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SECD - Standing Committee

National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs


THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

EVIDENCE


OTTAWA, Monday, November 2, 2026

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met this day at 4:01 p.m. [ET] to study Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access; and to study Bill S-223, An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act; and, in camera, to examine and report on defence procurement in the context of Canada’s commitment to increase defence spending.

Senator Marty Deacon (Chair) in the chair.

[English]

The Chair: I’d like to extend a big welcome to everybody. I’m Marty Deacon, senator from Ontario, and chair of the committee. We have a full house, we have a full evening and we have a bill that we are launching this evening, so I want to take an opportunity to thank not only the people at the table but also the support teams around the table, behind the table and, probably, in the hallway. I thank you very much for all of you being here this evening.

I would like to begin today by offering my colleagues the opportunity to introduce themselves.

Senator Dhillon: Good afternoon. Baltej Dhillon, B.C.

[Translation]

Senator Dalphond: Good afternoon. Pierre Dalphond, Quebec.

[English]

Senator Patterson: Rebecca Patterson, Ontario.

Senator Ross: Krista Ross, New Brunswick.

Senator Pate: Good afternoon and welcome. Kim Pate. I live here on the unceded, unsurrendered and unreturned territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg.

Senator Dean: Tony Dean, Ontario.

Senator Cardozo: Andrew Cardozo.

Senator Tucker: Geeta Tucker, Manitoba.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: Good afternoon to you all. Richard Martel, Quebec.

[English]

Senator McNair: Welcome. John McNair, New Brunswick.

Senator Hay: Katherine Hay, Ontario.

The Chair: Today, we begin our examination of Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access. We will hear from three panels of witnesses.

For the first panel this evening, we are pleased to welcome from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Philippe Dufresne, Privacy Commissioner of Canada; and Marc Chénier, Deputy Commissioner and Senior General Counsel. We also have, from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, Craig Forcese, Vice-Chair; and Lawrence Mangano, Acting Executive Director (Chief Executive and Deputy Head). Finally, from the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, the Honourable Simon Noël, K.C., Intelligence Commissioner; and Justin Dubois, Executive Director and General Counsel.

It’s a full slate. Welcome to all of our guests. We will begin by inviting you to provide opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. We will begin with Mr. Dufresne.

[Translation]

Philippe Dufresne, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair, honourable members of the committee, for the invitation to share my views on Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access.

Canadian law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies are facing new challenges arising from technological developments, the varying interception capabilities of service providers, and jurisdictional issues stemming from the cross-border nature of digital crime. Bill C-22 is specifically designed to address some of these challenges, including by requiring electronic service providers to provide reasonable assistance to state authorities in the exercise of their statutory powers.

[English]

The policy objectives of Bill C-22 are important, and the current bill incorporates significant improvements over previous versions, including a number of welcome changes adopted by the other place. For example, an amendment to Part 1 enhances judicial oversight by clarifying that a justice or judge may specify the information that must be produced under the new production order for subscriber information. Amendments to Part 2 preclude requirements to decrypt end-to-end encrypted information, impose new limits on the proposed regulatory information and order-making powers, and allow for appropriate disclosures to regulatory authorities.

[Translation]

These are positive measures. However, despite these improvements, further amendments would be needed to better protect the privacy of Canadians while continuing to provide state authorities with the tools they need to carry out their important work.

First, in the amended version of the bill, the proposed definition of “subscriber information” and the range of persons from whom such information could be obtained under the new production order remain broad relative to the reasonable suspicion threshold required to access it.

[English]

Depending on the nature of the service providers in question, which include health care providers, lawyers, financial institutions and dating apps, such information could reasonably attract a heightened expectation of privacy due to its sensitivity. For this reason, I would recommend narrowing the definition of “subscriber information” to a finite list of discrete identifiers and restricting the range of persons or entities from whom it may be compelled to telecommunication service providers. In the alternative, I would recommend adding a carve-out for medical or privileged information to the new production order, as is the case under the proposed confirmation of service demand.

Second, the bill would clarify that police do not require a production order or warrant for any information that is available to the public. However, the concept of publicly available information is undefined, and an individual does not automatically forfeit any reasonable expectation of privacy in information that has become public. I would, therefore, recommend defining “publicly available information” in such a way as to exclude information in respect of which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, consistent with the definition in the Communications Security Establishment Act.

[Translation]

Third, although the House amended Part 1 to provide that a judge may specify the information to be disclosed pursuant to the new subscriber information production order, it did not update the relevant prescribed forms that must be used to obtain such orders. I recommend that this apparent oversight be corrected in order to avoid any inconsistency between the forms and the applicable legal requirements.

[English]

Fourth, while the bill provides that both the Governor-in-Council and the Minister of Public Safety would have to consider several factors when making regulations or orders, including their potential impacts on privacy protection and cybersecurity, there’s no overarching requirement that all obligations imposed under the act be both necessary and proportionate. As it is a key privacy principle in Canada and around the world, I would recommend that necessity and proportionality be made requirements under the act.

Fifth and last, given the debates and the stakeholder and industry concerns with respect to the need to avoid creating systemic vulnerabilities, I would recommend amending the bill’s compliance enforcement framework to allow electronic service providers to trigger a pre-emptive arm’s-length assessment by qualified experts, as in comparable laws in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

Taken together, I believe that these changes would help ensure the appropriate balance between law enforcement, national security and Canadians’ fundamental right to privacy.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[Translation]

The Honourable Simon Noël, K.C., Intelligence Commissioner: Thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members of the committee, for the opportunity to discuss Bill C-22 with you. I am accompanied by Justin Dubois, my office’s Executive Director and General Counsel.

As Intelligence Commissioner, or IC, I fulfill an independent quasi-judicial oversight role. I approve, or do not approve, ministerial decisions authorizing certain national security and intelligence activities proposed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I assess whether the minister’s justification for allowing these activities is reasonable, which includes compliance with the Charter.

Part 2 of Bill C-22 would give the IC a new responsibility to review decisions of the Minister of Public Safety to issue orders to electronic service providers.

[English]

This new responsibility resembles my current work. I already review ministerial decisions that are not made public. For each ministerial decision, the legislation sets out what the minister must consider. The privacy of Canadians is a central concern, as it would be under Bill C-22.

I would apply the same principles of administrative law applied by Canadian courts. My decision would be shared with NSIRA, published with appropriate redactions and subject to judicial review by the Federal Court.

There would be new elements, nevertheless. An electronic service provider would have an opportunity to make representations to the minister, which would form part of the record before me. Also, the Intelligence Commissioner’s decision would concern obligations imposed upon the private sector service provider rather than activities conducted by CSIS or CSE.

I welcome the House amendments responding to some of the issues I raised. Orders are now limited to two years. It is also now clear that the minister must consider the listed factors in deciding whether to make an order.

I would raise an additional issue the committee might wish to consider; it is the same one raised by the Privacy Commissioner: Should the bill explicitly require the minister to consider proportionality as a factor when deciding whether to make an order? Subclause 7(3) of Part 2 states only that the minister must take into account the factors, but it does not explicitly require the minister to explain why the balance of the factors favours making the confidential order or to consider reasonable alternatives. It is also not clear that the minister must consider whether it is justified to proceed by ministerial order and, therefore, by a confidential process.

Nothing prevents the minister from addressing these questions, but the bill does not clearly require their consideration. If the intent of ministerial orders is to respond to situations where confidentiality is necessary, a clear proportionality factor that includes reasonable alternatives would ensure that the minister explains the needs.

[Translation]

This matters because my review is limited to the conclusions the minister makes pursuant to subclause 7(3). As the Supreme Court of Canada made clear in Vavilov, I must assess the decision the minister actually made and the reasons actually given. Making it explicit in the bill that the minister must address proportionality would guarantee this factor is included in my review.

Finally, as I’ve already stated, if additional resources are required for me to fulfill my mandate, I expect they will be provided.

I would be pleased to answer any questions that may be of particular interest to committee members.

Thank you, chair.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Noël. We appreciate that.

[Translation]

Craig Forcese, Vice-Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency: Madam Chair, members of the committee, good afternoon.

Thank you for your invitation to appear today.

[English]

I will address four points today: first, NSIRA’s role in the lawful access activities currently under consideration; second, the continued importance of timely access to relevant information; third, the reality NSIRA currently faces; and fourth, the way forward.

[Translation]

First, let’s talk about NSIRA’s role. The provisions in this bill will require notification to NSIRA about the use of the new lawful access powers. The agency’s work helps to ensure that national security and intelligence powers are exercised lawfully, reasonably and only when necessary.

[English]

We have the power to pick most of our review topics based upon careful consideration of criteria that we have published online. Consequently, the government does not choose what we do or do not review. Therefore, NSIRA’s role, should Bill C-22 be enacted, will be significant and vital.

Second is the importance of timely access to information. The lifeblood of NSIRA’s review work is timely access to information to which we have a legal right. We look forward to this timely access under the proposed notification regime, should Bill C-22 be enacted.

[Translation]

Third is NSIRA’s reality.

As new authorities expand the scope and complexity of national security and intelligence activities, our purview also expands. Our resources have not kept pace. Indeed, the opposite has been true. As a result, NSIRA has had to make and will continue to confront difficult decisions about how best to prioritize and deploy its resources.

[English]

Fourth is the way forward. Last week, the government released its national security strategy, in which it committed to reviewing the entire national security enterprise, including review and oversight bodies.

[Translation]

After more than seven years in operation, NSIRA has established a strong record of independent review. Drawing on that experience, NSIRA has provided proposals to government regarding potential legislative amendments to the NSIRA act that would strengthen and modernize the review framework.

[English]

These proposals are informed by lessons learned through our reviews and public complaint investigations. They are intended to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and long-term sustainability of independent review. They aim to ensure that review mechanisms keep pace with evolving authorities, like those in Bill C-22; emerging technologies; and an increasingly complex operating environment.

[Translation]

As the government considers broader reforms to Canada’s review and oversight framework, NSIRA stands ready to contribute its expertise.

[English]

To conclude, the notification provisions in this bill, when paired with timely access to relevant information and NSIRA’s independent discretion to prioritize its reviews, will assist our ability to evaluate the use of these powers.

[Translation]

Our independent review helps ensure that powers are exercised responsibly, risks are appropriately managed, and Canada’s national security institutions remain worthy of the trust placed in them by Canadians.

[English]

Meeting these objectives will depend upon proper funding and updated legislation. It will also continue to require a government culture that is responsive to the essential role of robust review in guarding faith in the necessary activities of intelligence and security agencies.

[Translation]

Thank you for your attention. We would be pleased to answer your questions.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you all very much. We will now proceed to questions, and those will have to be kept within seconds of four minutes each or we will shortchange some of our colleagues. Try to keep those questions succinct in an effort to allow for as many questions as possible.

Senator Cardozo: This is an incredible panel before us. Thank you for joining us. I wish we had more time because we could spend an hour, at least, with each of you. I have to pick one or two questions, but there are many more.

Mr. Noël, maybe I will start with you. Thank you for your presentation, sir. With regard to ministerial orders, which is section 7 of the supporting authorized access to information act, or SAAIA, how common are ministerial orders in this kind of situation? To what extent could we have a situation where there can be political abuse of that power? I’m thinking of things that have happened in certain other countries where political actors have really gamed the judicial and security systems. What are the possibilities of those kinds of situations happening here, and to what extent do you guard against them? Would you review every ministerial order under this act?

Mr. Noël: Yes, I would.

The experiences over the past five years show that, originating from CSIS and CSE, there are approximately 15 applications per year. They have to be compliant with what the legislation is all about. They cannot invent a new jurisdiction. Their jurisdiction is enumerated. I am looking particularly at this law here, this bill. If you look at the factors at paragraphs 7(3)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), you have a list of items. Then it mentions any other factor that the minister considers relevant. If the minister wants to rely on a new factor, the criterion of relevancy has its significance.

To answer directly whether there is a way to ensure that there won’t be any abuse in the future, there comes a time when a commissioner must decide that’s enough and it is not part of their jurisdiction, or I don’t see enough justification to conclude the way the minister wants.

Senator Cardozo: Right. Do you review that decision before it goes into effect, or is it post-facto?

Mr. Noël: It is before.

Senator Cardozo: It is before. Okay.

Mr. Noël: If I don’t sign off, there is no order.

Senator Cardozo: For information, does this happen quickly? There is information that security forces have to act on it quickly. Might you get a call in the middle of the night saying, “Can you approve this?”

Mr. Noël: I referred to the number 15, which is my experience.

My experience is that, on a few occasions, there was something that had to be looked at quickly because of the situation. At the time, I reviewed that over a period of 36 hours and made up my mind as to the conclusion. I decided that the justification of my decision would follow.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Noël.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: Thank you for being here today.

Mr. Noël, you recommended that the government determine whether alternatives exist before issuing confidential orders. As I review the bill today, I still do not see that requirement clearly set out in the legislation. Does that concern remain?

Mr. Noël: Senator Martel, we may need to wait for the regulations, as a whole regulatory framework will follow the bill. That said, if the minister were not to justify why he is proceeding on a confidential rather than a public basis, in my view that would raise an important question on which the commissioner would have to rule. Why? Because, as a matter of principle, a decision-maker, a minister, must act publicly. It is only in exceptional circumstances that a minister may act confidentially. So that would be one of the factors supporting my recommendation that proportionality form part of the decision-making process, in order to ensure that the exercise of these powers is subject to meaningful review.

Senator Martel: Mr. Noël, if the minister isn’t required to consider alternatives, how can you ensure that a ministerial order is truly necessary?

Mr. Noël: I have spent 48 years working in matters involving classified information, as a lawyer, as a judge and now as commissioner. At a certain point, when you sense that something isn’t working, you have to act. I believe that, if I were faced with such a situation, I would act.

Senator Martel: Mr. Dufresne, Bill C-22 would allow certain electronic service providers to be required to retain categories of metadata for periods of up to six months. I understand that this information may be useful for investigative purposes, but it is also important to ensure that Canadians’ privacy is properly protected. In your view, do the safeguards currently provided for in the bill strike an appropriate balance between the needs of investigators and the protection of personal information?

Mr. Dufresne: In my view, that objective is achieved through the principles of necessity and proportionality. This requires that, when an order is issued or a regulation is made, an assessment be carried out: Is it absolutely essential or necessary? The House added an essentiality requirement in the case of regulations, but one must also ask whether the measure is proportionate. What impact will it have on privacy or cybersecurity? What risks will it entail? Is it too lengthy or too intrusive? It is fundamental to consider all of these factors. This is a cornerstone of privacy protection. Even when the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians conducted its 2025 review of lawful access in this area, it recommended a legal framework incorporating fundamental principles such as necessity and proportionality, which is what Bill C-22 proposes.

Senator Martel: Thank you, Mr. Dufresne, Mr. Noël.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you. I welcome Senator Youance from Quebec and Senator Yussuff from Ontario. Thank you for joining us.

Senator Patterson: This is a distinguished panel. This is probably a question that touches on privacy and potentially NSIRA as well.

We know that Bill C-22 proposes to improve the ability of law enforcement and national security agencies to obtain certain telecommunications information.

However, we also know that the government has presented an example involving a missing 16-year-old whose last known cellphone location could not be obtained from the service provider. It caused delays in the search. Of course, in this case, it is with regard to a life. It isn’t necessarily the example of what I’m providing to you. It’s access to information.

This bill establishes a framework for lawful access by law enforcement and CSIS. However, in search and rescue operations, it can involve several organizations, including police services, both federal, provincial and municipal; emergency management authorities; volunteer search and rescue organizations; and the Canadian Armed Forces.

If the bill’s stated purpose is to modernize the gathering and production of data and information during investigations, its provisions identify law enforcement and intelligence authorities only rather than creating a direct-access mechanism for volunteer search and rescue organizations.

From an oversight perspective — and this may be to NSIRA first — is there a need for clearer statutory guidance on which authorities may request location information from telecommunication providers during a search and rescue emergency, especially when minutes and hours could mean a life?

Mr. Forcese: Thank you for the question. We don’t have a view on the breadth of the current law. However, insofar as we’re talking about a federal agency, from a review retrospective perspective, we would have jurisdiction to review the use of any information that might be acquired under Bill C-22 by anyone in the federal enterprise. It would not reach those in provincial jurisdictions, but under the federal enterprise, it wouldn’t be confined only to law enforcement and intelligence services.

National security and intelligence are a remit not tied to specific institutions.

Senator Patterson: Got it. Thank you.

If I can follow up with our Privacy Commissioner, if the RCMP or the Canadian Armed Forces are obtaining location information in support of a search and rescue operation, what oversight should apply to the subsequent use of that information and data?

Mr. Dufresne: The bill aims to provide that regime in terms of what is disclosed and what is limited; that’s why we are advocating for necessity and proportionality, saying not to take more than you need and ensure you go before a judge if you will be dealing with more sensitive information, as the Supreme Court has highlighted.

In terms of emergency actions and situations where time is of the essence, there are some exceptions provided in the legislation, including privacy legislation, where information could be disclosed.

Senator Patterson: I will stop there. Thank you.

Senator Pate: Mr. Dufresne, my first question is for you.

As you might be aware, First Nations children’s advocate Cindy Blackstock was the subject of online surveillance by a federal government department acting without a warrant, which the Canadian Human Rights Commission ruled to be retaliation. The Privacy Commissioner ruled it to be a violation of the spirit of the Privacy Act in 2013.

Surveillance extended not just to Ms. Blackstock but to those with whom she interacted, including First Nations children.

I’m curious as to whether there is anything — I couldn’t find anything — in Bill C-22 that would provide the type of injunctive relief that was not available to Ms. Blackstock in that instance. Also, what measures in Bill C-22 would prevent what happened to Ms. Blackstock from occurring again to others, including other Indigenous political advocates as well as land and water protectors?

Mr. Dufresne: In the context of this bill, you would look at some remedies from a criminal law standpoint or from a national security standpoint. Is the evidence that has been obtained improper? If so, it wouldn’t be used in court. It would be quashed. There would be remedies of that nature.

Bill C-22 aims to create this. In what situations can you get the information without an order from a judge, and in what situations is such an order required? That is why we focused some of our recommendations on the definition. To whom can you go for these types of information? Don’t make it too broad. Make it necessary and proportionate, and ensure that any type of information or any type of surveillance, when it is proposed, is scrutinized. Privacy and being free from surveillance are key elements of a free and democratic society.

At the same time, we need to ensure law enforcement has the tools it needs. As the Supreme Court has confirmed in the Bykovets case — and as I’ve argued — it should not be a zero-sum game: Canadians deserve security and law enforcement as well as the fundamental right to privacy.

Senator Pate: Issues have also been raised by the Ontario Human Rights Commission regarding Black Canadians, particularly in Toronto. Are there any measures in Bill C-22 that would prevent existing patterns of discriminatory over-surveillance and over-policing of Black, Indigenous and other marginalized groups from being reinforced by this legislation?

Mr. Dufresne: If the concern is discriminatory approaches by any organ of government, then the Human Rights Commission and, potentially, courts would be the appropriate mechanisms. In this bill, I think I would see the role of the judges reviewing the orders that are sought as being very critical. If we’re dealing with regulation-making powers, that’s where the criteria of necessity and proportionality focus on privacy and security — being very diligent in reviewing any proposed exercise of power.

Senator Pate: Thank you.

Senator Dhillon: Commissioner Dufresne, I will direct this question to you.

You have identified the need and the importance of the approach being necessary and proportionate. The legislation requires the minister to consider a range of factors, including the benefits to investigations, technical feasibility, costs, privacy and cybersecurity. Ministerial orders are also subject to approval by the Intelligence Commissioner.

I want to understand what additional protections your proposed amendment would provide beyond those existing safeguards. Could you give us an example of a technical obligation that might satisfy the current statutory requirements, including independent approval, that you believe should nevertheless be prohibited under your proposed necessarily and proportionality test?

Mr. Dufresne: Thank you, senator.

In my view, a clear reference to proportionality, in particular, is missing. That is absent from the elements that must be considered. The House has added an element of the essential nature, so that goes to necessity, so there are some elements there. However, it is the two of them. It is making sure that, when issuing an order in terms of retention — what you’re going to ask ESPs to retain or what types of systems you put in place for how long and so on — you need to establish that it is needed for the operations of the state. That’s important, and that was one that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians talked about. Sometimes, there’s a gap in data collection or evidence in terms of how many cases are needed and so on.

Also, we need to look at whether it is proportionate. Are we causing too much harm to privacy or cybersecurity? And cybersecurity is a growing issue in that the longer you retain data, the more there is a risk that there can be bad actors gaining access.

So, necessity and proportionality really get to those two things. They will help make sure, in my view, that the decision is going to be safer and more protective of privacy while, at the same time, allowing authorities to do their work.

Senator Dhillon: Regarding those two principles, do you believe it is important that they be captured in legislation, or do you feel comfortable and have confidence that they might be displayed within the regulatory framework?

Mr. Dufresne: I’m not the one who would be overseeing those regulations; Commissioner Noël would be. If the legislation doesn’t require something to be considered, it is hard for an authority to say that it should have been considered. “I am not seeing information on this element, so, therefore, I cannot approve it.” So having it in the legislation is —

Of course, the minister can certainly consider those things, and the legislation does mention any other relevant factors. One would hope that is the spirit.

Given the importance of this — and I did note this, and I repeat it now — the NSICOP explicitly named this, and international privacy authorities around the world consistently refer to necessity and proportionality. It is consistent with the approach under the Charter. When we are justifying a Charter violation under section 1, we are looking at whether it minimally impairs the right that is being impacted.

So, I would see no harm in adding it in the legislation, and I would see benefits in reassuring Canadians and industry that those orders are going to be as tailored as they need to be.

Senator Yussuff: Thanks to the witnesses, and I’m sorry for being late. Other things are going on in this place, as usual.

Let me get to the question that’s on many Canadians’ minds. As you know, a number of iterations of this bill didn’t make it this far, but we’re here now. Much has been learned in the process of coming to this final chapter, if we get there; obviously, that’s the hope.

Given what our Five Eyes allies have done ahead of us in regard to similar legislation, what can you share that is valuable for us to understand? Obviously, there is variance, and we have the Charter. They might not have something like that in some of the countries. What is the variance between the other legislation that might be of value for Canadians who are still wondering whether this bill is overreaching its intended purpose? I will start with Mr. Dufresne and then move to Mr. Noël.

Mr. Dufresne: I’ll address two elements that regard Part 2 of the bill in terms of requiring service providers to put in place tools and mechanisms.

If we look at Australia or the U.K., they have incorporated a necessity and proportionality assessment in their legislation. That is instructive in terms of the types of international consensus, the importance of those principles and how useful they are. Likewise, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand have put in place some mechanisms that I’ve recommended in my fifth recommendation for providers to be able to pre-emptively request an assessment by an independent technical expert if they have concerns that what is being asked of them will result in systemic vulnerabilities.

So, these are good practices, and they could help allay some of the concerns that have been voiced in the context of this bill in terms of whether we will be inadvertently causing systemic vulnerability, creating back doors and so on. The government has stated that’s not the intention. If there are still remaining concerns, that mechanism would help allay them.

Mr. Noël: In terms of metadata in Australia, I think the retention can be over two years. That’s one aspect. I think the six months in this bill is the shortest period of retention out of the Five Eyes partners.

As for the Americans, it is hard to know how they operate. It’s all very well, but I’m intrigued. I’ve been trying to research that and find out exactly how they operate. I know there is the FISA Court. I met the judges. I also know there are presidential executive orders that are confidential and we’re not aware of. I understand that some American senators criticized this bill, but it is hard to know where they are coming from. What I’m trying to get at is that it is hard to understand the Americans. They have the core service providers in their country. This is my personal opinion, but I suspect that there are a lot of arrangements we’re not aware of.

As for Great Britain, I agree with the Privacy Commissioner that necessity and proportionality are clearly mentioned in their legislation, as they should be in ours.

Let me give you a final thought on that: Proportionality means justification. It means when you have opposing goals, as you do in paragraphs 7(3)(a), 7(3)(d) and 7(3)(e), the decision maker must ask, “How am I balancing this?” Is it in the interest of the criminal investigation, or is it in the interest of the users? Does it impact their privacy too much? How does the minister deal with that?

Through my present role, I have seen that. It is working. They have to justify their decisions. Justifying means a lot. It means that you must put your opinion forward.

Senator Hay: Thank you all for being here. I’m going to throw this out as a free-for-all, so whoever wants to answer can. I am on a little bit of a learning mission here, and I’m trying to understand where Bill C-22 may apply with unintended consequences around data, privacy, security and cybersecurity. I’m going to give you a real example.

I used to work in an organization that was deeply involved with data and technology, as well as youth and mental health. I worked with some of the more vulnerable young people coast to coast to coast nationally. I’m curious how Bill C-22 would apply to that data. The organization holds a lot of data, including transcript data, young people’s data and locations, with up to 3 million to 4 million interactions a year. Maybe it doesn’t apply, but that would be helpful to know. I’m pretty sure people would want to know the difference because this is all based on trust. This is confidential and anonymous.

Occasionally, there would be a situation in this organization where we would work with the RCMP because of the potential for self-harm, when there were public threats to a school or if there may be harm to others.

My question is this: What risk would young people take if they reached out to this organization that now holds their data? Does this mean the organization might be asked or required to give the government data from young people in Iqaluit or Ontario? Under Bill C-22, if this organization had to comply, would it create more risk of cyberattacks to capture this data?

Mr. Dufresne: I can quickly start. This touches on the scope of what is captured under Bill C-22 and for what types of powers. If we look at the power to confirm a service demand — that’s where a peace officer would ask a provider for confirmation — it is limited to a telecommunication service provider. To me, it doesn’t sound like what you described would be covered.

Senator Hay: Except the provision at this organization is through telecommunications.

Mr. Dufresne: Right, but the organization itself is not a telecommunications service provider. However, the power to obtain subscriber information when going to a judge is not limited to telecommunications service providers. It is open to a person who provides services to the public, so that’s one of the concerns that I’ve identified.

In our view, that, too, should be limited to a telecommunications service provider so that the scope is limited to the type of basic subscriber information we’re thinking about in this context. The confirmation of service demands has a carve-out for medical and privileged information, which could apply here, but that carve-out does not apply to the subscriber information requests. In my view, those two things should apply to both exercises of power.

Senator Hay: There are many organizations like the one I’m referring to. Thank you for that. That’s very helpful.

I now have a broad question on this bill itself. Do you think it was built in, let’s say, a different era or designed for a different time? I’m thinking about AI. This is just an “in your opinion” question.

Mr. Noël: Your question is appropriate. Things are moving so quickly out there. I certainly hope this bill covers it, but I would suggest you ask the minister that question. I think he’d be in a better position to answer that.

Senator McNair: Thank you to the witnesses for being here tonight. We will have some witnesses before our committee who will talk about the onerous side of collecting and retaining the metadata and the risk of holding that metadata. As you know, the other place made an amendment to reduce the metadata retention period from one year to six months.

Mr. Dufresne, do the concepts of proportionality and necessity that you’re proposing be put into this legislation, like what has been done with other similar legislation, balance that concern, or should we be reducing the time period even further?

Mr. Dufresne: I’m not recommending a reduction of time. The maximum retention time has been reduced to six months, and I take no issue with that. In my view, necessity and proportionality would address concerns on a case-by-case basis. Not all cases are going to require that six months. Some will require less. But if there is a case that does need it, there should be that possibility.

Senator McNair: Honourable Mr. Noël, do you have anything to add?

Mr. Noël: I think the commissioner answered well.

Senator Cardozo: We talked about two terms, and I’m wondering if you could say a bit more. One is the necessity of proportionality. To what extent is that a rather subjective term, and is there enough in the bill or does that get defined during the course of jurisprudence or decisions that are made?

Mr. Noël: To your first question, these are principles of law. They’ve been developed through jurisprudence going back centuries. Proportionality goes back to the Greek times.

It is not something new. It is used, senator, on a daily basis in administrative law. The public officer has to justify their decision. The way to do it is to be able to analyze the factors even when they are in contradiction.

I go back to the benefits of the order to the administration of justice; that’s the purpose. However, at the same time, what will the potential impact be on the persons to whom the electronic provider supplies the services, or the potential impact on privacy?

Is the benefit of the order to the administration strong enough to impose itself on a potential impact on the privacy of individuals? There’s a balancing. The minister has to justify it. There’s a requirement for proportionality. That means the decision may be found to be unreasonable.

[Translation]

Senator Dalphond: I have two quick questions for Mr. Noël.

First, if representations are made, will you be getting a copy? Proposed section 8 provides for an opportunity to make representations to the ministers. Will you receive these as well?

Mr. Noël: Yes.

Senator Dalphond: Second, since proposed subsection 7(3) sets out a number of factors in a non-exhaustive list, is the principle of proportionality not already implicit in those criteria, which may at times be in tension with one another, such that, even if it were not added to the bill, a decision-maker such as yourself would still have to apply it?

Mr. Noël: I recognize the appeal court judge in that question. I can tell you that the answer is yes, it is implicit. That is the position we took before the House of Commons committee. As both the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and I have said, including it serves to ensure that the minister understands that decisions must be justified on the basis of proportionality and necessity. It imposes an obligation, Senator Dalphond, to such an extent that, if it is not there, the minister’s decision could be found to be unreasonable.

I can tell you that I have found a number of decisions to be unreasonable. Indeed, the legislation did not authorize the activity that was being proposed. That has happened before, and the system works. It is a kind of insurance policy. That is how I see it.

Senator Dalphond: And you have the representations?

Mr. Noël: Yes.

Senator Dalphond: Thank you.

Senator Martel: My question is for both Mr. Dufresne and Mr. Noël.

I’d like to return to the necessity and proportionality test. In the absence of such a test in the legislation, what consequences could arise if a requirement imposed on a service provider were challenged before the courts?

Mr. Dufresne: I believe that adding the necessity and proportionality test would certainly strengthen the case against any judicial challenge that might arise, as it would demonstrate that Parliament required, and that the minister in fact considered, those factors. It would ensure that the order is, both in substance and in appearance, more narrowly tailored, since the minister would be required to demonstrate why it is truly necessary and that the impacts on privacy have been minimized. I believe that would have a very beneficial effect.

Senator Martel: Mr. Noël, do you have anything to add?

Mr. Noël: It is important to understand that, in this process, the provider has an opportunity to be heard. The provider is aware of the order that the minister intends to issue and is therefore in a position to assess whether the minister is complying with the obligations imposed on him or her. The service provider can present its views. At that point, of course, the commissioner, having the benefit of the file and the various perspectives before him, is in a position to make an informed decision.

Senator Martel: Thank you.

[English]

Senator Patterson: I am sorry to put you in the hot seat, Intelligence Commissioner. We’ve received many letters from Canadians across the country with concerns.

One of the letters I received was from a group of academics at the University of Waterloo. What they were talking about is that the legislation itself, when it comes to bills and orders, seems to tilt in the direction of the government.

One of the points they brought forward is the fact that there’s no similar procedure for providers to challenge a regulation or order. While you must give the approval before a regulation or order goes forward, it is based on the reasonableness of the minister’s conclusion. There is no requirement in the legislation to consult independent technical expertise.

Can you talk about this, please, and what the process will look like for clarity purposes?

Mr. Noël: Thank you for the question. The point of view of the service provider will be part of the record. However, keep in mind that the service provider has its own interests. It may have the interests that we’re seeing here in the factors to consider, but there may be other interests. The commissioner is not a part of that. He or she will be looking at the issues. We’ll have different points of view.

I sympathize with academics who are imagining things that are sometimes worse than nature, and I say that respectfully. It is true there has to be proper supervision of police and intelligence matters by NSIRA.

At the same time, reality must prevail. The benefit to Canadians must be evaluated. I perceive the role of the commissioner as being right in the middle. The service provider may have, for its own purposes, the privacy of Canadians in mind, but the real decision maker at the end is not the service provider, nor the minister. The decision has to be reasonable.

Senator Dhillon: Commissioner Dufresne, you had in your recommendations that the new subscriber information production order be limited to telecommunication service providers.

One of the challenges we face in law enforcement today is that criminal activity is no longer confined to traditional telecommunication networks. Individuals involved in organized crime, extortion and other serious offences increasingly rely on a variety of digital services to conceal their identities and activities.

If Parliament were to adopt your recommendation, how would investigators obtain subscriber information from services that fall outside of that definition, particularly where identifying the individual behind an account is a first step in an investigation?

Have you considered whether this restriction could create investigative gaps the legislation is specifically intending to address?

Mr. Dufresne: The short answer is the police authorities would be able to get that through the general production order under the Criminal Code. It would be at a higher standard of reasonable belief.

In my view, the powers that would be granted under Bill C-22 would still be more than what the police currently have. It would expand on what they can now do in terms of the reasonable suspicion criterion.

The fine balance has to be some powers where the police officer on their own can get it, some where they go to a judge on reasonable suspicion and some where they go to a judge on reasonable beliefs.

My recommendation is to ensure you’re not expanding the category too much where reasonable suspicion alone is going to be enough to obtain the production order.

Senator Yussuff: This bill fills a gap where we have a hole in the country in law enforcement having to do their responsibility, and that hole is large.

At the same time, there is a fair degree of concern by Canadians — which may be warranted or unwarranted — because of other people inflaming the situation.

The reality is this legislation is, at this stage, hoping to look beyond our current horizons. How do we assure Canadians, writ large, that this is not an overreach by the government on their behalf and that it is also not an overreach that gives the police far more power than they should be entitled to in our legal and constitutional contexts in how they might exercise it?

Mr. Dufresne: In my view, we do that by having definitions that are narrow and by incorporating elements of necessity and proportionality. That stands the test of time. It’s not dependent on technology where it is now. If you have fast-moving AI, quantum and all of those things, factors like necessity and proportionality are flexible and are technology neutral.

I have made some other recommendations. If there are genuine concerns and there’s a need for independent assessment, there are ways of doing that. The goal should be avoiding a zero-sum game, making sure we’re protecting the fundamental rights of Canadians but making sure the police have the tools they need to do their critical work.

The Chair: Thank you so much.

This brings us to the end of our rapid hour and our time with this panel. Thank you so much for your concise and explicit responses.

We plan, but I think you’ve set the table really well for the next hour for our colleagues. I want to thank you deeply for that.

For this next hour, we have the honour of welcoming the Honourable Gary Anandasangaree, Minister of Public Safety, and the Honourable Sean Fraser, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada.

Welcome, ministers.

Minister Anandasangaree, I understand you are joined by Vanessa Lloyd, Senior Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service; Richard Bilodeau, Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch, Public Safety Canada; and Marie-Claude Dandenault, Deputy Commissioner, National Specialized Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Minister Fraser, you are joined by Kimberly Gibner, Deputy Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Sector, Department of Justice Canada.

That was a mouthful, and it’s a roomful. We had a very informative first hour, starting to deep-dive into this bill after much correspondence with Canadians over the past three months. We are very excited to be here and to have you here today.

We invite you to provide opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. You have five minutes each.

Hon. Gary Anandasangaree, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety: Thank you, Madam Chair.

At the outset, let me welcome the new members who are here today, Senator Tucker and Senator Martel. It is great to see you both.

Of course, I begin by thanking all of you for your work.

[Translation]

Thank you for inviting me to speak to Bill C-22 today.

[English]

I would like to acknowledge that we are meeting on the traditional territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg people.

I want to also thank Senator Dhillon and his team for his work on this bill. Thank you, senator.

Every day, law enforcement across Canada works to keep our communities safe. They investigate organized crime networks, pursue human traffickers, protect children from online exploitation and respond to cybercriminals who can reach victims from anywhere in the world.

While crime has evolved, our laws and investigative tools have not. Criminals exploit technology. They move quickly across platforms, jurisdictions and borders.

Meanwhile, investigators face delays in obtaining basic information that may be critical to preventing harm, identifying a suspect or rescuing a victim. That is why Bill C-22 matters.

This bill is about ensuring that when a judge authorizes an investigation, law enforcement has the ability to carry out that authorization. It establishes a modern, lawful access framework, one that will protect victims and equip law enforcement with the modern tools they need.

The legislation before you today was shaped by significant engagement with stakeholders and parliamentarians. That collaboration did not weaken the bill; it made it stronger.

You will recall we had Bill C-2 which had a lawful access regime similar to this. Over time, we heard Canadians and came back with Bill C-22. Again, based on feedback from committee, we amended the bill significantly at the committee stage in Parliament.

Canadians expect everyone, including big tech and the private sector, to help keep our communities safe. These companies must be active partners in stopping serious crime and protecting Canadians.

The central challenge before us is straightforward: How do we protect both public safety and privacy in an increasingly digital world? Our answer is that public safety and privacy are not in competition. They are complementary objectives, and both are protected in this legislation.

The bill before you ensures that the investigative authorities remain effective while maintaining the legal thresholds, safeguards, oversight and accountability measures that protect Canadians’ rights and freedoms. The current legal framework lacks that balance.

Take, for example, a child exploitation investigation where a digital account can disappear before police can identify the individual behind it.

Imagine a human trafficking victim whose location depends on digital evidence that is available one day and gone the next. These are not theoretical challenges. These are real-world public safety realities.

Bill C-22 brings us to the 21st century. It will help ensure that investigations can begin with speed and certainty, rather than losing critical time at the early stage navigating gaps in outdated frameworks. It will mean fewer investigations are stalled at the starting line and provides a clearer legal pathway from digital identifiers to further investigative steps.

Canada remains the only Five Eyes country without a comprehensive lawful access framework, and criminals know this. I was reminded of this in Australia when I met with our Five Eyes partners in August. That is increasingly difficult to justify when criminals operate globally. Our investigators must work seamlessly with international partners.

Madam Chair, let me be equally clear about what this bill is not. Bill C-22 is not about weakening privacy protections. It is not about surveillance. It is not about creating back doors into Canadians’ private communications.

The House of Commons committee has adopted amendments, including a safeguard clarifying that electronic service providers cannot be compelled to decrypt end-to-end user-encrypted information that causes a systemic vulnerability.

We reduced metadata retention requirements to six months from our initial one year. In fact, this will be among the shortest periods of retention of any of the Five Eyes partners, significantly shorter than the retention periods of Australia, France and Italy.

Those changes reflect an important principle: Giving investigators the tools they need should never come at the expense of creating new vulnerabilities for Canadians.

Bill C-22 will help investigators follow critical digital evidence before it disappears, identify suspects more quickly, support victims sooner and prevent harm before it escalates. It will help Canada work more effectively with international partners to pursue justice and support victims.

Ultimately, this bill is about ensuring that our laws reflect the realities of today’s world we all live in. Canadians expect us to keep them safe.

I will conclude, Madam Chair. I wish to thank all of you for your hard work on this bill. I especially wish to acknowledge my colleague the Honourable Sean Fraser for his collaboration.

I look forward to your questions and comments.

The Chair: Thank you, minister.

Now we will hear from Minister Fraser.

[Translation]

The Honourable Sean Fraser, P.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Before I begin, I’d like to congratulate the newly appointed senators, especially Senator Martel.

It is a pleasure to see you here instead of on the other side, in the House of Commons.

[English]

For no reason whatsoever.

[Translation]

As senators are well aware, our public safety strategy rests on three pillars. First, to strengthen the Criminal Code, we are advancing Bills C-14, C-9 and C-16. The second pillar, which is particularly relevant to today’s discussion, involves supporting law enforcement and other front-line workers that protect our communities. As an aside, the third pillar concerns investments in long-term community safety.

[English]

It is the second pillar I wish to focus on today.

When we talk about supporting those on the front line, we often default to a conversation about how much we’re putting toward new officers on the ground. Certainly, that’s a part of the conversation, but that’s not the whole conversation.

It’s important we actually equip those we’re asking to keep communities safe with the tools they need to do the job we have asked them to. There are members of this committee who would know well the importance of having the tools to do the job when it comes to public safety.

Specifically, what has alarmed me over the course of conversations I’ve had in developing this legislation from the early days — and I wish to thank Gary for the leadership role that he’s played — is the fact that Canada has gone through the majority of my life without tools that have been available to most of the rest of the world.

We’re living in an era when crime is of an increasingly fast-moving, transnational nature, and digital by default. Even with crimes committed in an analog way with real consequences for real people in real communities, the digital footprint can often allow us to investigate crime with a view to both preventing it and prosecuting it should the crime take place.

When we’re trying to come up with the right strategy, thankfully, we have other leaders in the world we can look to. As the minister mentioned, our Five Eyes partners — and our G7 partners, for that matter — have figured out different ways to address the challenge when it comes to digital evidence as technology advances.

We don’t have to reinvent the wheel. We can adopt practices and put protections in place that are unique to the Canadian experience but, nevertheless, will allow law enforcement to do their job more effectively.

Specifically, for my part, I want to focus on Part 1 of the bill, around lawful access, simply empowering law enforcement — when they are investigating a crime — to ask for information about a particular IP address or phone number to say, “Is this on your network?”

When that information is gleaned, after a process plays out contemplated by this legislation, we have created a new ability with the authorization of a judge for law enforcement to seek the court’s permission to access subscriber information, to tie an individual to the number or IP address that may be at issue.

Keep in mind that these are not entirely new powers that are impossible in Canada today. However, when you talk to law enforcement, they are time-consuming. When they are dealing with threats that can play out in real time, the need to ensure that we move quickly to prevent crime and not just prosecute it after the harm has fallen upon Canadians could not be more important.

I wish to save as much time as possible for questions, so I’ll terminate my comments here. Suffice it to say, I look forward to the questions you may have and the work the Senate will do on this bill to advance public safety in Canada. Thank you.

The Chair: Our witnesses will be with us until 6 p.m. As always, we will do our best to allow time for each member to ask their questions with a brief use of words. Also, officials will be joining us on the next panel, so we can continue some of our questioning then. We have four minutes for each question, including the answer.

The first question will be asked by Senator Cardozo from our steering committee.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you both, ministers, for being here. I appreciate your time. This is an act that has been a long time coming, as you’ve noted.

Do you think we have the right balance here between lawfully allowing access to information, on the one hand, versus ensuring the privacy of Canadians and the security of end-to-end encryption? We’ve heard a lot about whether that is in danger.

I raise all of that in the context of Canadian public digital sovereignty.

Do you think it’s time for us to consider a public player in the field, such as a Crown corporation, that would play a role in working with platforms and our digital system, which would give us greater assurance in terms of our digital sovereignty?

Mr. Anandasangaree: Let me address the first part of your question.

Sean mentioned that we actually haven’t had a proper lawful access framework in almost a generation. The constant inability of law enforcement to be able to access what is, in most countries, easily accessible has, in some cases, threatened the lives of people who might be extorted, sexually exploited and a range of other things where we believe this tool would be exceptionally helpful.

It’s important to understand the journey. When Bill C-2 was tabled, I actually talked to many of you around Bill C-2. I received a fair amount of feedback. You will recall that we pulled back and said, in September last year, that we will go back to the drawing board and try to come up with something more in line with our values. That’s exactly what we did.

We spoke to a range of stakeholders, including law enforcement, me, Sean and Ruby Sahoda. We essentially went across Canada and spoke to many law enforcement agencies that gave us the specifics of what they were looking for. We then spoke to civil society groups, privacy experts, the Intelligence Commissioner and a range of official government players who have a role in this regulation. Then, we came up with what we believe is the right balance between privacy protection and the ability of law enforcement to do their job with the tools they need.

This was further clarified during the committee process. We were flexible and open to the advice of the committee. For example, the retention of metadata went from one year to six months, which was a critical point because law enforcement had insisted that it be a year. We went back to law enforcement and asked them to walk us through what a new application looks like. Then, we thought six months might not be ideal, but it does give confidence that, within that timeline, you could do what you need to. If required, there are judicial ways of extending that timeline if you go to court. There was an opportunity for them to do that, but — at the end of the day — the reduction in that timeline was critical.

Then, we had issues around ministerial orders, for example. Who would be the oversight body for that order? That’s where the Intelligence Commissioner came in. Any ministerial order will require the consent of the Intelligence Commissioner, who will, regarding a range of issues, assess the validity of that order. If they believe that it is not in line with the law or our protection rights, they have the ability to say no.

Then, we have the three-year review period. Again, that is another important part of the safeguards we have in place.

The Chair: Thank you very much, minister. We appreciate that.

Senator Patterson: Minister Fraser, this one is for you. It picks up on your colleague’s comment about the non-criminal side of things. It’s about legal authority and the protection of individuals in emergencies.

I will use search and rescue as an example because that is something at the federal level that impacts both the RCMP and the Canadian Armed Forces. One of the challenges is that, in a missing persons case, it does not necessarily involve a criminal act. A person might be lost, injured or experiencing a medical emergency and unable to communicate with family members.

While Bill C-22 addresses access to location information under existing legal authorities, it’s important for the people who are watching this to understand whether those authorities sufficiently cover situations where the primary purpose is to protect someone’s life. While we talked about human trafficking, it is not necessarily on that side of things.

The Department of Justice’s Charter Statement explains that Bill C-22 expands certain exigent circumstance powers to include tracking data, but those powers remain tied to statutory regulatory requirements for exigent circumstances.

Minister, after that preamble, from a legal perspective, does Bill C-22 provide sufficient authority for police to obtain cellphone location information during an urgent search and rescue operation when there’s no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?

Mr. Fraser: That is a fascinating question. The manner in which I envision the legislation being used, primarily informed from conversations I’ve had with law enforcement, was about the investigation of a crime rather than an investigation that might be triggered in an emergency that does not involve a crime.

Just for clarity, there are definitions not only in statute but in common law that are considered when exigent circumstances might take place that would allow information to be shared. Typically, you might think of an event of abuse that might be livestreamed or the known whereabouts of a person who might be a subject of human smuggling.

At the risk of pushing the responsibility onto the more talented officials sitting next to me, Ms. Gibner, I am curious about your expectations about the application in a non-criminal emergency situation where the police might still find value in this information.

Kimberly Gibner, Deputy Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Sector, Department of Justice Canada: The only thing I would add, if it’s of assistance, senator, is that the definition of a peace officer or public officer, at least in the Criminal Code, is quite broad, so it does apply in municipal, provincial and all sorts of circumstances, more generally.

Bill C-22, as the ministers have identified, has quite a narrow scope, so it might not apply in the situation you referred to. However, it still applies to public officers and peace officers.

Mr. Fraser: I have one point of follow-up. The reason “exigent circumstances” is defined in the common law is that it can have applications in scenarios that are not necessarily envisioned by Bill C-22. There might be other ways to get such information, but if this is an area where the committee would like to expand the potential applications for emergencies that might not be criminal, I would sincerely welcome the perspectives of the committee in that regard.

Senator Patterson: Thank you.

If use the example of the RCMP and the Canadian Armed Forces during search and rescue in the North or even during an avalanche recovery, people work with their cellphones right now. Again, it’s the access to the information. Is the mechanism there? There is certainly anecdotal evidence out there that it has made it very difficult to get the information they require.

These are both federal entities that I’m referring to here, which is why I’m asking.

So, should we expressly recognize the protection of human life as a basis for emergency access to location information? Again, it’s through the same providers.

Mr. Fraser: Having thought about this in a different context over the past year or so, I want to reserve the ability to ensure there are not any unintended consequences with this new scenario being put to me. It strikes me that it would be a reasonable use of the same information for the purpose of protecting a person who is potentially facing grave danger. I want to ensure there’s not some other side of the coin. I don’t see it in the moment, but I would certainly undertake to get back to the committee as to how, specifically, we would envision the application in a non-criminal situation that would, nevertheless, get the information.

I expect there are other ways to share information that might not require a court process where you would still be able to have access to it. However, I would be happy to provide follow-up thoughts in writing on this particular question.

Senator Patterson: Thank you. Do I have time just to clarify what I’m looking for?

The Chair: No, you don’t; you’re way over.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: Thank you for being with us today. My question comes from my colleague Senator Claude Carignan, who is not here today.

Minister, Bill C-22 provides certain specific protections for medical information and information protected by solicitor-client privilege. In 2017, Parliament enacted the Journalistic Sources Protection Act to protect the confidentiality of sources in criminal investigations. However, Bill C-22 creates new powers enabling authorities to obtain subscriber information.

Could these new powers allow authorities to identify a journalistic source without having to comply with the protections set out in the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code?

Mr. Fraser: Thank you for the question.

[English]

To be clear, there is a big difference between a confirmation of service demand and subscriber information.

One of the protections I believe is helpful for subscriber information is the requirement that you go before the court to seek judicial authorizations. Generally speaking, I prefer to have a person who is aware of all the facts to understand what’s reasonable with the full protections that come from the Charter.

Obviously, when you’re dealing with journalists, the right to free expression is paramount. Allowing the judge to understand the circumstances and hear the case would typically be my preference. I’d like them to have the full benefit of the facts with the protections known in the Charter. I believe that they would land in the correct place by protecting journalistic integrity without compromising on public safety.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: Mr. Fraser, in its submission to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, the Canadian Association of Journalists expressed serious concerns about Bill C-22, including the risks it poses to the confidentiality of journalistic sources. What is your response to those concerns? I think it would be a good idea to reassure journalists that the new powers granted under Bill C-22 will not compromise the confidentiality of their sources.

[English]

Mr. Fraser: I agree with you on the importance of protecting journalistic sources. Where I think we have a point that we can talk through, now and subsequently, regards whether legislative protection would offer anything that the Charter currently does not. In my view, the Charter offers superior protection to those that would come from the legislation. It is not a question about whether your point is valid. It is about whether the protection is necessary to add incremental value over and above the nature of what’s being asked for.

Keep in mind that we’re not asking for the content of what people may have shared. We’re trying to deal with the identity where there’s reasonable suspicion and it is agreed upon by the court that it is reasonable that this information is going to yield value to the investigation. I accept and would demand protection for journalistic sources, but I would question whether adding language to the legislation would be necessary in order to strengthen the protection that already exists under Canadian law.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: Thank you.

[English]

Senator Pate: Welcome, ministers. My questions are for both of you. The government has committed, through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or TRC, Call to Action 30 and the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Calls for Justice, to eliminate the overrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples. There’s also been a similar commitment to eliminate the overrepresentation of Black folks and other racialized people. There have also been concerns raised around politically motivated surveillance in the cases of certain Indigenous leaders.

I’m curious as to what steps the federal government took before introducing Bill C-22 to assess the impacts of its measures — including the expanded investigative powers and lowering of evidentiary thresholds for warrants — on rates of criminalization and incarceration of Indigenous, Black and other marginalized communities, including, in particular, land and water protectors. What are the findings, if there have been any? When can we expect the Gender-based Analysis Plus, or GBA Plus, for this legislation to be tabled? And what’s the government’s timeline for meeting TRC Call to Action 30?

Mr. Anandasangaree: I’ll start with the parts that are directly relevant to this bill. Then, senator, I’d be more than glad to talk more about the work done on our Indigenous and Black justice strategies that are in play right now.

With respect to the surveillance of Indigenous leaders, it is an ongoing conversation. I’ve had the opportunity to meet with all the national Indigenous organizations. This is with respect to the RCMP in particular. One of the demands they initially imposed was that we release available surveillance information to the individual. As of November 10, we anticipate that Library and Archives Canada will be able to release the available information, and we will share it with both national Indigenous organizations and those who have been impacted.

Coming back to the legislation itself, the entire manner in which lawful access will be implemented is through judicial authorization, save and except for the first element, which is seeking confirmation of service. Beyond that, every element of this will require judicial authorization for Part 1. For issues such as a ministerial order, the oversight is with the Intelligence Commissioner. It is not to repeat the failures of the past, and it has nothing to do with the lawful access regime. The surveillance was motivated by politics and mistrust more than anything else. This is about ensuring that we have Criminal Code and Canada Evidence Act provisions in place for law enforcement to be able to do the type of surveillance that can lead to charges and not just as a fishing expedition.

Senator Pate: When will we see the GBA Plus? Experts have raised concerns about the Charter analysis and whether section 8 actually could be satisfied. Of course, the GBA Plus would inform that as well.

Mr. Fraser: I have read it in full. It exists. We will get it to the committee imminently.

Senator Yussuff: Minister, let me start with the definition of an “electronic service provider” in Bill C-22, which is extraordinarily broad. Toronto is the home of a number of successful VPN companies that provide a service. They have real concerns about whether they could be captured by the legislation. Can you clarify for members of the committee whether VPN providers are considered electronic service providers under this bill?

Mr. Anandasangaree: The term “electronic service provider” is deliberately broad. This is to reflect the speed at which technology is exploding — and that’s probably the right word. We know that AI, for example, is going to speed up the growth and the availability of electronic service providers exponentially in a number of ways, so it is deliberately broad. Having said that, the core service providers are telecommunication companies, those who are licensed by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, satellite companies and social media companies who primarily provide services to the public.

Some VPN providers have expressed concern. I would say two things. First, their concerns have been taken into account. We have put in measures confirming that encryption cannot be compromised. That’s a measure that we put in as an amendment as part of the committee process. We’ve reduced the data retention period from one year to six months, and those are to reflect the concerns of VPN providers.

There are also VPN providers that are deliberately threatening, in some cases, to leave Canada. I’ve learned from my conversations with Five Eyes partners that the same playbook was used in different countries, including Australia and the U.K. With great respect to companies that provide this service, we value their service, but we also expect them to be good citizens.

When we protect encryption, that means that the end-to-end component of the privacy rights of Canadians is protected because we’re protecting end-to-end encryption. At the same time, we are demanding that those who operate in Canada provide law enforcement with the support they need. We’re not asking them to break any laws. We’re asking them, with judicial or authorization, to provide information that is authorized by law to be released.

I am of the belief that we have found the right balance, as I’ve indicated previously. Yes, senator.

Senator Yussuff: But, given that VPN companies are not a primary carrier of this data, they don’t store the data. They are only providing a service to stop hackers from getting into your device. It seems that you’re saying, on the one hand, they are not the target of this legislation. Is there a better way to clarify that what they do is obviously important and that we value their service, but, at the same time, this legislation is aimed at other actors providing the core services to which law enforcement would ultimately need access?

Mr. Anandasangaree: We made it clear, but we can certainly clarify it further, senator. At the end of the day, our core service providers are telcos. The internet service providers are satellite service providers who provide communication services. The expansion to other platforms is not what is immediately envisioned, although, as technology develops, we want the ability to do that. Again, in some cases, we’ll require a ministerial order. If that’s the case, then the safeguard is with the Intelligence Commissioner.

Senator Dean: Thanks for joining us. I want to raise the spectre of the so-called back doors in relation to data retention orders. I, for one — and I’m sure I’m not alone — haven’t been impressed by service providers’ responses, not least because they don’t have a particularly good track record of retaining subscriber information within their own boundaries. In fact, we know that some of them sell it. But, further, these organizations have suggested that data retention orders would attract malfeasant actors, and that retained data might then not be secure.

My question and my points are as follows: First, I don’t think we’re likely to see retention orders published in the Gazette. There is the question of how malfeasant actors would find out about these orders. Second, Canadians would expect those companies to assist and work with our security organizations to show them the front door. We know that front doors exist for various reasons.

I have no doubt that the service providers involved in this would work hand in hand with our security organizations to ensure that data is secure. I think Canadians would expect that, too. What’s your reaction to that? Mr. Fraser, could I ask you to comment?

Mr. Fraser: One point in your intervention, senator, stuck with me. I will want to save time for Minister Anandasangaree because a lot of the data retention piece falls into his area of responsibility.

Canadians have a fair and reasonable expectation that corporate players would absolutely work with the security apparatus, both to protect the information over which Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy but would, at the same time, facilitate the investigative tools that are necessary to help keep our communities safe.

Obviously, a list of examples exists that is as long as my arm, of companies that are custodians of personal information of Canadians that have failed to put protections in place. To the extent that we can work with companies to establish practices to ensure retention of the information that will facilitate the requests under Part 1 of the bill, without compromising on the privacy interests, that is ultimately fair and reasonable. That is not just my own opinion. I think it is a reasonable expectation that most Canadians would have.

Minister Anandasangaree, on the data retention piece, you may have something to supplement that response.

Mr. Anandasangaree: Sure. The safeguard already built in is that anything that would cause systemic vulnerabilities does not need to be implemented. In fact, it is in the interests of the government and law enforcement to ensure there are no backdoor ways in which data can be compromised. It is the responsibility of every electronic service provider to protect their data and protect their systems so that data breaches are avoided at all costs. Those breaches can have significant impacts on Canadians.

The bill enables electronic service providers to protect their data when and if systemic vulnerabilities emerge from those changes. It is their responsibility to continuously assess if, for example, metadata retention would compromise their systems and then to inform us.

Ultimately, senator, it is the responsibility of Canadian business, and we are partners; there’s government, there are businesses and there are consumers. Our interest is to support businesses and also to support the safety and security of Canadians. Within this paradigm, we’ve been able to —

The Chair: Thank you, minister.

Senator Hay: Ministers, thanks for being here. The previous panel suggested they would lob the question back to me to lob it over to you, so you’re the lucky recipients.

I really appreciate the intent of the bill in putting 21st-century or even 22nd-century tools into the hands of our law enforcement and public safety. I do want to talk about technology, AI and the warp speed at which they are moving. A three-month cycle is probably slow for technology these days.

When I think of the bill, one could perhaps say it has been built in a different era, which could even be last year, for example. If so, it might not be designed for where we’re at right now, which is ever evolving. In particular, we see global risk and global cyber, whether through bad actors or foreign whatnot.

My question for you both is this: How do you see this bill being able to flex and evolve with the speed of technology and risk?

Mr. Fraser: I’m taken back to the day the bill was tabled. Commissioner Carrique, who was also with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, gave one of the most powerful statements in support of this bill’s direction that I can recall hearing. He discussed his frustration that it has taken this long to get here, the work having started in the 1990s, when I started Grade 7.

It is remarkable to think of how much time has passed and how much technology has advanced. If you imagine where we may be 30 years from now, we simply can’t afford not to have tools to examine the kinds of threats on which we are read in on, literally on a daily basis. Some flexibility needs to be baked into the legislation to allow us to future-proof it against advances in technology that are beyond our current ability to imagine. This includes some flexibility on who will be a service provider because the rate of technological change is so fast that we would be obsolete by the time we achieved Royal Assent.

The Criminal Code seeks to be neutral by design to allow for the application of rules and principles in which we believe to technologies and social phenomena that have not yet come to pass.

My view is that, in a number of ways, the bill seeks to achieve that ability to apply these rules to the technology that exists today that didn’t exist in the late 1990s and that have not yet come to exist but which we will certainly see over the next number of years.

Mr. Anandasangaree: I’ll add three points. First, we recognize this bill is decades late. It should have been available in the 1990s. I think there were seven attempts to bring the bill forward. At some point, it should have passed. For whatever reason, it did not, but we’re here.

The perspective we’ve heard from law enforcement is, “Better late than never,” but let’s also have the agility to evolve. While this will serve as the foundational piece, the built-in three-year review will allow us to have a deliberate review of this bill and to make changes so we’re not again starting from scratch.

The ability to address the evolution of technology and electronic service providers is deliberately in there with the ability for us to change and evolve with emerging technology. We don’t now have a world in which AI will be able to generate its own electronic service and sell it to Canadians or make it available to Canadians. However, perhaps that is something the regulation and definition could capture.

Similarly, as we look at the ministerial orders, again, it enables expansion. We envision core service providers to be the primary compilers with this. The ability for us to provide ministerial orders that can expand is something that, again, is built in because of the need for that agility.

It is there. It may be imperfect. Critically, it forces us to start somewhere with the ability to evolve over time.

The Chair: Before we ask our next questions, we have four senators left, and I will be razor-sharp with respect to the timing to honour all of you.

Senator Dhillon: I will ask my questions to my colleagues Deputy Commissioner Dandenault and Senior Deputy Director Lloyd.

For Canadians who are watching this today who want to understand what Bill C-22 brings to them when the bill is passed, with what we’re struggling with today in law enforcement when we deal with extortion, human trafficking, drugs, fraud, money laundering and all of those things, what are we challenged with today that Bill C-22 will fix for us when this comes into law?

Can you take one case and clarify? For an investigator receiving a complaint today where someone’s been defrauded and their life savings have been taken away, or they are being extorted, or you see something online and now they have to act on that, what would that look like?

Marie-Claude Dandenault, Deputy Commissioner, National Specialized Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: I will start with Part 1. For me, it is timely access. What I hear most from my teams, and I do have the National Child Exploitation Crime Centre under me, is what they find difficult is when they try to get that first “yes” or “no.” Do you provide this service?

I understand Canadians might not understand what that looks like in real time. However, when it takes them days and days, you’re adding these days up. If you imagine this might be a child victim, this is continuing to happen. That aspect is frustrating because of the safety of the victim. Sometimes, that is what stands out the most if you’re talking about a real case situation. You could talk about a child. There could be another victim of another crime, perhaps an elderly person. While we’re not tracking down this suspect doing the crime, they are continuing to act. For me, for Part 1, I can speak on that, for sure.

Vanessa Lloyd, Senior Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: I would echo timeliness. Being able to know what network a number or identifier is associated with in a timely manner enables us to consider the next step.

Regarding the subscriber information, ensure you are dealing with the right individual in terms of considering the next step. That might be an intervention with a young person who is being radicalized online. It may be going back to the Federal Court to seek, at a higher legal threshold, intrusive powers to be able to take a more intrusive investigative step.

The range of options available to us to mitigate threats — and to have consistency under Part 2 and know that when you go to ask for those powers necessary to protect Canadians, they are going to be there consistently — will be a game-changer for us to be able to work both domestically and across borders on national security investigations.

Senator Ross: My question is this: How would Bill C-22 affect the sharing of information with foreign entities? What safeguards are in place to ensure that information shared with foreign partners receives protections that are equivalent to those available under Canadian law and the Charter?

Mr. Fraser: There are a number of different ways. I am happy to start. Minister, if you want to supplement, feel free.

This is an issue that operates in two directions. Thankfully, Canada is very experienced in dealing with mutual legal assistance agreements where we share information and evidence to ground investigations and prosecutions, typically governed by treaties we sign with like-minded partners.

To make a long story short, when we receive a request from a foreign jurisdiction, we would insist that the protections we’re putting in place when Canadian law enforcement is doing an investigation would still be met before we share information with a foreign partner.

Similarly, there’s a related issue when Canada is seeking information that may be in the custody of another foreign nation. Something that the process contemplated by this bill provides for is some legitimacy to the request.

Though it may not be required by a supplier of information, it can smooth out the process if you can say, “We actually have a request that’s been authorized by Canadian law,” though they may not require it, in practice, it has the opportunity to smooth the waters and facilitate the timely sharing of that information to Canada, not just when Canada shares information with a third party.

Senator Ross: Do you have anything to add?

Mr. Anandasangaree: No. All I will say is there are 36 such agreements in place right now, and that could expand over time.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: My first question follows up on Senator Hay’s question. Parliament is currently being asked to pass Bill C-22. These powers will be used in an ever-changing environment. Is the government open to adding a parliamentary review clause in that regard? Yes or no?

[English]

Mr. Anandasangaree: I believe it is there, senator. I believe, typically, it has been five years. I think we deliberately had this reduced to three years.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: Do you not think that the five-year period is too long?

[English]

Mr. Anandasangaree: That’s right. That’s why we agreed to a three-year review period.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: My second question is for Minister Fraser and has to do with reconciling the objectives of Bill C-22 with the principles established by recent case law.

Have there been any court rulings that would limit the application of Bill C-22?

Mr. Fraser: Can I respond in English?

Senator Youance: Yes.

[English]

Mr. Fraser: There are a couple more recent Supreme Court decisions that have breathed life into the reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to the kind of information that has been the subject of a lot of public commentary on this particular bill. I’m thinking of the Spencer and Bykovets decisions in particular. They build on a long history of principles that can be applied in a modern context that deals with how section 8 of the Charter is interpreted in particular and a long history of practices by law enforcement to investigate crimes for the protection of the public.

I don’t know that there is a great reconciliation that needs to take place. We simply need to modernize the application of long-standing principles in a modern and digital context.

There’s still going to be a reasonable expectation of privacy that attracts Charter protection under this bill. We very specifically, in order to ensure we’re not brushing up against the boundaries of the Charter, have ring-fenced the kind of information that can be the subject of a request that does not require judicial authorization, in particular, knowing whether an account is attached to a particular network, for example.

Second, when we only want basic information that ties a person to the account, we’re asking those seeking the information to go before the court.

This is not a common feature of international counterparts who have adopted similar laws. When they are seeking subscriber information, they don’t always require judicial authorization.

We’re taking it a step further than many of our allies in order to protect privacy, which, in any event, would be protected by the Charter over and above the manner in which it has been ring-fenced for the purpose of this legislation.

Senator Dalphond: Welcome, ministers, to this committee.

When I read the briefs, I found there were concerns expressed about Part 1 over the breadth of the order called the production order. You can have a demand confirmation, which is addressed to a telecom service provider.

But those that express concern, and they are serious — the Privacy Commissioner, the Bar of Quebec and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association — have written that the definition doesn’t refer to an electronic service provider, but a judge may order “a person who provides services to the public” to prepare this information.

They say in the BC Civil Liberties Association:

Notably, this definition is not specific to electronic service providers, and could be applied to brick-and-mortar service providers like booksellers, daycares, and counselors. . . .

The Bar of Quebec referred to health service systems, including hospitals.

Could you reassure people who have expressed these serious concerns that these are beyond the scope of the bill? Are these things possible?

Mr. Fraser: Let me start by saying that one of the reasons that there is a broader range of service providers who could, in theory, be captured under the subscriber information piece is the fact that we require a court to approve, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, that the information that would be garnered would contribute to the investigation that’s being undertaken or the prosecution that would be warranted.

We want it to ensure that we don’t simply give access to anyone who asks. However, in addition to having to go through the process where you get information about whether the account is on the network without a warrant, the minute you have identifying information — and a limited amount of information, by the way — we would require a court to approve that.

As I mentioned in response to the last question, this is not a common feature in the international frameworks that have looked at this issue. That additional layer of protection of requiring a court to go to a judge to get basic information about a name and an address attached to the account is a unique Canadian contribution to this conversation on a global basis.

This is not about the information that may be shared, and, in any event, it would have to be approved as reasonable by the court.

In any event, my sense is that the privacy protections that will attach will have a heightened degree of scrutiny as a result of the judicial authorization being required, despite the fact that the definition of “service provider” is a little broader for the purpose of that section.

Mr. Anandasangaree: If I may just add, with respect to health and medical information, solicitor-client privilege and, of course, protection of journalists, those are already in case law. As well, Charter protections are embedded for them, and any breach of those will not be in any way part of authorized access through Bill C-22.

Senator Dalphond: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you all very much.

This brings us to a pre-timed end with our witnesses today.

Thank you, ministers, for taking the time to meet with us, as getting this right really matters. Its relevance today — and the effort of coming back at this over and over — is critical, so thank you, all, for being here.

For this panel, we have the pleasure of welcoming some folks who are returning witnesses, which is fantastic. From Justice Canada, we have Kimberly Gibner, Deputy Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Sector; and Anne-Marie Lebel, Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Policy Sector. From Public Safety Canada, we welcome Shannon Hiegel, Director General, National and Cyber Security Branch; and Richard Bilodeau, Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch. From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Ramzi Nashef, Director General, Policy, Planning, and Accountability. From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we welcome Rick Burchill, Assistant Commissioner; and Sergeant Aaron Gilkes, Acting Officer in-charge, RCMP Lawful Access.

Thank you all, including the support folks who are with you today, for being with us. It is really significant having you around the table together.

We’re going to fly right into questions. We will have our colleagues with us here until 7:00. As always, we will do our best to allow time for each member to ask their questions.

Senator Cardozo: I don’t know who can answer this, but one of the issues that’s come up a lot is breaking the end-to-end encryption. Some people refer to it as a back door. The argument that has been made is that if we allow ESPs to break the end-to-end encryption, we are making the system more vulnerable to the bad guys; whereas, right now, it isn’t broken and, therefore, there is no back door.

I would like you to comment on that, please.

Richard Bilodeau, Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch, Public Safety Canada: Thank you for that question.

First, one of the amendments that was introduced and passed by the House of Commons was an explicit protection of end-to-end encryption as something that cannot be allowed to be done under this legislation as it now stands. That is one clarification that was made; it sets that out explicitly.

Second, and the minister spoke about this, there is a provision that prevents core providers or electronic service providers that are subject to a ministerial order from instituting, making any or following any order that would put a systemic vulnerability into their system. That could include end-to-end encryption, for example. It could include other changes, but that definition was also clarified to say that a systemic vulnerability is something that is a credible risk as defined against international standards.

Those two specific provisions were put in place in the legislation to address things like end-to-end encryption and ensure that any changes protect systems.

Senator Cardozo: Sergeant Gilkes, I think your role is in regard to lawful access. Can you tell us more about how you deal with that issue now and what you see the bill doing in terms of making things different?

Sergeant Aaron Gilkes, Acting Officer in-charge, RCMP Lawful Access, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Thank you very much for your question, senator.

For the bill itself, in terms of encryption, it doesn’t speak to encryption or decryption. That was actually written in as a clause to purposefully exclude end-to-end encryption.

We currently deal with the same challenges that most law enforcement deals with in terms of encryption. An example would be a banking application. We are all using our banking applications online. We are comfortable that the information is encrypted between us and our bank. However, in the event that police would write, for example, a production order to a bank or financial institution for information in relation to a particular client, they expect to receive that information in an unencrypted format.

There is already an encrypted network that also provides lawful access, with judicial authorization, to police.

Senator Cardozo: So, currently, you do have lawful access to some extent.

Sgt. Gilkes: To some parts of the network, depending on whether the encryption has been provided by the company itself. I’m thinking, for example, of a financial institution, but there are others that can provide that service, depending on how it is currently moving across the network and how that information is stored.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you.

Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses, for being here. I have two questions.

Again, I come back to VPNs. Could you clarify whether a VPN provider that does not currently collect or retain user identification could be required under this legislation to develop the capacity to collect and retain that information? If so, how would that be reconciled with the protections against introducing systemic vulnerabilities — just in that event.

Mr. Bilodeau: Thank you very much for that question.

I think the minister clarified in his remarks to your question, senator, that core providers — the intent is to cover telecommunications, internet service providers and satellite service providers. Others could be the subject of a ministerial order — other electronic service providers — but whether it’s through a core provider regulation or through a ministerial order, the legislation, as currently drafted, does not allow for the creation of a systemic vulnerability by applying the different provisions of the legislation.

In certain contexts, it’s very fact-specific. Whether it’s a VPN or anybody else, if we were contemplating a ministerial order, one of the things the legislation requires us to do is to work with the electronic service provider to understand what the issues are around what we are asking them to do and the feasibility of it, the privacy implications, the cybersecurity implications and cost implications. Justice Noël spoke about that in the first hour. All of those things would need to be taken into account in the making of a ministerial order — and that is in any case, whether it’s a VPN or anybody else, for that matter.

Senator Yussuff: This bill has been working its way through Parliament, and we have a short attention span in this country. When something is in front of us, we tend to focus on it, and when it’s not there, we kind of do not.

So, given the vulnerabilities that Canadians have been facing for decades because we haven’t had this legislation in place, maybe the RCMP can speak to how this legislation will enhance the responsibility of front-line law enforcement agencies in carrying out their full responsibilities in investigating crimes when they occur, in ways that will bring remedy for those who have been harmed by malicious actors.

Rick Burchill, Assistant Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Thank you for the question, senator.

There are two important streams where this assists law enforcement in Canada. We have talked about them.

One is timely access to information at the very beginning of an investigation. That enhances what we do quite a bit because of the delays associated with some of the barriers that we have now to getting at the front end of an investigation when we know there’s been a criminal offence committed and there are victims but we’re having trouble getting access to the subscriber information or even the provider of the person who has done the crime. Timely access to that information at the front end will enhance law enforcement significantly.

Then, there is the consistent access to that information.

There are currently service providers in Canada that have the data available when we provide a judicial authorization — they are able to provide it — but that’s not all of them. For service providers and law enforcement to have a consistent understanding of what we’re capable of getting during a criminal investigation is good for everybody.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: Thank you for being here today.

According to the government, how many providers will be considered core providers when the regime is fully implemented?

Mr. Bilodeau: Thank you for the question, senator.

That will depend on who is designated as a core provider. I would not want to say who will be included in that because a regulatory process will follow, but we can look at who is currently providing telecommunications services in Canada: Bell, Telus, Rogers and Vidéotron. I’m sure everyone knows the others. When we look at the list of the top 10, we see a group that covers almost everyone. The same goes for Internet providers, who are often the same players, and satellite service providers. There are not that many companies that provide these services in Canada. The goal is not necessarily to look at the number of telecommunications companies but at the coverage they provide.

Senator Martel: Have you conducted a specific analysis on the financial and technical impacts this would have on small and medium-sized providers?

Mr. Bilodeau: That is one of the factors that the minister or the Governor-in-Council has to consider, the financial implications of making these changes. As the assistant commissioner mentioned, various telecommunications service providers already have the capacity to provide the information required, while others do not. That will vary from one provider to another. Discussions will be held with the providers that could be designated as core providers. We expect to discuss that aspect with them before we draft the regulations.

Senator Martel: What empirical analysis led the government to set a retention period of up to six months for certain categories of metadata? Do you have any specific data on the proportion of police requests that involve data dating back at least 30 days, 90 days, six months or longer?

Mr. Bilodeau: I will ask my RCMP colleagues. Their input was used to determine the retention period. As the minister mentioned, it was reduced from one year to six months.

Sgt. Gilkes: Thank you for you question.

It is important to keep in mind that an investigation usually takes several months. We do not usually get all of the information that we need at the beginning of the investigation. We get a lead at the beginning of the investigation and then we have to get legal warrants to get other information, which means that some time may pass before we can get answers from service providers. Then, we need to gather even more information. We need to do more than just identify the IP address. We have to link the device to that IP address and link a user to the device. There are several steps to follow before we can file charges in a criminal investigation.

Senator Martel: Is there no specific time frame? Does it take a fairly long time? Can it take more than a year?

Sgt. Gilkes: Yes, absolutely, depending on the type of investigation. For example, if we are talking about child sexual exploitation, a number of children may have been targeted by the same individual. If all we have is three months’ worth of evidence, then we will not be able to identify other potential victims.

Senator Martel: Thank you.

[English]

Senator Pate: My question is probably for you, Ms. Gibner. If not, you can pass it to somebody else.

Extensive evidence, including the work of the MMIWG national inquiry, highlights systemic misogynistic abuse of police powers and even judicial powers to stalk, harass and endanger women, in particular Indigenous women.

I’m curious as to two pieces: First, what measures do you see existing in Bill C-22 to prevent these abuses of power via the new tools that the bill creates? Second, how has the government assessed the risks that additional metadata retention requirement in this bill could create for women whose safety depends on keeping their location and support networks confidential? Who is liable under this bill for harm that it may cause as a result of such breaches?

Ms. Gibner: Thank you very much for the question, Senator Pate. Apologies to the committee who didn’t receive the GBA Plus. I understand that it’s on its way to you. There was an issue with translation, so you should have it shortly.

The GBA Plus points out the complexity that the Senate is dealing with because, of course, as you quite rightly pointed out, some work is still needed by the criminal justice system as it relates to the issues that you highlighted.

At the same time, the bill really is meant to address assisting law enforcement with detecting those sorts of crimes. You heard our colleagues here talk about some of the child protection issues. Women have the highest numbers with respect to sexual exploitation online.

It really is for this committee to be looking at the GBA Plus that sets out those considerations for you.

Senator Pate: Are you saying the answers to the questions I’ve just asked about who would be responsible and liable for harm would be in that analysis?

Also, does it address things like the most recent breaches of data, of which we have recently become aware, in Crime Stoppers and in the Alberta voting registry, and the manner in which those breaches put particularly vulnerable women at risk? Are those things addressed in the GBA Plus?

Ms. Gibner: No. The recent incidents that you have talked about are not in the GBA Plus. This is just as it relates to the bill.

Senator Pate: Who is liable for harm caused and how that will be addressed? Is that in the GBA Plus?

Ms. Gibner: No, the GBA Plus is just about the bill and the impact on the different issues that you’ve talked about. It’s just an analysis of that.

Senator Pate: Okay. I ask for this next response in writing. Many concerns were raised about the Charter Statement from legal commentators. It is essentially expanding search and seizure provisions and implicating section 8 of the Charter.

How do you see that being addressed beyond what’s in the Charter Statement? I’m out of time, so if you could provide that in writing, that would be great. Thank you.

Senator McNair: Some of you were in the room for the first panel. You heard both the Privacy Commissioner and the Intelligence Commissioner indicating that they would recommend and support amendments to the bill to add the concepts of necessity and proportionality.

My question is first to Ms. Gibner and then to Mr. Bilodeau: Would your respective departments have any objection to that? If so, why?

Ms. Gibner: Thank you very much for the question, senator. I haven’t turned my mind to those issues, so I’ll pass it over to my colleague, who may have.

Mr. Bilodeau: Thank you, senator, for that question.

As either the Privacy Commissioner or the Intelligence Commissioner noted, we have added an element of “essential” in the retention of metadata. It links back to that.

On proportionality, I would point out that both section 5 and section 7 have a list of factors, whereas we don’t use the word “proportionality” in the list. Those factors are all ones that the minister shall or must consider in deciding whether or not to issue a ministerial order or that the Governor-in-Council needs to look at in terms of regulations.

We expect that, in that calculus, all those factors will be considered and weighed in making that decision. Obviously, we will take note of the comments from the first hour, analyze them and work internally on that.

Ultimately, it will be up to the committee here and the Senate to decide on that, but we are happy to take a look at that and provide further advice when we have an opportunity to return.

Senator McNair: I realize those factors are there in the legislation, and two commissioners were aware of those. They still felt it was appropriate to ask for the amendment, so I ask you to raise it with your minister.

Mr. Bilodeau: Absolutely.

Senator McNair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: I would like to come back to the rapid pace of technological change. What aspects of Bill C-22 are most likely to become obsolete in the short term, given how quickly technology is changing?

Mr. Bilodeau: Thank you for the question.

When drafting Bill C-22, we were fully aware that technology is changing quickly, as we have seen in the past 20 years. The bill, particularly Part 2, is therefore drafted as a legal framework that will be made more specific through regulations and ministerial orders. That will enable us to use the regulations to define certain things, such as electronic service providers. A service may not exist today but could suddenly emerge in two years. If that service were to become people’s primary means of communication, then the law would enable us to define it as an electronic service provider.

Senator Youance: In that case, are there any specific safeguards for drafting these regulations?

Mr. Bilodeau: For example, if a new electronic service were to emerge and the government wanted to designate it as a core service provider, that would be done by regulation. We would follow the standard regulatory process, including consultations.

Senator Youance: I have a quick question about systemic vulnerabilities. Are there any mechanisms that enable us to quickly identify whether the implementation of Bill C-22 creates any systemic vulnerabilities? If we find any, what can be done about them?

Mr. Bilodeau: Thank you again for the question.

I would say that the regulations will be developed through consultation. The best people to tell us whether there are systemic vulnerabilities are the providers themselves because they have an in-depth knowledge of their system. They can tell us whether what we are asking them to do will work or not and whether it will create a vulnerability.

Obviously, on our side, we have experts within the government who helped us with Bill C-22 and who understand these challenges. We can continue to call on them to assist us in developing the regulations and in working with the service providers.

Senator Youance: I would imagine that the implementation of Bill C-22 will involve a lot of information. Do you intend to use AI at the departmental level to analyze that data? Again, what would the safeguards be?

Mr. Bilodeau: It is important to point out that the government will not hold any of that information. The information that could be retained by service providers, the metadata, will not be held by the government. We are not interested in having it. This is people’s personal information we are talking about. The only situation where a government entity could access that information would require a search warrant issued by a court and executed by the police. In such cases, there are some safeguards to protect that information.

Senator Youance: Thank you very much.

[English]

Senator Dalphond: I have two questions.

[Translation]

The first is for Mr. Bilodeau and the second is for Ms. Gibner.

Mr. Bilodeau, you may have heard previous witnesses asking to add the principle of proportionality when it comes to ministerial orders. Would you have a problem with adding that principle and making it more explicit than implicit?

Mr. Bilodeau: If we look at the existing criteria, this principle certainly is implicit. As Mr. Noël mentioned, that is what he would do with the information. We expect, at least implicitly, that this analysis will be conducted. As for whether that principle can be added to the legislation and my minister’s position on that, those are discussions that we can have with him. As the process continues, we will have the opportunity to revisit that, or at least I hope we will, and we can discuss it then.

Senator Dalphond: Thank you.

[English]

Ms. Gibner, could an order for subscriber information be addressed to a daycare or health authority? The minister said information held by health providers or medical information is protected, and the same is true for informants and lawyers. My question is more about the scope of what is intended here. Would it be possible to use that provision to ask a nurse or kindergarten provider that communicates with parents through a web service to be a service provider as contemplated here?

Ms. Gibner: If it is all right with you, I’ll pass that question to Ms. Lebel.

[Translation]

Ms Anne-Marie Lebel, Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice Canada: Thank you very much for the question.

Your question could pertain to Part 1 or Part 2 of the bill.

Senator Dalphond: Part 1.

Ms. Lebel: In the case of Part 1, a production order for the subscriber information could be made to any service provider, to anyone who provides services to the public. That could be a daycare in some cases, but the conditions for obtaining such orders are related to an investigation. The judge must be convinced that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed and that asking for the information of the subscriber or client would help the investigation. The criteria are there. A daycare cannot just be asked any question for any reason. The provision sets out the conditions for obtaining the order.

It is also important to note that the new production order for subscriber information is actually more limited in scope than the other orders under the Criminal Code. The other production orders under the Criminal Code can be made and presented to any person who is in possession or control of information related to the investigation. The scope is already more limited than that of the other orders. Does that answer your question?

Senator Dalphond: Would the other orders be made with reasonable grounds to believe?

Ms. Lebel: Not necessarily. There are currently several examples of production orders in the Criminal Code that are obtained on the basis of reasonable grounds to suspect, for example, location data and data concerning the transmission of financial information.

Senator Dalphond: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: That completes the first round of our third session this evening.

I’ll take the chair’s prerogative to ask this question at this time. It is general to all of you. In listening to the past three hours, I’ve noticed some of the lanes of expertise at the table are complementary and overlapping and some are unique, whether they are in the field, in policy or in criminal law. I would like to give you the opportunity to add to your testimony if you have not shared something that will make this story complete for us as senators, since we may not get to see you again in the next little while. Is there anything missing from your testimony, from your perspective, that you want to make sure you emphasize for us this evening that you might not have had a chance to? I invite you to consider doing that now.

Ramzi Nashef, Director General, Policy, Planning, and Accountability, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: We talked about some of the RCMP and law enforcement examples, but maybe I can give you an intelligence perspective. From CSIS’s perspective, the emphasis is on Part 2. At the end of the day, we feel, if passed as written now, Part 2 will take us out of the space we are in.

To get back to Senator Cardozo’s question about whether we have some lawful access in Canada, the short answer is yes. However, it’s incredibly ad hoc. From an operational planning perspective, what we get, even when we have a Federal Court warrant, is incredibly heavy, unstable and unpredictable in different parts of this country and with different service providers regionally.

What we would get with Part 2 is a strong starting point for us to know what to expect operationally. That means less front-end planning of operations among intelligence professionals. It means less operational uncertainty. It means fewer inconsistent and unpredictable investigative outcomes. At the end of the day, the investigative outcome component, for us, is the difference between a successful and a dropped investigation regarding the most harmful threats in the national security space. Essentially, we’re talking about foreign interference, espionage and terrorism, primarily.

Really, that’s the starting point that all like-minded partners — well beyond the G7 and the Five Eyes and into medium and small European countries, for example — have had, in many cases, for more than a decade, which we’ve really struggled to cobble together in different ways to sort of get the job done. The amount of effort and the amount of uncertainty that’s created operationally have been significant. Maybe I will leave it there.

The Chair: Thank you. You jumped in there, and I really appreciate it. My follow-up with that, with you, is this: In Canada, I would say that Canadians are expressing their discomfort, regarding business and otherwise, in section 2. I’m just going to talk about section 2. As a closing question for you, how do we calm, respectfully, folks who really feel that section 2 will paralyze their world?

Mr. Nashef: It is a great question. I think we have some really good case studies to look at in terms of the like-mindeds, as I said. When we’re sort of last in line, we have a lot of examples to look at regarding what was mythology and what actually came to pass.

In combination with the House Committee on Public Safety and National Security study that went in-depth and where officials on this side appeared, through clause by clause, for upwards of 20 or 25 hours — and they answered a huge depth of questions — I think, ultimately, where we have a bit of a challenge is there are strong views on both sides of this bill, as you all know even better than we do. Ultimately, the proof will be in the pudding in a lot of cases.

Some of the maximalist interpretations of this bill in terms of saying that it will be the end of x, y and z, or that it will create a surveillance state in ways that go well beyond — I think we’ve seen a lot of examples where that came to pass, and it has been a bit of a fizzle, to be frank. Looking at those examples, what it should counsel for us is, certainly, deep study and appreciation for the scale of what we’re talking about and for the privacy rights at stake, but also to look at what might have been hyperbole that really didn’t get realized in a lot of key partner countries — not that that’s the end of the conversation, though.

The Chair: Thank you so much. I’m glad I asked. Is there anyone else? Yes, sir.

Mr. Burchill: Thank you, chair. I just want to underscore some things in our parliamentary appearances here that don’t always get focused on. When we give operational examples, a lot of times, we provide examples that are dealing with one issue. Something I wanted to highlight that supports the timeliness and the consistency of access is the complexity of the file.

So, to my colleague’s example earlier, it is not just one IP address or number you’re generally looking for. When we’re dealing with major transnational organized crime files, extortion files and national security files, there are multiple targets in these files. So you multiply all the things we’re talking about and the timeliness that we need access by many. I don’t think the volume and complexity of investigations always get captured in committee with folks.

Then there is the volume of files. I’ll use the example of our National Child Exploitation Centre. As of today, because I asked them what the intake unit is at, they are 24,700 files behind. A lot of that is just trying to get through that volume and get timely investigative evidentiary packages out to police in the jurisdiction. I don’t think those things always get captured by the operational examples we use, and I wanted to highlight those in relation to the two parts of the bill.

The Chair: That is so important. Thank you. That’s why I asked. That’s great. I think we’re good across the rest of the table, except for Mr. Bilodeau.

Mr. Bilodeau: I may pick up on something he said. You asked about Canadians. I think the minister highlighted where our efforts are going to be concentrated regarding core providers, and that is on the three categories we mentioned earlier. The rules around that are about facilitating access. They are about making sure that when police or CSIS go in, the providers can provide the information. With the metadata, there is a lot of information that’s stored already by a lot of companies. They all take cybersecurity very seriously already, regardless of this legislation.

The safeguards that have been put in place are really meant to balance privacy and security. It is important to highlight that, because it is not about creating direct access or things like that. It is about creating the conditions so that when these folks have a need for the information, they can really quickly dial into that and get the information consistently. That’s something where we need to take a step back sometimes and look practically at what this is going to mean. To your point, Senator Youance, it is about making sure that we have the right framework so we can pivot in the future as well.

The Chair: Thank you very much for that.

We have some more questions, which is great. We have four senators, Senators Cardozo, Ross, Martel and Dalphond, who have joined us for the final round. I will ask Senator Cardozo and Senator Ross to give us your questions. Then we can get those answers. If you could, please ask those first, back to back.

Senator Cardozo: I want to pursue the last question that Madam Chair asked a little more. When requiring lawful access to information, what is the role of the RCMP versus CSIS? Are you often on the same files?

The other question I have for Mr. Bilodeau is this: You talked about this being technology neutral in terms of what you’re looking at. Are you thinking about AI down the road — and it may not be very far down the road — where it may be a bad actor on its own and not driven by anyone?

Senator Ross: I understand that some Taiwanese cyber experts and some emerging technology researchers have been invited as witnesses as part of this study. Taiwan faces 2.6 sophisticated cyberattacks every day and deals with extreme risks related to encryption issues. I’m wondering if the government has looked at their approach to governance, resilience and cybersecurity to incorporate into this framework. If not, what other international models have we looked at for guidance?

Mr. Bilodeau: Maybe I can start with your question first. The answer on lawful access and, specifically, the Taiwanese, is no. However, just generally, on cyber resilience, Parliament, as you know, passed Bill C-8 this summer, and it received Royal Assent. This is the legislation about protecting cyber systems and critical infrastructure. I think that’s a very important piece of legislation that will increase the protection of critical infrastructure in this country from cybersecurity threats. We know, especially in the age of AI, that the threat is increasing. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or CCCS, has spoken about it, so it is a constant battle. There are billions of attacks on systems happening all the time. There is a separate piece of legislation, and that’s what we are focused on implementing now.

It is not just us. It is the private sector, and it is provincial, territorial and municipal governments. Everybody takes this seriously. We try to partner and help as much as we can on that. Again, this legislation is going to live alongside that. The systemic vulnerability provision is designed to make sure we’re not weakening the system while we implement this legislation.

On AI, yes, it is something that we are focused on every day. It is hard not to when it is constantly in the media and we see example after example. Right now, in terms of whether AI would be subject to a ministerial order or a core provider, I think time will tell how services that use AI evolve. However, right now, the focus is trying to establish that baseline and raise everybody’s “floor” — as I think Ramzi said at some point at the House Committee on Public Safety and National Security — to a level where when these folks go to them and need information, they can respond to them. I will go to the RCMP for the first question.

Mr. Burchill: My colleague at CSIS can jump in to supplement. We have different mandates, but our mandates cross when we have a national security investigation. However, we’re doing them for very different reasons. In a criminal investigation, of course, everything we do is done through the courts, is disclosable and goes through the court process. CSIS does it in a separate sort of process that’s in secret because of the nature of what they do. So we’re using the same legislation but for different Band-Aids, if that helps.

By the very nature of what we do, our Band-Aids cross in a national security investigation, but for different reasons. And there are ways to hand off to one another when it is not a law enforcement mandate part of the investigation or vice versa; if it is not a security intelligence mandate, they hand it off. There are mechanisms for that. However, as far as this legislation goes, we would use them in parallel and for different mandates.

[Translation]

Senator Martel: I would like to come back to the service providers. Bill C-22 provides that the minister can grant financial compensation to service providers to meet certain technical obligations. What criteria will be used to determine whether a provider receives such compensation?

Senator Dalphond: Part 2 comes into force by order of the Governor-in-Council and Part 1 comes into force six months after royal assent. Since this is a major undertaking, the framework is there, but everything else will be done later through government regulations. What deadline do you have in mind? You will have to consult, publish, review and republish. I read that some critics are saying that Part 2 will not take effect for two or three years. Is that possible?

Mr. Bilodeau: Thank you.

I will start with Senator Martel’s question about service providers. One thing we need to consider when implementing the bill is how compensation will be handled, for both core providers and for orders. We will have to look at what is appropriate. It is difficult to say what the criteria will be. In cases where the capability does not currently exist, it could be more expensive. We will have to assess the situation as we go and as we work with the service providers to understand their needs.

With regard to the coming into force, our timeline is much shorter than two years. We understand that law enforcement has been waiting for these tools for nearly 35 or 40 years. We are already thinking about developing and implementing these regulations in well under two years.

Senator Dalphond: Will it be before the parliamentary review in three years?

Mr. Bilodeau: Absolutely.

Senator Dalphond: Thank you.

[English]

Senator Pate: Many cybersecurity experts, as well as stakeholders such as telecommunications and internet service providers, have argued that any introduction of mandatory data access capabilities will create systemic vulnerabilities that will inevitably be targeted and breached by bad actors.

I’m curious as to the provision that’s put in place by the act. It establishes that any service provider who does not comply with a regulation or order can be subject to significant fines for every day of non-compliance. So, I’m curious how a service provider could push back against a measure they determine would create systemic vulnerability while under such a threat.

Also, the scope of “electronic service and electronic service provider” seems extraordinarily wide, and I’m curious as to why it needs to be that wide. How would there be some protection in terms of the scope for booking services, retail platforms, banks and so on? I’m not sure who could best answer.

Mr. Bilodeau: On your first question, we want to work with service providers to understand, and they know their systems best. When we put forward regulations, we’ll consult and work with them to understand their systems. It is the same thing with ministerial orders; we have to work with the electronic service providers to understand what those concerns are. The goal is not to issue administrative monetary penalties against them for non‑compliance. Our goal is to get to a point where they can put in place capabilities that allow law enforcement and CSIS to get access when they have judicially authorized warrants to do so. Compliance regimes are common for these kinds of frameworks. It is kind of the backbone. It is the thing you want there backstopping things, to make sure there’s compliance, but that you don’t want to use. You want to make sure you’re doing it collaboratively.

At the end of the day, if they can meet the needs of the legislation and law enforcement in a way that’s secure, respects the legislation on systemic vulnerability and gives law enforcement access when they need it, that’s the goal we’re looking to achieve.

I’m sorry, senator. What was the second part of the question regarding?

Senator Pate: The scope of the definition of “electronic service and electronic service provider” seems extraordinarily wide.

Mr. Bilodeau: I will ask Ms. Hiegel to answer.

Shannon Hiegel, Director General, National and Cyber Security Branch, Public Safety Canada: Thanks very much for the question. It is one that we get quite frequently when people are trying to understand why we’re as broad as we are. It is probably where we’re leaning the most forward when we look at the comparisons across all the countries we’ve taken a look at. However, the fact of the matter is that our definition would at least include things like gaming platforms, where communication isn’t the primary purpose of that service but there is a predominant chat room and chat function. I suppose I shouldn’t name names, but there are certain gaming platforms where we know there is child grooming and there are human trafficking discussions. So if we don’t allow for the flexibility — I think there have been other senators asking questions about how we ensure that we are technology-focused and forward-leaning in this space. That’s where we have made a choice to at least present a definition that is quite broad.

Senator Pate: I know it is going to be a three-year review. In your experience, in the areas where legislation has been passed in the past — just pulling a number out of the air — 10 years, how often have those legislative reviews happened?

Mr. Bilodeau: I know they happen. I wouldn’t have a number. I know that with the Bank Act, for example, they happen every five years, but I wouldn’t be able to give you a number.

Ms. Hiegel: For the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, or PCMLTFA, it is every five years, and Finance is diligent in doing it every five years.

Senator Pate: How about criminal law changes?

Ms. Hiegel: I would pass it over to my Justice colleagues for that question.

Ms. Gibner: We’d have to get back to you, Senator Pate. There is no specific review mechanism in the Criminal Code.

Senator Pate: No, but there are many pieces of legislation that have been passed over the past 10 years that required a 3‑year or 5-year review that have not occurred. I’d be very interested in a catalogue of those. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you to our panel. You do incredible work, and we really appreciate your time, frankly, in building on a three-hour opportunity for us this evening. I know some of you performed twice, so well done on that. We really appreciate it.

This brings us to the end of our time with witnesses. We are going to carry on. We want to thank you for taking the time with us today.

We are going to proceed with our clause-by-clause consideration of Bill S-223, An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.

I would also like to acknowledge and welcome Senator McCallum, who is joining us today. Thank you very much for that.

Before I begin, there are quite a few words, for sure. I would like to remind senators of a number of points as we proceed to clause-by-clause consideration.

If, at any point, a senator is not clear where we are in the process, please ask for clarification. I would like to ensure that, at all times, we have the same understanding of where we are. In terms of the mechanics of the process, when more than one amendment is proposed to be moved in a clause, amendments should be proposed in the order of the lines of the clause. If a senator is opposed to an entire clause, the proper process is not to move a motion to delete the entire clause, but rather to vote against the clause as standing as part of the bill.

Some amendments that are moved may have consequential effects on the other parts of the bill. It is, therefore, useful to this process if a senator moving an amendment identifies to the committee other clauses in this bill where their amendment may have an impact. Otherwise, it would be very difficult for members of the committee to remain consistent in their decision making.

Because no notice is required to move amendments, there can, of course, have been no preliminary analysis of the amendments to establish which ones may be of consequence to others and which might be a little contradictory.

If committee members ever have any questions about the process or the proprietary of anything occurring, they can certainly raise a point of order. As chair, I will listen to arguments, decide when there has been sufficient discussion of a matter or order and make a ruling.

The committee is the ultimate master of its business within the bounds established by the Senate, and a ruling can be appealed to the full committee by asking whether the ruling shall be sustained.

I wish to remind honourable senators that if there’s ever any uncertainty as to the result of a voice vote or a show of hands, the most effective route is to request a roll call vote, which, obviously, provides unambiguous results.

Finally, senators are aware that any tied vote negates the motion in question.

Is it agreed that the committee proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill S-223, An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall the title stand postponed?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall clause 1 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall clause 2 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall the title carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Thank you.

Shall the bill carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Thank you.

Does the committee wish to consider appending observations to the report?

Senator Hay: Yes.

The Chair: Does the committee choose to stay in public for this part of the conversation? We will carry on in public. Thank you.

I have a name for one observation. Are there any other observations in the room?

Thank you.

I would welcome Senator Hay to speak to the observation.

Senator Hay: Before I begin, I want to thank Senator McCallum, the bill’s sponsor, for her leadership on this legislation and the First Nations leaders who co-developed it with you. Thank you so much for that.

These observations that I’m putting forward are intended to strengthen the bill and ensure that its provisions are as effective as possible. I support Bill S-223.

Colleagues, I’m proposing that the committee append three observations to its report. They would follow a standard opening paragraph:

Your committee held one meeting on 5 October 2026 and heard from 10 witnesses on the subject matter of Bill S-223, An Act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act. The committee also received one written brief.

No witness opposed the objective of this bill, but we heard again and again that confirming the RCMP’s duty is only the first step. These observations speak to what must come next.

I’ll start with the most practical question we have heard in plain terms: Who pays for this? The committee:

. . . notes that Bill S-223 would confirm the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP’s) duty to enforce First Nation laws but is silent on any potential additional funding requirements to meet the objectives of Bill S-223. The committee heard that the RCMP already faces significant resource pressures and that, without adequate policing and enforcement resources, First Nation communities could continue to experience challenges in the enforcement of their laws. The committee therefore strongly encourages the Government of Canada to assess the potential additional resources required so that the RCMP can enforce First Nation laws effectively.

Furthermore, Chief Louie of the First Nations Lands Advisory Board told us plainly that the RCMP faces significant resource pressures and called for dedicated funding for policing, prosecutions and First Nations enforcement personnel. Chief Blake urged us to make sure this bill is adequately resourced.

When I asked the RCMP whether new funding would be needed, Assistant Commissioner Ebert told us:

I’m not sure, in relation to funding specific to this bill, how much may or may not be required . . . .

A duty without the resources to carry it out is just a promise on paper. This observation asks the government to find out what it will actually take. Funding is one piece, but even a well-funded police service needs to know the laws it’s enforcing and to work with other services around it.

That brings me to the third paragraph, on coordination and training:

In the committee’s view, consideration should be given to promoting coordination among police services across Canada, including in provinces with their own police services, such as in Ontario, where the Ontario Provincial Police has jurisdiction. As well, the committee believes that such coordination could help facilitate adequate professional development and training in support of a consistent implementation of Bill S-223 across jurisdictions.

We heard that enforcement is inconsistent across the country. Assistant Commissioner Ebert told us a band in Kamloops and a band in Conne River should be treated equally.

Mr. Anderson of Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak Inc., or MKO, told us, “After 30 years of non-enforcement, there is very little muscle memory on working with First Nations laws.” He described sitting down with the RCMP in Manitoba to look up bylaws online. The browser the RCMP was using was so out of date, it couldn’t open the First Nations Gazette.

This bill only reaches the RCMP. In Ontario, where the OPP has jurisdiction, First Nations won’t see a direct benefit. This observation asks police services to work together, including on training, so that a First Nations law means the same thing no matter who polices the community.

The final paragraph in the observation picks up what may have been the clearest message we heard from every panel, which is that enforcement and prosecution go hand in hand:

The committee further recognizes that effective enforcement of laws requires a clear path to prosecution so that the laws can be enforced, and violations of them can be prosecuted and adjudicated. Therefore, in the committee’s view, without the prosecution pathway that is being proposed in Bill S-224, An Act to amend the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, the implementation of Bill S-223 may be limited.

Grand Chief Settee summed it up, saying, “. . . the basic enforcement formula is ‘no enforcement without prosecution.’” The RCMP told us the same thing.

To close, I want to come back to why this matters to the communities we heard from.

Grand Chief Settee told us that during the pandemic, when First Nation leaders asked the RCMP for help enforcing their laws, “ . . . they felt totally abandoned . . .”

Chief Louie asked us a simple question, “. . . how can you be a recognized government without having your laws enforced? . . .”

I fully support this bill as a strong first step toward an answer. These observations help make sure it works on the ground as well. I hope you’ll join me in supporting it. Thank you.

That was a lot.

The Chair: Thank you, Senator Hay. Yes, it was. Good substance.

Before we go too much further, a couple of things: There was an opening statement, the committee notes, the committee’s view and then what the committee further recognizes.

We would take a look at, as far as an observation, each of those as a package of one, just to clarify with you.

Are there any comments, questions or clarifications we are seeking from Senator Hay?

Senator McCallum: I want to go back to the observation, the paragraph with “. . . that Bill S-223 would confirm the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s(RCMP’s) duty to enforce . . . .” It’s silent.

The intent and scope of this bill regard amending the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act. Yes, the funding did come through, but in my speech, I said that needs to be addressed differently.

Senator Hay: Yes.

Senator McCallum: When you look at all the reports done by different groups, since 2010, there have been 10 reports up to 2024, all to do with a lack of funding. There are decades of recommendations and limited government action.

This is beyond the scope of my bill, but it is within your scope, as the committee, to look at these reports and to recommend what happens. I have looked at some of them.

The Office of the Auditor General also commented on the lack of funding. It’s beyond the scope of this bill, and it has been acknowledged by the government.

Senator Hay: Thank you for the clarification and also for the enormous amount of work.

My intent here regards that someone else coming into this — the government, the department — may not have the benefit of all your knowledge and research.

I wanted to attach an observation, not an amendment. I don’t want to change the scope of your bill. I just want to make sure it is the obligation of the government to ensure there’s funding for Bill S-223, as you point out in your research.

I am completely fine with how you want to approach it as the sponsor of this bill. If you find the observation will complicate this as it moves forward, I’m completely happy to withdraw it.

I wanted to shore up your bill and say to the Government of Canada that they are required to fund this and can’t carve it out of another budget where there are limited resources as well. The RCMP doesn’t have reserves of funding to earmark toward that. That was my intent, but I appreciate where you’re sitting right now, senator.

Senator McCallum: Because of the bill and the scope, that it be one observation, the other one could be that the government needs to act on all the reports and look at how they are funding the RCMP and First Nations and Inuit policing programs.

When I met with police units across Canada, all of them said they were underfunded, including provincial policing. However, it’s beyond the scope of this bill.

When you’ve had the Senate, the House of Commons, the Auditor General, the Management Advisory Board and the whole report — a special report on RCMP — and they haven’t been able to do anything, attaching this observation will not accomplish what you would like.

I recommend that the committee investigate these reports and deal with that policing program.

Senator Hay: I completely appreciate that. I don’t recall those reports being part of the committee dialogue.

Senator McCallum: No.

Senator Hay: I would withdraw my observation, and then a new observation would have to be put forward. I don’t think we should delay.

I do not want the government, with all respect, to not have to consider appropriate funding for Bill S-223, as well as to the RCMP. What we know could happen is the funding side may be ignored, regardless.

If you feel this will complicate your bill as an observation, I support your bill. I support the work that’s been done on it.

I’m a former banker, so I’m always worried about money.

Senator McCallum: I would like to hear what other senators think.

Senator Yussuff: I applaud Senator McCallum for bringing the bill forward, but I’ve been very clear that this bill will not accomplish what it set out to.

Resources are a part of the problem, but enforcing First Nation or Indigenous laws from their jurisdiction inherently has some contradictions with the Charter. This is where the RCMP has some challenges in their dilemma and responsibilities. How do they enforce laws that are not necessarily from their thinking? It is their training and responsibility.

The bigger challenge will be when the bill goes to the other place, where I think it will receive far more scrutiny than on this side of Parliament. It will go through a different level of rigour. That’s for the other place to determine.

I think Senator Hay’s observation was trying to highlight what we have heard as a way to provide some appreciation for the other place. However, what those paragraphs highlight will turn this bill into something requiring a Royal Recommendation because you are asking the government to spend money on a private member’s bill that is problematic in a general context for a private member’s bill.

I understand what the bill is attempting to do. I don’t think it will accomplish that from what I heard from the RCMP and given the history of the country. With that aside, if it passes through the chamber, it will go to the other place. We will let them figure out what they want to do with the bill because that’s their jurisdiction and responsibility.

I see this in a problematic way. I say that candidly because I don’t think it will accomplish what it set out to accomplish; that’s my observation from hearing the witnesses who came before us from the RCMP, because, ultimately, they are the ones who are on the front line having to carry out the responsibility of enforcing First Nations laws. There are some inherent contradictions with their understanding. They know Canadian laws because they are trained to, and they work with the prosecution service. The other side is that the prosecution service at the provincial level is not yet versed on how to enforce First Nations laws.

The Chair: Senator Hay, as you listened and spoke, great work. Are you open to moving forward with these observations? Are you feeling as if you wish to pull them? I have no opinion. I am asking the question.

Senator Hay: Thank you for that. If I could ask the indulgence of the committee, I would love to hear your feedback.

I will withdraw the observation because I’m respectful of your commentary, Senator McCallum. Thank you for that clarity. This is great learning for me.

I would love to hear what you were going to say, Senator Pate and Senator Cardozo.

The Chair: Absolutely. Thank you for that.

Senator Pate: If you didn’t withdraw it, one suggestion I thought might capture some of what’s been discussed is to delete the first sentence. Then, with the second sentence, the observation would be, “The committee heard that the RCMP already faces significant resource pressures . . . .”

Then take out the next phrase, and then:

. . . and that First Nation communities could continue to experience challenges in the enforcement of their laws. The committee therefore strongly encourages the Government of Canada to address countless reports recommending additional resources be provided, so that the RCMP can enforce First Nation laws effectively.

I think that gets at your intent without going into the scope of the bill, but it pushes the government to look at the resource issue and references that there are previous reports that have recommended that.

I defer to you on whether that meets the concern or whether you would rather see it withdrawn.

Senator McCallum: I would rather see it withdrawn.

Senator Cardozo: I also want to add my compliments to Senator McCallum for all the work you have done on this bill and bringing it forward.

As I went through the process, the part where the penny dropped for me was when it was explained, or at least the way I understood it, that it’s not that different from the RCMP enforcing bylaws of municipalities across the country. That’s how I saw the RCMP witnesses seeing it. I see it as fairly straightforward in that context.

I like the intent and what Senator Hay laid out. As you say, if it is complicating matters, I’m happy not to go with it. The main thing is that we move the bill along. It’s gone through a lot of work, and I’m happy to support it moving ahead.

Senator McCallum: I wanted to address the Charter.

In the Lands Advisory Board, or LAB, submission, they said:

First Nation law making authority should be clarified in all legislation governing police forces, so police officers have no doubts as to their authority to assist First Nation police services or exercise their authority when called upon to do so. Not only should police authority be crystal clear but standard protections and limitations of liability for police officers must also be crystal clear . . .

The continue, saying that this legislation, Bill S-223:

. . . clarify legal authority and provide all standard protections is vital, as RCMP and prosecutors are routinely advised by their lawyers that they do not have what they need to enforce . . . . .

However, this bill will give standard protection and limitation of liability for police officers because, as Senator Cardozo said, municipal, city and every law is enacted. The only other ones are First Nations, and that is a Charter breach. Why are they the only ones?

The Chair: Any other thoughts or comments at this moment?

Senator Hay: Thank you, all, for my learning opportunity tonight and also for the good dialogue. It was great.

Thank you, Senator McCallum.

The Chair: The learning is every day until you’re not doing this any longer.

It is agreed then, to be clear, there will be no amendments coming forward.

I would ask then to report this bill to the Senate in both official languages.

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

(The committee continued in camera.)

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