THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, February 12, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs met with videoconference this day at 10:30 a.m. [ET] to examine the subject matter of Part 4 of Bill C-4, An Act respecting certain affordability measures for Canadians and another measure.
Senator David M. Arnot (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Good morning. My name is David Arnot. I’m a senator from Saskatchewan and the chair of this committee.
I invite my colleagues to introduce themselves.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I am Julie Miville-Dechêne, from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Tannas: Scott Tannas from Alberta.
Senator Cuzner: Rodger Cuzner, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Clement: I am Bernadette Clement, from Ontario.
[English]
Senator Prosper: Paul Prosper, Nova Scotia, Mi’kma’ki territory.
Senator Simons: Paula Simons, Alberta, and I come from Treaty 6 territory.
Senator Pate: Kim Pate. I live here on the unceded, unsurrendered and unreturned territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabe.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: Good morning. I am Manuelle Oudar, from Quebec.
Senator Saint-Germain: I am Raymonde Saint-Germain, from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, we’re meeting to continue our study on the subject matter of Part 4 of Bill C-4, An Act respecting certain affordability measures for Canadians and another measure.
With respect to our first panel, we’re pleased to welcome Jim Balsillie, Founder, Centre for Digital Rights, or CDR, by video conference; Bill Hearn, Principal, Hearn Law, External General Counsel to the Centre for Digital Rights, by video conference; Jason Woywada, Executive Director, BC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association, by videoconference; and Sara Bannerman, Professor and Canada Research Chair of Communication Policy and Governance.
We welcome all the witnesses. Thank you for joining us under short notice for this study. We will begin with opening remarks by the witnesses. Time is of the essence, today most particularly. I will allow each witness five minutes, but when we get to questions, I will be very circumspect and succinct. I see there are a number of senators here, so maybe we should start with four minutes each.
In order to proceed as efficiently as possible, I will now ask each of the four witnesses to commence.
Mr. Balsillie, you’re first, please.
Jim Balsillie, Founder, Centre for Digital Rights: Honourable chair, honourable senators, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you as you study Part 4 of Bill C-4.
I am here in my role as founder of the Centre for Digital Rights, and I am joined by the centre’s general counsel, Bill Hearn.
I will focus my remarks on four areas. First, the absence of governance for the contemporary surveillance economy has allowed personal data generated by our experiences, choices and even our thoughts to be captured, processed and traded as an economic input for profit and power. This inattention has led to a litany of harms that continues to worsen. A list of harms to both individuals and communities is summarized in Figure 1 of my appendix.
Second, these harms have led to the erosion of fundamental human rights. The digital age is shaped by who controls the data, the algorithms that act on it and the information environments they create. This has caused a new era of human commodification that violates fundamental human rights in new ways, which I list in Figure 2 of my appendix.
Part 4 directly violates the right to political participation and democratic self-governance. Over time, these conditions weaken individual autonomy and collective self-governance.
Third, the unprecedented levels of surveillance coupled with advanced algorithms have also created markets that are neither free nor fair, driving higher costs of living and eroding paycheques for most of Canada’s working population. Last week, I wrote about this connection in The Globe and Mail, which I have submitted in Figure 3. Weak privacy rules allow firms to collect and use detailed personal data without meaningful limits, shaping prices through opaque and individualized practices rather than transparent competition. In practical terms, inadequate privacy governance contributes directly to higher household costs.
Fourth, we have a real problem with how political parties in Canada approach privacy. Political data sits at the core of democratic participation, yet Canadian political parties have placed themselves outside the privacy rules they impose on others. In Europe, under the General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR, political opinions and political affiliation are classified as data of the highest sensitivity and subject to heightened protection, including strict limits on processing, explicit consent, or a clearly defined public interest basis, including binding regulatory enforcement.
Part 4 is framed around affordability, but all it does is exempt federal political parties from privacy obligations entirely. It provides no independent enforcement and applies retroactively. This follows years of resistance by political parties to basic transparency about what data they collect on voters, as summarized in Figure 4 of my appendix. This also comes during litigation challenging the exemption federal parties claim from privacy obligations legislated in certain provinces.
To conclude, Part 4 is not only wholly inadequate; it is also out of place. Measures that compromise democratic integrity should not be held hostage to much-needed relief measures aimed at affordability. Challenges this serious deserve separate study through stand-alone legislation and full public scrutiny.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Bill Hearn, Principal, Hearn Law, External General Counsel to Centre for Digital Rights, Centre for Digital Rights: Good morning, honourable senators. For eight years, the CDR has worked to subject Canada’s federal political parties, or FPPs, to robust guardrails protecting Canadians’ privacy. CDR’s December 2025 brief on Bill C-4 describes how Part 4 violates both the division of powers under the Constitution and Canadians’ right to an informed vote under the Charter.
There are six documents pertinent to your study that I’ve submitted in an appendix, including Document 2, CDR’s December 2019 proposal to extend PIPEDA to the FPPs; Document 3, CDR’s October 2023 report on former Bill C-27 reiterating this proposal; Document 5, the December 2019 complaint letter to the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia that revealed the FPPs’ penchant for litigation; and Document 6, the transcript of a September 2019 podcast in which a political insider exposes the FPPs’ cavalier attitudes toward protecting Canadians’ personal information and their quasi-constitutional right to privacy.
Against this concerning backdrop, CDR urges this committee to recommend that, first, Part 4 be dropped from Bill C-4; and second, PIPEDA be modernized to cover FPPs.
Thanks for this opportunity to present CDR’s concerns. I welcome your questions.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Woywada?
Jason Woywada, Executive Director, BC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association: Chair, honourable senators, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
Today I am presenting from the unceded ancestral homelands of the Lekwungen-speaking peoples in what is known as Victoria, British Columbia.
I will be very direct with the committee. Bill C-4, Part 4, represents a significant departure from established Canadian democratic and privacy norms that places the personal information of Canadians at increased risk. It does not simply modernize electoral rules. It removes guardrails protecting the personal information of Canadians at a time when global experience tells us those guardrails are increasingly important.
Political parties in Canada invest heavily in collecting and analyzing personal information. Parliament is well aware that this data can be misused and weaponized. In 2018, the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics examined data-driven electoral manipulation connected to Brexit, prompted by Canadian corporate involvement and the offshoring of voter data.
In 2024, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes examined coordinated efforts by foreign states to influence Canadian elections through domestic channels.
Now, in 2026, we have organizations and political parties aligning with separatists and a foreign power to promote a referendum that could break up the country.
Instead of drawing from these studies and experiences and treating them as cautionary lessons, Bill C-4, Part 4, moves in the opposite direction and opens the floodgates. Part 4 is troubling for numerous reasons. It removes meaningful limits on the collection, use and retention of personal information by political parties and their agents. It removes independent oversight specialized in information management and removes citizen rights without establishing any minimum national standards framework.
Additionally, there is no alignment with Canadian privacy standards established in 1996 and reaffirmed in 2001, no right for people to access their own personal information under the control of political parties, no breach-notification obligations and no independent regulator empowered with order-making capabilities.
Part 4 grants political parties more power and less oversight in the collection, use and retention of personal information than Canada’s spy agencies. At a moment of declining public trust, Parliament is effectively saying, “Trust the parties.” Experience tells us that trust without law is no protection for the public.
Political parties now hold information that is as valuable as the money they raise. Those managing these systems operate under intense pressure to identify, persuade and mobilize voters. This creates predictable structural risks and dangerous moral rationalizations that cannot be addressed through voluntary policies alone.
That is precisely why Canadian privacy law has always relied upon principles-based approaches, with legislated guardrails. Civil rights, including privacy, have long been protected through shared federal and provincial frameworks, enforced by independent officers of Parliament and the legislatures. Part 4 attempts to remove those protections when personal information is held by a single powerful class of actors — political parties and their agents — without replacing them with equivalent federal safeguards. That approach is inconsistent with Canadian federalism, established privacy jurisprudence and democratic principles.
Foreign interference does not require hackers overseas; it often relies on lawfully obtained domestic personal information accessed through intermediary domestic actors that can include Canadian political parties. In such cases, the data may be lawfully collected and election law may not be formally breached, yet the cumulative effect can still be the distortion of democratic choice, decision-making and the erosion of electoral sovereignty. That is why privacy and fair information safeguards are also national security safeguards. By weakening those safeguards without replacing them, Bill C-4 lowers the barrier for foreign interference.
In conclusion, it is a fact that the elected members of the House of Commons have passed this law. It is also a fact that, as majority members of federal political parties involved in ongoing litigation, they have a vested interest in Part 4. That is unusual, and it is precisely the sort of scenario where sober second thought is essential. In past interventions on privacy, national security and electoral law, the Senate sought to strengthen legislation by seeking to add guardrails when the House moved too quickly or too narrowly.
Part 4 of Bill C-4 calls for that same corrective action. The Senate can ensure Canadians do not lose long-recognized civil rights simply because their personal information is controlled by a political party. It can require minimum national standards for political parties aligned to Canadian fair information principles and Canadian privacy standards. It can restore the need for involvement of independent oversight with expertise in information management and ensure constitutional alignment while explicitly accounting for foreign-interference risks. These steps would not impede democratic participation; they would ensure it occurs within enforceable, transparent and constitutionally sound boundaries.
Once privacy protections are removed, they are unlikely to come back, and the harm may be irreversible.
Thank you. I welcome your questions.
The Chair: Thank you. Professor Bannerman, please go ahead.
Sara Bannerman, Professor and Canada Research Chair of Communication Policy and Governance, as an individual: Thank you for inviting me and for your work on Part 4 of Bill C-4. Today, I’ll discuss Part 4 and my relevant research, but I want to start with an example.
Last summer, my partner received a call from a major federal party inviting her to attend Ottawa Pride. My partner is not very public. How did the party get that information? Did a volunteer provide it? Did they observe at the door? Are they ingesting marriage registries into their data systems?
Part 4 of Bill C-4 purports to provide a complete personal information regime for political parties, but it’s far from complete. It would retroactively make provincial privacy laws inapplicable to political parties, shielding them from legal responsibility, as per a recent B.C. Supreme Court decision that is under appeal.
It’s a privacy-busting bill.
It doesn’t meet the core privacy principles. Principle 2 is that the purposes of collection should be identified; it only requires illustrative examples. Principle 3 is that knowledge and consent should be given; instead, it gives near blanket permission to parties and those working with them — potentially tech companies — to collect and use any type of personal information. Most Canadians that my team surveyed felt that sensitive personal information should never be collected and retained, or should be done only with individuals’ explicit consent.
It doesn’t address principle 4, on limiting collection. There are no limits on the types of personal information that parties and their agents or volunteers can collect: Ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity and location are all fair game. My team’s work suggests placing the most sensitive types of information out of bounds.
It doesn’t address principle 5, on limiting use. It doesn’t prevent making profiles; statistical inferences about sexual orientation, interests, political opinions or religion; or any uses involving AI. There are massive risks of misuse and of the wall between political parties and government breaking down, making information available to government or for patronage. Data could be used against civil servants at the border or passed to other governments. OpenMedia recently revealed that parties use many data companies, many of those foreign. Tech companies routinely take data and apologize later.
Personal data and metadata are useful to businesses and governments, domestic and foreign, including on trade and sovereignty issues.
Part 4 of Bill C-4 doesn’t address principle 6, on ensuring accuracy, nor principle 7, on safeguarding personal information. It requires only that training offered to volunteers be described. It could allow tech companies or others potentially unbridled access and use, with little or no meaningful protection or oversight. This is at odds with personal and digital sovereignty, as well as common sense. Breaches and misuses of data are not a question of if but when.
Part 4 doesn’t address principle 9, on the right of access, nor principle 10, on the right to make a complaint. Instead, it makes those existing provincial rights inapplicable.
My team’s work surveying Canadians raises the concern that failing to subject political parties to the 10 basic privacy principles may threaten confidence and engagement in elections. We found that, first, respondents were not aware of the range of data that the parties collect, particularly political views, ethnicity, income, religion, and online activities and IDs.
Second, awareness of parties’ collections may reduce electors’ willingness to interact with political parties online. Third, increasing awareness of datafied campaigning goes hand in hand with growing concerns about collection. Finally, very few respondents saw data collection as important to the democratic process. If collection is important to democracy, our respondents were not convinced.
Part 4 would not create a complete privacy regime; it would undermine provincial laws that do. Part 4 would undermine privacy, engagement, confidence and personal and national digital sovereignty. It would facilitate parties’ exploitation of electors’ data without limits, transparency or consent. Parties should be subject to the same fair information principles as businesses and governments, big and small.
Part 4 should be deleted. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, professor.
Colleagues, my goal is to make sure that every senator gets a chance to ask a question. We have 12 senators. I’m going to restrict it to four minutes for the question and answer both, so I would ask the senators and witnesses to be as succinct as possible.
Senator Batters: Thanks to all of you for being here and helping our committee with this. First, I want to say to Mr. Balsillie that I adored my BlackBerry so much, and I wish I could still have one. I think I had one of the last ones in the country. Well done.
Also, I wanted to say to you that I very much agree with what you were saying, both in your opening remarks and also in your op-ed, when you said that this part is really ill suited to an affordability act, which is where it’s been placed right now, probably for the sole purpose of the government making sure they can pass it quickly.
Then, I also note that certain portions of this part are similar to measures that were included in Bill C-65. That was an actual bill to amend the Canada Elections Act, but it died on the Order Paper when the Liberal government prorogued Parliament and then dissolved it to have an election. That would have been the appropriate type of bill to deal with to allow for more scrutiny.
My questions today are, with my limited time, to Professor Bannerman.
First, Professor Bannerman, you recommend retaining clause 446.7, which would require Canada’s Chief Electoral Officer to hold at least one annual meeting on privacy protection.
For that meeting to have some real impact, especially given the use of digital tools in campaigns, what would you say is the minimum content it should have to be able to cover it properly?
Ms. Bannerman: At the meeting, it could be reviewed and organized around the basic privacy principles, and I guess checking the privacy policies of the parties, which is the only thing that this act would retain against those privacy principles in trying to at least review — which might be all that the meeting could do — the principles against privacy policies to at least integrate those principles in some way, as well as looking at any breaches.
Unfortunately, the act wouldn’t leave many teeth or much enforcement power to that meeting, but at least it would incorporate the principles in some way.
Senator Batters: Dealing with those principles, you recommend that clause 446.6 require privacy policies to reflect those 10 fair information principles drawn from the federal act PIPEDA. Practically speaking, then, which principles of those 10 do you think should be prioritized for political parties and why?
Ms. Bannerman: They are all so important. It’s hard to prioritize some over others, but the principle of consent is crucial, as well as the principle of access so that Canadians can have more transparency about what political parties hold about them. The principle of transparency about use and limiting use is extremely important because of the many uses that are possible and done that Canadians are totally unaware of, making Canadians effectively unaware of how democracy is operating and the datafied underpinnings of that.
Safeguarding is important as well, obviously, with the massive threat of data breaches and misuse. The training of volunteers is also important, which this version makes very few commitments on.
I would highlight those. Thank you for the question.
Senator Batters: Thank you, again, to all of you for being here.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Thank you all for joining us.
Would this bill be better if we added to Part 4 that the express consent of those from whom information is requested must be obtained? Because of the use of data banks, isn’t having the express consent enough? I’d like to hear your thoughts on that.
Also, can you give us some easy-to-understand examples of unacceptable personal information that political parties are looking for? All the documents talk about personal information, but could you explain what type of collected information you find particularly scandalous?
[English]
It is for anyone who feels they have enough knowledge to answer.
Mr. Balsillie: Professor Bannerman said a number of thoughtful things about the privacy violation. The part we have to understand is that this information is the feedstock of algorithms for manipulation. You lose personal autonomy and democratic integrity when everyone is in a siloed manipulation structure. This is not about free and informed debate where we have an open forum.
That’s why it’s so critical to look at the feedstock that comes into these algorithms. Their power is increasing by the day, and I can’t see how privacy can survive. I can’t see how democracy can survive with inadequate privacy in this era of highly turbocharged algorithms.
Ms. Bannerman: In some ways, as I reflect on it, consent might be one of the weaker principles to incorporate because of the weak mechanisms of consent. Often, consent is achieved by including it in a privacy policy that people don’t read, and so it may achieve little. Thank you for the question.
Senator Prosper: Thank you to all our witnesses.
Professor Bannerman, I take it your position is to just delete Part 4 from this bill, but I want to delve into some areas you’re quite familiar with, data sovereignty being one, and also democratic harms from datafied campaigning, data misuse and breach risks.
Within your submission, you link that there are certain privacy gaps to digital sovereignty and foreign data intermediaries. Could you explain how reliance on U.S. platforms and data brokers creates risks for Canada’s political independence? What statutory guardrails would you recommend to keep political data within Canadian jurisdiction and oversight?
Ms. Bannerman: Thank you for the question. This issue of data sovereignty is important right now, and I want to thank you for focusing on that.
It’s difficult to know what parties are doing with data, what tech companies are holding on to that data and, in turn, what the tech companies are doing with the data. We can certainly remember Facebook’s apology tour after the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and there are many other apologies that we have heard. It’s recognized that tech companies often, legitimately or illegitimately, with a fair or unfair legal basis or argument or interpretation, will take data, make more data with that data, such as through statistical inferences, adding in AI to that and combining that with other data. They could make extrapolations about individuals’ political positions, opinions, economic circumstances and economic behaviours that would be relevant in a trade context, in a political context or in a context relating to sovereignty.
When I think of where the data may travel, who may have access to it and what might be done with it, my mind goes wide and broad because of the capabilities that are there and the ways that we see data being used broadly in other contexts. We certainly know, even just looking at the Cambridge Analytica scandal, where political targeted advertising was being done in manipulative ways in countries around the world. So we certainly see infringements of sovereignty everywhere.
It’s a very important thing to focus on. In the absence of concrete information and transparency, either from political parties or tech companies, into what’s being done and the data being held, one can only imagine, and the imaginings are quite alarming.
As to guardrails, I think either subjecting political parties to the same 10 principles as businesses under PIPEDA, whether by incorporating the 10 principles into the Canada Elections Act, if that’s what’s at hand at the moment, or doing it by a reform of PIPEDA. I think those things are important. The future strengthening of privacy laws will be important because our current privacy basis is based on individual privacy and consent, whereas we’re now living in a world of big data, where extrapolations and data about one person can allow inferences about another.
So the personal information and consent paradigm now is actually quite weak, and yet that is our basis.
Senator Simons: My first question is going to be for Mr. Woywada. When we look at Bill C-4, Part 4, at subclause 446.4(2), it says:
For greater certainty, the registered party, eligible party . . . cannot be required to provide access to personal information or provide information relating to personal information under its control or to correct — or receive, adjudicate or annotate requests to correct — personal information or omissions in . . . information under its control.
How worrisome do you think that is? Under PIPEDA, as I understand it, if you find out that the information someone has about you is wrong, you have some recourse. But this bill specifically removes any recourse a citizen has to correct information that may be in the holding of a party. What do you make of that?
Mr. Woywada: It is deeply problematic. One of the key things I keep going back to with this is the proto-laws that informed PIPEDA, the Canadian standards act, privacy standards that were enacted in 1996. Access is central to that because people should have the right to know what a corporation, individual or organization has about them.
Those proto-laws have influenced the world in this. GDPR and other privacy standards across the world sort of look at those Canadian standards as one of the ways that this has really sort of expanded and been built from.
So access is central to all of this because right of access and right of correction are central to all of that. Otherwise, the organization may be making inappropriate decisions about you. The individual should have a right to be able to correct something if it’s wrong.
One of the things that has informed me with this as well is spending a decade managing the voter file as the director of caucus services in the province of Manitoba. One of the things we tried to strive for at that point was making sure we had accurate phone numbers and addresses for people all the time. It is a real dilemma in terms of identity preservation to make sure that you’re maintaining accurate records, because otherwise you’re wasting a lot of effort trying to contact people multiple times.
So access is central to all of this. It is one of the things we’ve really been focused on with this because it’s so important. Ultimately, if you don’t have access, you don’t have power. You have no ability to address the inaccuracies of the organization’s records, and that is particularly problematic when it interfaces with democratic institutions, government bodies and political parties.
I, at one point, may have been labelled as a Reform member or an NDP member or a Liberal member, but I should be able to delete myself from those records at some point. There are multiple examples, even in the Canadian context, where we see right of access, right of deletion and right of correction put in place as a minimum standard framework. But again, in Bill C-4, Part 4, there is no minimum standard framework. It’s delegated out to the parties in a way that creates a patchwork approach across the nation.
Senator Cuzner: I would like to thank my colleague Senator K. Wells for allowing me the opportunity to sit with this august committee today for study of Part 4 of Bill C-4.
Thank you to the witnesses for their presentations. Certainly, the issue around privacy and protection of personal information is paramount, and I would in no way push back on that or argue with that. Even the fact that Canada is many years behind many countries in where we are with it, we know that some past legislation has died on the Order Paper. I’ll ask two questions, then back off if you would like to weigh in on either.
Do you see anything in Part 4 that would preclude the government from going forward with a more robust and fulsome study of PIPEDA and bringing forward stand-alone legislation to address the issue?
One other aspect of it, we have heard from the parties — and, in particular, the smaller parties — on just how they would be challenged. Could you weigh in on what the financial costs would be of compliance with a greater degree of protection? It’s been voiced by the smaller parties that they wonder whether they would have the bandwidth to build that kind of capacity. It is probably the cost of doing business.
Would the panellists like to weigh in on either of those questions?
Mr. Balsillie: That is all gaslighting. This is dominated mainly by the two big parties, and Canada is facing a real set of challenges because we’ve cut corners on so many aspects of the data economy and the contemporary economy, and this will consign Canada to further erosion. It is a remarkably cynical bill with respect to Part 4, and Canada and Canadians will pay the price for it. The question is this: Is this about serving narrow, specific political actors or is this about serving Canada and Canadians?
Senator Cuzner: But you see nothing in the bill that would preclude the government from going forward with a more —
Mr. Balsillie: Yes, I do, because it’s expressly designed to say it goes to these actors to do it and to carve out the provinces. If you look at all of their past actions on this, both legislatively and to not include it in their privacy, it is very clear what their intent is, which is to keep it lawless.
I see it as an absolute direction to make it lawless. Why would you be doing all this work to say, “When I do privacy, which is imminent, I’m just going to reverse this thing I’m fighting so hard for”? So, no, I’m not buying such a narrative one bit.
Mr. Hearn: And if I may, not only does Part 4 stomp on provincial rights, but it also dramatically extends to agents of political parties. Again, all those third parties, from data sciences to others, would be exempt from PIPEDA when they are not now. Why would they ever retreat from that?
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: My question is for Ms. Bannerman, but other witnesses who want to add something can do so, if we have time.
Before I ask my question, I’d like to emphasize how important it is — and we all understand that — to hold democratic elections and to have a trustworthy and impartial electoral system. That said, political parties play an important role in organizing and holding these elections. It’s a legitimate role. That’s my preamble.
I have two very specific questions.
First, the Canada Elections Act already allows for the collection of data necessary for organizing elections or participating in elections, and political parties have access to this data. If I’m not mistaken, names, addresses and whether or not the person voted on the day of an election are data that is already accessible to improve participation. I’d like to know what types of data you consider legitimate and that recognized political parties would need access to.
Second, in what way does Part 4 of Bill C-4 not improve the privacy protection currently provided by provincial legislation?
[English]
Ms. Bannerman, if you would like to go first, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Bannerman: Thank you. Could I clarify your second question? I believe you asked how Part 4 fails to improve provincial privacy law as it applies to the parties.
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you for asking. For more clarity, I would like to know how Part 4 of Bill C-4 would be less protective than current provincial legislation regarding privacy for elections and electors.
Ms. Bannerman: Thank you. Your first question was about what type of data is legitimate, starting with the data provided by Elections Canada.
Interestingly, in my study, the participants in my survey didn’t feel that data was legitimately collected and that they would like to provide consent. I understand that there may be a need to allow parties access to some personal information, including the Elections Canada data, and that it may serve democracy to allow certain data to be collected.
I would like to see some guardrails around data informed by Canadians’ expectations. Currently, the data collected is far out of line with Canadians’ expectations. Some of the graphs I’ve provided in my brief and my studies indicate some of the expectations about when consent should be required, and I think there’s an expectation that certain sensitive information, such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender and political opinions, should not be collected and certainly not without explicit consent.
But there’s a whole data infrastructure that would allow for inferences to be made on many dimensions that are not even necessarily demographic, that Canadians are unaware of and currently do not have an informed opinion about. The transparency aspect is important.
I would hesitate to declare which data, but obviously, we can all imagine a range of sensitivities, including data that are intended to manipulate people’s responses to get reactions on social media or that are designed to appeal to certain voters or get certain reactions.
If there could be some guardrails, some limits on the types of data and the actions that are taken with that data so that all parties are on an even playing field, I think that would be very positive.
Sorry, I realize I’m going on.
The Chair: We have to stop now, Ms. Bannerman. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: My question has to do with retroactive provisions, a particular but very important aspect of the bill. Some of you mentioned it in your presentations. Clause 49 of the bill actually says that the headings will be deemed to have come into force on May 31, 2000. I emphasize the word “deemed.” It doesn’t say “presumed”; it says “deemed.” It’s a non-rebuttable presumption, which means no citizen will be able to provide evidence against that presumption. It also means retroactive provisions infringe on citizens’ rights.
That is very serious in terms of the rule of law. Retroactive provisions should be an exception. Retroactive provisions that go back 20 years is something I’ve rarely seen, and I’ve been involved in legislation all my life. I’d like you to confirm whether I’m correct and whether this will prevent citizens not only from requesting access to their information, but also possibly from exercising recourse. It could even retroactively revoke citizens’ rights — rights that they’ve had for more than 20 years, as I’ve already pointed out.
How can we, in the Senate, reconcile the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, particularly in paragraph 2(b) and clause 3 on the democratic rights of citizens, with this provision in Part 4, which sets us back 20 years and retroactively takes away rights from all Canadian citizens? I’d like to hear your thoughts on this aspect in particular, which I find not only worrisome, but disturbing.
Thank you.
[English]
Mr. Balsillie: You read it correctly, and it is deeply concerning. Though it is not your direct question, I wouldn’t mind adding that I twice testified on Bill C-27, and there were extensive representations by Minister Champagne, who was the then-minister of industry and is now Minister of Finance, saying that none of this privacy legislation would stomp on provinces, particularly in Quebec. When you look at Quebec’s Law 25, this is “bigfooting” that, not only currently but also, as you appropriately see, retroactively.
Mr. Hearn: If I may, as much as Part 4 is directed at litigation in B.C., it does also take aim at Quebec. Under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Civil Code of Quebec, Quebecers have a right of access. This retroactively stops that 26 years back.
Mr. Woywada: The other concerning part of this is whether individuals will be able to look at the privacy policies that federal political parties would have said they were following over those 20 years. We find that political parties have a pretty bad track record of information management in their own houses.
In the year 2001, what privacy policy were the Conservatives using, or the Liberals, or the NDP, for Canadians to know if their rights were breached in that regard?
It creates a difficult dynamic and is concerning on many fronts.
Senator Dalphond: Thank you to the panel. It is very interesting. One of you, I think, hinted at the fact that, in Europe, political parties are regulated and there are some privacy protections. Do you know if, at the provincial level in Canada, political parties are regulated? If so, could you mention the provinces and tell us the content? Could you answer the question about political parties in Europe if there is no answer for Canada? Thank you.
Mr. Woywada: I would like to point to Bill 98 of Quebec that passed last spring and which has a fascinating new clause in it that allows deletion of records.
It creates a really interesting dynamic where it recognizes the conflict between political parties and the candidate in the collection of this information. They have some really progressive legislation from a Canadian perspective that I’ve been quite interested in seeing passed there.
I know you are going to receive written submissions from Colin Bennett and other academics that speak to other regulations in European and Asian countries.
At a provincial level, we see Quebec leading the charge on this because of their efforts to maintain data adequacy and more modern privacy legislation with GDPR, so because of those alignments, we see some important changes there. That is just one example, but ultimately, it is the most relevant one, I think, in this case.
The Chair: Are there any other responses to Senator Dalphond’s questions?
Mr. Hearn: Only to make the point that B.C. and Quebec have laws that apply to political parties. Canada, federally, is an outlier here in the G7. We are more in line with the United States on this at the moment.
Senator Clement: Thank you all for your testimony. Mr. Hearn, that’s such a good point that you just made about being more aligned with the U.S. and how that might be difficult timing right now.
A very good point about the Civil Code of Quebec. Thank you for that.
Mr. Balsillie, BlackBerry forever. They are prominently featured in “Heated Rivalry.” I just needed to make a “Heated Rivalry” reference.
I will get back on track now.
My questions are for Professor Bannerman. I want to thank you for using a personal example. That always grounds us, so I appreciate that. I would ask you to comment about Canadians’ expectations around this because I feel as if this thing is buried in an affordability bill, and Canadians are not fully aware of what is going on here. What are the risks? Please dig deeper into those.
Mr. Woywada, you spoke about trust. Full disclosure, I have been a candidate. I have knocked on doors, and I have noticed an erosion over the years in terms of how Canadians feel about political parties and how comfortable they are. Could you speak a little more about that? That is also a huge concern. Thank you.
Ms. Bannerman: Thank you for your question.
Maybe I could speak a bit about the two things you mentioned, first about Canadians’ expectations, as discussed in the study that I’ve done, as well as some of the risks.
It seems clear from my study. As I became more aware of the collection of data and the potential uses that it could be put to, especially through what was happening with the Cambridge Analytica scandal that revealed the power of statistical inferences: That data could be collected about one group and then similar inferences could be made about another group. That is not to mention the massive availability of data via ways that were quite unexpected at the time.
That highlighted in my own mind how little I knew or could extrapolate about what the possibilities of data use might be as a regular Facebook user at the time. That inspired my study to look at other Canadians’ use. I found myself, when I received a call from a political party, wondering if they were keeping track of my answers — either then or when they came to the door. Since that time, through my study, I have found that Canadians are very concerned and very uncomfortable with data collection when asked, but they are also not necessarily aware of all those potential uses and the political consequences of those uses. It’s just very important.
They want much more control than they currently have.
The risks, as I’ve mentioned, do relate not just to the risks of a data breach, but there is also a transformation of how electoral campaigning is being done that does go heart of questions about how our democracy works. There is especially a risk of exclusion, and I think that speaks to the question raised earlier about Part III of the Charter, where part of the purpose of using data for parties is to conduct efficient campaigns and exclude people from communications where it’s already known how they’re going to vote. It makes a campaign more efficient. I think that goes against the purpose of democracy, which is about inclusion and ensuring everyone has access to messages and information.
So that’s just one more risk I have not had a chance to mention so far.
The Chair: Thank you. Dr. Bannerman, we’re moving toward the end of the time limit here. I’m sorry.
Senator Pate: Thank you very much to all the witnesses for your testimonies.
I want to allow you each an opportunity to just opine on if this passes — it went without any kind of resistance in the House of Commons, and it looks as if it’s on track to be almost a fait accompli. What do you think the courts will make of this kind of approach? What would be your predictions — given the ways that these provisions have been written — with respect to the challenges for individuals bringing a court challenge to this part?
Mr. Hearn: Perhaps I should lead on this.
At the heart of Canada’s Constitution lies cooperative federalism: collaboration and coordination between federal and provincial governments. Part 4 violates that. In our view, it is the latest ham-fisted and arrogant kick at the can targeting provinces’ privacy powers, specifically the B.C. litigation. It is doomed to fail, it shares the same flaws as past efforts and the FPPs can’t sidestep Canada’s Constitution or the Charter by simply enacting a law that puts them beyond the legitimate jurisdictions of the provinces.
Mr. Woywada: I want to go back to that element of trust in that this is going to erode Canadians’ trust in the political process. Every time we look at these things, there is an intersection of trust through transparency, and people need to be able to believe in democracy in order for it to function. You look at every group that measures trust in public institutions and can see that eroding, whether it’s the Edelman Trust Barometer, the Gustavson Brand Trust Index or the OECD. Our own Ipsos survey in B.C. shows that people do not trust political parties and how they manage that information. Simply asking people to trust you isn’t going to meet the test. They need to be transparent in terms of what they are doing.
That is not just policies; it’s walking the talk, following guardrails and meeting Canadians’ standards. Because if they are not willing to meet Canadians’ standards, whose standards are they meeting? Are they meeting the Americans’ standards as part of a trade agreement? Are they meeting the standards of Palantir and tech companies out of Silicon Valley?
There are some deeply concerning elements here that we can keep going back to as we look at this.
Ms. Bannerman: If this passes, I think it will be a disastrous weakening of democracy, the right of expression and the right to vote — deleting those laws that we have or making them inapplicable to federal parties, which are the provincial laws. I think it will be a really negative thing.
Mr. Balsillie: The point I made in my op-ed is that our world is digitally mediated now, so it fundamentally drives your paycheque, your cost of living, your security and all kinds of social, community and individual realms.
In a sense, if you pass this, you’re asking the sheriff, who is addicted to this privacy like a drug addict, to get the drug dealer out of town.
The reason I very specifically support this litigation and why I have been working on it is because I know they are interested in preserving the regime. Therefore, if you don’t cut off that interest, they will never regulate this realm. I think the price to Canada will not just be in the democratic realm but all the other realms I listed in my appendix.
Mr. Hearn: To just add, if Part 4 passes, we will still have the B.C. Court of Appeal hearing the case in May. Whoever wins that case will likely seek an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The litigation is very time-consuming and expensive, and I know that my client is committed to taking this to the highest court, if necessary.
Political parties will be before you later today, and you should ask them for their views on this.
The Chair: Thank you, all. I would like to express the committee’s appreciation to all of our witnesses here today, coming in on short notice, advising us and answering our questions. If there are any questions that you didn’t feel you had a full opportunity to respond to, you can submit it to the clerk in writing. I know it’s very truncated, and I know some of the witnesses were cut off due to time limits.
Honourable senators, we are continuing our study of the subject matter of Part 4 of Bill C-4, making life more affordable for Canadians.
For our second panel, we are pleased to welcome officials from the Privy Council Office, Ms. Cathy Hawara, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions; and Rachel Pereira, Director, Electoral and Senatorial Policy Unit, Democratic Institutions. Both witnesses are here in person. We thank you for coming here today to assist us in our work and study of this bill.
I will allow our two witnesses to take five minutes each to make an opening statement. As you have seen before, we will hold you to five minutes. Then, each senator will get approximately four minutes for a question and answer in order to complete the work. Since there are only two witnesses, it may be that we will have a second round. We will see. My goal is to ensure that all senators get a chance to ask a question.
With that, I would ask Ms. Hawara to commence.
[Translation]
Cathy Hawara, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office: Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting us today and for the opportunity to appear before you to contribute to your study of Part 4 of the bill.
[English]
My name is Cathy Hawara. I am the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions. I am joined by Rachel Pereira, Director in the Democratic Institutions Secretariat. I will deliver the opening remarks on both of our behalf.
This overview will outline key amendments to the Canada Elections Act introduced in Part 4 of Bill C-4 and their implications for federal political parties in relation to personal information.
These changes aim to enhance clarity and compliance related to the personal information protection policies and practices of federal political parties registered and eligible to be registered under the Canada Elections Act.
The proposed amendments would support three outcomes: one, confirm Parliament’s long-standing intent respecting its exclusive regulation of federal political parties’ dealings with personal information for electoral purposes; two, establish new requirements for personal information protection policies of federal political parties; and three, promote compliance with these policies.
I do want to note that some of the changes made in the bill, including repealing and reintroducing provisions currently in the act from amendments made in 2023, are done in order to centralize provisions, avoid duplication and provide complete coverage of activities related to personal information.
Finally, to support accountability, I would like to note that non-compliance with these policies will be a violation of the act and may result in enforcement action by the Commissioner of Canada Elections, such as warning letters and administrative monetary penalties. Elections Canada will also hold annual meetings with federal political parties related to the protection of personal information.
[Translation]
In summary, Mr. Chair, the amendments introduced in Part 4 of the bill introduce new requirements, promote accountability of federal political parties for the handling of personal information and clarify Parliament’s intent that only federal laws regulate such activities.
[English]
We are pleased to answer the questions that the committee may have. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Batters: Thanks very much for being here today. First, I would like to ask why the government decided to include this important part in what seems to be a completely unrelated bill dealing with affordability. It is an affordability act, and then it says, “. . . and another measure.” I mean, that’s a bit of an understatement.
Can you explain why the government chose to do that when you had these types of clauses already included in Bill C-65 in a previous Parliament, the act to amend the Canada Elections Act? That died on the Order Paper when the government chose to prorogue and then dissolve Parliament to call an election. So why not bring it back? We have had quite a paltry legislative agenda thus far in this Parliament. Why not bring back an actual elections amendment act rather than what they are doing?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question. There was a desire early in the mandate to use the first legislative vehicle that was available to the government to clarify that it had always been Parliament’s intent that the Canada Elections Act would be the full and complete regulatory regime in relation to privacy for federal political parties. To the extent that was being called into question, it was felt that it was important to move expeditiously, and it was one of the first legislative vehicles that was available.
Of course, the committee will recall that the bill was introduced earlier last year.
Senator Batters: Also, since there wasn’t a budget until November, there wasn’t a Budget Implementation Act until November or December. Was this something that was contemplated as potentially being included in a budget implementation act and those wide-sweeping measures that the government seems to like to do? Or was it already known by that point that there wasn’t going to be a budget for quite some time, and so this legislative measure was what you put it in?
Ms. Hawara: I’m not sure I have insight into whether, at the time, Bill C-4 was contemplated as the vehicle for these provisions. I’m not sure whether there was information about the timing of a budget implementation act, to be honest.
I’m not sure I have great insight there other than this was, at the time, the first legislative vehicle that was found to be appropriate.
Senator Batters: Part 4 introduces an attestation that a political party complies with this privacy policy. Is that attestation based solely on just a self-declaration? Are there verification mechanisms the Chief Electoral Officer would use? What consequences would be contemplated if that attestation is found to be false or misleading?
Ms. Hawara: That is correct. The bill will provide for the requirement that there be an annual attestation by the privacy officer of the political party. There is also a new requirement included in Bill C-4 that political parties comply with their privacy policies. Non-compliance with the privacy policy would be a violation of the act and, therefore, subject to compliance action by the Commissioner of Canada Elections. It would be subject to the administrative monetary penalty regime.
The oversight mechanisms that currently exist within the Canada Elections Act, both the Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections, will continue to apply, and compliance is a feature of the provisions in these amendments.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Ms. Hawara, I have a question for you. You called this bill a “complete regulatory regime” that applies to registered parties. However, citizens and voters clearly can’t access the personal information under these parties’ control. I don’t see any authorized access mentioned in the second part of clause 446.4. People can’t correct a mistake, they can’t ask to see their information or that their request be processed. It’s a very large part of what is called a complete regime that is absent.
I don’t understand how one or two provinces… Quebec has a similar clause that gives citizens access to this much-touted personal data. It’s hard to understand how a federal regime can’t be inspired by a province to at least give a complete regime to citizens and voters, those whose personal data is currently being stolen.
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question.
I talk about a complete, uniform, national and exclusive regime to emphasize the fact that Parliament’s intent is to ensure federal political parties are subject to the Canada Elections Act only. We’re aware some provinces have legislation that has been interpreted or could be interpreted as applicable to federal political parties. One of the reasons why this bill is before Parliament is precisely to avoid subjecting federal political parties to different regimes or requirements that might exist in the country and ensure the provisions in the Canada Elections Act are the only ones that apply. I’d also like to point out that we’re still looking at other ways to improve the regimes that apply to federal political parties. The intent behind this bill is very targeted.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: It’s hard to add a right to access. It already exists in other provinces; it has already been written. Why was it so hard to add that to Part 4 to make is stronger? Why is it difficult?
Ms. Hawara: I think we have to go back to the original intent of the bill which was to clarify Parliament’s intent and ensure its exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of federal political parties with respect to policies related to personal information.
[English]
Senator Prosper: Thank you to our witnesses. In part of your testimony, Ms. Hawara, you provide that one of the objects certainly is to promote accountability and clarity with respect to intent, given other rules that exist provincially, and compliance being a component of these within the intent of this particular part of the bill.
Privacy law and the handling of personal information are not novel subjects, either domestically or internationally. Why wouldn’t government avail itself of those standards or rules to at least codify them to provide some parameters to federal political parties, to ensure that they meet those benchmarks? It seems they just draft a policy and there is no further substance to it other than a discussion. Would you comment on that?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question. I will go back to the premise of the bill, which was to be very targeted in terms of what it is attempting to accomplish, and it is really trying to clarify that the Canada Elections Act is the regulatory framework in relation to federal political parties and their dealings with privacy and personal information. That is the primary objective and why we find what we do in the bill.
There are requirements for policies to be public. There are requirements for the parties to describe the kinds of activities they undertake that implicate personal information and to give examples of those.
There are some requirements, and the policies will be publicly available, but I need to go back to what the intent of the bill was and that we are always looking for opportunities to make improvements to the Canada Elections Act.
We know that the Chief Electoral Officer, for example, and the Commissioner of Canada Elections will be sharing their recommendations following the last general elections soon or in the coming months, and we are always paying attention to those recommendations to see what more can be done.
Rachel Pereira, Director, Electoral and Senatorial Policy Unit, Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office: Thank you, senator, for the question. These measures don’t preclude parties themselves going further. These are minimal requirements. For example, with respect to the previous senator’s question on access — and correct, the current policies of the New Democratic Party and the Green Party do permit electors to access and correct their information, so parties themselves can also go further than what the minimum requirements are with respect to access and correction. This clarifies that federal political parties are not required to comply with provincial laws, given the Canada Elections Act is the exclusive regime for them. However, parties can choose to implement requirements as part of their privacy policies. That’s what I would add.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Welcome.
I understand that clause 446.7 of Part 4 of the bill adds an obligation to the Chief Electoral Officer. It will be required to hold at least one meeting each calendar year relating to the protection of personal information by registered parties and eligible parties. I understand that since the bill doesn’t give the Chief Electoral Officer any additional powers, you feel it already has enough powers to implement the act at the federal level. How are its current powers enough? Because provincial and territorial laws will no longer apply, does that remove protections from voters? Does that limit the Chief Electoral Officer’s powers?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question.
There are new powers, and a new compliance obligation is imposed with respect to personal information policies which federal political parties must adopt and publish. It’ll be up to the Commissioner of Canada Elections to administer these provisions. The Chief Electoral Officer has other powers, because there’s already an obligation to have a policy to that effect. The Chief Electoral Officer could revoke the registration of a political party that doesn’t have such a policy. This means the act provides the necessary powers for both the Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections.
Senator Saint-Germain: Do you think voters will be as well protected if provincial laws no longer apply? Won’t there be loopholes? You talked about possible improvements to the act. However, when the bill receives Royal Assent, what would be different in how voters’ personal information is protected? Federal elections will no longer be subject to provincial laws.
[English]
Ms. Pereira: Thank you, senator, for the question. Just to clarify, these provisions do not mean provincial laws no longer apply. These provisions are intended to clarify that the requirements for political parties have been and continue to be exclusively governed by the Canada Elections Act. The measures that are in the act now will continue forward, which has, to date, been Parliament’s intent since 2000. That’s what these provisions clarify. For nuance, it’s not that, as of now, provincial laws don’t apply, but this provides clarity. That has been the case to date.
Senator Saint-Germain: But does the electorate lose some level of protection regarding their personal information? That’s the key point of my question.
Ms. Pereira: For federal political parties, there is no change unless they amend their own requirements to align with other requirements that may be out there. However, it does not require federal political parties to be subject to provincial laws.
Senator Simons: I want to come back to Bill C-65, which Senator Batters namechecked earlier. Bill C-65, which was introduced late in the Senate calendar, in June 2024, required that a party notify you if your information had been breached or disclosed in some way if there were reasonable circumstances to believe the breach created a risk of significant harm to the individual. That is gone from Bill C-4; it doesn’t exist. Bill C-65 said that parties could not provide false or misleading information to individuals about the purpose for which the party was collecting personal information. Bill C-65 said it was against the rules to sell personal information under the party’s control, and that disclosing personal information under the party’s control to the public for the purpose of causing harm was also against the rules. None of those protections are included in Bill C-4.
What should we make of the fact that those specific provisions, which provided a good deal more protection to citizens, have been stripped out of Bill C-4?
Ms. Pereira: Thank you, senator, for the question. You are correct that there were other robust measures proposed previously. Those could be considered in the future as part of amendments, potentially, to the Canada Elections Act. In this context, as Cathy noted, this was the vehicle by which to clarify Parliament’s intent around the exclusive regulation of federal political parties’ —.
Senator Simons: We all understand that the intent of this was to do an end run around the courts in British Columbia. I mean, I understand you can’t have a higgledy-piggledy patchwork of different provinces regulating federal elections. We all understand, and we all agree.
The question is this: Why was the decision taken to make the rules so wishy-washy? You say that the parties will be bound by their rules, but they get to set the rules, so they could set themselves very loosey-goosey rules. Then they could conform to those rules, and that would work fine under the Bill C-4 regime.
What we all want to know is this: Why weren’t the same robust protections for sensitive voter information included in the ambit of the Bill C-4 regime?
Ms. Hawara: As Rachel just said, we are aware of the provisions that were previously included in Bill C-65. The purpose of this bill was very specific: to clarify Parliament’s intention to be the exclusive regulator —
Senator Simons: We understand that’s the intention. What I’m asking is, if you’re going to say the federal government is setting the rules, why was the bar set lower than anybody could limbo?
Ms. Hawara: I’m not sure there’s much more I can add at this point. I want to share with the committee that we are always looking for opportunities to improve the Canada Elections Act. This bill was meant to address a very specific issue.
Senator Tannas: Thank you. Yes, we all understand the first priority was to assert exclusive jurisdiction so that it was clear — to assert that we had always meant to do this and so it needed to go back 20 years. We kind of thought we had this dealt with, and it wasn’t dealt with, so here is a clear statement — support it 100%.
You mentioned, Ms. Hawara, looking for opportunities to improve. Clearly, anybody with a reasonable mind would say this needs improvement. There was a list of improvements in Bill C-65, which we have talked about, but for whatever reason, those are not ready for prime time in the political parties’ world.
How long do you think it would be before a reasonable collection of these opportunities could come forward? Maybe we could put a sunset clause in this bill that would give a certain amount of time for everybody to get their act together and conform with what the public would demand if they knew this was all going on.
Could you give us any guidance on how close you think the government is to coming up with the proper framework for this important issue?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question. It would be very difficult for me to provide a time frame.
I am not in a position to get ahead of the government on this. Certainly, our team has a role to play in supporting the government from a policy perspective as it relates to the Canada Elections Act.
We are constantly reviewing recommendations that come forward. I unfortunately cannot give a precise time frame for that, however.
Senator Tannas: Given your answer, and given some of the witnesses we heard who said the timeline would be “never” — and it’s great to have a person here with us on electoral and senatorial policy — what do you think should be the Senate’s policy on being given this and asked to wave it through in our current circumstances here?
Ms. Pereira: Thank you, senator, for the comment and question.
It is for Parliament to determine. That has been the case to date. Historically, since 2000, there was an indication that Parliament wanted federal political parties to be exclusively regulated under the Canada Elections Act.
Not until 2018 did Parliament approve the first privacy policy requirements as a condition of registration. Then Parliament approved again, in 2023, through Bill C-47, clarity around the national, uniform and exclusive regime, again reiterated here and further clarified.
My answer, senator, would be that it is for Parliament to determine.
Senator Tannas: Thank you. I have one more thing. You mentioned the NDP having in their privacy policy that a citizen could request their information. I don’t see that in their policy.
I see “To update or correct the personal information you provide to us, please contact us . . .” However, nothing that says you’re entitled to learn from them what information they’re holding. It’s virtually the same language for all three major political parties.
I think you have said that you could ask for your information via the policy. If that’s the case, could you point it out in writing? That would be helpful because I’m out of time.
Ms. Pereira: Certainly, I can do that.
The Chair: Can you do that now?
Ms. Pereira: Yes. In the publicly available policies now, for example, in the NDP’s privacy policy, under “Updating your Personal Information,” there is a sentence that says:
We aim to keep your information accurate and up-to-date. To update or correct the personal information you provide to us, please contact us at contact@ndp.ca.
So it does reference the ability to —
Senator Tannas: How would I know what information they have?
Ms. Pereira: That is a good question, senator. That is something that —
Senator Tannas: Because they all say that. If that’s your view of how we could ask for information, all the parties say it. If you look at the Conservatives and Liberals, they use virtually the same words.
I wondered if there was some reason you mentioned the NDP.
Ms. Pereira: Yes, right.
Senator Tannas: I don’t see the difference.
Ms. Pereira: No. The NDP and Green Party are a little more explicit in the reference to access. But, yes, you’re correct.
Senator Tannas: Thank you.
Ms. Pereira: There is contact information, and electors can approach the parties for that kind of information. Right now, it is a generic email.
Under the proposal, one of the small measures at this time is to have a dedicated privacy officer with the name and personal contact information available so that electors could ask.
Senator Tannas: Thank you.
Senator Cuzner: Thank you, Ms. Hawara.
In your comments, you said a few times that you continue to study options on how to improve. In response to Senator Tannas’s question, and at the risk of gaslighting, I’ll once again lead with my chin here.
Though not able to speak on behalf of the government, do you see anything in Part 4 that would preclude the government from moving ahead with a more fulsome and robust study into the issue and bringing forward stand-alone legislation?
Ms. Hawara: I think it’s always open to the government to do that. There’s certainly nothing precluding it from proposing additional measures.
We know that we have actors in this space, including the Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections, who will be providing us with some recommendations following the last general election. There is always that possibility. I could not comment on specific timelines, of course.
Senator Cuzner: Of great concern as well is when you said that it’s up to the individual parties. It would make far more sense to Canadians if there were a uniform national framework or rules around this that all parties had to comply with. I think that would certainly provide a greater degree of comfort for Canadians on the issue.
[Translation]
Senator Dalphond: Twice you referred to Parliament’s intent. My understanding is that, for the moment, this is the government’s intent, not Parliament’s, since the Senate has yet to pass the bill.
Also, Parliament’s intent has been very clear since 2020. After all, it was a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 2024 who wrote in paragraph 146 of his ruling on an attempt by federal political parties to overturn the British Columbia Privacy Commissioner’s decision that he could not find a clear intent on Parliament’s part to exclude provincial legislation. So I don’t know why we’re being told today that the intent has always been very clear, when it was argued by lawyers, including the Attorney General of Canada, and rejected by the court, and has now been referred to the Court of Appeal. I wanted to clarify that. And here we are talking about Parliament’s intent. We should still take into consideration that the Senate, which is part of Parliament, published a report in 2023 in which it says what is proposed is not enough, that it needs content. I wonder if someone can tell us if what we’re being asked to do is in line with Parliament’s intent.
I don’t think you can answer—what I am saying is quite political—so I’m no longer asking a question, rather I’m making a comment. I wanted to tell you that Parliament’s intent may not be as obvious as you say.
[English]
The Chair: Do you want any comment from the witnesses on that?
Senator Dalphond: I don’t want to put her in a political dilemma.
Senator Clement: Thank you, both, for your testimony.
I had the same question as Senator Tannas around opportunities to improve and how we can make this practical and real for Canadians.
I noticed that you came in early and so probably heard the testimony from the previous witnesses. I was interested in Mr. Hearn’s comment about how this regime, or whatever word we want to use for what’s being proposed as a national regime, is closer to a U.S. style of how to deal with privacy information as opposed to what the EU has done in their regulation.
I want your comments on that, and on whether you have closely studied what happened in the EU — which, quite frankly, has a lot of experience with patchwork types of situations — and why you wouldn’t have gone in that direction as opposed to a looser style.
Ms. Pereira: I can’t speak to international practices at this time.
I can say that, historically, in Canada, federal political parties have been exclusively regulated under the Canada Elections Act. That means they have never been regulated under PIPEDA, which is for commercial enterprises, nor have they been regulated under the Privacy Act, which is for federal entities. They have always been treated, to date, as a unique body, a democratic actor, exclusively regulated under the Canada Elections Act. That is more of a rationale or reason for the way the regulation has evolved under the Canada Elections Act. But I don’t have an answer for you at this time in terms of the practices of the U.S. and the EU.
Senator Clement: Would you agree that this regime here is closer to a U.S. style than —
Ms. Pereira: I don’t know enough about the U.S. style and how it is treated federally or at the state level. Regarding the terminology, it is not quite a privacy regime, but it is how federal political parties are exclusively regulated here in Canada.
Senator Clement: I also want to ask about previous legislation. The government is trying to legislate around AI and digitization. There was Bill C-27. How are you working with all those other pieces of legislation, or all those other intents, to create something that is cohesive?
Ms. Pereira: As Cathy mentioned, we can’t quite speak to what the government’s plans are. Certainly, when the time comes, we would consider all the various relevant pieces of legislation, if there were further amendments to be considered in this space.
Senator Clement: Thank you.
Senator Simons: I understand more clearly now, from your testimony, that this is meant to be — I don’t want to call it a stopgap. Let’s call it a first step, perhaps, in establishing a national regime.
What concerns me is what happens in the interval. When people think about political parties, we generally think about the Liberals, the Conservatives, the Bloc, the New Democrats and the Greens. But there are many other registered political parties in this country — the Marijuana Party, the Marxist-Leninist Party, the Libertarian Party, the Christian Heritage Party, the Communist Party, the People’s Party, the Parti Rhinocéros Party — I won’t list them all, but you take my point.
None of those parties, by the terms of this legislation, will have to follow the kinds of rules that we expect private companies to follow under PIPEDA or that we expect the government to follow. In fact, the protections that would have existed in Bill C-65 will not exist. What’s added is the fact that nobody can be required to correct information that is incorrect.
This is a hypothetical question, because I don’t want to malign any of these parties. But what is to stop a hypothetical registered political party from weaponizing the powers they now have in ways that are malicious?
Ms. Pereira: Thank you. I will point out one thing that is currently in the act. It was introduced in the year 2000 through Bill C-2. The list of electors that is shared with registered political parties is generated by the Chief Electoral Officer from the National Register of Electors. It contains the personal information of electors: name, address and so on. That is distributed to registered parties solely for the purpose of the parties communicating with electors for electoral purposes. That is in the act now.
Should any party use that information for any purpose other than to communicate with electors for electoral purposes, it is an offence under the act. They would face penalties on summary conviction of up to $20,000 and/or one year in prison or, on indictment, up to $50,000 and/or up to five years in prison.
That is the existing requirement that was importantly introduced for that foundational piece of information.
Senator Simons: But that only applies to the information they receive from the Chief Electoral Officer. It wouldn’t apply to other information they may harvest through door-knocking, polling or just going through the neighbourhood and taking photos of your house.
Ms. Pereira: Yes, correct.
Senator Simons: Then you have many small political parties. They will each create their own unique privacy rules, which they will each enforce themselves.
When Minister Champagne was before us in Committee of the Whole in the spring, he said that every party in Parliament agreed to this. No doubt they did because the parties benefit from this type of self-regulation.
Maybe I’ll ask Ms. Hawara this question. You said something about it being the will of Parliament. Parliament has two halves. Many people forget that the House of Commons may have its will, but the Senate is a partner in a bicameral system of government and we have an obligation to provide sober second thought and protect the Constitution and the rights of all Canadians, including regional rights.
Do you have any discomfort with the way this bill is being presented to us as a fait accompli, making it difficult for us to do the job that we are constitutionally required to do?
Ms. Hawara: It is certainly our understanding — and this is why we are here — that the Senate has an important constitutional role to play here, and we are here to support you in carrying out that role.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: I would like to follow up on Senator Tannas’s question on voters, citizens and their ability to access their personal information held by an eligible party. I’d like you to enlighten me on the symmetry between two clauses. The first is paragraph 446.6(c), which refers to the type of personal information in relation to which the party carries out its activities.
The citizen would have access based on this paragraph.
However, I read in subsection 446.4(1) that the eligible party is not required to
. . . comply with an Act of a province or territory that regulates activities in relation to personal information, including the collection, use, disclosure, retention and disposal of personal information, unless the party’s policy for the protection of personal information provides otherwise.
In subsection 446.4(2), it says that the same eligible parties
. . . cannot be required to provide access to personal information or provide information relating to personal information under its control or to correct—or receive, adjudicate or annotate requests to correct—personal information or omissions in personal information under its control.
I see a contradiction here. However, I’d like to have your interpretation on whether citizens can access their personal information collected by eligible political parties, correct it, rectify it or have it removed, as the case may be.
Ms. Hawara: Paragraph 446.6(c) specifies what information must be included in the policy. The policy must explain the type of personal information—
Senator Saint-Germain: Collected.
Ms. Hawara: Yes, more than collected information, in relation to all the activities that the political party engages in.
Senator Saint-Germain: As I understand it, that type of information is made public. That’s relatively clear to me. However, I see a contradiction between subsections 446.4(1) and 446.4(2). I also feel the clarification is a contradiction. I would like to know if my interpretation is wrong or if there’s indeed a discrepancy between two clauses of the bill.
Ms. Hawara: I don’t think there’s any discrepancy. Subsection 446.4(1) states that a federal political party doesn’t have to comply with a provincial law on the matter, while subsection 446.4(2) states that they can’t be required to provide access to personal information. I don’t see any discrepancy between the two.
Senator Saint-Germain: If I may, I don’t see how paragraph 446.6(c) or even the entire section grants citizens access to their personal information. I understand that on the website, we’ll see that a party is collecting names, addresses and gender. Maybe I’m misreading it, and please correct me if I am, but I don’t see how that gives the citizen access to their information and the ability to have it corrected or even removed, if they wish.
Ms. Hawara: You’re right. Paragraph 446.6(c) tries to describe the type of information, but it doesn’t confer a right of access to the individual.
Senator Saint-Germain: Would the public have access to it under another Chief Electoral Officer power or under another act? Is that a no?
Ms. Hawara: The answer is no.
Senator Saint-Germain: Okay.
[English]
Senator Prosper: Part 4 is described as creating a “. . . national, uniform . . . and complete regime.” I get the “national” part that you mentioned earlier regarding my question. It falls under the Canada Elections Act. Yet it relies on each political party adopting its own privacy policy with no independent body assessing adequacy.
How does a system of individualized, self-written standards produce true uniformity and compliance with the fundamental privacy principles that underlie privacy law?
Ms. Hawara: The intention of the bill is to clarify that the Canada Elections Act is where federal political parties look to know what roles they are subject to with respect to privacy, so it is from that perspective that it is a national, complete and uniform set of rules. That is the intention of the bill.
Senator Prosper: That is in and of itself, but can you comment on how these are self-drafted with respect to each party with no independent oversight? How does that lend itself to it being uniform and complete if it can vary from party to party?
Ms. Hawara: There are certain requirements in terms of what should be in the policy. The policies need to be made public and available for Canadians to consult, so in that sense, it provides some frame that will guide political parties.
Rachel, I don’t know if you want to add anything.
Ms. Pereira: Thank you, senator. You are correct that the policies can be different across parties, but the requirements that you see in the act currently and then with the new minimal requirements that are being added, those would be common to all the policies. But you are correct that the policies can be different across parties.
Senator Clement: Can we come back to the warning letters you were talking about? You said if there were a breach, it would be a violation of the bill, but what would that lead to? Can you repeat what you said about what the infraction or the punishment would be?
Ms. Pereira: I’m happy to.
Senator Clement: And is what you said in the bill?
Ms. Pereira: Yes, it is. A party that does not comply with their requirements and their policy can be subject to the administrative monetary penalties regime, which is already existing in the Canada Elections Act.
It is a regime that intends to encourage compliance and not be punitive, so the Commissioner of Canada Elections has tools at her disposal should there be a contravention of a party’s privacy policy. She could not necessarily go straight to monetary penalties — which vary, depending on whether it is an individual or an entity — but she can issue a warning letter, because it could be an honest mistake that someone made, or a warning, once she looks into the issue.
But if there is deemed to have been an infraction, then she can issue a monetary penalty of a minimum of $50 or more, or $300 for an entity.
Senator Clement: Is it $50 or $300?
Ms. Pereira: It is $50 for individuals and $300 for entities at this time.
Ms. Hawara: I will point out the specific provision in the bill. It is subclause 446.5(2).
Senator Clement: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, witnesses from the Privy Council Office. Thank you for appearing before us and answering our questions. Your testimonies are valuable to the committee’s work, and we are grateful for your appearance here today.
Senators, before we adjourn, I want to remind the senators that we have two further meetings today: one commencing at 1:30 p.m. for two hours with two panels, and a second commencing at 4:15 p.m., again, for two hours with two panels. Then we’ll come to 6:15 p.m., when we’ll continue that meeting. At that point, we will discuss recommendations and/or observations, which we would pass onto the National Finance Committee.
Senator Simons: I have a very practical question. May we leave our papers in the room, or do we need to clear and then come back in an hour and start over fresh?
The Chair: The clerk is going to be responsible for this room, and you can leave your items here. I will not take that responsibility.
Senator Simons: I trust Vincent.
The Chair: We all trust Vincent. That’s true.
Thank you, senators. We will reconvene for the next meeting at 1:30 p.m.
(The committee adjourned.)