THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, May 27, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4:15 p.m. [ET] to examine the subject matter of Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and to enact An Act to change the names of certain electoral districts, 2026.
Senator David M. Arnot (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: My name is David Arnot. I’m a senator from Saskatchewan. I invite my colleagues to introduce themselves.
Senator Batters: Senator Denise Batters from Saskatchewan.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Julie Miville-Dechêne from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Mohamed: Farah Mohamed, Ontario. I am the sponsor of the bill.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: Manuelle Oudar from Quebec.
Senator Clement: Bernadette Clement from Ontario.
[English]
Senator Prosper: Paul Prosper, from Nova Scotia, Mi’kma’ki territory.
Senator Lewis: Senator Todd Lewis from Saskatchewan.
Senator Simons: Paula Simons, Alberta, and I come from Treaty 6 territory.
Senator Duncan: Pat Duncan from the Yukon.
Senator Pate: Kim Pate. Welcome. I live here in the unceded, unsurrendered, unreturned territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabe.
Senator Dasko: Donna Dasko, Ontario.
The Chair: Pursuant to the order of reference adopted by the Senate on May 7, we are meeting today to begin our study of the subject matter of Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and to enact An Act to change the names of certain electoral districts, 2026, which was introduced in the House of Commons on March 26, 2026, in advance of the bill being referred to the Senate. In other words, this is a pre-study.
Our committee has also been mandated to submit its final report to the Senate in pre-study no later than June 4, 2026.
For our first panel on this pre-study, we’re pleased to welcome Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada; and Trevor Knight, General Counsel, Elections Canada. From the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, we have Caroline Simard, Commissioner of Canada Elections; and Michael Bisson, Deputy Commissioner.
Thank you, witnesses, for joining us here today. We’ll begin with opening statements, starting with Mr. Perrault and then followed by Ms. Simard. These should be five minutes each, please. Then we’ll move to questions shortly thereafter.
[Translation]
Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to appear before the committee to discuss Bill C-25.
At the outset, I would like to indicate my support for the bill, which introduces a range of measures aimed at strengthening the security and integrity of Canada’s electoral process in light of foreign interference and evolving threats to democracy.
That said, part of my responsibility as Chief Electoral Officer is to highlight aspects where improvements may be warranted. I will briefly highlight those areas in my remarks, but I have also provided the committee with a table outlining these and additional suggested amendments.
Broadly speaking, Bill C-25 aligns with several recommendations I presented in my 2024 report Protecting Against Threats in the Electoral Process, which was developed in the context of the Foreign Interference Commission.
Among other things, the bill proposes new measures to prevent foreign funding of third parties, provisions to prevent the use of non-traceable payment methods for political contributions, and expanded prohibitions related to interference in nomination and leadership contests, such as bribery and intimidation, as well as undue influence by foreigners.
In addition, the bill introduces new rules to better safeguard the information environment. Notably, it includes provisions targeting the growing use of deceptive technologies — such as deepfakes — to mislead electors, an issue on which I have previously emphasized the need for action.
The legislation also addresses challenges associated with unduly long ballots, which is consistent with prior recommendations I have made. Importantly, the rule preventing electors from signing multiple nomination papers has been designed carefully to ensure that candidates are not penalized if a supporter has also signed another nomination paper.
Finally, the bill introduces additional privacy protections largely drawn from what was found in Bill C-65 from the other place. While the bill does not go as far as what I recommended in my 2022 report, the new requirements represent improvements to the regime put in place by Bill C-4 in March.
[English]
While I commend the direction taken in this bill, I believe there are areas where improvements or additional measures should be considered.
One of my principal concerns relates to the evolving information landscape and its effect on the democratic process. The Foreign Interference Commission identified disinformation as the biggest threat to our democracy, a conclusion with which I fully agree.
The bill proposes creating an offence for knowingly publishing false information about the electoral process with the intent of interfering with voting rights. It is worth noting that similar provisions already exist in the Canada Elections Act and that they have been applied successfully.
What remains unaddressed is the deliberate dissemination of inaccurate information about the electoral process with the intent to erode confidence in an election or its outcome. Examples include manipulated videos falsely suggesting that ballots have been tampered with to support the narrative that the election has been rigged or stolen. Debate about the electoral process or its administration, including criticism that may be based on incorrect assumptions or even false information, is an essential feature of a healthy democracy and should remain protected. While any offence in this area should, therefore, be carefully defined, I do believe it is necessary to establish clear limits to guard against deliberate attempts to undermine electoral democracy through disinformation.
I would also recommend introducing a requirement for transparency markers when electoral communications involve AI-generated synthetic content. Although there are legitimate uses for such tools, their potential to mislead voters is significant. Accordingly, electors should be clearly informed when such content is used.
In this respect, I note that the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage in the other place has recommended that fully synthetic or AI-generated material be clearly labelled, using standardized, easily recognizable markers.
Thank you once again for inviting me, and I would be happy to answer questions.
The Chair: Thank you, sir. Ms. Simard?
[Translation]
Caroline Simard, Commissioner of Canada Elections, Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections: Honourable senators, thank you for the invitation to provide testimony today on the topic of Bill C-25.
This bill responds to a number of recommendations I have made with a view to strengthening compliance with, and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act. In particular, it increases our capacity to address threats related to foreign interference and disinformation in our federal elections.
[English]
My office has long relied on the act’s well-established penal regime, which remains a critical enforcement tool. In contrast, the Administrative Monetary Penalties, or AMPs, regime, is comparatively recent and still evolving, and so Bill C-25 makes a meaningful contribution to its continued maturation. For instance, I note the proposed amendments would introduce three main changes: first, making AMPs applicable across a broader range of circumstances; second, increasing the maximum penalties for both individuals and entities; third, expanding the OCCE’s investigative toolkit.
Canada has long been a world leader in electoral compliance and enforcement, and I believe the amendments that would be brought about by Bill C-25 would further solidify this position. However, the newly adopted privacy regime for political parties, even with the additions brought about by Bill C-25, still does not address concerns raised by my office. These include elements such as mandatory retention periods for documents and the requirement to report privacy breaches to my office. Absent these changes, I believe we may face investigative challenges.
Bill C-25 also proposes an option to destroy crypto contributions. This could result in the loss of important evidence and impede investigations. It would be preferable to remove this option and instead require that such contributions be returned unused or converted to money and returned to the Receiver General.
Bill C-25 represents the most comprehensive series of amendments to our mandate in recent years. We welcome these amendments and commit to working towards their full implementation.
I would be pleased to answer the committee’s questions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senators, we have 15 senators attending this meeting. There is a lot of interest in these issues, so we’ll start with four minutes each. Please proceed.
Senator Batters: First, I would like to ask the Commissioner of Canada Elections about the new offences for knowingly publishing false or misleading information in Bill C-25. There is an exception for representations that would be “for the purpose of parity or satire.”
How would enforcement distinguish between knowingly false information and fast-moving political commentary or satire in an online social media environment? Also, how can you be confident these provisions would be sufficiently precise to avoid unintended impacts on political free speech and other Charter-protected freedoms?
Within that, given the scale and speed of online disinformation, how realistic would it be that Elections Canada or the commissioner could detect, investigate and enforce these offences in quick fashion during an election campaign? Or would you intend that the enforcement largely occur after the fact?
I know that’s quite a bit to answer, but I do have another question about one of the Elections-Canada-suggested amendments, so if you could keep it quite confined, please.
Ms. Simard: A short answer is that this exception already exists in the current act. It is challenging; I can confirm that. It’s a question of facts and evidence on the file. I don’t know if you want to have more details about how the investigations are conducted.
Senator Batters: Would that sort of thing largely occur after a campaign or do you intend that it occur during the campaign to have it dealt with more quickly?
Michael Bisson, Deputy Commissioner, Operations, Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections: Thank you, senator. When it comes to the nature of the information, for example, if there is misleading information that might mischaracterize the place of voting or something like that, which may have a very short and immediate effect on an electoral campaign, we do maintain relationships with major social media platforms, for example, and we have a relationship as a law enforcement body. We are recognized by them, and we are able to intercede very quickly to take down any misleading information to minimize the impact on an electoral event.
Senator Batters: If you deem it necessary to take it down?
Mr. Bisson: Yes, senator. That’s if it’s obviously false, for example. I understand your nuance around, for example, if it’s nebulous around the parity and satire piece. That will be more delicate, as the commissioner noted. It would depend on the facts and the evidence that we do collect. That would usually take a longer period of time.
Senator Batters: Thank you.
To Mr. Perrault, I would like to ask you about the first of your suggested amendments because I don’t agree with you that it’s needed. You’re suggesting taking out the requirement that the Chief Electoral Officer publish a list in the Canada Gazette, with the returning officer’s name and municipality — or equivalent, town, what have you — and province of residence. You’re suggesting that the municipality and province be taken out. You’re saying that’s not needed because they already have to live in their electoral district.
However, just for basic identifying purposes, it would be needed. Having been involved with my late husband and his election campaigns, certainly, I know a little bit about this. Many rural ridings in Canada have multiple municipalities within a rural riding. For example, say, we’re looking at, for instance, Souris–Moose Mountain in Saskatchewan. You could have Bill Smith from Estevan, Saskatchewan, or Bill Smith in Carlyle, Saskatchewan. Both of those people would live there in one region and, just looking at the list, you wouldn’t be able to tell which is which and who the returning officer would be. Given that, does that still seem like an important thing? It really wouldn’t infringe on their privacy. You’re not giving away their mailing address, street address or anything like that — simply their municipality.
Mr. Perrault: I understand the concern. It’s easy for us to put political participants in contact with the returning officer through our office and through our contact information. So I don’t think this is a real operational issue. I don’t know if people do go to the Canada Gazette to get that kind of information. But I think it would be easily resolvable by going through our office.
Senator Batters: You don’t think they go through the Canada Gazette?
Mr. Perrault: I don’t know that they do. They certainly work with us and contact us regularly.
Senator Batters: Right, but they could. That would be something that would be required. I have probably used up my time. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I have a question for Mr. Perrault.
You have proposed a number of amendments. In particular, you want us to add an offence for people who attempt to cast doubt on the legitimacy of an election or its results. We already have an offence for people who try to influence the results or disrupt the process. I was curious as to why you wanted to add another offence. Are you afraid of something in particular? Is there a recent event that has made you fear this kind of interference? Are you being overly cautious? As you know, generally speaking, the legitimacy of elections has not been contested in Canada.
Mr. Perrault: Thank you for the question. It’s a very important one.
I think we all know what’s going on elsewhere in the world. We’ve seen situations in several countries, such as Brazil or the United States, where certain narratives are pushed by people who intend to overturn the results of an election. What I’m proposing includes a two-part intent requirement: The individual must know the information is false and must do it not for the purposes of criticism or satire, but with the aim of undermining confidence in the election results themselves. Therefore, a high degree of intent would be required.
It’s important to draw a line. On social media, we see content fabricated after the election showing stolen ballot boxes. This is AI-generated content. If this type of content proliferates and is used for the purpose of overturning an election, in my opinion, we need to have legal instruments to take action.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I have a quick question for Ms. Simard.
Bill C-25 creates new offences for sharing false information about nomination voting. Is that enough? We know that with artificial intelligence, it’s easy to spread disinformation about candidates and party policies. Should the bill go further?
Ms. Simard: What I see in the bill allows us to make significant progress and, in fact, we’ll work with what’s currently being adopted. I think we could already do our job with certain provisions. Several are drafted in a technology-neutral way. That already allowed us to do our work, but these additions are important to reflect current challenges, as the Chief Electoral Officer said, related to artificial intelligence and, in particular, disinformation.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Does it concern you, Mr. Perrault, that political parties are not protected?
Mr. Perrault: They are addressed by new provisions on deepfakes, and that, to me, is important. In the last election, we saw party leaders who were misrepresented.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Were they targeted?
Mr. Perrault: They were targeted. Fortunately, it was less extensive than we had feared.
For example, in Ireland, we saw deepfakes where, on the eve of the election, the frontrunner for president was depicted as resigning. That caused quite a stir. In other countries, we’ve seen audio recordings used to influence elections. These were fake recordings. These are very serious situations.
The bill contains measures in this regard that I believe are absolutely critical. What is missing — and this is likely what you’re referring to — are more general rules around disinformation about parties and candidates. I think this is a very sensitive issue. The political world is full of allegations, distortions and exaggerations. It becomes difficult to draw lines in that environment.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Thank you both.
[English]
Senator Prosper: Thank you to all our witnesses here. I would like to ask a question with respect to the sufficiency of the provisions within the bill when it comes to privacy of personal information.
There are three areas that I’m wondering if you could further provide comment on, just reading some of the submissions. One is that this bill lacks absent, fair information practices — a term I think you’re familiar with.
Secondly, the sufficiency of independent oversight. Thirdly, the assertion that some of these protections and safeguards are policy requirements rather than statutory obligations.
Could either of you provide comment on those three areas?
Mr. Perrault: On the issue of standards required through Bill C-25, there is an improvement. If you look at the 10 basic privacy principles that are found on the Privacy Commissioner’s website, which are related to what is commonly called PIPEDA, there are elements that are in this bill. For example, the requirement to protect information in a manner that is commensurate to sensitivity. That is one of the principles. It’s in this bill. Not all of them are.
The right to correct information that one has to seek to know and correct — that’s not there. The obligation to limit collection is not there. So there is some progress, but they are not all there.
There are some very clear prohibitions, for example, on selling or certain uses of personal information.
I would add that there is a restriction that is not directly about privacy, but it is indirectly, which is a limitation on who receives the preliminary list of electors. We see what is happening in Alberta these days. The bill would make sure that not any party just coming in, not having even fielded a single candidate, would get access to the preliminary list for the entire country. There are privacy elements indirectly in this bill that are not in the privacy section.
[Translation]
Ms. Simard: Regarding the policy part or the part that’s missing, I would say that there are three that concern our office. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, there’s retention, that is to say the obligation to retain documents. We talked about it during my first appearance. Introducing a retention requirement for a period of two election cycles, ideally from eight to 10 years, could make a difference in our investigative work.
The second point concerns there being no obligation to inform us in the event of a leak or a privacy breach. There’s no obligation to inform us. You will understand that this complicates our work if we are not informed.
Finally, from an operational standpoint, we currently have 14 policies to review and familiarize ourselves with. There is a need to build expertise. We said this from the start: It’s expertise we do not currently possess. We did not ask for these new powers. They are being granted to us. We’ll do the work required to get up to speed. This can be done in co-operation with the Privacy Commissioner.
Senator Simons: I’m a senator from Alberta, and I’m speaking tonight as an Albertan.
[English]
I’m not happy that the allegation in Alberta is that the elector’s list of the Republican Party of Alberta, which was a registered political party that had fielded candidates, somehow went from them to a far-right advocacy group. The allegation has been made that the far-right group bought the list for $45,000.
I know, Mr. Perrault, you just mentioned there is a provision in this new bill that says that the list won’t go to every party, but I’m wondering, for you and Ms. Simard, if you could comment on whether or not you think the provisions in Bill C-25 will protect Canadians. Once this has been modelled as something that can be done — that you can sell the list, and the list is now seemingly in the hands of an American far-right group that is using it to create an app for voter activation — if something similar were to happen federally, do you have the powers necessary in Bill C-25 to investigate, prosecute and punish that kind of flagrant misuse of private voter data?
Mr. Perrault: This is for the Commissioner of Canada Elections; I can’t speak to the investigation side, but there are prohibitions currently in the law regarding the use of a list of voters; it must be used for a federal electoral purpose. It can’t be used for any other purpose. It can be used for fundraising, getting memberships and getting out to vote, but it could not be used nor could it be shared for another purpose.
Bill C-25 adds a prohibition on selling the list of electors. It does require that, if it is shared with a third party, the privacy protections that the party has, based on its policy, and the requirement that the protection be commensurate to the sensitivity, that this carry through to a third party through some arrangement.
So there would be a number of rules in place. The question, then, is about the challenges and enforcement. I’ll leave that to the commissioner.
Ms. Simard: To be precise, in the act, there are two relevant provisions, which are 110 and 111(f). They would give us the power to investigate and do our work — to prosecute if the threshold is met. That is the short answer. I can provide you with more details.
In Bill C-25, in this context, we asked to have the power to impose AMPs, as well. This was a recommendation, but this has not been incorporated in the bill.
Senator Simons: Another challenge in Alberta is that we’re being flooded with internationally generated AI deepfake content, which is designed to inflame people and to provoke the separatist vote.
What power do we really have when this kind of thing is coming internationally to control those kinds of deepfakes that might interfere with a federal election in the future?
Mr. Perrault: There are rules in this bill to prevent third parties from engaging monies to influence the electoral process. The rules would be there, but what’s missing, from my perspective — and I won’t speak to the enforcement challenges of cross-jurisdictional enforcement — is a transparency of AI-generated content so that people are on the alert from the get-go that the content is synthetic. It might be legitimate, in a sense, but it’s not true content. That is something that would alert Canadians, I think.
Senator Simons: How do we work across international boundaries?
Ms. Simard: To reassure you, for the forty-fifth general election, we were ready to investigate and do our work with that respect.
For international challenges, they are international challenges, but I can reassure you that we also can do our work. Mr. Bisson could provide you with more details on that.
Senator Simons: I think my time is up, but if you could provide that in writing, that would be terrific.
Ms. Simard: I will do that.
The Chair: It’s important.
[Translation]
Senator Oudar: Welcome to all of you.
My question is for Elections Canada. I was particularly interested in the provisions of the bill pertaining to Canadian funds, more specifically the excluded amounts provided for in section 349.95. We see that the bill would require third parties to use only contributions from Canadian individuals to pay for regulated expenses. However, there’s a significant exception that would allow third parties whose total contributions represent 10% or less of their annual revenue to use their own funds.
We have seen criticism of this exception, which could allow organizations that receive grants from foreign sources to use non-Canadian funds for political activities, since these contributions would be absorbed into the organization’s budget. How will Elections Canada monitor compliance? Do you have reporting mechanisms? Do you have enforcement powers? Are you suggesting any amendments to obtain more powers to monitor the application of these provisions?
Mr. Perrault: It’s a measure that I had recommended and it’s intended to strike a certain balance. The goal is to preserve some leeway for groups wishing to intervene legitimately and unexpectedly in an election debate. This debate would raise crucial issues for them, even though they wouldn’t have raised any funds so they could use their own resources. The law prohibits the use of funds from abroad.
In practice, when the assets or holdings are commingled, it’s very difficult to distinguish between them, unless all of the funds come from abroad. That’s why I recommended that groups funded primarily by fundraising organizations be required to maintain a separate bank account. This would make it possible to trace contributions, assuring Canadians that this money does not come from abroad. This is a compromise measure. I believe that if we were to ban it outright, that would prevent groups that legitimately wish to participate in an election — and haven’t engaged in fundraising activities — from doing so. The same applies to individuals: They must be able to participate. There is therefore an element of balancing competing interests at play in this proposal. I believe that, if it is adopted, we will have to see over time whether there are improvements to be made.
Senator Oudar: Are you concerned that circumvention measures might be used? That requires the condition you outlined in your answer, which isn’t always present. How are you going to handle that?
Mr. Perrault: Organizations must submit annual financial statements and demonstrate that the financial statements for the previous year — the law provides two options for this — show that no more than 10% of funds came from contributions. In the financial realm, loopholes exist, and they will probably always exist. No system is 100% watertight. I think this is a huge improvement over the current state of affairs, where there is virtually no way of actually knowing where the third party funds used in elections come from.
In the last election, we saw an exponential rise in the percentage of third-party funds reported as coming from their own funds. While this was initially quite marginal, now it is the majority. We don’t know where the funds come from. Sometimes, funds flow from Organization A to Organization B, but we don’t know the source of Organization A’s funding. There are currently real issues at stake. This bill would bring about significant improvements in this regard.
Senator Saint-Germain: My first question is for you, Chief Electoral Officer. Under the current Elections Canada Act, we know that foreign persons and entities are prohibited from unduly influencing a Canadian voter to vote or abstain from voting in an election for a specific candidate or a specific registered party. Bill C-25 expands the scope of this prohibition to include voting for or abstaining from voting for a prospective candidate or an eligible party.
Should this prohibition be extended to prospective candidates, to individuals who take the steps required under the Canada Elections Act to become candidates but who have not yet filed their nomination papers with the returning officer of their electoral district? Then, as a follow-up question, are you currently equipped to prevent a loophole if the bill is passed as is? Are you able to ensure that it doesn’t happen?
Mr. Perrault: To answer your second question, that’s essentially a matter for investigation. However, if complaints were filed with Elections Canada, they would be forwarded to the commissioner. She would be the one to handle that.
The bill extends the application of the provision on undue influence beyond the election period, applying to both nomination and leadership candidates and prospective candidates, which includes candidates whose nomination papers have not yet been accepted. This extension is already provided for.
Senator Saint-Germain: Ms. Simard, regarding oversight, are you already equipped to ensure that the law would be enforced if it is passed as is?
Ms. Simard: The short answer is yes. I don’t know if Mr. Bisson would like to elaborate or not.
Mr. Bisson: I believe so, yes. We don’t conduct active monitoring as such, but we will investigate when complaints are filed or when cases are referred by Elections Canada.
We have a range of tools that allow us to conduct investigations. I believe this will enable us to be more effective.
Senator Saint-Germain: It will improve the quality of your investigations.
Mr. Perrault: Absolutely.
Senator Saint-Germain: I have another question for Mr. Perrault.
You say that you’re satisfied with the bill. However, as I understand it, you still insisted — as a call to this committee to propose amendments — on the fact that you also proposed amendments that were not adopted by the government or the House of Commons. If I were in your shoes, I would strive for the best possible outcome to ensure we have the best system in the world. I understand that very well.
Would you be comfortable telling us which of your amendments you consider most important? Once again, I understand your role and your situation.
Mr. Perrault: Thank you for the question.
That’s why I made the distinction between the table and my remarks. The table shows a number of amendments, including the two I mentioned in my opening remarks. They’re not the easiest ones, but they’re the ones I think are most important.
The first is the labelling of synthetic content, known as deepfakes, made by AI. There has to be transparency about where it comes from.
The second is a carefully defined prohibition on activities that are deceptive, deliberate and aimed at overturning an election or undermining confidence, when such activities are deliberate attacks on an election through disinformation. I’m not talking about criticism; I’m talking about attempts to overturn an election or undermine confidence in the outcome. I think the legislation needs to draw a clear line.
Senator Saint-Germain: Are you equipped to implement the act if these amendments are made?
Mr. Perrault: In both cases, it’s a shared responsibility.
Senator Saint-Germain: With your colleague?
Mr. Perrault: Exactly.
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Busson: I’m intrigued about the issues of crypto-currency, money orders and other kinds of payment that might be used by political parties or third parties in order to affect election contributions.
Commissioner Simard, how do you detect that parties are accepting crypto-currency or those kinds of assets?
Ms. Simard: The process starts with a complaint.
Senator Busson: It’s based on complaints.
Ms. Simard: Yes.
Senator Busson: That’s interesting. I was trying to imagine how else it could possibly happen. That confirms what I thought.
I was intrigued by your comment around if those crypto-currencies or money orders or whatever had been placed with parties or were detected, that they would be returned to the Receiver General. That was part of your presentation. Could you elaborate on that?
Ms. Simard: Right now, I don’t have the specific provision, but it is currently contemplated that the person could destroy their crypto contribution. As you can imagine, it’s a challenge for us. If we want to have access to evidence, it’s important that those crypto contributions are not destroyed.
Senator Busson: I would suspect it might be a little bit of a deterrent if people that were trying to evade the process that way knew that anything detected would go to the Receiver General.
Do you see that as part of it, Mr. Bisson?
Mr. Bisson: I believe there would be a deterrent effect, but from a chain of evidence perspective as well, it would allow us to preserve evidence. For example, if that crypto contribution was made as part of a conspiracy to contribute funds that would not be eligible by a foreign party, by destroying it, it may undermine our investigative ability to then pursue that avenue of investigation, whereas preserving it would allow us to maintain that evidence, and then returning it to the Receiver General would further reinforce that.
Senator Busson: Thank you very much.
Senator Pate: Thank you to all our witnesses for reminding us of the recommendations your respective bodies have made.
I’m curious about how much consultation and co-development there were on the development of this bill. In situations where your recommendations from previous reports were not followed, what was the rationale provided if there was consultation?
Mr. Perrault: The law provides that, after a general election, I make reports on the recommended changes. It doesn’t always happen.
In this case, I made a report off cycle in the case of the Hogue commission on foreign interference. Normally, these reports tend to be studied in a parliamentary committee. They present their views on that and ask for a government response, and that triggers some legislation at some point down the road.
This was a bit different for all kinds of reasons. These were not studied in a parliamentary committee, and the government decided to take action. There is no other consultation except on a very technical nature, late in the stage of the drafting, with the government, and that is the normal process. We are not typically involved in discussions with the government on the drafting of legislation.
Senator Pate: In terms of the particular recommendations you made, has there been any response as to why some of them weren’t picked up or many of them weren’t picked up?
Mr. Perrault: Most were, certainly from my last report, but, no, there hasn’t been any discussion of that nature.
Ms. Simard: It’s very similar. So for PIFI, or the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, we were an active participant, and we provided Commissioner Hogue with some considerations. I don’t have anything else to add.
Senator Pate: If we were to prioritize amendments, what would be the most important amendments that we should make to this bill?
Mr. Perrault: I stand by my answer on this one, but maybe Commissioner Simard has additional points.
Ms. Simard: It’s the same. The ones that are included in my opening remarks.
Senator Pate: Is there anything else either of you would like to add?
Mr. Perrault: Perhaps on the earlier question on crypto-currencies and other instruments, we haven’t seen contributions using crypto. We have seen contributions using prepaid credit cards, and they’re declared as such. In my view, there’s no legitimate reason why one would make a contribution through a prepaid credit card. That baffles me. They’re declared as such, but in the future, they would no longer be acceptable.
Senator Pate: Thank you.
Senator Clement: Thank you for your work, your careers and for being here. There are so many good questions already. I would like to know the priority of your amendments.
I find it surprising, though, that there are still nine amendments. It’s a surprising thing. You are the experts. When we legislate, we want to turn to the experts, and if the experts are still telling us there are nine amendments, I wonder why. I know you don’t want to answer that directly, but I am wondering about that. That’s my first question.
Secondly, I appreciate your comments to Senator Batters about the privacy piece. I want to also say out loud that some of us live in intersectionality, so privacy is important from a protection perspective for some of us. A breach means different things, depending on who you are sometimes. I wanted to say that.
I have a question about AI. I feel as if we’re disjointed on AI. We are all over the place. Everybody is doing things. Is there an overarching policy that you’re working with? Has the Minister of AI been involved in how you’ve come up with these amendments?
Finally, which jurisdictions are doing this really well, and how closely do you work with those jurisdictions to be inspired in what you’re proposing here?
Mr. Perrault: I have a few points.
It’s important to note that, as agents of Parliament, our relationships are not with departments and ministers but with parliamentary committees and Parliament. It is very normal for us not to be engaged with ministers on plans to deal with matters more broadly or even on electoral matters. That’s the way it operates.
It’s perfectly healthy to have an open relationship with parliamentarians about changes that we would like to see implemented. It’s in that spirit that I’m proposing some additional amendments.
In terms of AI, I don’t know that anybody is getting it right. There is a lot of interest on the issue. It’s a big challenge across the world. I’m having a conference next week with the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. Part of our discussion is how to deal with this. The issue of transparency markers has been talked about for several years now, but I don’t know that anybody has implemented transparency markers for synthetic content.
This remains an area where there are not a lot of things to draw on.
Senator Clement: Do you also consult with the “internet gods” — “the biggies”? I ask because many times we say we can’t regulate or control because they do. How closely do you work with those big folks that facilitate some of this trouble?
Mr. Perrault: We have an ongoing relationship with the major digital social platforms, in some cases, as clients, because we provide information through platforms. We want to be where Canadians are, so we go through the same channels that Canadians go through.
We also try to influence them on how to deal with misinformation. I have no authority to compel, but I did ask them in the lead-up to the last election to at least tell me. Some of them wrote to me — and I published their letter — regarding what they would do to deal with mis- or disinformation. What are their policies? What are their moderation mechanisms? I published that letter so people could become aware.
However, there is no obligation for them to be transparent about that.
When we have interacted with them during the course of an election, we typically do not ask for a takedown, contrary to the commissioner, for different reasons. We inform them of incorrect information about the voting process, for example, someone saying the vote is on Tuesday rather than Monday. We have seen very quick action on their part regarding that, so there have been some good responses.
It is an increasingly fragmented universe, so it’s increasingly difficult to be in a relationship with so many platforms and players. It’s no longer two or three major players but a much broader range.
Senator Batters: I want to briefly ask you about the longest ballot provision issue. Bill C-25 does attempt to address the real misuse of the election process that has led to these extremely long ballots. There is one provision that would require an elector to not be able to sign multiple nomination papers within that short nomination period.
How realistic is it for Elections Canada to verify if an elector has signed multiple nomination papers for candidates within a short nomination period? What practical challenges do you foresee in enforcing that requirement? Will this largely be left to a blanket signature clause, such as “I certify that I have not signed another nomination paper”? I really question whether that would be sufficient here.
Mr. Perrault: Thank you. It’s an important question.
We do not have any possibility of verifying side-by-side signatures at the returning office within the few hours that they have to validate the signature of a candidate. The idea is not that they would ensure that there is no double signature.
In fact, I asked specifically — and it’s in the bill — that the fact that a person signed more than once does not put into question the validity of the nomination paper. One candidate does not know that the other candidate has the same person on their list of signatories. There is no way for candidates to fight that.
This would capture orchestrated activities to coordinate people to sign multiple signatures across the line. It’s not meant to prevent one or two signatures from being inadvertently twice on two nomination papers. It is really intended, in my view, to make sure that there is no orchestration of activity to have people sign the same nomination papers for all of the candidates.
Senator Batters: Is it just going to be this type of a blanket signature clause where the person signing multiple things would be certifying that they are not doing that?
Mr. Perrault: Normally, the nomination paper would be modified to make it clear that it is unlawful to sign more than once, so people would be alerted to that. However, the coordination that is required to have, say, 200 candidates, as we have seen, is something that is highly visible. That is not necessarily caught at that point at the returning office, although it could be because that would be extremely easy; it would not be a painstaking exercise. It could also be intercepted through enforcement activities. We would, of course, notify the commissioner that it is happening.
Senator Batters: If it is something saying it’s unlawful, what would the offence be? What would the consequence potentially be for an individual doing that?
Mr. Perrault: There is a prohibition in the act that comes with a fine, which I believe is up to $1,000, if I’m not mistaken. However, I believe the intent is not to chase the person who inadvertently or forgot that they signed somebody else’s paper; that is not the intent of this bill. The goal is to go after those who coordinate and do large-scale signature events.
There is an offence for inciting people to commit violations of the act.
Senator Batters: Is it worded as “inciting”? That would be very interesting wording.
Mr. Perrault: “Counselling” is the word.
Senator Batters: “Counselling.” Okay, so there are two separate offences. What are the consequences listed for the counselling offence?
Mr. Perrault: It is the same as the main one.
Trevor Knight, General Counsel, Elections Canada: It is also an administrative monetary penalty, or AMP.
Senator Batters: So it is just a fine of up to $1,000, even though they have potentially orchestrated many candidates?
Mr. Perrault: I do believe the people who are involved in this are not after fines of that nature. We’ll see what the future holds and whether they need to be reinforced. I’m not against increasing the maximum amount if it’s deliberate.
Senator Batters: That seems to be a mistake to have the same consequence. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Mr. Perrault, I too was surprised to see that you had nine amendments. Now, that’s fine, they’ve been drafted and put in writing, so everything is in order. Are any of them a priority? Are there some that you consider absolutely essential, and others less so?
Mr. Perrault: I wouldn’t say there are any that are absolutely essential. I think they’re all valid. Two that I mentioned that are particularly important are the one on labelling the use of AI —
Senator Miville-Dechêne: So the House of Commons is going to be —
Mr. Perrault: I submitted the same table to the House of Commons, which is supposed to look at it. Clause-by-clause consideration starts tomorrow, I believe. We’ll see if the bill is amended at that time.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: And the second one?
Mr. Perrault: Labelling and deliberate attempts to influence or erode confidence in the outcome of an election through lies about the electoral process.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I would like to ask you about your second amendment, the one that allows a person to remove their name from the list of electors.
Do you often get calls from people who don’t want to be on the list of electors? Is it a big problem?
Mr. Perrault: This applies to people who want to be registered but don’t want to be on the list for safety reasons, such as intimate partner or former intimate partner violence.
Now, there are mechanisms that are a bit complicated. Individuals can get off the list and vote at the office of the returning officer by special ballot so their name won’t appear on the official list after the election. However, if they wish to register and go to a regular polling place to vote, their name will appear on the list that will be prepared after the election and that will be shared with the political parties. There is no easy mechanism for these individuals to vote without compromising their safety.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Out of curiosity, do many voters go to a special place to vote?
Mr. Perrault: I don’t have any data to share with you. I don’t get the sense that it’s a lot of people. This isn’t something that’s brought to my attention, but we could try to follow up on that.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I’d like to know if there are many women experiencing intimate partner violence who prefer —
Mr. Perrault: They still have to go to the office of the returning officer. Depending on the size of the riding, it’s not as easy as going to a polling place to vote.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I understand.
Mr. Perrault: The amendment would make it possible for individuals to vote like everyone else without their name appearing on the list that’s shared.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Simons: I have one short simple question and one long existential question. In section 384.3(13), we’re not supposed to know where the fundraising event took place, but as you note, in every other section, you have to say where the fundraising event took place. Would your recommendation be that you are stripped of the power? How would you like the amendment to be so that we never know where the event took place or so that we go back to knowing where the event took place?
My second question deals with section 482, which talks about people undermining the legitimacy of an election or its results. It strikes me that there might be a challenge there in differentiating between what is false and malicious, and what is good faith, mistaken and perhaps delusional, but is not false in the same way.
I look to the United States of America and its president. How do you differentiate between a malicious campaign to undermine the credibility of an election and sore losers who really believe that they were wronged?
Mr. Perrault: I’ll start with that question. It’s important to keep in mind that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. It has to be beyond a reasonable doubt, in a criminal context, that there was malicious intent. So the burden needs to be high, precisely in order not to stifle what would be errors of judgment or people wanting to criticize by way of exaggeration.
Senator Simons: There are people who really believe that they were robbed somehow.
Mr. Perrault: Correct. But properly crafted, it would have to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew that it was false, and that they did this for a particular purpose, which is to undermine the election. So there is a double-intent requirement in my proposal that would safeguard, in my view, the freedom to speech of people who were upset about the election, for one reason or another, which, of course, has to be respected.
But I do not believe there is a right to undermine free and fair elections in a deliberate way. I do not believe that is the case.
On your earlier question, I’m not sure I got the sense of your question. I apologize.
Senator Simons: It says that Bill C-25 amends so that you can’t say where a fundraising event took place. You can say it happened in Wetaskiwin, but you can’t say it happened at the Wetaskiwin Community Hall. But you point out that Elections Canada, in other sections of the law, is required to make that information public.
I’m asking you this: When you propose the amendment, do you propose that we just revert to the status quo and that we make the venue public, or that changes have to be made in every other part of the act to make it consistent?
Mr. Perrault: I understand the question. Unfortunately, I believe there is a legitimate security concern that is going on right now, because of where we are as a society. I believe that, in order to protect that, section 541 would have to be amended to make sure that information is not otherwise made public.
Now there may be a finer way of cutting that and saying if it’s a public place like a restaurant, there is no real privacy involved in saying that an event took place at a particular restaurant.
Senator Simons: I’m a non-partisan, independent senator and I don’t belong to a political party, but hypothetically, if I had an event for Mark Carney in my backyard — which I wouldn’t do because my backyard is a mess — I wouldn’t want that to be public.
Mr. Perrault: Correct.
Senator Simons: I’m not holding any fundraising events for anybody, just to be clear.
Mr. Perrault: The bill does maintain transparency after the fact of who was there and how much money was provided in order to be there, so the transparency ex post facto, I think, is preserved.
Senator Dasko: My question has to do with something that perhaps is not in this bill, but arises from observing the gerrymandering going on south of the border. I would like to understand the guardrails we have here. How embedded are our rules around redistribution, creating new ridings and adjusting the boundaries of ridings? I was just reading about Alberta wanting to deviate from the results of the commission that they had to set new boundaries. I think you get the gist of my question.
Mr. Perrault: There is long-standing legislation in Canada at the federal level. In 1964, the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act was created to take away from political actors the task of drawing boundaries. It has been adhered to since then. It does create completely independent commissions. It’s a highly valuable aspect of our democratic process.
Once the commissions provide their report, there is a portion for feedback in the parliamentary committee, but the government is bound by law to enact the final recommendations of the commission. So there is a legal requirement for the government to enact. That is not equally present across provincial jurisdictions. Some do not have that. So at the federal level, there is a strong level of protection. Legislation can be changed, of course. It’s not clear at this point what the constitutional parameters around that are.
In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court said that the process is not protected by the Charter. There is a more recent lower court decision in Quebec that suggests otherwise. It went to the Supreme Court very recently, but that aspect was not debated. So it remains unclear to what extent the courts would constitutionalize interference, or protect against interference, by way of legislative interference with the independent Electoral Boundaries Commission’s work once instituted. But there is a strong commitment I have seen to maintain that process in Canada.
Senator Duncan: I believe you were afforded more money in Budget 2025. It’s a very fast-changing environment. We know that there are additional funds. Is there the capacity to do all of this enforcement that is required? For example, the nomination papers where you’re only allowed to sign one. There are 380-plus ridings, and a person could be temporarily absent, working, and signing a paper in the Yukon and another one in Newfoundland.
Mr. Perrault: Right now, a person must reside in the district where they sign. But there could be inadvertent signatures; people just forgot or they don’t understand the rules. That’s for the commissioner to decide whether she would go after those people. I’m not sure that is really the intent here.
Senator Duncan: With regard to all the other infractions that are listed, do you have the capacity?
Mr. Perrault: That’s a question for the commissioner.
[Translation]
Ms. Simard: We’re currently assessing that situation.
[English]
The main changes where additional capacity would be required refer to additional powers regarding privacy.
[Translation]
There are all the nomination and leadership races.
[English]
As you can imagine, the volume is there, and all the other powers as well. Yes, there is an assessment right now conducted by my office.
Senator Duncan: The assessment is addressing whether the staff are able to —
Ms. Simard: Exactly.
Senator Duncan: Okay. Thank you.
The Chair: At this point, we’re going to wrap up our first panel. I want to thank the witnesses on behalf of all the members of the committee for sharing your expertise and answering our questions in our effort to analyze Bill C-25.
For our second panel, we’re pleased to welcome the Honourable Steven MacKinnon, Minister of Transport and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. He’s accompanied today by two witnesses from the Privy Council Office: Cathy Hawara, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions; and Rachel Pereira, Director, Democratic Institutions.
Minister, we will ask you to give your opening remarks, and you will have seven minutes or so. You can take as much time as you need, but I’ll limit you after eight minutes. There are a number of senators here, as you can see — I think 14 — and they’re very interested in asking questions of you and your colleagues.
Please proceed, Minister MacKinnon.
Hon. Steven MacKinnon, P.C., M.P., Minister of Transport and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
[Translation]
I’m proud to be here today.
[English]
I’m, obviously, pleased to appear before the committee today to speak to Bill C-25, the strong and free elections act.
[Translation]
The Canada Elections Act is the cornerstone of our electoral system. It allows for free, fair and independent elections. Canada’s electoral system is renowned and a source of pride.
It is robust thanks to regular updates and improvements in response to emerging threats, expert recommendations and lessons learned.
[English]
The amendments contained in the strong and free elections act respond to recommendations made by the Chief Electoral Officer, the Commissioner of Canada Elections, and, of course, the Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. It is the product of consultation and collaboration with members of Parliament from all parties because I strongly believe that changes to the regime that governs how our elections are conducted should be based on consensus as much as humanly possible.
Bill C-25 has two parts. Part 1 includes amendments to the Canada Elections Act in five key areas: first, safeguarding elections, as well as nomination and leadership contests; second, strengthening the political financing regime; third, facilitating enforcement; fourth, protecting personal information; and fifth, countering unduly long ballots.
Part 2 of the bill also includes name changes to 19 electoral districts as proposed by the current members of Parliament of those ridings.
[Translation]
I will briefly highlight some of the key measures in Part 1 in the time I have left.
One of the key improvements in this bill is more robust enforcement powers for the Commissioner of Canada Elections.
The amendments in this bill will allow the commissioner to enter into information-sharing agreements domestically and internationally to facilitate investigations, conduct more effective administrative investigations using tools similar to those available to other federal commissioners and impose higher administrative monetary penalties where warranted to better encourage compliance with the act.
[English]
Security is increasingly a concern in our political system. We are seeing people’s addresses published online, and harassing behaviour is occurring that limits the rights of people to participate in the democratic process. This needs to be addressed.
That’s why Bill C-25 proposes new measures to protect people. The home addresses of returning officers will no longer be made public. Candidates will be granted greater reimbursement for personal security expenses, and the rules for regulated fundraising events will be changed.
[Translation]
The next element of Bill C-25 that I would like to discuss is the stringent new privacy requirements imposed on federal political parties.
These requirements are modelled on Part 4 of Bill C-4, which received Royal Assent on March 12 and clarified the exclusive regulations governing federal political parties’ interactions with personal information under the Canada Elections Act. It also made non-compliance with a party’s policies subject to the act’s administrative monetary penalty regime. This means that a federal political party or any person acting on its behalf could be subject to a monetary penalty, where appropriate and as determined by the Commissioner of Canada Elections, if it does not comply with its policy.
It should be noted that Bill C-25 would increase maximum administrative monetary penalties for both individuals and entities.
To ensure greater transparency and accessibility, each party must make its privacy policy public. It must be written in plain language in both French and English. In addition, the policy must explain, using examples, how the party collects and uses Canadians’ personal information.
Federal political parties must also protect personal information through physical, organizational and technological security measures. In addition, each federal political party’s policy must require that appropriate measures be taken in the event of a data breach, including the loss of personal information or the unauthorized disclosure of or access to personal information.
While we hope this never happens, an individual must be notified if the lost, accessed or disclosed personal information poses a real risk of significant harm.
Privacy policies will also require parties to ensure that any third party that receives personal information from a federal political party, such as a supplier or contractor, has equivalent safeguards in place.
Since the passage of Bill C-4, to ensure accountability, each party must have a designated privacy officer who will be responsible for monitoring the party’s compliance with its policy on an annual basis. The Chief Electoral Officer must hold an annual meeting on the protection of personal information by federal political parties, which the chief privacy officer or representative must attend.
A party’s policy must also cover the relevant training provided to parties and those acting on their behalf.
[English]
In closing, Bill C-25 further strengthens and secures Canada’s federal elections through targeted, priority amendments that were recommended by experts and will ensure our legislative framework remains resilient in a constantly evolving threat environment.
I look forward to answering any questions this committee may have.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, minister.
Senator Batters: Thank you, minister.
I want to start with something that came up on the last panel with the Elections Canada officials. Regarding the longest ballot provisions, they pointed out to us in questioning that both the offence of counselling others to sign and the consequences of signing many more than one candidate’s nomination paper would be the same.
According to the Chief Electoral Officer, the same consequence in your Bill C-25 would provide for just a maximum $1,000 fine, whether it’s just signing more than one or counselling.
Why do you think that would be an acceptably stringent consequence for someone who is organizing potentially thousands of unlawful signatures?
Mr. MacKinnon: Senator, I am very preoccupied by this question, and I think it’s fair to say that all parties are. Long ballots inconvenience electors and make elections difficult to run. In many cases, it imposes physical constraints on them. Literally, can we get paper that long which has integrity? We juggled a lot of ideas with respect to how we would best go about dealing with this situation.
Is the penalty high enough? It will become an offence. It’s not just a fine, but there’s a public airing of these issues, and we think that, in the first instance, as a new law takes effect, it will be highly dissuasive. There are two measures, as you know, that are designed to deal with this matter, which we hope effectively does deal with it. Second is the period of adaptation. If someone innocently were to sign a paper, you can imagine that it could be easy to make a mistake. So imposing a sanction higher than that might be a little vexatious, but as we review these things after every election, we’ll continue to do.
Senator Batters: As I’m pointing out here, it’s one thing for someone to mistakenly sign two or three documents or something like that. I’m asking why there isn’t a more significant consequence for people counselling or organizing people, such as these longest ballot organizers, to sign potentially thousands of unlawful signatures. They’re collecting them.
I would ask you perhaps to think about that. I know that a clause-by-clause examination has not yet occurred in the House of Commons, so maybe that could be something that you would change to make it more of a significant consequence because it doesn’t make sense to have both the same.
The second thing I want to ask you about is this: In Justice Hogue’s report entitled Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, 51 recommendations were put forward. Bill C-25 would implement only six of those recommendations. Among the recommendations that are not yet implemented is recommendation 16, which relates to reforming the Security Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force. I’m wondering, minister, if you would agree that implementing only a limited subset of what some national security experts have called “low hanging fruit” risks leaving systemic vulnerabilities in place on such a critical issue.
Mr. MacKinnon: I did announce measures in terms of the task force and the cabinet directive, alongside tabling this bill. So there are non-legislative measures that the government is taking, and will continue to take, with respect to combatting foreign interference in our elections. We certainly dealt with the most urgent — if not the most important — issues highlighted by Justice Hogue in her report, and we think that the amendments proposed, along with these two other measures that we’ve announced, are a very robust response to the issues she raised in her report.
For the first time, for example — just to bring that into relief — we’ve brought leadership and nomination contests under these dispositions in the act. That’s very new and will require a significant adaptation by political parties.
[Translation]
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Minister, the Privacy Commissioner, Philippe Dufresne, believes that Bill C-25 does not do enough to protect voters’ privacy. You should obtain voters’ consent and provide them with a mechanism to access and correct their personal information. That’s what British Columbia does, and it doesn’t seem to be a problem.
Why don’t you just impose one set of rules on all parties rather than allowing individual policies? The Commissioner of Canada Elections has already told us that this would greatly facilitate auditing. I know you have improvements to Bill C-25. As you know, the Privacy Commissioner has some criticisms. Why didn’t you give her what she wanted?
Mr. MacKinnon: When it comes to privacy, we tend to treat political parties like any other entity, such as a corporation or an organization. It’s already the most heavily regulated sector in Canada, and I speak from a lot of experience. Political parties devote a lot of their time, energy and staff to complying with the very costly and stringent regulations we impose. We must not lose sight of the fact that political parties are also public assets and in a class of their own. For us to have a healthy democracy, we must always look at these issues from the perspective of facilitating communication among citizens, voters and political parties. We must not erect artificial barriers or obstacles that would be imposed on other organizations that are not similar to political parties.
That said, the principles in this bill reflect society’s best practices. I wouldn’t suggest that best practices are exactly the same, but they reflect the best personal data management principles to which organizations and corporations are subject under privacy legislation.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Consent seems pretty straightforward. You meet with a voter and you want to collect their information. Nowadays, it’s common practice to seek consent in different ways. British Columbia does it for its voters, and it’s not a problem, so the idea that it would disrupt your system strikes me as a bit far-fetched.
Mr. MacKinnon: When you knock on doors, when you call people and ask for their support, it’s not always easy. It’s not the same as selling a product or service to a citizen or a person. To me, that would create a barrier to communication, one that people appreciate: door knocking, the kind of normal, desirable contact between candidates, politicians and someone they hope to represent. I strongly believe that we need customized tools and provisions. We have a single act that governs political parties, that governs only this type of activity. The provisions governing this aspect of political parties must also be customized.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: You still haven’t answered my question. If a province such as British Columbia imposes these same principles on political parties and appears to be doing well, why would it be any different at the federal level?
Mr. MacKinnon: We have a federal act. As a member of Parliament, I would never personally support regulating federal political parties with provincial legislation.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: I’m talking about the principle.
Mr. MacKinnon: I just explained why I believe consent is not appropriate when it comes to political party management.
Senator Miville-Dechêne: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Prosper: Thank you, minister, for being here, and for speaking on this very important bill.
As you know, this bill aims to protect Canadian elections from potential threats, including impersonation, such as deepfakes, and protecting people from misrepresentation.
Earlier, there was a dialogue with the Chief Electoral Officer. Senator Clement initiated a discussion around AI policy and capacity issues. One of the things we heard from the Chief Electoral Officer was an underscoring of the need for transparency markers for AI-produced synthetic content intended to mislead voters. What are your thoughts? Do you think this legislation addresses that? How do you plan to implement this bill effectively to deal with the developments in AI?
Mr. MacKinnon: Implementing the bill will be up to Elections Canada. To be perfectly candid with you, senator, that’s an excellent question. I think we’ll be chasing this AI issue for a little while.
This issue of impersonation troubles me, not only in things I’ve seen in Canada, but also around the world, especially the issue of impersonation. When citizens cannot trust in what they are seeing, then we have a fundamental problem in our democracy. The measures in this bill are intended to get at that. Then again, we have to balance freedom of expression, and we’ve taken pains to outline that things like satire would be acceptable. We’ve all looked at things and laughed too. That’s okay. I don’t mind being made fun of. That goes with the job. But having someone say I said something that I obviously did not say is another matter.
We’ve tried to get at that in this bill. I don’t know if that answers your question.
Senator Prosper: It does. Yes.
What about the suggestion of having these transparency markers within the legislation to help address AI and synthetic content?
Mr. MacKinnon: I’d want to think about that some more. We do have Charter issues. We have freedom of expression issues. I would want to know the intersection of freedom of expression and these markers. I want to stress as well that we worked hard to get a consensus of parties on this bill.
As I said, we’ll be chasing these AI and technology issues for some time. I suspect the next minister after the next election will come back with further measures, or maybe amended measures, that will be aimed at doing the exact kind of things you’re suggesting, but this is an incredibly robust start, and this is the first time that we’ve legislated in this way.
Senator Prosper: Thank you, minister.
Senator Simons: Minister, as you will no doubt recall, when this same committee dealt with Bill C-4, and we had Ms. Hawara and Ms. Pereira there at the time, there were some of us who were concerned that, by leaving the privacy protocols in the hands of the individual parties, we were letting the foxes guard the henhouse. The argument was made that the parties would act in good faith, that they would be honourable, and, of course, they would not make malicious use of data.
Even while that debate was happening, unbeknownst to us, a registered provincial political party in Alberta was leaking information. I have to be careful here. Information that was in the hands of that party ended up, somehow, in the hands of a far-right extremist group. Now, everybody in Alberta has been doxed, and the information of every public official, every person fleeing domestic violence and every person who came to this country as a refugee and who would prefer their home country not know where they live is now public.
You’ll pardon me if, as an Albertan, I’m not entirely comforted that we’re still moving forward with a model that allows a political party to set their own rules for how they govern the collection and maintenance of voter data. I wonder if you can tell me how Bill C-25 might put to rest some of the fears we had about Bill C-4.
Mr. MacKinnon: That’s a very good question and a timely one. As you may know, I was the national director of the Liberal Party. The use of elector data — and this was 20 years ago — was considered something next to sacrosanct in our party, and we had a clear awareness that it would be a serious offence to misuse that information, so we set up serious protocols, even then, about its use, its sharing and how we fence it off so that no one ever gets a complete picture. All parties continue to know that there are very serious penalties that would be levelled against parties and individuals who misuse this information.
If I understand correctly what happened in Alberta, if that happened at the federal level, that would constitute a very serious offence. It would be breaking the law, and we have a commissioner who is sufficiently resourced to investigate these matters, get to the bottom of them and impose sanctions or prosecutions as the case may be.
We have very real safeguards, but if I were an Albertan, I would be extremely concerned by what I’m reading about these events, and I think anyone who fears that data may have been shared — even home addresses —
Senator Simons: It was their home address.
Mr. MacKinnon: Perhaps, yes.
I believe it was you who suggested that we bring back the Bill C-65 provisions — which we have done — and put them in this bill to accompany those measures in Bill C-4.
Senator Simons: But not all of them.
Mr. MacKinnon: Not all of them. That’s correct.
Senator Simons: That remains my concern. The political parties themselves set their own rules and enforce their own rules.
Mr. MacKinnon: I haven’t read all of the parties’ privacy policies, but I suspect they all fall into a very narrow and best practice type of —
Senator Simons: I understand that now there are changes in Bill C-25 that will mean that a party can’t just set itself up overnight and get the voter list, but there are long-standing parties of particular political viewpoints. What I worry about is that the culture you spoke about when you were president of the party — that the idea that the information is sacrosanct — that innocence has been lost. I worry that now that this has happened in Alberta, bad actors are going to say that it’s pretty hard to figure out who leaked the data. It’s pretty hard to convict anyone. Maybe the data is valuable enough to take that risk.
Once that culture has been besmirched in Alberta, it will alert people throughout the political system that this is valuable data, and it has value to international political actors who may want to undermine Canadian democracy and sovereignty, whether that’s a foreign country or a foreign corporation, or it may have extraordinary commercial value.
In light of what has happened in Alberta, I’m wondering how confident you are that we can maintain that honour culture that protects our privacy.
Mr. MacKinnon: I’ve seen no evidence at the federal level from any entity that they don’t take this matter extremely seriously, and I’m obviously much more familiar with one political party than all of the others. However, the number of people who have access to the complete picture is very small.
For example, as a candidate, I get access to the elector’s list in Gatineau, as do people who run for other parties in that seat. But I have no way of accessing data from any of the other 342 ridings. The practices around management of that data at the national level tend to be extremely tight. I know that is the case in one party, and I have no evidence that that is not the case in all parties.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you, minister.
Before I ask you my question, I would like to offer some context.
I too believe that political parties are an essential component of our electoral system and that it’s not appropriate to compare them to a private company or a public body, whether at the federal or the provincial level. That’s the basis for my question.
As you know, just before you, we heard from the Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections. I understand that the Chief Electoral Officer wants to take the opportunity to ensure the law is as perfect as possible and try to anticipate and manage all the risks.
Because he proposed so many amendments, I asked him which ones he thought were the most important, if he had to choose. He emphasized two amendments: the ones that Senator Clement and Senator Prosper raised. These amendments address foreign interference, which I’m very concerned about, and the mandatory disclosure of AI-generated content.
We know that Canada is at risk, as are many other countries. He believes — as he has stated in the House of Commons — that the bill does not adequately address the dissemination of misinformation about the electoral process with the intention of undermining confidence in an election or its results.
As the minister responsible for reviewing the amendments proposed by the Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections, what were your guidelines for striking a balance between the desired ideals and the practical realities of a bill? I have no doubt that you yourself want it to be as relevant and pragmatic as possible for implementation in today’s context.
Mr. MacKinnon: You just used the right word: pragmatic.
As I said in my remarks, I think it’s obvious that we were inspired by the three primary sources: the Chief Electoral Officer, the commissioner and the public inquiry. There have been no other sources of inspiration for this bill.
However, as members of Parliament, we must also represent the public interest and apply our knowledge of democratic practice. I’m speaking very generally here. We compare ourselves to other systems around the world. I believe that, if you compare Canada with other countries, we’re somewhat at the forefront in terms of election management. We share common traits with a number of other democracies. However, I believe that our behaviour and how we manage our democratic system are absolutely exemplary.
We’re identifying and fine-tuning certain issues. It’s very useful for a government to receive transparent and open input from these electoral authorities. In other countries, which I won’t name, you don’t often hear about electoral authorities insisting on changes that are later accepted by the government and proceeding based on a consensus.
However, we shouldn’t adopt them without reviewing, discussing or debating them with various political actors and parliamentarians. I also don’t think you’re suggesting that they should always be dictating the content. That wouldn’t be realistic in any sector, and it’s no more realistic in an electoral context.
Senator Saint-Germain: In my case, given the positions I held in the public service, it was a requirement that I not be a member of any political party.
Ever since we began our work around this table, but also when we studied Bill C-4, one issue struck me. I’d like to draw on your experience. I get the impression that it’s citizens who are members of a political party who take the initiative to join that party and agree to provide certain information. So, in reality, that information is retained under the act.
For a political party, are there other ways to access information that would be available without the consent of the person concerned?
Mr. MacKinnon: In relation to that person?
Senator Saint-Germain: In relation to that person, the voter, whatever the riding is.
Mr. MacKinnon: In fact, I believe that political actors and entities are trying to compile as much information as possible from public sources.
Senator Saint-Germain: For example, voter profiling.
Mr. MacKinnon: Exactly. We also know that algorithms are becoming more and more sophisticated. Having said that, I don’t think political parties have reached the point where they can track you online simply because you’ve done a Google search on a particular product and then get ads, for example. In my experience, we are not at that level. However, parties are trying to improve the ability to communicate relevant information to voters.
Senator Saint-Germain: Thank you.
Senator Oudar: Welcome, minister.
Unfortunately, I also have a question following the testimony of the Chief Electoral Officer. You may regret appearing after him, as you have been asked about this since you arrived. I would ideally have a question about artificial intelligence, but I’ll turn to another topic.
Earlier, when he was asked about the amendments, Mr. Perrault mentioned the two amendments that my colleagues discussed earlier. There is another amendment that he mentioned that has to do with personal information. These are requests from citizens who want to be excluded from the list for a period of five years so as not to make their name and address public. When we asked him for examples, he referred to women who were victims of domestic or former partner violence.
Would the explanations he provided lead you to be open to this amendment? He then explained that it would not remove someone from the electoral list, but rather to allow these women to go and vote in the same place as everyone else.
Mr. MacKinnon: No one is more sensitive to this issue than I am.
That said, I would refer you to the answers given to Senator Simons in terms of the use of this information. It’s very strict and narrowly defined. As a result, the dissemination or possible dissemination of information about a woman who is a victim of domestic, spousal or former partner violence would still be limited.
That is something I would like to measure against the other risks that same woman would face in other databases or in online searches. Would that add to the problem or not? That is what I would like to consider.
Obviously, if anything can be done to avoid a catastrophic situation, whether this one or another, it will be done.
Senator Oudar: Thank you for that answer.
I’d like to briefly talk about artificial intelligence and come back to the discussion we had earlier.
In fact, in the bill, we see that the government is concerned about everything related to artificial intelligence, deepfakes and algorithmic manipulation of voters. What Bill C-25 contains are mainly prohibitions, such as structural, financial or procedural measures, rather than specifically addressing the very basis of the information found in the use of artificial intelligence in particular. Is Bill C-25 just a first step? Are you looking at regulations? How should we reconcile the speed at which AI is evolving with the legislative process, which is sometimes much slower, to allow it to adapt?
Mr. MacKinnon: It’s kind of the same question that Senator Prosper asked earlier. I think this is an evolving process, and these issues will need to be revisited on a regular basis. I don’t think we’ve reached an end point in managing the interaction of technology with our electoral process.
I think we’re less affected in Canada so far. Knock on wood. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t remain vigilant. As the minister responsible for democratic institutions, I consider it one of my roles to keep an eye on this set of issues.
Currently, we believe that the proposed measures are both the most urgent and the most relevant in terms of the Canada Elections Act, and we will continue to monitor that. So we haven’t reached anything resembling a conclusion.
Senator Oudar: Do you feel you’re well equipped to do that? Are you receiving adequate and timely advice?
Mr. MacKinnon: Yes. As I mentioned earlier to Senator Batters, when the bill was introduced, we announced two other measures that strengthen the government’s ability to identify, detect, measure and respond to threats, whether foreign or otherwise.
I hear that, in civil society as well, there are a good number of organizations that are monitoring this issue, not out of partisan motives, but out of a desire to defend our democracy. I speak with them, and I know the experts also engage with these organizations. I am delighted and inspired by a fine ecosystem that defends our democracy.
Senator Oudar: In fact, there is a wealth of expertise in this area in Montreal.
Mr. MacKinnon: Absolutely.
Senator Oudar: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Duncan: Thank you, minister, for appearing. My question has been asked and answered.
Senator Clement: Thank you for being here and for your work.
My questions were asked and answered as well. But I will ask you a big-picture question. It will follow up on what Senator Oudar was asking you.
I was one of those senators who was disappointed in Bill C-4. I’m glad that we’re having more robust conversations on this specific bill around elections.
I knocked on hundreds and hundreds of doors years ago now. It was hard enough back then. Since then, I have sensed that there is less trust in the process, the system and candidates. It’s also harder to be a candidate, especially if you live in intersectionality.
How are you talking about this bill to Canadians? How are you pitching this bill? Here, around this committee table, we are experts, and we have inside baseball conversations. How are you, as a politician, talking to Canadians about how this bill will help? How are you talking to candidates, as well, about how this bill will help?
Mr. MacKinnon: Let’s start with candidates and people who participate. Fundamentally, this bill does two things. There are some significant measures designed to protect candidates and protect participation in the political process, and that includes election officials, by the way, all the people we should thank, absolutely, and people who devote time and energy to get involved in that way.
It’s appropriate that we all take a moment to thank people who put their hands up and help out with the election process. We all know people in our communities who do that, and they deserve to be saluted.
For candidates, I would point you to candidate security and other measures we are putting in place, increasing the amount that they may spend, if such expenditure is warranted, on their own security. The government as well, as you know, in the last election, had specific measures to protect candidates as well.
We watched with horror the events in the U.K., for example, and obviously, the alarming political violence to our south. Heaven forbid that this should occur in Canada. We’re doing all that we can to protect people.
I’m very sensitive, though, to the issues that you raise. I knock on thousands of doors, like hundreds of candidates do across the country. I regularly get a lot more out of that than people assume, in the sense that you get some “non-constructive” people behind that resident’s door, but for the most part — certainly in Gatineau — it’s a far more heartening experience than it is a disheartening one. That’s how I would speak to people who are looking to become involved in politics about this bill.
But to Canadians, what I would say is that we’re doing our best to respond to new and emergent threats, foreign interference, AI, technology and misinformation. We’re tightening financial rules. We’re increasing sanctions. We are always striving to have a far better administration of our electoral process, one that, as I just said, I believe is exemplary in the world, based on the perfect system, which is a piece of paper and a pencil, which avoids a lot of problems, frankly.
How do we make that system, which is, at its core, pretty basic, a better one and one that Canadians can have confidence in? But I do think the fact that we go through this process regularly gives Canadians that confidence that perhaps citizens of other countries do not have in their electoral process.
Senator Pate: Thank you. I want to come at this from a slightly different angle, but the same sort of issue. Thank you, minister, for being with us. Thank you for all of the input you have provided so far.
Part of your role in promoting democracy and democratic institutions means encouraging people to have trust in those institutions. We know that this bill is designed to deal with when there is a reason there may not be trust, and to detect, apprehend and punish that. We know that prevention often is far more effective. What are the measures you would see going along with this bill that would encourage Canadians to have greater trust in our political institutions, political parties and political process?
Mr. MacKinnon: I refer you to a lot of what I just said, which I won’t repeat. But perhaps to give it a little more context, 2004 saw a fundamental reform of our electoral system — in 2003 perhaps, it came into effect, but most measures came into effect on January 1, 2004. It was what we called Bill C-24 at the time. Mr. Chrétien’s government passed it.
That reform has stood the test of time. What did it do? It banned corporations and unions from contributing to political parties. For the first time, it gave Elections Canada oversight, not only of political financing, but in terms of registration and compliance, inasmuch as nominations became regulated events, leadership became regulated events, and the oversight of political parties just generally became much tighter.
Senator Pate, I’m not pretending there is not cynicism among Canadians about politicians, politics or political parties. There obviously is. But I would say that it is a quantum better than in other places you can observe around the world, and that is precisely because we have open, transparent and extremely strict and onerous regulation of political activity in this country at the federal level.
I think we have talked about some things, maybe at the subnational level, that ought to be looked at in those places, but at the federal level, we have strict oversight in the governance of our political system. How it can be done, what are the time frames and how much money you can spend. You can become a member of Parliament for $50,000 in donations that you can only garner from individuals. I read last night that there was a primary in one party in a country to our south that cost $100 million. I think we do have to acknowledge — I don’t know that we do that enough quite frankly — how effective and complete a job we have done in this country of eradicating inappropriate, gaudy financing of our political process. We don’t talk enough about how well our process is run, how exemplary Elections Canada is as an organization, and how effectively they run it.
We all heard about the ballot stations that had to stay open, but you can count those on one hand. We run very tight, well-organized elections in this country, and the people who run in those elections run under the strictest and most transparent of rules that exist in the world. I think we should be proud of that.
Senator Lewis: To build a little bit on what Senator Batters said about the long-ballot situation. I think it is a real risk. I think it has been fairly effective. What the people who have wanted to organize this — they have received a lot of press out of it — have done has been very effective. It’s something that is going to take some good on this bill to try to answer some of those questions around it.
I get the concept that counselling is an offence, and an individual that signs these nomination papers is an offence as well. Is there any provision in the bill to track who pays the fine? This is heavily organized. If you are found guilty of signing 25 fines, are you individually going to pay that or are the organizers going to pay that?
Mr. MacKinnon: If I’m not mistaken — I could be corrected — paying a fine itself is a political expense, so the source of that money would have to be divulged. But I would have to get back to you on that.
Senator Lewis: It could be a gap if these are highly organized.
Mr. MacKinnon: Are you suggesting it might be appropriate to make illegal the paying of an administrative monetary penalty on someone’s behalf?
Senator Lewis: I’m saying if you are the individual who is found guilty of it, then you’ve got to pay the fine.
Mr. MacKinnon: Yes, but that person’s mom could lend them a thousand dollars or something.
Senator Lewis: Good enough. Track it. That’s not the organizer paying. Right.
Mr. MacKinnon: Look, as with anything, as a legislator, you will know this, Senator Lewis, as do I, you can sit around and think of 100 —
Senator Lewis: This is a situation where it is highly organized.
Mr. MacKinnon: It is. I agree.
Senator Lewis: Some of these people found guilty will hold this as a badge of honour that they were found guilty.
Mr. MacKinnon: Perhaps.
Senator Lewis: But it is not as if they have to pay the fine themselves.
Mr. MacKinnon: I have been asked about this a lot. By the way, I accepted right off the bat to address this situation, which I found odious, purposely inconveniencing election administrators and voters to make a point that goes against the very spirit of our democracy. The very spirit of our democracy is that if you have an issue you want to raise, you should talk about it and be allowed to talk about it as much as you want and to promote candidates for office who will defend that point of view.
But interfering in the very administration of elections to make a point that is unrelated to the administration of elections is something that I think Canadians have reacted with contempt for, and this bill tries to channel that contempt. Maybe that’s the best way to put it.
Senator Dasko: Thank you, minister and officials, for being here. I want to ask about something that isn’t in the bill. Over the past couple of elections, in 2019 and 2021, the Chief Electoral Officer has recommended that he have the power to collect data and information on the diversity of candidates that are running in elections. He doesn’t have the power to do that. He has recommended that he have this power because, as he has said, Canadians are interested in how diverse candidates are, how many women the parties are running, people from Indigenous backgrounds and other background characteristics.
I’m wondering why, perhaps, that hasn’t been picked up in this bill, given that Canadians are interested in knowing this, and that’s why he has recommended it, but I do not see it in any of the legislation put forward by the government.
Mr. MacKinnon: Whatever the worthiness of that suggestion or that category of thing may be, I think the question that has to be asked and that parties and others ask themselves is whether Elections Canada or, for that matter, the Elections Act is the right place to address that issue.
In my experience, political parties do a pretty good job of communicating some of those very facts. Candidates, obviously, in many cases, self-declare as they wish or may not wish to do. I think it’s best left that way.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
Senator Batters: Thanks very much, minister. Yes, I actually did know that you used to be the national director of the Liberal Party of Canada. I also really enjoy door knocking and have probably door-knocked thousands and thousands of doors in my many years involved in politics.
When we were studying Bill C-4 at this committee, I was a little concerned because there seemed to be a number of people, both around this table and also Canadians who might be watching, that might have very alarmist ideas about the type of personal data that federal political parties typically collect. So I wanted to give you a chance to actually set the record straight.
I know what type of political data that I look for at the door, and it’s pretty basic. I just wanted to give you the chance at this committee to talk about what kinds of personal data politicians at doors actually collect.
Mr. MacKinnon: I can talk about what data I, as a candidate, would have access to. I hate this term, but it’s what we call “tombstone data,” which are the names, addresses and, very rarely, phone numbers. Any other information that would be in the possession of a political party would be information offered by the electors themselves.
Senator Batters: It isn’t the kind of thing that somebody simply scrolling on Facebook or other types of things like that could find. They would probably have willingly given social media companies much more —
Mr. MacKinnon: Oh, heavens, yes.
Senator Batters: — information than the types of things that volunteers, usually, and political candidates are getting at doors from people willingly.
Mr. MacKinnon: The voters list is quite literally “name and address.”
Senator Batters: Occupation is not even on there.
Mr. MacKinnon: Occupation is not on there. The polling division is, of course.
Senator Batters: Yes. Thank you.
The Chair: I have the pleasure of thanking Minister MacKinnon for coming here with two additional witnesses from the Privy Council Office. Thank you for joining us. Thank you for your forthright remarks, answering the questions and assisting us in our work.
Mr. MacKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, honourable senators.
(The committee adjourned.)