QUESTION PERIOD — Justice
Canada Labour Code
June 3, 2026
Senator Moreau, since June 2024, the government has been using section 107 of the Canada Labour Code to end work stoppages. This provision has existed for over 40 years, but until two years ago, it had been invoked only in very exceptional circumstances. Traditionally, when a dispute became economically untenable, the government would introduce special back-to-work legislation, which would be debated and voted on in Parliament in a transparent manner.
The government keeps saying that such a decision “is not taken lightly” and that it is “examined on a case-by-case basis,” but, under the circumstances, what are the legal criteria on which the government bases its conclusion that a labour dispute justifies the use of section 107 rather than following the legislative process?
Senator, there are different legal regimes across Canada. You are aware that the provinces intervene in labour disputes. I did it myself by passing special legislation to end disputes. Generally, that is done in very exceptional circumstances.
As you mentioned, within the federal system, section 107 has been in place for 40 years and has been used very rarely, only in cases where there would be legal and economic repercussions for the country as a whole. It is in these exceptional circumstances that section 107 has been invoked. Every time this section is invoked, the same system of checks and balances that exists when Parliament passes special legislation comes into effect, since the government must debate it in the House of Commons.
Section 107 is one way to end disputes, but the government believes that the best labour relations happen at the bargaining table, and that is the basic principle that the government supports.
Senator Moreau, in the 2015 decision Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to strike was protected by the Charter — a fact that is not in dispute — and that any limitation on that right must be accompanied by a meaningful and independent alternative mechanism.
In this context, can the government assure us that binding arbitration and the measures imposed under section 107 meet the Supreme Court’s requirements and the constitutional requirements for a meaningful alternative mechanism?
This is a highly complex legal issue. I grappled with it when I was President of the Treasury Board and the government’s lawyers went on strike. I can assure you that I will put myself in the Supreme Court’s shoes in order to determine whether this mechanism meets the criteria of the Saskatchewan ruling, since, in the specific case of the government lawyers, the Government of Quebec had established a mechanism, but the court ruled seven years later that it did not meet the Saskatchewan criteria. I will not define them today, since I have only 30 seconds.
