior leaders having been eliminated by Israeli and American strikes, is who will come after and whether these individuals will try to carry the torch in maintaining a highly repressive environment. Or will they be what we usually refer to as more moderate and have an interest in trying to negotiate some kind of a new deal to facilitate its integration into the world community, including economic, political and security?
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to you and your team for the work that you are doing in these incredibly difficult times.
We haven’t heard much about the Houthis in Yemen, recognizing they are, in fact, an Iranian proxy as well. There were some reports this morning that they have possibly considered, in some ways, limiting access to and travel through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and then potentially impacting the Strait of Hormuz. Do we have any information with respect to that?
I would further add, potentially, even with the destruction of Iran’s capabilities, what are the risks of sleeper cells in the West and other countries surfacing and leading to disruption in terms of cybersecurity, attacks on key sites, et cetera? Is this something that we’re monitoring in Canada as well?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. It is a great question. Let me begin with the question that refers to the Houthis. As you know, the main three proxy groups with which Iran spreads its terrorism are Hezbollah, particularly in Lebanon; Hamas, particularly in Gaza; and the Houthis, operating out of Yemen.
The first thing I would say about those three groups is that their levels of independent decision making vary quite significantly. While they have close ties and have benefited from a lot of technical, scientific and, of course, financial support from Iran in the past, some of them have developed their own capacities, including in missiles and drone manufacturing.
That is the case for the Houthis. To be honest, we were and are a little surprised to see that the Houthis have not been triggered to enter the conflict at this point. You will hear various theories as to why that is. One is that Iran doesn’t have direct and complete control over them in that the Houthis have their own calculus, their own strategic goals and their own longer-term strategies as to when or whether to get involved in the conflict.
There have been, as far as we can tell, limited kinetic actions on the Bab el-Mandeb. The focus really has been on the Strait of Hormuz. But it remains an open question as to if and when they might engage a little more significantly, in a kinetic fashion, in the conflict.
As to whether sleeper cells are a concern, they are a huge concern throughout the region. I mentioned the three large proxy groups, but there are dozens of smaller armed militias throughout Iran, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere in the Levant. They could be activated at any time and not necessarily during the height of the conflict. It could happen months or years from now.
Of course, that concern always exists with regard to potential actions on Canadian soil. Obviously, I would have to defer to our domestic security agencies to comment on what is being done, but I can assure you that, through our intelligence capability and profile-building capability from our security agencies, this is very much top of mind. Our colleagues in those institutions are on much higher alert as a result.
Senator Coyle: Thank you for being here. I’m sorry we are living through this absolute disaster on so many levels, as you’ve described it. You’ve identified the fact, and we know this, that we don’t have a diplomatic presence in Iran. That is an issue in all sorts of ways in terms of keeping Canadians safe, getting them out of the region, that sort of thing, but also just in our diplomatic role in this conflict. We do have a goal to see this de‑escalated. We don’t want to see people killed. We don’t want to see energy infrastructure damaged or reduced. We want oil and other goods to move through the Strait of Hormuz.
We see Pakistan taking a role in mediating, at least between the U.S. and Iran. How, if at all, are we involved in that? I’m just curious what that looks like. How are we engaged either in gathering intelligence or in feeding into that process?
Mr. Lévêque: That is a million-dollar question, which I appreciate, senator.
Successive Canadian governments, over the past 20 some years or 25 years, have made choices about how to position the country and our institutions vis-à-vis Iran. We will often be pressed to condemn, to isolate and to impose sanctions. Having compared Canada’s actions vis-à-vis Iran with all of our like‑minded usual partners, I can honestly say that, other than the United States, we are probably the most restrictive on connections with Iran.
We have multiple layers of sanctions, as I mentioned before, with close to 500 different people and entities sanctioned. We are one of the very few that have declared the IRGC a terrorist organization. We have reapplied UN sanctions once the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, triggered the snap-back mechanism. We were immediately one of the first to reimpose the UN sanctions that had been suspended.
It puts us in the category of high critics and isolation countries towards Iran. The flip side is we closed our embassy there in 2012. We kicked them out also in the same year. Of course, that puts us in a less favourable position to play a direct mediation role. We have, for all intents and purposes, eliminated direct diplomatic contact with them.
Where we do think Canada has a role to play is through multilateral or “mini-lateral” settings where, with a small group of trusted countries, we can add our voice and propose logical, attainable ideas, principles for facilitating future mediation talks.
The Chair: Thank you. I’m going to interrupt. It is a very interesting topic, but we have gone over the time limit.
Mr. Lévêque: I apologize.
The Chair: I’m sure we will return to it.
Senator Woo: Thank you for being here. You used the term “illegal” to describe Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but you did not use the word “illegal” insofar as the attack on Iran is concerned. Instead, you talked about the well-known horrors of the Iranian regime: human rights abuses and the export of terrorism. Are you trying to say that the attack on Iran by Israel and the United States is justified by international law? Is that the rationale you’re offering?
Mr. Lévêque: Mr. Chair, I will first defer to my colleague who has the legal expertise to cover legal questions, and then I can complement after.
Senator Woo: The fundamental question is this: Was this an illegal invasion?
Rebecca Netley, Legal Adviser and Director General, Legal Adviser and International Law Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, senator and chair, for the question. I will provide a bit of an explanation. I might not be able to precisely answer your question in terms of what our advice is, but I will try to provide some parameters around the way we’ve looked at the situation. You will understand that some of the advice that I provide would be protected by client-solicitor privilege, so that’s the reason for which I might not be able to disclose as much as you might want to hear.
In any event, as you well know, international law provides for three exceptions to what are normally prohibited uses of force against the territorial integrity of another state: a UN Security Council authorization under Chapter VII being one, host state consent being another, and invocation of the inherent right to self-defence being the other.
In its Article 51 letter, which is a letter that the United States filed with the UN Security Council to justify its use of force, the U.S. made three arguments. First, it said that there was an ongoing armed conflict; second, it said it was invoking its own right of self-defence against the Iranian regime; and third, the collective self-defence against Iran.
You seem well aware of these three.
Senator Woo: Abused by them.
Ms. Netley: In the normal course, it is for the state that is using force to justify its use of force. These are the justifications the U.S. used. We would evaluate their description of the potential for an existing ongoing conflict or for their justification of self-defence as more novel arguments. I am not able to disclose what our advice and conclusions were with respect to that particular use of force right now.
I will also say that there is more information that might be required that the U.S. and Israel might have had at their disposal that we do not have at our disposal, not being the ones that were implicated in this decision making.
Senator Woo: We wait with bated breath.
Your presentation essentially frames our position as continuing to oppose the Iranian regime. I’m trying to think about what that means as the war proceeds. Does it mean that if the U.S. and Israel continue their kinetic effects, including the disruption of civilian infrastructure and heritage sites and hospitals and so on, we essentially, fundamentally will support it because it will lead to the destruction of the Iranian regime? Even if we don’t participate, is it our position that we want to see the regime destroyed? That seems to be the position we are taking.
Mr. Lévêque: It has been a long-held position of successive Canadian governments that the Iranian regime was one of the most appalling in the world and that, yes, we would very much like to see different governance, a different type of leadership in Iran that respects its people.
Senator Woo: Even through the use of force?
Mr. Lévêque: The thing is when you hear the expression “regime change,” this has the connotation of externally imposed regime change. Canada does not pronounce on this. We don’t have a favourite candidate in mind. What we do see and have been advocating for over decades is a different governance model, far greater respect for human rights and fundamental rights for Iranians and, honestly, an end to the export of terrorism and warfare throughout the region and beyond.
Senator MacDonald: I have met and spoken to quite a few Persians over the years, and many of them have never been back to Iran because they don’t feel safe going back. They think their lives would be in danger. We have 1,200 that have been in Iran, and they’re coming back home to Canada. They must have assumed their life was not in danger if they went over there.
I’m curious how they’re vetted when they’re coming back. We know we have at least 700, maybe twice or three times that, of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps running around this country, and nobody has been removed. We just had a guy murdered in British Columbia by two people because of this. When these people are coming back, I’m not judging them, but how are they vetted by the Department of Immigration?
Mr. Lévêque: Senator, you just alluded in your last comment to the fact that, obviously, some of this work is outside the purview of Global Affairs. There are two different groups that you have been referring to. One is Canadians, dual nationals. Some of them have been going back and forth. Those are Canadian citizens. They will always be allowed to come back to the country. They are not foreign citizens, so this is their home. If they have a valid passport and citizenship, they come back here.
Senator MacDonald: I’m not questioning that.
Mr. Lévêque: No, but you said, “those who have been going back and forth.” The people whose return we have facilitated are Canadians. We do not provide consular services for Iranian citizens trying to flee the country. We provide that to Canadian citizens who require assistance in exiting a war zone.
As to potential IRGC members or Iranian nationals, again, I would need to defer to our security agencies and our Department of Immigration as to how they process the applications, and this is an ongoing discussion.
Where we come in is by always checking things against lists of known IRGC members. As I said, we have listed a great number of them. Those who are, regardless of whether they are specifically mentioned by name in our sanctions annexes, in our sanctions listing, if they are known, recognized members of the IRGC, they are de facto barred from entering the country.
There have been public reports in the past alluding to some individuals with association. Often these refer to cases that are dated years back and are no longer here, but with any given piece of information that we are provided on specific individuals, specific sightings, we share those immediately with security agencies and with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to have a closer look at it. If they are deemed inadmissible, they will be deported.
Senator MacDonald: We have to get security people in to chat with them about this.
The Chair: Senator, I think this is a topic that is not going to go away very quickly, so I’m sure we can return to that.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to all of you for joining us repeatedly. It is unfortunate, in a way, because of the topics we are covering, but we are certainly glad you are here today.
In this conflict, a number of desalination plants have been hit both in Iran and in other Gulf nations. Water was mentioned earlier, but in terms of other Gulf nations, with Iran threatening irreversible destruction of water infrastructure across the Gulf countries if the U.S. follows through on its continued threats to attack Iran’s electricity grid, how big is the risk of a water crisis in the Gulf? As this crisis unfolds, is there any discussion of what role Canada might play if access to water in the region plummets or drops to disastrous levels?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. You raise an essential question.
The short answer is the destruction of desalination plants would have catastrophic effects on one of the vital elements of human life anywhere. It is particularly exacerbated in the Gulf because that is the largest source of clean, drinkable water. Look at the geography of the region with its very large deserts. The vast majority of potable water comes from the sea through desalination and through enormous infrastructure, with aqueducts that bring fresh water to very large cities. This would be absolutely catastrophic, and it’s why the government has several times commented on the fact that it is essential that the civilian critical infrastructure be spared from any attacks.
There have been some strikes. They’ve had, thankfully, somewhat limited effects or impacts because there was no complete destruction. It happened on both sides. It is difficult to tell at this point whether it was deliberate or accidental. We do consider any deliberate action against civilian critical infrastructure, which these plants would be, to be a war crime. We’ll denounce it absolutely and discourage it every chance we get.
We haven’t yet thought through what Canada’s contribution could be. Mind you, while we have a lot of fresh water, it is not conceivable to export this water halfway across the world, from a logistics point of view. Any contribution, should this come to pass, would need to be in the context of urgent, expedited repairs and reconstruction of these facilities.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Wilson: Whether or not we agree with the tactics of Operation Epic Fury, it seems pretty obvious that there was no exit plan and that the uprisings that we had seen in Iran in recent months had maybe created this — it is probably overly simplistic to describe it this way, but the U.S. administration seemed to think that if you blow up all the leaders and the military assets, the people will rise up and take over. That’s kind of how it feels.
We had a delegation here with a former U.S. national security adviser who told us a story about speaking truth to power and the advice being given that regime change is not a military exercise. That really sticks with me.
I am curious to know what you think. What should be the next steps in terms of dealing with the situation? Are there measures in place, working with our allies, to do that? Is there a big gap with the U.S. not being properly at the table in that? I would be interested in that.
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you. It is a very complex question but a very good one. Let me try to break it down.
Obviously, I can’t speak to what ultimately motivated the U.S. decision to start taking kinetic actions, nor can I really comment on what assumptions they made. I would say, first, it appears that U.S. objectives and Israeli objectives were overlapping but not completely identical in joining efforts in conducting this war.
A lot of noise has been heard in the public space about this. The leadership in Israel has been pretty open about what it wants to achieve. It has even taken over air waves a few times, forcefully, to convey messages to the Iranian population to encourage them to rise up. That’s definitely something they were hoping to achieve and maybe still do.
We heard various comments from the U.S. leadership on this that have gone as far as pushing for and hoping for regime change and then sometimes falling back on pure military objectives and the weakening of Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile ambitions, et cetera.
From our point of view and our analysis at Global Affairs, it is not really surprising us to see that the strikes, even four weeks in, have not led to immediate regime change or natural uprisings in the streets. That is because our understanding all along has been that the Iranian regime has much deeper roots than one might think. The IRGC has what I like to refer to as complete vertical integration of penetration into all segments of society, whether it be business, infrastructure, research, religion, security and political. Assessed to have around 190,000 members, the IRGC is a national police, a militia, a domestic spying agency — it does all of that — and there is a well-established succession regime pattern prepared in case of senior leadership being eliminated. When you know this, it is not really surprising that cutting the head of the snake doesn’t make the entire operation crumble.
In terms of what we can do, look, the question is still out there as to what kind of Iran and Iranian leadership will emerge from this war. Right now, it seems evident that the U.S. is pursuing a bilateral track to try to negotiate a ceasefire and an end to the war. We are hearing reports of talks, of negotiations, potentially taking place in Pakistan today. Then, where Canada can help is whatever seems to stick, whatever seems to start working. We will be in support of that because our main objective here is to de-escalate, to go back to political dialogue and to really lessen, if not eliminate, the impact on the innocent Gulf countries that have shown enormous restraint in not getting kinetically engaged in the war.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Youance: My question is in the same vein as that of Senator Wilson. When analyzing the situation in Iran, how does the Government of Canada assess the cultural, social and historical factors that influence the relationship between the government, the Iranian state and its people? To what extent do these factors help us to understand the potential or limitations of a popular uprising against the current regime?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you very much for your question. First, it is important to mention that there is an enormous fundamental difference between the level of education and the level of exposure to the outside world, despite the restrictions and repressive regime imposed on ordinary Iranians. It is a theocratic regime of repression, as we have seen in other countries where the government serves as a state institution and attempts to crush all hope. However, given human nature, the thirst for knowledge and freedom, and above all, the very rich cultural and academic culture of Iranians, it can be said that individuals can be killed and institutions destroyed, but an idea can never be killed.
Parents, people who knew Iran before the theocratic regime, can talk to their children. They find ways to use VPNs to get around information restrictions. They are able to continue instilling hope, which means that most of the population continues to hold onto hope. This does not make the restrictions or the regime’s enforcement of them any less heavy-handed, but it makes it impossible to know what solutions could come out of this.
There is no organized political opposition in Iran. There would no doubt be popular support for an alternative, regardless of what it looked like, but repression, violence and arrests are so prevalent that, as soon as anyone suggests an alternative to the regime’s theocratic ideology, most Iranians choose to simply hunker down and try to find a way to survive while maintaining their dignity and their ability to put food on the table.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Adler: If Canada is serious about being a leader of the middle powers of the world — as shorthand or a bridge to Davos — which seems to be something that many Canadians embraced and many people around the world congratulated our Prime Minister for, what is the advantage of us not having an embassy in Tehran?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. I think I alluded to this a little bit earlier. Governments of the past have made choices, and they are not completely incompatible, but there is some mutual exclusion to wanting to play a role and wanting to be on the side of those who criticize, exclude from the world community, the most abhorrent regimes. It will be for governments present and future to decide which way to go on Iran. Wanting to play a greater mediation role may mean softening our approach to Iran. Right now, that is not in the cards. The resolve to criticize, to isolate, to inflict as much pain as possible on the regime is the continued policy. It’s why we have one of the most restrictive and exclusive sanctions and otherwise controlled engagement regimes towards Iran.
Choices have to be made on this. That’s as far as I can go in describing the current position and obviously cannot presume what the government might want to do in the future.
The only other thing I would add is exclusion and isolation of nefarious regimes work best when as many countries as possible apply that logic. If you apply sanctions on a country and they are able to conduct sanctions evasion because large economies still trade with them, you will be more limited. If we want to continue to apply pressure on the Iranian regime and force it to change its behaviour internationally, regionally but also toward its citizens, we need to convince as many other countries as possible — not just the usual like-minded ones — to apply similar pressure and get them to recognize that this is not just about how Iran treats its own people but about how it is an enormously destabilizing force, particularly in the Middle East.
Senator Adler: But does it diminish our ability to help play a role in peace and even regime change if we have no representation there?
Mr. Lévêque: If what you are referring to is whether it impacts our ability to directly offer mediation, yes, I would argue it does. I go back to my many lateral expression ways. This is the Gulf countries’ region, their neighbourhood, and they have no choice but to deal with Iran. They are right across the strait or right across the Gulf. They need to have transportation, air traffic; everything is more integrated, but they can benefit from outside parties helping with the talks. This is where we play a role.
Minister Anand, for example, is in France today, meeting with her G7 counterparts. I can assure you that at least 50% of the conversations will be on Iran and how the G7, in its own way, can complement what the U.S. is doing bilaterally to see if there are ways in asymmetrical geometry to lend some support to identifying de-escalation paths that, ultimately, everybody in the region is in favour of.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I have a question about tradecraft. I remember the second Iraq War. I was posted in Washington. Prime Minister Chrétien decided we would not become a co-belligerent. We are in a similar decision phase now in that Canada is not a belligerent in this particular war, but back then we still had access to the highest levels of U.S. officialdom. We were invited to the briefings, along with a few other countries. I can think of Germany, which was also not part of the then coalition of the willing. Do you have access? Do you have contact with high levels of U.S. officialdom? Are they talking to us?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you. That’s a great question, Mr. Chair. Yes, we absolutely have access at all levels. It would not be an exaggeration to say that our colleagues in Washington have mastered and even created envy in many other countries represented in the U.S. because of our ability to reach deep into the various political machines, both Democratic and Republican. This is not just dealing with the U.S. Department of State and the White House but having ongoing, constant contact with all movers and shakers, whether it be senators, members of Congress in general, staffers, think tanks, et cetera, because it is an ecosystem that allows us to inform and advocate, and things percolate up to the top.
We have an excellent rapport with the State Department among the professionals in the very senior ranks. We speak on a regular basis. Minister Anand was talking to Secretary Rubio on Monday afternoon, and they had a detailed conversation about this. Part of what she does then is advocate and say, “We see what you are doing. What is your strategy? Here is what we would recommend.” That’s taken on board with a lot of open‑mindedness and candour.
This White House also operates unlike many White Houses of the past in that decision making is extremely centralized and there are some unusual sources of advice. It’s not because the advice is unusual but because it’s the people who are not part of the institutions are often the ones providing advice directly to the President. On this, we know that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have been among the close advisers to the President, and the extent to which he takes that or not, nobody knows. It is also interesting to see that, in the current round of talks and mediation efforts, Vice President Vance seems to be in the seat. It is difficult to know exactly how all of that advice is taken on board.
Back to your original point, we do have entry points at all levels in the U.S. system. It allows us to convey with trust and transparency what we think would be most helpful to our interests but also to theirs.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Ravalia: Do we have any assumption of where Reza Pahlavi stands in the potential succession in the new Iran? There has been much talk about that, as he is the son of the former shah, but that regime itself had many warts, including a terrible secret police, which I think is ingrained in the memories of Iranians.
Mr. Lévêque: That’s an excellent question. There has been a lot of self-promotion on the part of Reza Pahlavi. It is difficult, again, given the limited access we have to what is going on inside Iran, but I will make a bit of a detour on this to say we have enough insights because of the friendly countries that have embassies. Think of Italy, Switzerland, Germany, France, the U.K., Australia. We are in frequent communication with them, and, of course, even they have limited access to human rights defenders and potential political opposition.
Our best assessment is that, at best, the support that seems to be spontaneously being surfaced for Pahlavi was probably marginal. He has no base to speak of. I mean, he was the son of the shah and has lived almost his entire life in exile in the United States. It goes back to the point I was making earlier. In order to have a political alternative, you need a base. You need to have a grassroots movement, and that doesn’t exist for him. He has a good communications machine from the outside. It’s not clear that it will translate into an uprising that would welcome back what was a hereditary monarchy in many ways.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Ataullahjan: Going back to what Senator Coyle said, the Pakistan foreign minister, Mr. Dar, just said that Iran is deliberating the 15 points that the U.S. has given them. How hopeful are we? Iranian officials are saying that the U.S. proposal to end the war is one-sided, but diplomacy is still open.
One other thing — you said, “to prevent further escalation.” What could that possibly be?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. There always has to be hope when we hear of mediation and exchanges of proposals. Having said this, hope is not a strategy. You will have heard that adage.
We are encouraged, I would say, by the fact that there clearly seems to be a desire — we will see how firm the determination is — for both sides to talk and try to find a de-escalatory path. Because hope is not a strategy, we will continue to explore — and this is what I was referring to earlier, what is being discussed, probably right now, as we speak, in France at the foreign ministers’ meeting — other potential paths so that if this one, these direct talks, doesn’t succeed, we will be able to think of other paths toward de-escalation. That’s the role Canada will play.
What I mean by how things could further escalate, Gulf countries could start reacting not just in a defensive way but in an offensive way. So far, all they have done was use their air defences to stop drones, missiles and attacks on their territory and on civilian infrastructure. If they decide enough is enough, and they decide to start retaliating with their own strikes, then we’re really talking about a full regional war. At that point, the danger of miscalculations, the danger of hitting civilian centres and civilian infrastructure with catastrophic impacts, this is what the concern is.
Senator Coyle: We are all trying to get in all our questions. Mr. Laporte, I think this question might be for you: an assessment, if you could, briefly, of the military strength of Iran at this moment. Is there anything you might want to add on the nuclear threat and anything in relation to the relationship with the BRICS?
Eric Laporte, Acting Director General, International Security Policy and Strategic Affairs, Global Affairs Canada: Certainly. That’s a good question, senator. Thank you so much for it.
What we’ve seen throughout the war is a steady degradation of Iranian capabilities, as Mr. Lévêque mentioned, in terms of its ballistic missile capabilities and the targeting of drone capabilities. The nuclear program was more or less destroyed last summer, except for some highly enriched uranium that is buried somewhere.
That being said, we understood before the war that Iran had a stockpile of approximately 4,000 ballistic missiles. It has probably fired about 1,000 of those. The U.S. and Israel have gone after the launcher capabilities. That’s kind of the weak link in the chain, but they still have some. Those are still there.
As for the Iranian forces themselves, the navy has been pretty much decimated, but the Iranian regime has a number of security forces at its disposal. They have the IRGC, which is the regime’s military, but they also have the Iranian national army. Together, that’s a force that is probably about 800,000 strong. As was mentioned earlier, it is a regime that is built for survival, with multiple layers of redundancies and security institutions that watch over each other in addition to defending the country.
My assessment is that it is still fairly resilient, although —
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Woo: We know what the GCC position is: They don’t like being attacked; I understand. They’re hosting U.S. bases, and that’s the rationale that Iran is offering. I know what the leadership is saying, and it resonates with their past positions.
What is the public thinking in the Gulf countries? Is there a shift in the broader picture here: dependence on the U.S. military, being the target of a war they didn’t start but as collateral damage essentially caused by being an ally of the U.S.? What’s your read on that?
Mr. Lévêque: That’s an excellent question, senator, because it is very clear to us, in talking to both the Gulf Cooperation Council country leadership as well as its inhabitants, that they never saw this coming. The impact it has had on their sense of collective security is ground-shaking. You expect many things when you travel to the Gulf, but one of them is to always feel secure and safe from anything from petty theft to assault, to armed conflict.
So I think it’s important not to underestimate how much of a shock this has been to populations and to the leadership, who really thought the calibration of their careful engagement with Iran, having the United States as a strategic and military partner, as well as some of them having started small steps of rapprochement with Israel — that the longer term was keeping all of this in balance, and that has been upset massively right now.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: I will pick up on Senator Ravalia’s question. He took a half of my question; I will give you the other half.
There are organizations like the National Council of Resistance that have been around for 40 years. How do you weigh their support compared to the shah’s son? Is there a route there, a pathway where they could both work together, where he could be — I don’t know — even a constitutional monarch with a duly elected secular, democratic government? Is there a pathway there? Can they work together, or is there a big divergence in those two groups? Is there a third option with the base that we’re not talking about?
Mr. Lévêque: These are all possibilities, senator, to be honest. I will go back perhaps to the comment I made earlier. When I say we are not advocates of regime change, I really do mean it. So us trying to pedal with various actors and say, “Maybe we could . . .” — we’re observers. We’re analysts on this. There is absolutely no desire on the part of Canada. It is not part of our foreign policy to meddle in internal affairs, to prop up certain groups over others.
What we do is collect information. We engage and listen to those who —
Senator MacDonald: But what intelligence do you have on these groups?
Mr. Lévêque: We will talk about information gathering rather than intelligence, which, of course, I could not reveal in this setting.
It’s impossible to answer that just because, as much as we can see the desires some of these exiled groups have, it’s impossible for us to see how much of that could actually translate into something that could take root inside the country. Again, that’s because we have little visibility on this, not being there ourselves, but also because of the absolute control that the IRGC maintains on all segments of society, so it is difficult to see —
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: We are talking about Iran, but there is a place called Gaza, which we have not heard about lately. I don’t want a Gaza update, but I wonder if, when we look at this, with Gaza having their primary patron weakened and otherwise occupied, could a potential silver lining be the weakening or even the end of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad?
Mr. Lévêque: Everything is connected in the Middle East. Absolutely, what you say is not lost on us. The fact that the world is watching another theatre of operations does not mean that we the professionals — we are not like Little League five‑year‑old soccer players who all follow the ball. We know how to spread out and look a little bit everywhere. We are still watching this very closely. As a matter of fact, we were among those who asked that the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting which is taking place today also include a conversation about Gaza and about the Gaza peace process, because it is not progressing as quickly as we would like. Israel’s position, having further restricted aid going into Gaza, claiming security threats, is also something we are watching closely and advocating for.
You didn’t mention it, senator, but there is Lebanon. Maybe that will be for a future invitation if you should have me back.
The Chair: That is a good moment to say that we do expect to address this topic and related topics again.
On behalf of the committee, to Assistant Deputy Minister Lévêque, Director General Laporte and Legal Adviser Netley, our thanks. We are grateful for the job that you do. We appreciate it, and please take that gratitude back to your very dedicated teams.
Colleagues, for our second panel, we are pleased to welcome, by video conference, Pierre Pahlavi, Professor of International Security in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College. Welcome. With us in the room, we welcome Dennis Horak, former Canadian head of mission in Iran from 2009 to 2012 and our former ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2018.
We are ready for your opening remarks. Mr. Horak, you have the floor.
Dennis Horak, Retired Diplomat, as an individual: Thank you. No one should be surprised that an attack on Iran quickly turned into a region-wide conflict with global economic repercussions. Iran spent decades building a regional network of proxies — known collectively as the Axis of Resistance — and a formidable missile program for just such an eventuality. Threats to the Strait of Hormuz go back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.
For Iran, the threat of a wider, deadlier conflict was meant to deter an attack by the U.S. or Israel or spread the pain if war came, to enhance Iran’s leverage in bringing it to an end. All of this has been a core feature of the Iranian playbook for years.
At this stage, it is not clear how this war will end. But it is a safe bet that its impact will be felt across the region long after the shooting stops.
Various scenarios remain possible. At one extreme, the Iranian state could collapse, resulting in civil war, chaos, new terrorist groups and massive refugee flows, as we saw in Syria. At the other end of the spectrum, theoretically, the war could lead to regime change and the emergence of a new, moderate and democratic leadership in Tehran.
Frankly, both possibilities seem highly unlikely at this point. The Islamic Republic has proven to be much more resilient than many in Washington and Jerusalem seem to have anticipated — though, again, this was largely foreseeable. The regime seems certain to survive this war, and for them that means victory, no matter how badly they have been weakened.
In an ideal world, the remnants of the regime would take a hard look at how they got here. What has 47 years of revolutionary zeal, regional meddling, support for terrorism and open hostility towards Israel gotten them besides blown-up buildings, a population that largely despises them and economic stagnation? The region would embrace an Iran that makes different choices, even if the regime itself survives.
But we don’t live in an ideal world. The most likely outcome is a regime that is more hardline, perhaps even vengeful. But they will take some lessons from the war, and changes will come, particularly with regards to Iran’s role and impact in the region.
The regime will take comfort from its survival and tout its victory far and wide. Supporters will cheer the success of the resistance. But reality will set in quickly. Faced with wide destruction, a severely degraded military, economic hardship and a still restive population, the regime will also have to focus on tending to its own garden for a time, and that could be good news for the region.
Some in the regime, now more dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, may see an ideological need to rebuild Iran’s proxy networks. But at the same time, there will likely be others wondering whether the money, effort and risk of building a new resistance axis are justified by the very limited return on investment Iran received when war finally did come.
Proxies had value in Iran’s war planning and ideological mission, but, in the end, the regime will have survived because of what it was able to do, not its proxies or allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza or Yemen.
Even if they want to rebuild the Axis of Resistance, the ground may not be as fertile as it once was. The Lebanese people and government, for example, have grown tired of being drawn into wars with Israel by Hezbollah. Building Hezbollah back better will be a tough slog for Tehran, unless a sustained Israeli presence in southern Lebanon helps them get back off the mat.
An Iran that’s either less inclined or less able to meddle in regional affairs could make dealing with the region’s many problems less intractable. Tehran didn’t create Lebanese sectarianism or the Houthis in Yemen, but they exploited these challenges, pushing an agenda that suited Tehran first. Taking Iran out of the equation would be a plus for the region.
While the regime will emerge from this war emboldened by its successes, there will also be voices in the new leadership who recognize how close things came this time and will look to ensure that the existential threat they faced does not return.
It would be tragically ironic if this war, ostensibly launched to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, ended up serving as the catalyst for Iran to definitively move to get one.
It would be a risky strategy, but some will no doubt conclude that nuclear weapons are the only real deterrent to a future attack. While Iran’s nuclear program has no doubt been severely degraded, you can’t bomb away knowledge. The real challenge will be to figure out a way to get there undetected.
The war has been a wake-up call or a reminder for Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbours. While they have resisted being drawn in as belligerents in this war, it hasn’t saved them from being targets. Efforts over the past few years to reconcile with Iran made no difference once missiles and drones started flying. Even those Gulf states that have most actively cultivated good relations with Iran for years — Qatar and especially Oman — have been hit. Decades of distrust of Iran have been vindicated and reinforced these past few weeks.
Iran’s decision to target civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states made tactical sense for Tehran, but it may prove to have been a strategic blunder. Iran has long aimed to have the U.S. leave the region, but Tehran’s decision to hit civilian targets in the Gulf states will likely only reinforce the partnerships they have forged with the U.S., other Western countries and now even Israel.
This war started with a lot of questions, including why. It will end with even more uncertainty. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Professor Pahlavi please.
[Translation]
Pierre Pahlavi, Professor of International Security, Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College (As an Individual): Good morning. Thank you to the Senate committee for giving me this opportunity to speak to such an important issue. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have on specific aspects of it, but I want to start by providing a broader picture.
In Canada in particular, we have a tendency to look at the conflict through a very regional or moral and ethical lens, especially when it comes to references to international law. However, while we need to keep that perspective in mind, it is also important to look at the situation in Iran through the lens of the rivalry between the United States and China. Iran plays a very important role in that rivalry, and I will explain why. Iran is an interface in this systemic competition between the U.S. and China, which extends to Canada and affects our interests, so I think it is very important to look at this from a broader perspective.
As we see every day in media reports and commentaries, at first glance, the actions of the U.S., of the Trump administration, seem to be improvised, opportunistic and strategically disorganized. However some of my colleagues and experts, such as Stephen Walt from Harvard University, are starting to put forward the hypothesis that while the Trump administration’s policy may be chaotic, it is not completely incoherent. Behind the political media hubbub is a much more coherent strategy targeting structural objectives and that must be taken into account. These objectives are basically centred on disrupting systemic networks that, according to Washington, unduly or disproportionately benefit Beijing.
We are talking here about energy corridors, trade corridors and financial and logistical networks, including some illegal supply chains. All of the initiatives developed in recent months have one thing in common: They seek to counter Chinese influence. In South America, this is being achieved by targeting China’s and BRICS’s forward support points, key crossing points, notably the Panama Canal.
In the Arctic and Greenland, the idea is to contain China’s ambitions. China is claiming to be a near-Arctic state and has shown a continued interest in the critical minerals and shipping routes there. Even the warming of relations with Russia can be seen as an attempt to weaken the Sino-Russian axis and to prevent the emergence of an anti-western bloc centred on Russia and China that would include Iran.
In short, the idea is to weaken the ecosystem that the People’s Republic of China has put in place in recent years. You will no doubt ask me what that has to do with Iran. Why is Iran so crucial for China? You are no doubt aware that Iran is a strategic linchpin in China’s global strategy. Chinese strategists are quite open and honest in saying that Iran is vital to China.
Here are three key points: China takes up approximately 85% to 90% of Iran’s oil exports, and the two countries forged a strategic partnership by signing an agreement in 2021 that covers technological, military, security and economic considerations. Iran has joined the BRICS+ organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and it is important to note that this cooperation between Beijing and Iran has accelerated since the 12-day war in June 2025. There has been an acceleration in security, military and technological cooperation. Iran is therefore a key link in China’s strategic security system, and it seems that, right or wrong, Washington believes that any pressure on Iran will indirectly weaken China’s power projection.
Last question: How does this affect us here in Canada? Canada would be wrong to think that it is on the sidelines of this systemic competition between China and the United States. We are part of the North American strategic space, and our resources, energy and critical minerals are among the geopolitical assets at the heart of this rivalry. We cannot stand on the sidelines. We are part of this rivalry, whether we like it or not.
Until now, we have been wrong to limit our analysis of this issue to looking at it through a regional lens, where we see Iran as a distant, isolated country; through a normative and moral lens based on international law; or through a Canada-centred lens, where we treat it with indifference because Iran is far away and this does not concern us. As the previous witness said, everything in the Middle East is interconnected, and the same is true on a global scale.
As a result, I think it is important for Canada to adopt a systemic, realistic and comprehensive approach that would take into account these interconnections and their implications for Canada, particularly with a view to anticipating the indirect effects of the current war and developing a long-term perspective on energy interests, alliances and supply chains.
I will close by summarizing and saying that Iran is just a symptom of a much larger rivalry between the American and Chinese superpowers. Canada is very much a part of that equation. We need to wake up to that reality.
I am not the only one who thinks this way. This is not just one person’s hunch. More and more researchers are starting to take into account this idea of systemic competition. They include authors such as Matthew Kroenig, Hal Brands, Stephen Walt, Jonathan Fulton, Vali Nasr and my Canadian colleague Wesley Wark. We need to take all of this into account. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have about more specific aspects of this issue.
The Chair: Thank you for your presentation, Professor Pahlavi. We will now move on to questions.
[English]
Senator Woo: I wanted to ask about your assessment of Israel’s position coming out of this war. It would seem to me that the war was fundamentally provoked by Israel and that, according to reports, the U.S. went into it at the urging of the Israeli government.
You have talked a lot about how Iran and the Gulf states might emerge. How do you think Israel might emerge from this war? To the extent that Israel is emboldened by success in this fight, what does that mean for its policies in Palestine?
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: Thank you for the question, senator. The Israelis are determined to see this through. In June 2025, they knew that they had started something that they had to finish. They make no secret of the fact that they want to bring about a regime change in Iran and promote a restructuring of regional balance. That goes well beyond Gaza, Palestine and Iran.
The Israelis have their own agenda. Israeli analysts are currently talking more and more about Türkiye, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood. We must bear in mind that Iran is just one chapter in a much more long-term plan. I don’t think the Israelis started this war. They forced the pace. They were in a hurry. They rushed things. However, as I mentioned in my presentation, the Trump administration had its own objectives and it also has a long-term perspective that goes beyond the Middle East and is much more global in scope.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Woo: Thank you.
Mr. Horak: I also don’t think that Israel was pushing Washington on this. If they were pushing at all, they were pushing on an open door. The animosity of the Trump administration towards Iran was well known.
In terms of how they come out of this, we have to go back to October 7. That was a traumatic experience for the Israelis, and there was realization that things had to change, come what may. We have seen Gaza. We have seen Lebanon. Now, we’ve seen Iran both last June and now. Israel does want a different dynamic to exist there. Iran has been weakened. The Axis of Resistance has been weakened. They want to deal with Hezbollah. The Lebanese government is shifting a little bit, although I don’t think they have the power to do all that much with Hezbollah at this stage. But Israel does want a different dynamic in this region.
I think there was a bit of divergence between Washington and Jerusalem on how far this war goes. The Israelis, I think, are concerned that the regime will survive and that it will rebuild, that it may acquire nuclear weapons — all of these things. But for the moment, at least in the short run, I think they are satisfied or hopeful that the kinds of pressures they felt from Iranian meddling and Iranian support for terrorist groups across the region have been weakened. Certainly, we’ve seen that in Syria.
Ideally, they would want a Syria kind of result — that it would be sort of chaotic in Iran for a while and that they would be so focused internally.
Again, the Israelis may have overestimated what they were able to achieve, as has Washington. We’ll see have to see how things go forward, what sort of peace agreement there will be and all the various elements that are involved in that.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Colleagues, I want to remind you to direct your questions to one of the two witnesses or indicate if you want both of them to respond. That would be great.
Senator MacDonald: I will direct my question to both witnesses because we have two great witnesses here. It’s great to have both of you here.
I want to go back to something I brought up with the previous panel. What if this regime does collapse? Let’s say it works out the way the world would like and they are gone; how do you see the vacuum being filled?
I was at a rally a few weeks ago in Halifax. Most of the people there were carrying the old flag and pushing for the shah. I saw that. But there is a National Council of Resistance that has been around for 40 years. Where is the traction? Who has the critical mass to do something if there is a regime change?
Mr. Horak: That’s the problem. There isn’t any. There isn’t a viable opposition. The monarchists, as mentioned by the previous panellists — former colleagues of mine — have been great at public relations. They’ve been great at getting the posters out and the flags flying, particularly among the diaspora around the world. He is a figure whom people recognize. Insofar as there is internal support within Iran for him, I think it’s because his is the only name out there that anyone recognizes, not because there’s any love for a return of the monarchy.
I don’t think it has much traction within Iran. In terms of trying to bring together various opposition groups, there have been efforts over the years by the monarchists and others to build some sort of unified opposition. They have failed miserably, often because the monarchists themselves are very arrogant in terms of their approach to these other groups.
In terms of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which has changed its name dozens of times over the last 40 years, it’s basically the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, or the MEK. It’s Maryam Rajavi, and they are nuts, to put it frankly. They’re crazy. It’s a cult in a lot of respects. You see some of the meetings that they have there. When I was in Iran, you would mention them, and people would laugh. There is zero support for them within Iran. There is actually quite a lot of animosity toward them. They were involved with the Iran-Iraq War. They did support Saddam Hussein. No, they have zero traction; in fact, quite the opposite.
So there is nobody; that’s the problem. In terms of trying to do regime change from the air, it never works to begin with. We saw that in Libya, for example, amongst other places.
But there is also nothing to fill that vacuum. We saw in Iraq, they had various Iraqi exile groups. I met a number of them when I was posted in London. They all had interesting ideas, but, again, they had no traction within Iraq. It took years for some of these guys to work their way into the system. One of them ended up becoming prime minister at one point.
It’s really hard to have these exiled groups standing and ready to go. Even when you think you have them, as they did in Iraq, they get there and it’s a disaster. It’s chaos. It’s problematic. If there were to be a vacuum, someone within the country, whether it’s a faction of the military — not the IRGC — or some other group of notables within the country, might somehow be able to step in, with the backing of people who have weapons. Because that’s another big part of the problem: The ones who are in control have the weapons and the ideological commitment. So it’s really hard to see how regime change would function. The best we can hope for is that the regime itself changes its behaviour, and, again, I don’t think that’s realistic at this point.
Senator Wilson: My question is directed to Mr. Horak, but I would be happy if both witnesses had time to answer.
Actually, you answered most of my question in response to Senator MacDonald’s question. It was very similar. I just want to continue that discussion.
Is there any possible pathway, no matter how narrow, for regime change? What would it take? Who would be able to do it? What sort of constellation of things needs to happen?
Mr. Horak: I don’t think there is a viable pathway at this point, again, unless there are elements within the country that we’re not aware of that may be able to step in if a complete vacuum were created. Then there is a possibility. Beyond that, I don’t see one.
Senator Wilson: You also said that if there were folks in the country who were prepared to do that, they would need to be backed up by some military strength. Is that not an opportunity for some kind of coalition from outside with those internal folks? I don’t know enough about Iran to know these things.
Mr. Horak: I’m sure there have been efforts to reach out to various elements. I’m sure that has happened. The monarchists have said they have allies within the military, and, again, I would take that with a grain of salt. But it will take something internal and somebody who has power. That could lead to civil war; that is entirely a possibility as well. It depends on how much the state collapses, but, as we’ve seen, they are very institutionally resilient.
The Chair: Did you want Professor Pahlavi to answer?
Senator Wilson: Yes, that would be great.
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: For a regime change to occur, two essential conditions must be met. Brute force, bombing and military intervention are not enough. There must be defections within Iran’s political and military systems. However, to date, we have seen very little defection or division among the political decision-makers, namely the mullahs or the Shiite clerics, or within the military forces, namely, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular army, the Basij militia.
The second condition is the will of the people to put an end to this regime. Although it is very difficult to quantify, it is currently estimated that 15% of Iranians support the existing mullah regime. We are essentially talking about family members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who control 60% of the economy, are deeply embedded in the system and therefore have no interest in a regime change. The vast majority of Iranians, whether ethnic minorities, women, political opponents or all manner of dissidents, want a regime change.
Now the question is this: What sort of regime? As some people have mentioned, Reza Pahlavi cannot provide that change alone. What is more, he has never expressed a desire to take the throne and replace his father. Although we in the western world have a hard time listening to him, what he is saying is that he, as an Iranian, would like to play a coordinating role to ensure that elections are held and that the Iranian people are consulted. Ultimately, that is the solution: A democracy.
Iran has a highly developed civil society. It was the first country in the Middle East to adopt a constitution, which it did in 1906. Iran was a democracy at least until 1953, when Operation Ajax was carried out. Iran is better equipped to hold elections than any other country in the Middle East. I think that we need to seriously consider Reza Pahlavi’s offer, not to restore a monarchy, but to hold a people’s referendum and to let Iranians have their say. The political landscape is deeply divided. We just need to trust Iranians.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Coyle: I would like to ask a related question to both witnesses. First, I would like to hear Mr. Horak’s reaction to what Mr. Pahlavi has told us about the bigger geopolitical play here: U.S.-China. Then I would like to ask Mr. Pahlavi if he could elaborate on what he sees as the impacts of this war on China to this point.
Mr. Horak: I do agree, to a point, that the rivalry between the U.S. and China is heating up, and it will be reflected in various crises around the world. I don’t think that’s disputable. I’m not sure I would ascribe the level of strategic coherence to this operation that putting it within the China context perhaps implies. The Trump administration has other drivers, although I’m not sure that’s particularly coherent either.
In the broader picture, it does exist, but I’m just not sure it is what drove this operation here.
Senator Coyle: We heard it from others before you, and you’ve mentioned others, Dr. Pahlavi, so could you tell us more about that and on its impact to this point on China?
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: Thank you for the question, senator.
I think that the People’s Republic of China is very concerned about the situation in the Middle East. As I mentioned earlier, 90% of Iran’s oil exports go to China. China is one of its main customers.
I travelled to Caucasus. I saw the development of the Chinese silk roads. Chinese trucks pass through Iran on their way to Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is an essential component of China’s belt and road initiative. Iran and China are strategic partners. They conduct joint military exercises. For the moment, China is observing because the Chinese are cautious. They have huge strategic reserves, which means that, unlike Japan and other countries in the region, they can hold out for longer. However, in the longer term, they risk losing a very important partner.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here. I would like a response from both of you to my question. We know this conflict can go a number of ways. The concern I have is Iran’s inclination to lob missiles to Türkiye. Thankfully, these missiles have been intercepted thus far, but, if they do get through, could this cause Article 5 to be implemented, and would Canada then have to answer the call or be pulled into the conflict to help prop up an alliance that is already being stressed?
Mr. Horak: It is part of the Iranian effort to widen the war, widen the pain, increase pressure to bring the war to an end. The couple of shots they took at Türkiye, it’s sort of a shot across the bow, literally, to NATO that this thing could get a lot wider. So they’re trying to engage all of the NATO partners and others, all of the Gulf countries and other countries in the region to apply pressure on Israel and the United States to bring this to the end. That’s the objective of this wider war.
In terms of if Türkiye were actually hit, and damage was done, and Türkiye decided to invoke Article 5, then yes, we would have to respond and see how that would go. Türkiye wants good relations with Iran, has for some time, so they would try and de‑escalate it. It would take a pretty bad hit for Türkiye to start going down that road of Article 5.
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: In answer to that extremely important question, I would say that Türkiye is well within range of Iranian ballistic missiles. There have been some attacks in Turkish and Azerbaijani territory. To date, President Erdogan has condemned the American-Israeli operation, but Türkiye has its own agenda. It has amassed troops at the Iranian border.
In Baku, Azerbaijan has revived the rhetoric of a great Azerbaijan. It is important to know that there is a an Azerbaijan in Iran and there is the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is independent. The worst-case scenario would be a Turkish intervention to support the Iranian Azerbaijanis’ desire to separate. In the longer term, a breakup of Iranian territory could be a nightmare for the region.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Youance: My question is for Mr. Pahlavi.
You mentioned that we have entered a phase where conflicts are structured around strategic and economic interests. I would like to hear your thoughts on the fact that many news articles add a religious or almost messianic dimension to that, both in certain Israeli views and in the role of the United States in this war. What role does religion play in the current conflict? I would like you to tell me that it does not play any role because the articles I read talked about how the conflict could be turned into an almost existential fight.
Mr. Pahlavi: Thank you for your question, senator.
Yes, the Israelis have referred to the Bible. Yes, the Islamic regime is attributing religious connotations to its conflict. Yes, even the Americans and Secretary Pete Hegseth have made references to God. I believe that religious and theological symbols are being used to justify their actions. However, I don’t believe that this is an deep-seated motivation. It is a way of appealing to the public, particularly the Arab public, and legitimizing and justifying their actions and protecting themselves against these attacks.
[English]
Senator Adler: Ambassador Horak, earlier you responded to a question about Israel’s influence on this decision to go into Iran saying that if they were pushing the door, the door was wide open. I’m not here to question the motivations of the “blame the Jewish state” crowd. People can make up their own minds on what that’s about. What I would like you to focus on, if possible, is why President Trump’s ears and eyes and door were wide open.
Mr. Horak: Getting into Donald Trump’s mind is difficult. There are a few things at play here. They walked away from the original nuclear agreement in 2016 and wanted a better one but didn’t get a better one than Obama had. So, here we were; we were back negotiating again, and again the idea was that we were going to sort of keep Iran in the box here. It didn’t happen. There are questions about whether the two envoys he sent actually understood what was on the table. That’s a whole other issue.
Whether he actually believes they were weeks away from a nuclear weapon or not, it is really hard to say. There have been concerns about Iran’s role in the region and the risks that it poses to stability for the Gulf states, even though they have been having some better relations with Iran over time.
Also, it is entirely possible that he wants to be the guy who deals with all of these decades-long problems. Iran was one. Cuba is one. Venezuela has been one for a number of years. I think he wants the legacy of being the one who solved all of this. It sounds ridiculous that this would drive an American president, but that may be a factor in his decision making.
Senator Adler: Is it possible he just takes very seriously the idea that he is the ultimate “art of the deal” and that everything in the world can be solved by doing a deal?
Mr. Horak: Yes. I think that is part of the driver. It’s about him being the one — the only one — who can fix all of these things. Part of it is legacy reasons. Part of it is that they were legitimately concerned. The concerns that they had about Iran’s support for terrorism and its nuclear program, which was contained and then wasn’t contained, was damaged, was obliterated, and then maybe not — all of these things were legitimate concerns that Canada shared and a number of countries shared about Iran, without a realization that you are opening a Pandora’s box here. That’s where some of the rationality, if you will, gave way to the art of the deal, the legacy, all of that.
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: I have something I would like to add. It is shallow and irresponsible to try to blame everything on Donald Trump’s personality. We have a tendency to do that. It is a convenient but anecdotal way of looking at things. The Iranian regime has been a nightmare for the United States since the hostage taking in November 1979. For 47 years, Iran has been a long-standing adversary of the United States, not an existential threat, but a pebble in the United States’ shoe, and the door has always been open.
It is rather convenient to blame everything on Donald Trump and his colourful personality, but he is not responsible for all of the world’s problems.
[English]
The Chair: I’m going to ask a question, and then we will move into the second round. This is to you, Mr. Horak.
You were an ambassador in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is obviously a big actor in all of this behind the scenes and perhaps more in the forefront, both economically and possibly with some diplomacy. There are reports that there is a lot of contact between the Saudi government and the United States administration. Do you have any comments on the role of Saudi Arabia as this war continues?
Mr. Horak: They are in a difficult spot with Iran. The trust level between the Saudis and the Iranians — even in the good times, when they had better relations during the Khatami period in the late 1990s and certainly the rapprochement they had a little bit of leading up to this — is paper thin. They’ve had this concern essentially since the revolution.
On the one hand, they would support getting rid of the regime, no question about it. I’ve seen reports that Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, nudged the Americans and was pushing for this. Again, he is rather unpredictable, but they would understand the risks of such an operation unless it was completed, unless it was finished. I’m not sure that they wanted to take that risk. So I’m not sure I am buying that the Saudis pushed them into this.
They see the risks to the oil economy, to their own economy, to their own oilfields in the Eastern Province, as do the Bahrainis, as do the Emiratis and the Qataris, all of that. If they could wave a magic wand and make the regime go away, they would, but I really don’t think they were supportive of the kinds of risks that this operation would entail.
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: In March 2023, Saudi Arabia initiated talks with Tehran for the first time in a very long time. There has been a thaw in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Who brokered that thaw? It was China because China needs regional stability for its silk roads. Once again, China is the elephant in the room that we are ignoring, but it is very important.
[English]
Senator MacDonald: I just have a quick point, and then I will have my question. I also think that when it comes to Trump, their government obviously has access to information from the fourth level down from the Pentagon that perhaps we don’t. When you see the way they targeted certain targets in Iran or were able to find them, obviously they know a lot about what is going on, on the ground.
Since the Six-Day War — I was 12 years old — I’ve seen nothing but turmoil in the Middle East. Iran seems to be one of, if not the greatest, sponsors of instability in the Middle East. My question to both of you is this: If this regime did collapse and there was some sort of a democratic successor, what would the impact be on the Middle East overall, the politics in the Middle East and the relationship with all those neighbours?
Mr. Horak: I think it would have a profound impact. It wouldn’t solve all of the region’s problems. Iran didn’t create them. Iran didn’t create the chaos that is Yemen. They didn’t create sectarianism, as I said in my statement, in Lebanon. But they have very actively exploited these situations, similarly to the Palestinian-Israeli question. They exploit these, and they do it very much for their own priorities.
Part of what Iran was doing in building this access was to build forward defences to both deter and then bring to bear these various forces around the region in the event of war. Now, they were severely degraded in the months and years following October 7, so their ability to play the role that they were meant to play — that the billions were spent on — wasn’t there.
So you would still have a problem in Lebanon with sectarianism. You would still have a potential civil war resuming. In Yemen, the challenges are between the Houthis and the government — I mean, Yemen is a very tribal society — and reconciling that. But without someone on the outside stirring the pot on a lot of these issues, it does create opportunities perhaps to make some progress on them.
Now, I won’t be facile again by ascribing priorities and opportunities to individual leaders, but it does take a change in leadership, too, to change some of these, both on the Iranian side and on all these other problems as well, whether it is the Israeli and Palestinian question, whether it is Lebanon, whether it is Yemen. The value and importance of the leadership that is looking to solve these problems are important as well.
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: I would say that we need to think back to what President Jimmy Carter told the Shah of Iran in 1978: Iran is an island of stability. Over the past 47 years, Iran has become a volcano of instability. It is difficult to predict the future, but in my opinion, a post-theocratic regime would help provide stability in the region. The Islamic regime created a polarization both between the Shiites and the Sunnis and between republics and monarchies. Things used to be more stable. The Israelis are counting heavily on this change in regime to make them feel less isolated and alone, less like a citadel under siege. A regime change would thus be seen as a stabilizing factor. It would be very bad news for Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Woo: Dr. Pahlavi, on your thesis that the Iran conflict is about the larger geopolitical, geostrategic competition between the U.S. and China, I agree with former Ambassador Horak that it is happening. We know that to be true, but I’m not sure that it was front of mind for the United States.
But even if it were — let’s accept your thesis for a while — you say Canada has to be mindful of that bigger picture. What do you mean by that? What mindfulness should we have if we were to frame the Iran war as a geopolitical conflict between the U.S. and China? How is it for the U.S. insofar as that strategy is concerned?
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: Thank you for that important question, senator.
That certainly doesn’t mean that Canada should passively align itself with Washington, but it does mean that we need to take into account the structural nature of this rivalry between Beijing and Washington in reshaping our foreign policy. Rather than being reactive and looking at the short term, Canada needs to develop a forward-looking, long-term policy, particularly when it comes to supply chains and energy corridors. Canada needs to understand the bigger picture to reorganize itself more effectively. In my opinion, that would be far more prudent, realistic and pragmatic than spending our days criticizing Donald Trump.
[English]
Senator Woo: I presume we would need to do that anyway, whether or not there was a war in Iran. That seems to be our policy as it is. We recognize the geopolitical conflict, and much of our foreign policy is being turned upside down in recognition of the tensions between the U.S. and China and being caught in between.
I’m still trying to understand what the Iran conflict specifically means for Canadian foreign policy. We take your frame of reference. I don’t mean what happens in the Middle East per se. How does it really change the overall calculus that is different from what we are already doing?
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: In Canada, we have been talking for a very long time about diversifying our strategic partnerships, but what has become increasingly clear in recent months is that imperial logic is making a comeback. Canada has always known that we need to develop our own ties. Today, we are seeing the major powers tearing the world stage to pieces. Iran has become an issue and so has Canada. Given this imperial logic, we need to develop a much more pragmatic strategy. This has a direct impact on our economy. Canadians are seeing it in the price at the pump. They are also seeing it in skyrocketing marine insurance costs. We need to stop seeing ourselves as immune from what is going on internationally. What is happening in Iran does not stay in Iran. It has a direct impact on us.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
Colleagues, we have five minutes. I propose that you ask your questions in sequence so that our witnesses will have a chance to respond fully, and if you could make them short, that would be perfect.
Senator Coyle: It’s a big question but if you could answer in a few words: What’s the best chance for achieving peace?
[Translation]
Senator Youance: My question will be very brief. I don’t want to reopen the discussion.
What lessons can we learn from the regime changes in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan that could help us today?
[English]
The Chair: Let’s begin with Mr. Horak, to be followed by Professor Pahlavi.
Mr. Horak: As for the chances of peace, I think there will be a cessation of hostilities at some point, sooner rather than later, if we’re lucky. But in terms of peace and settling these issues, it remains to be seen how hard and fast both sides will stick to what have been their hard and fast positions. I think we will be in a period of some instability for the next little while.
In terms of regime change, what have the previous ones taught us? It’s not easy. It takes a whole lot more than bombing from the air. They are often preceded by periods of chaos before something gets settled. All of those things, what we saw in Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq, if we get that kind of chaos in Iran, it will make the others look like a picnic.
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: I agree with the ambassador. Bombing will not magically bring about an automatic regime change. We have the results of past experiences. Let’s not forget that there was a regime change in Japan 80 years ago that was preceded by bombing and that had a successful outcome, but generally speaking, it is true that regime changes are chaotic.
However, try putting yourselves in the shoes of my fellow Iranians. They took to the streets to peacefully bring about change from within, and 40,000 people were killed in two days. Many of my fellow Iranians will agree with you that a regime change should not come from outside the country, but they don’t have a choice. They are desperate. If there is no regime change now, then we are in for another 47 years of Islamic rule.
[English]
Senator Coyle: And what about chances for peace or what might bring about peace?
[Translation]
Mr. Pahlavi: Senator, ideally, the regime would collapse and Iranians could go to the polls to choose the system that works best for them in accordance with international rules and in light of discussions with the international community. You and I both agree that this is what we hope will happen. That would be preferable, but sometimes reality is much more difficult.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much. That’s a very sobering note on which to end our session on a very difficult subject that I suspect we will come back to very soon.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank our witnesses, Dennis Horak and Pierre Pahlavi, for joining us today. We’ve been enriched by your testimony.
(The committee adjourned.)