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Russia's Disinformation: Understanding the Challenge, Strengthening Canada's Response

Russia’s disinformation poses an urgent threat to Canada’s national security, democratic institutions and social cohesion.

Executive Summary

During the 44th Parliament and the 45th Parliament, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (the committee) held a total of five meetings to examine the impacts of Russia’s disinformation on Canada. This report summarizes the witnesses’ testimony on three themes: the context for disinformation; Russia’s dissemination of disinformation; and ways to address Russia’s disinformation.

Chapter One: The Context for Disinformation

Disinformation – the deliberate dissemination of false information – is not a new phenomenon, but its volume, its reach and the speed at which it spreads have increased significantly in recent years. As such, it is a complex and rapidly evolving challenge. Witnesses emphasized that disinformation – particularly from Russia and other hostile states – is an urgent public policy issue for Canada and other countries.

Several states produce and disseminate disinformation with differing approaches and objectives, but witnesses characterized Russia as among the most prolific states in this regard. Witnesses asserted that Russia’s approach largely consists of overwhelming target populations with large quantities of disinformation, often exploiting existing societal and other divisions, in order to erode trust in information and institutions.

Artificial intelligence (AI), online platforms and social media algorithms are key enablers of disinformation, with AI increasingly used to produce fake content, including “deep fakes.” Witnesses expressed skepticism about social media platforms’ effectiveness in moderating disinformation, which allows it to spread rapidly.

Several societal factors appear to make individuals and groups vulnerable to disinformation. Witnesses contended that disinformation is most effective in environments where confidence in institutions and media is weak.

Chapter Two: Russia’s Dissemination of Disinformation

Russia’s disinformation is part of a broad strategy designed to accomplish several objectives, such as undermining Western democracies and their support for Ukraine, and weakening the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. Witnesses noted that, to achieve its objectives, Russia employs narratives that may be linked to existing vulnerabilities and divisions within target populations. Disinformation is part of the hybrid tool kit that Russia uses to advance its geopolitical and military interests.

To disseminate disinformation, Russia relies on various entities and tools. Witnesses drew particular attention to state-controlled media, proxies, influencers and online platforms, emphasizing that influencers and certain media outlets help to promote narratives, and give them credibility. Witnesses held differing views about the degree of sophistication of Russia’s disinformation.

Disinformation has been integral to Russia’s military strategy against Ukraine. Witnesses cited several examples of Russia’s disinformation narratives aimed at weakening Ukraine, which have reached populations outside of Ukraine. These narratives include portraying Ukraine as “neo-Nazi” and spreading false claims about bioweapons or nuclear risks. According to witnesses, Russia has also been using disinformation to target Ukrainian populations directly to cause confusion about its military operations.

Canadians’ exposure to Russia’s disinformation is significant. Witnesses identified a number of false narratives involving Canada’s military and political figures, as well as specific issues that have been the focus of Russia’s disinformation narratives targeting Canada, including in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Although measuring the impact of disinformation is challenging, witnesses linked disinformation to polarization, violent extremism and declining support for Ukraine. In the view of witnesses, Russia’s global disinformation efforts also affect Canada by destabilizing the liberal international order and undermining democracy.

Chapter Three: Ways to Address Russia’s Disinformation

Multiple federal entities – including Global Affairs Canada and Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security at the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Privy Council Office and Public Safety Canada – play roles in addressing disinformation in Canada. Witnesses discussed the Government of Canada’s current approach to address disinformation through these entities, the resources allocated to them, the transparency of the Government’s efforts and the role of the Government in exposing disinformation.

A whole-of-society approach to addressing disinformation, with coordination among governments, communities, academic institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector, may be effective. According to witnesses, such an approach should comprise strategies that meet the particular needs of populations, including Indigenous communities and the residents of Canada’s northern regions, and involve international collaboration. Witnesses stressed the need to balance efforts in two areas – addressing disinformation and protecting the freedom of expression – and suggested that limiting certain entities’ ability to disseminate disinformation does not necessarily infringe on the freedom of expression. That said, in the view of witnesses, efforts to address disinformation must be transparent to establish and maintain trust.

Legislative tools can be central in addressing disinformation. Witnesses drew attention to several tools, such as Canada’s Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, sanctions on entities and individuals disseminating disinformation, and the regulation of online platforms that are used to disseminate disinformation.

Discussing various techniques for addressing disinformation, witnesses mentioned the effectiveness of fact-checking – the process of verifying the accuracy of information – and prebunking – the preventive process of preparing an audience before it encounters disinformation. In the opinion of witnesses, education – particularly media literacy skills and critical thinking skills – are foundational to addressing Russia’s disinformation, and the educational approach in Finland provides an example in this regard.

Conclusion

Russia’s disinformation has been growing and evolving at a rapid pace. Having heard the perspectives of Government of Canada officials, academics, journalists and representatives of civil society organizations, the committee is convinced that Russia’s disinformation poses an urgent threat to Canada’s national security, democratic institutions and social cohesion.

The Government of Canada has been making efforts to address disinformation. However, the extent of Russia’s disinformation exceeds Canada’s current capacity to address it effectively. Because disinformation affects all parts of society, addressing this threat requires a coordinated approach based on cooperation and collaboration among governments, academic institutions, civil society organizations, the private sector and international partners. To address Russia’s disinformation, Canada must act now to develop a strategic plan that leverages all available legislative, technical and policy tools, demonstrates transparency relating to the country’s responses to disinformation, and draws on best practices to improve resilience to disinformation within Canadian society.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada develop, fund and implement a whole-of-government approach to address Russia’s disinformation. The approach should include both a strategic plan and a requirement for an annual report to be presented in Parliament concerning the Government’s disinformation-related activities and the results of the approach.


Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada address the threats of, and responses to, Russia’s disinformation in any national security strategy that is released during the 45th Parliament. In particular, the Government should ensure that any national security strategy outlines responses that are effective, comprehensive and coordinated.


Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada enhance transparency about the nature, scope and impact of Russia’s disinformation targeting Canada. In particular, the Government should consistently increase the amount of publicly available information about such disinformation, expand its activities designed to raise awareness about Russia’s disinformation relating to that country’s war against Ukraine, and review its practices relating to the security classification and protection of national security–related information.


Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada, in collaboration with the Ukrainian community in Canada and civil society organizations, develop and implement measures to address Russia’s disinformation aimed at reducing Canada’s support for Ukraine. Entities monitoring Russia’s disinformation in the context of that country’s war against Ukraine should receive financial and other resources to facilitate their efforts.


Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada lead the development of, provide funding for, and ensure the implementation of a whole-of-society approach to addressing disinformation, including from Russia. Any such approach should involve cooperation between and among the federal government and provincial, territorial, municipal and Indigenous governments, communities, academic institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector. In examining options for such an approach, consideration should be given to the elements of Finland’s model that would be appropriate for the Canadian context.

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada prioritize the strengthening of Global Affairs Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanism and contribute to any efforts by Group of Seven (G7) leaders to improve the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. The Government should consider allocating additional financial, human and other resources, and should encourage other G7 governments to do the same.


Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada establish an independent expert panel to review Canada’s approach to addressing disinformation, including in relation to online platforms and artificial intelligence.


Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada – through its involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Group of Seven, the Five Eyes alliance and other international entities – take a global leadership role in publicly condemning Russia’s disinformation and contributing to efforts designed to achieve a cohesive global approach to addressing such disinformation.


Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada, when developing Canada’s approach to disinformation, address the distinct vulnerabilities of Arctic communities – including Indigenous communities – to foreign disinformation. In particular, the approach should include Arctic-specific responses.


Recommendation 10

That the Government of Canada continue to develop and implement strategies to use artificial intelligence–based tools to monitor, detect, analyze and respond to foreign disinformation. These tools should be based on responsible and ethical principles.

News Release

Ottawa – Russia is targeting Canadians with disinformation and propaganda to sow division and erode confidence in our democratic institutions, the Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs has found in a report released April 30, 2026.

The report, Russia’s Disinformation: Understanding the Challenge, Strengthening Canada’s Response, notes that the rise of artificial intelligence applications is only making disinformation more dangerous as convincing deep fakes and sophisticated micro-targeting transform social media networks into conduits for falsehoods and distortions.

Witnesses said Russia uses disinformation to reinforce pro-Russian narratives, particularly to justify its war in Ukraine. It also seeks to destabilize Western democracies and undermine the NATO alliance, blunting Western efforts to effectively address Russia’s aggression.

Enhancing critical thinking and media literacy skills among Canadians is foundational to countering disinformation. Finland — which shares a long land border and fraught history with Russia — has integrated these skills into school curricula from an early age. An informed population will not be taken in by Russia’s deceit.

The report makes ten recommendations to the federal government, including that it review its approach to regulating online platforms, that it better inform the public about Russia’s disinformation efforts, and that it work with other levels of government to integrate media literacy and critical thinking skills into academic curricula.

Quick Facts

Quotes

“Canadians must become hardened against the relentless flow of Russia’s disinformation. Think carefully about what you read and watch, and consider the source.”

- Senator Hassan Yussuff, chair of the committee

“Challenging times should bring us together as a country. Disinformation threatens to drive us apart and to make us question the very foundation of what has made Canada so successful.”

- Senator Mohammad Al Zaibak, deputy chair of the committee

“Russia’s disinformation is a genuine threat to Canadian democracy. We must raise awareness of the scope of the problem and implement solutions to build our resilience.”

- Senator Claude Carignan, P.C., member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure

“Technology is making it increasingly easy for bad actors like Russia to flood Canadians with vast quantities of disinformation. Vigilance is necessary against this tidal wave of propaganda.”

- Senator Andrew Cardozo, member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure

Associated Links


For more information:

Chelsea DeFazio
Communications Officer | Senate of Canada
343-576-1481 | chelsea.defazio@sen.parl.gc.ca

Senators who participated in this study

Hassan Yussuff

Hassan Yussuff
ISG - Ontario

Mohammad Al Zaibak

Mohammad Al Zaibak
CSG - Ontario

Dawn Anderson

Dawn Anderson
C - Northwest Territories

Andrew Cardozo

Andrew Cardozo
PSG - Ontario

Claude Carignan, P.C.

Claude Carignan, P.C.
C - Quebec (Mille Isles)

Donna Dasko

Donna Dasko
ISG - Ontario

Marty Deacon

Marty Deacon
ISG - Ontario (Waterloo Region)

Katherine Hay

Katherine Hay
PSG - Ontario

Tony Ince

Tony Ince
CSG - Nova Scotia

Stan Kutcher

Stan Kutcher
ISG - Nova Scotia

John M. McNair

John M. McNair
ISG - New Brunswick

Judy A. White

Judy A. White
PSG - Newfoundland and Labrador

Suze Youance

Suze Youance
ISG - Quebec (Lauzon)

Ex officio members of the committee: The Honourable Pierre Moreau, P.C., or the Honourable Patti LaBoucane-Benson, the Honourable Senator Leo Housakos or the Honourable Senator Yonah Martin, the Honourable Senator Raymonde Saint-Germain or the Honourable Senator Bernadette Clement (until January 4, 2026), the Honourable Senator Lucie Moncion or the Honourable Senator Joan Kingston (since January 5, 2026), the Honourable Senator Scott Tannas or the Honourable Senator Rebecca Patterson (until January 4, 2026), the Honourable Senator Flordeliz (Gigi) Osler or the Honourable Senator Robert Black (since January 5, 2026), the Honourable Senator Brian Francis or the Honourable Senator Judy A. White

Other senators who have participated in the study: The Honourable Senator Gwen Boniface (retired), the Honourable Senator Peter M. Boehm, the Honourable Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais (retired), the Honourable Senator Tony Dean, the Honourable Senator Clément Gignac, the Honourable Senator Rebecca Patterson, the Honourable Senator David Richards (retired), the Honourable Senator Duncan Wilson

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