THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, November 20, 2025
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met via videoconference this day at 10:30 a.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good morning, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
I wish to invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Good morning. Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Hello. Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Good morning and welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Ataullahjan: Good morning and welcome. Salma Ataullahjan, Ontario.
Senator Woo: Hello. Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Wilson: Duncan Wilson, British Columbia.
Senator M. Deacon: Welcome, Marty Deacon, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Martine Hébert from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome, senators. I would like to welcome everyone and, certainly, those who may be watching us across the country on ParlVU.
Colleagues, today we’re meeting under our general order of reference to discuss the situation in Sudan. For our first panel, we are pleased to welcome here in the room, from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Emadeddin Badi, Senior Fellow; from Humanity & Inclusion Canada, by video conference, Anne Delorme, Executive Director; and, as an individual, Nisrin Elamin, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and African Studies at the University of Toronto, also joining us by video conference.
Welcome and thank you for being with us today. Before we hear your opening statements and proceed to questions and answers, I would ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices and also please observe the instructions regarding the placement of earpieces and microphones so that we do not have audio feedback, which, of course, can be injurious to those listening, especially our interpreters.
We are ready to hear your opening remarks, and since we have three witnesses on this panel, and it’s going to be a very compressed and tight discussion, I would ask our witnesses to give us a maximum of three and a half minutes in terms of their statements. That will allow for a full period of questions from senators and, of course, witness answers.
Mr. Badi, the floor is yours.
Emadeddin Badi, Senior Fellow, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today. To keep it short, my remarks will essentially address how Canadian-linked arms transfers intersect with the atrocities in Sudan and the steps that Canada should take to ensure its laws and values are not contradicted by its own actions or inaction, in this particular case.
The reason for that is that the humanitarian crisis in Sudan cannot really be viewed in isolation, and the suffering in Sudan is very much driven by external support networks that enable the perpetrators of violence. My intervention will probably place particular emphasis on the United Arab Emirates, or U.A.E., in particular, whose continued material support to the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, in Sudan remains one of the major enablers of violence against Sudanese civilians.
Since April 2023, conservative estimates indicate that around 150,000 Sudanese people have been killed, and over 12 million displaced. The fall of El Fasher on October 26 of this year marked a major escalation, followed by verified reports of massacres, ethnic cleansing and systematic attacks against civilians by the RSF. Tens of thousands who have fled that city remain unaccounted for today.
Amid this, Canadian-linked weapons continue to surface in RSF hands. The CBC has authenticated images and videos of precision rifles bearing the logo of Sterling Cross Defense Systems, a British Columbia-based company, used by RSF units in Khartoum and in Darfur.
The STREIT Group, another Canadian-owned armoured vehicle manufacturer, has, likewise, appeared in United Nations reporting, sadly, for over a decade. Its vehicles were supplied to South Sudan during its civil war, in Libya since 2012, and models produced at the U.A.E. facility have repeatedly been observed with the RSF.
For years, Canada claimed that when such transfers occurred through second parties, this fell outside of Canadian export control. That position is no longer tenable and, actually, no longer reflects Canadian law to begin with. When Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019, Parliament amended the Export and Import Permits Act and the Criminal Code to create an extraterritorial brokering regime. Unauthorized brokering today is actually a criminal offence, and when a Canadian person or company is involved or arranges or facilitates transfers abroad, manufacturing origin is irrelevant to Canadian responsibility.
The broader context also highlights the implausibility of the U.A.E.’s denials of support. The U.A.E. is a highly centralized, heavily surveilled autocracy, and it strains belief that armoured vehicles or weapons systems manufactured on its territory and later documented with embargoed actors in other theatres were moved without state knowledge. If the U.A.E. insists that it did not authorize transfers to Sudan, it is effectively conceding they were unlawful exports. That creates a clearer basis for partner states such as Canada to pursue accountability on their own terms.
One last small parenthesis I’ll make is related to another major gap in our arms export regime, which is a U.S. local. Most Canadian military exports to the United States bypass individual assessments, and we have very little visibility once they enter U.S. territory on where they may end up. This is another part, perhaps less explored, of how Canadian weapons can go into conflict zones like Sudan.
I’ll close with three brief recommendations: First, I would recommend that Global Affairs Canada immediately review all export and brokering permits involving the U.A.E. and suspend or refuse them when diversion risks cannot be mitigated. I would stress that in the case of the U.A.E., they probably cannot be mitigated.
Second, Parliament should request proactive investigations into potential unauthorized brokering by Canadian persons or companies whose equipment has appeared with the RSF.
Finally, we should probably improve our own transparency. Large gaps in reporting, especially on U.S.-bound exports and brokering, prevent adequate oversight of Canadian supply chains by researchers like myself and other international organizations interested in that.
We have the laws, the treaty obligation and the evidence. The only thing lacking is, really, the political will to act.
I’ll close here. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Badi.
I’d like to acknowledge that we’ve been joined by Senator Al Zaibak of Ontario.
Now we will go to Ms. Delorme for your comments, please.
Anne Delorme, Executive Director, Humanity & Inclusion Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair and honourable senators, for inviting me to speak on the situation in Sudan. I hope my comments will be complementary to my other colleagues.
I represent Humanity & Inclusion Canada, or HI, which is a Montreal-based organization that works in 50 countries worldwide. We are known for our humanitarian and development assistance that is inclusive of persons with disabilities and victims of conflict, as well as for our work in landmines with the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, for which HI is a co-laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize.
[Translation]
Sudan is currently facing the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Two thirds of the population, or 30 million people, need assistance. Fourteen million people have been displaced. Additionally, the number of cases of child rights violations and gender-based violence is staggering. At least 4.6 million people with disabilities remain largely invisible in the humanitarian response.
[English]
In late October, El Fasher falls after a 560-day siege. Families that had survived on leaves and livestock feed fled on foot by the tens of thousands. They walked 10 to 12 days through a barren stone desert at night to avoid armed groups. They crawled on their bellies for the final kilometres, terrified of being shot or killed, and when they finally reached the camp, when they were asked where they came from, when HI asked, “How did you arrive? Is your family with you?,” most refugees shut down completely. They’re unable to speak. The trauma is overwhelming, and it’s compounded by hunger, loss and fear.
Our response spans both Sudan and eastern Chad. We provide rehabilitation and psychosocial care for the war-wounded and the delivery of food and non-food items through inclusive humanitarian action, ensuring that no one is left behind.
Within the camps, we’ve also identified women and men from diverse organizations of persons with disabilities and human rights organizations who came from various regions of Sudan. With our support, these leaders have been able to come together to form new disability organizations at each camp. These groups now play a vital role in coordinating with humanitarian actors to ensure services are adapted and inclusive, covering everything from accessible food distribution to inclusive health and wash services. This approach not only meets urgent needs but also empowers refugees to lead and advocate for their rights. This is especially important as disability rates rise in conflict because of the injuries linked to the war.
Humanity & Inclusion also runs an innovative logistics system called Atlas Logistique, which powers one of the most complex humanitarian supply chains in the region, providing services for over 30 humanitarian actors there. We’ve even rehabilitated an airstrip in Adré, in Chad, to keep aid moving swiftly. Despite these efforts, humanitarian access is severely restricted. Aid workers face increasing attacks, including ambushes and drone strikes. Five humanitarians were killed near El Fasher in June, and these conditions make operations extremely dangerous and slow, while needs continue to rise.
In closing, Canada’s leadership matters now more than ever. We need to ensure all necessary measures are taken to protect civilians. We need to ensure the safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid operations. We must protect humanitarian workers, and we must increase funding for inclusive and effective humanitarian action. Honourable senators, Canada’s voice and influence can help secure access, protection and resources for those who need them the most in Sudan. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Delorme.
Nisrin Elamin, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and African Studies, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you so much for allowing me to be here.
As we gather to discuss the humanitarian catastrophe produced by the war in Sudan, we have to avoid depoliticizing this crisis, which is rooted in the extractive practices of external actors who are trading Sudanese resources in exchange for weapons to the warring parties and in a desire to undermine Sudanese aspirations for civilian governance and democracy.
In this moment, as my colleagues have mentioned, after 18 months of a brutal siege, the Rapid Support Forces are committing acts of genocide as they take full control of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, after the army withdrew, relinquishing their last stronghold in Darfur and leaving behind thousands trapped inside the city with no access to food, health care or safe evacuation routes. While 99,000 civilians have managed to flee El Fasher in recent days, many of them are still unaccounted for and over 150,000 remain inside the city as the RSF carry out brutal massacres and use sexual violence as a weapon of war in a targeted ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Arab communities. Pools of blood and dead bodies are now visible through satellite images from space.
The RSF owe this military victory in part to the logistical and military support they receive from the United Arab Emirates in exchange for Sudanese gold and gum arabic. Last year, 90% of Sudan’s official gold exports flowed to the U.A.E., primarily from the RSF but also from the mines owned by the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, while the U.A.E. reported $53 billion in gold export revenues.
The U.A.E. is not the only harmful actor benefiting from the war in Sudan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, are supplying the army with weapons in exchange for millions of Sudanese livestock as civilians starve. The U.A.E. is, however, perhaps the most significant actor, and it is also likely the conduit of Canadian Sterling Cross Defense Systems rifles and STREIT armoured vehicles that are currently being used by the RSF.
In line with Canada’s commitment to peace and humanitarianism and given that Canadian weapons are being used in Sudan, the federal government should take the following four actions:
First, impose an arms embargo and trade restrictions on the U.A.E. until it stops arming the RSF. As one of the U.A.E.’s largest trading partners in the Middle East, Canada holds significant economic leverage, especially with Prime Minister Carney’s current visits, particularly if it restricts gold imports from the U.A.E. Canada should hold Canadian weapons manufacturers accountable for their complicity in this war and should adopt Bill C-233, which amends the Export and Import Permits Act and eliminates the U.S. loophole that allows arms exports to the U.S. to bypass review, thus allowing Canadian weapons to be rerouted to conflict zones like Gaza and Sudan.
Second, Canada should deliver humanitarian aid to millions across Sudan facing hunger and lacking access to health care and shelter. It can ensure the quick delivery of aid to displaced people in areas like Tawila, North Darfur, where aid services provided are critically insufficient and which is not controlled by the RSF or SAF. It can partner with local Emergency Response Rooms to efficiently deliver this aid to people in need.
Third, given that Sudan faces the world’s largest displacement crisis, the federal government should establish a special immigration program for Sudanese nationals, modelled on the program created for Ukrainians. This would address the stark disparity in admissions, currently a 1-to-100 ratio between Sudanese and Ukrainian refugees admitted, and challenge the systemic anti-Black racism reflected in Canada’s immigration system. Canada should also reverse the recent changes to the Humanitarian and Compassionate Considerations program and prioritize separate, expedited processing for Sudanese refugees.
Finally, Canada should support an immediate ceasefire and arms embargo and apply diplomatic pressure to ensure that members of civil society, such as the resistance committees and grassroots networks leading relief efforts on the ground, are centred in future peace negotiations. These civil society groups should not be conflated with the civilian elite bodies that represent the interests of the RSF or the army and are sometimes included.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Elamin.
Colleagues, to remind you, we will each have a maximum of three minutes per question and answer, so please be concise in putting questions forward, and, indeed, I would encourage our witnesses to do the same.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I am particularly pleased that today, our committee is examining the situation in Sudan, which is experiencing one of the worst and one of the most neglected humanitarian and security crises in the world. I’d like to thank our witnesses for sharing responses and proposals regarding this crisis.
My question is for Mr. Badi, but any witness can answer. When it comes to foreign powers external to the conflict in Sudan, do you think Canada is doing enough diplomatically to stop the interference and to end the conflict?
Mr. Badi: Thank you very much for your question. My short answer is no. Unfortunately, Canada is not doing enough. I’d also like to mention that during the Prime Minister’s visit to the United Arab Emirates, there was not a single mention of Sudan on the agenda.
I also think that practically all international stakeholders from the west are not putting enough pressure on the United Arab Emirates. They even refuse to mention that the United Arab Emirates is intervening in the conflict in Sudan. As long as the situation remains the same, the United Arab Emirates enjoys impunity supported by all western stakeholders.
I’d also like to mention that this is not really the exception. It’s practically the same situation in Libya, in Ethiopia and in most conflicts where the United Arab Emirates are one of the main players. They intervene and they do so militarily.
[English]
They don’t have a domestic defence industry of their own, so they have to rely on Western weapons for the most part, so unless Western stakeholders put pressure on the United Arab Emirates, they will not have any incentive to actually revise their current policy.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much to our witnesses for your compelling and moving testimony.
My question is for Professor Badi, and it’s in the context of recognizing the statements you’ve just made. In September, a road map for peace was proposed by the “Quad,” comprising the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Egypt.
The proposal included a three-month humanitarian truce followed by a ceasefire and a transition to a civilian-led government. In your opinion, what is the prospect of securing agreement from the two parties in the conflict with the Quad proposal, and what obstacles remain, given the testimony you’ve just highlighted?
Mr. Badi: Thank you very much. It’s a very thoughtful question.
On the broader, sort of, Quad set-up, there are critiques of that set-up being a pathway to peace to begin with. That is one thing that is structural that I thought is important to mention here.
Secondly, I would say there’s almost — yes, the SAF and the RSF politically disagree, but where they have generally agreed and previously have agreed is not having a civilian-led transition. And none of the states of the Quad — which I should mention are, for the most part, autocracies themselves — would be in favour of a civilian-led transition in Sudan.
So I would doubt the extent to which the long-term political outlook of whatever the Quad would propose would actually be to the benefit of civilians. It would probably be a deal between elites.
Now, what is lacking, whether it’s in that format or anything else, is essentially what Dr. Elamin has mentioned: It’s involving civil society and organizations as more than recipients of humanitarian aid, which they’re already not allowed to receive in many cases or receive insufficient support. It’s also being politically empowered to actually lead the transition forward and take it away from the RSF and the SAF, which have, probably, very hegemonic ambitions as to what they want Sudan to look like. That’s my critique of the broader Quad.
Secondly, where we have leverage — and I say “we” as the broader West, but also as Canada — is over the arms export component. It’s unacceptable that we allow weapons to be diverted to stakeholders like the U.A.E., where we have — make no mistake about it — very little visibility and very little ability to mitigate transfers. Because ultimately, there have been flurries of UN panel-of-experts reports over the past 15 years that I’ve looked at where multiple UN panels of experts document U.A.E.’s and other states’, but primarily U.A.E.’s, illegal exports and where the U.A.E. either refuses to comment or shrugs its shoulders, essentially, because of the impunity afforded to it. I hope that sort of answers your question.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Colleagues, I’d like to acknowledge the presence of our former colleague senator Mobina Jaffer, who has devoted much of her career to issues of this kind. Welcome, senator.
Senator Ataullahjan: My question is to you, Professor Badi. You said Sudan was not on the agenda yesterday of Prime Minister Carney. Were you disappointed? Did you expect him to at least raise the issue?
I was just looking at the news this morning, and the Saudi crown prince is visiting the U.S., and he appealed to Trump to help with securing peace in Sudan. What role has the U.S. played currently?
The other thing I want to say is, having just returned from Geneva a couple of weeks ago with the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which is 183 countries, I was hoping this time that we would discuss Sudan, because Africa would keep saying, “You’re not talking about Sudan.” But Sudan didn’t come up again. Why is the situation in Sudan not on anyone’s agenda anymore?
Mr. Badi: Thank you very much. On your first question, I would say I was disappointed but not surprised that Sudan did not turn up, in large part because, well, it’s no secret the federal government’s focus is largely on foreign direct investment. It’s not on giving the U.A.E. a tap on the wrist for Sudan, so that’s one, if I may be sort of blunt.
Second, this is largely the pattern with most Western stakeholders to begin with. Canada is no exception on this front, but it should be, because our weapons are there.
And then, third, there has been recently a shift, I would say, in that the U.A.E. is feeling the reputational damage of its involvement in Sudan, which I would say for the U.A.E. is probably unprecedented. This is in large part thanks to Sudanese efforts to highlight what is going on and efforts to investigate supply chains of both parties to the conflict. And overwhelmingly what emerges — including in my organization’s research but also in other organizations’ research — is that the RSF has really benefited from a transnational system of supply orchestrated specifically and explicitly to be deniable by the U.A.E. It passes through at least five countries, off the top of my mind, a multitude of shell companies, and it is quite lucrative, thanks to the links that Dr. Elamin has highlighted. So it’s almost a profit-making war for the stakeholders involved. There’s virtually no incentive for them to stop. If it makes you money to wage war and no one tells you to stop, why would you?
On the U.S. side of things —
The Chair: I’m going to interrupt; we’re past the time on that segment. Colleagues, I would like to remind you we have three witnesses, two by teleconference as well.
Senator Woo: Thank you to the witnesses. My question is principally for Dr. Badi, but others may wish to chime in.
There’s an analogy in this discussion about our Canadian arms finding their way to conflict zones, to, of course, the issue in Palestine, where we’re also concerned about Canadian arms directly exported to Israel in its assault on Palestine. In that case, there is, of course, a moral imperative for us not to continue shipping arms, but there’s also a risk of legal complicity because of cases in the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
I wonder if you can comment about the issue of legal complicity that Canada might face because of the situation you describe. Although it is an indirect shipment of arms, is there some jeopardy for Canada?
Mr. Badi: Yes, absolutely, especially if it’s recognized ex post facto — and generally recognized even at the moment — by most organizations looking that the RSF is perpetrating a continuation of its previous genocide. Essentially, the RSF is an offshoot of the Janjaweed, which carried out a genocide previously. There’s scholarly consensus about that. And it’s replicating those very policies nowadays.
We risk being complicit in genocide now. And we cannot claim that this is inadvertent or we did not know, because this is reported. We’re knowingly continuing to export our arms that we know can end up whether in Sudan or in Gaza, as well.
I’m happy to let my other co-panellists chime in.
Ms. Elamin: I want to echo that. Absolutely, part of the problem here is that the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale University warned about the possibility of this genocide happening over a year ago, and the world did not respond. Canada, like other Western countries, had an opportunity to respond at the time and did not, and it is now being found to have been complicit through its weapons manufacturing companies. So, absolutely, I think there is that risk.
The Chair: Ms. Delorme, did you want to respond? There’s still some time left.
Ms. Delorme: Yes. I would like to perhaps add as a comment — and thank you Senator Woo for the question; it has been a pleasure working with you on Gaza and the question of arms transfers there as well — that Canada has made important, bold, ambitious commitments to increase defence spending. Does that mean we’re increasing our role in these conflicts, in these genocides? Not only are we complicit today, but what will we be tomorrow?
And I cannot help but think, ironically, that we used to hold a role of leadership on the international stage. Apparently, now it’s President Trump who is leading peace processes in countries around the world, while Canada — what will our reputation be? What is our new legacy as we increase defence spending but are unable to control where those arms go?
Senator M. Deacon: Hello to our witnesses. Thank you so much for being here today. In context, I have to acknowledge that Senator Ataullahjan, Senator Al Zaibak and I had a chance to hear on-the-ground experiences yesterday of what life is like in Sudan from a very practical day-by-day perspective. We want to acknowledge that it was a very important meeting to have.
When I’m looking at a question for today, I’m thinking about what we’ve heard. We’ve heard some public calls for the restoration of the United Nations–African Union peacekeeping force that was disbanded in 2020, just five years ago. I was wondering if any of our witnesses — and I’ll invite our virtual witnesses first — could give us some context as to why that mission was disbanded and how it could be restored in an effective way under the present circumstances in Sudan. I was hoping the professor would be here today who was one of those folks who made a public call. I’m wondering if any of you are comfortable in responding to this today.
Ms. Elamin: I think there have been multiple calls for civilian protection. As I mentioned, there are 150,000 people trapped, for example, in El Fasher at the moment who very much need protection. There has been a targeting of local responders who are at the front lines of relief efforts; there are about 700 Emergency Response Rooms across the country.
The peacekeeping force was disbanded for a number of reasons. I’ll let Ms. Delorme comment on that. In some ways, part of the problem here is that it has been too little too late. We are already witnessing the genocide happening as tens of thousands are unaccounted for. It’s frustrating for me as a Sudanese person to see the delays in responses. Calls for civilian protection have been ongoing since the beginning of the war. This is not the first episode of genocidal violence that we’ve witnessed since the war began in 2023. There was also one in El Geneina against Massalit communities. I’ll let Ms. Delorme pick up on that.
Ms. Delorme: Hello. I could not speak specifically to this particular peacekeeping effort and force, but I will say we’ve seen a strong withdrawal of Canada from its peacekeeping role over the decades. There are a few different reasons for that. If you speak to the Canadian Armed Forces, they’ll say that it’s increasingly difficult to maintain peace when they themselves are not armed. I won’t comment on whether or not that’s effective.
There has also been scandal after scandal around peacekeeping. However, what is the alternative? If we cannot support some stability, some security in a region through peacekeeping, we haven’t come up with better tools to date. Definitely, if we’re looking at the humanitarian organizations like my own, working in the region, we’re at great risk. We require support in order to be able to deliver life-saving humanitarian aid.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Al Zaibak: My question is directed to Professor Nisrin Elamin. Thank you for being with us today. You mentioned the non-Arab communities targeted by the RSF. I’m wondering if you could, please, identify, name those communities and give us a sense of their presence, the size of their populations and history in the region.
Ms. Elamin: Yes, thank you for that question.
The non-Arab communities in Darfur include the Fur, the Zaghawa, the Massalit and others, and they are primarily sedentary farming communities. In many areas, they constitute large majorities. They have for decades been competing with Arab-identified pastoralist groups over grazing land. Of course, these kinds of competitions or conflicts have been exacerbated by desertification but also by decades of government neglect and by the government, essentially the state, arming pastoralist groups in the 1980s and the 1990s against non-Arab sedentary farming communities as they compete over land.
Traditionally, there have been conflict-resolution methods where a third party would come in and resolve conflicts between groups. But since the state began arming the pastoralist groups, this is the precedent to the Janjaweed that emerged in the early 2000s in the first genocide in Darfur, who were then legitimatized by the Bashir regime in 2013 as the Rapid Support Forces in an effort to “coup-proof” his rule against the army. They were also further legitimized by the European Union, which used the RSF essentially as border control in its attempt to externalize its border to the area between Sudan and Libya.
The Janjaweed are essentially an aggrieved ethnic militia, if you will, made up of Arab-identified pastoralists that have been targeting non-Arab communities for decades now. Again, to me, peace building on the ground needs to reflect the traditional conflict-resolution methods that existed prior to these groups getting armed and also take into account we’re dealing here with various factors like government neglect, desertification, et cetera, in order to also address the root causes of this violence.
One of the things I look at as a researcher is the land grabs that have been happening, driven by the state, the resource plunder that I discussed earlier that is very much driving these forced land displacements of non-Arab communities. Unless we address the root causes of that, we’re not going to get any closer to peace.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Harder: Thank you to our witnesses. We’re clearly dealing with a situation in which it is not obvious to me at least what the coalition of partners would be to move to a better situation with respect to either humanitarian relief or some elements of peace building. We’ve been at this, as was referenced earlier, earlier this century, where there was a much larger humanitarian response and a much larger civic engagement.
My question is for Ms. Delorme, if she can reflect on why the humanitarian response is in such stark contrast, disappointingly, to that of, let’s say, 20 years ago.
Ms. Delorme: Thank you for your question. Clearly, there are some conflicts today that are taking up most of our media attention. We hear every day about Ukraine, and we also hear every day about Gaza. The newspapers are covering it. We are talking about it in the streets and the cafés. We’re writing our parliamentarians about it. The diaspora community is well organized, which is not to say that it is not so for Sudan. Clearly, it is getting a lot less attention, and attention breeds attention. Therefore, we’re not seeing a huge response.
What I find deeply concerning is in a moment where there is this horrifying humanitarian crisis in Sudan, the conflicts around the world that are increasing and are increasingly deadly, countries are withdrawing from funding for international aid, development and peace processes. We are withdrawing. Canada itself has announced that we will cut aid by 15%.
Need is increasing; resources are decreasing. I hope that this committee hears that cry very loudly that we need to reverse that trend and increase Canadian support to the conflict response and humanitarian response in Sudan.
Senator Harder: Who are your principal partners on humanitarian assistance in Sudan?
Ms. Delorme: They are European partners. We are not receiving funding at this time from Canada. We received funding from Canada for other conflicts, like Gaza and Ukraine, but not, at this time, for Sudan.
Senator Harder: Are these EU or national funds?
Ms. Delorme: They are both EU funds and, in some cases, national funds, like France.
I should, however, note that we have received funding to respond to the crisis in the past through the Humanitarian Coalition, of which we are a member, where Canada had offered some modest matching funds to try to deal with the crisis. The Humanitarian Coalition group is made up of about 12 international NGOs, and we try to increase the efficacy and pool of funding so that we can more adequately respond to the crisis.
Senator MacDonald: Senator Harder’s second question somewhat reflects what I was going to ask, but I will go back to it.
Canada is always asked to do more in situations like this. We’re one of 195 countries, and we’re 41 million people out of 8 billion. I’m not saying that we shouldn’t do more, but which countries are doing more in terms of money and support on the ground? Which countries have made a real difference over there? If any one of you could please answer. We hear it all the time here with Haiti and Ukraine. We are doing stuff around the world, but, of course, every country has limitations.
Ms. Elamin: Thank you for that question. I want to also emphasize that Canada has played a negative role in the past through its corporations, through its mining sector. If we look at the Talisman Energy company, the London consortium, they have been complicit in state violence by asking the former Bashir regime to clear oil concession areas at a time in the late 1990s when the civil war against the south was at its height. We also have a PR firm in Montreal that represented the Rapid Support Forces after they committed a massacre during the revolution, in collaboration with other military forces. I do want to say that because of that I think Canada has a stake and a responsibility to respond.
To your question, though, I think no country really has played a positive role. Sudanese people have been mostly left to fend for themselves. Even on the aid front, the vast majority of relief efforts are actually being coordinated by local Emergency Response Rooms that grew out of the resistance committees that were the backbone of the revolution. Again, we have to remember this war is essentially a counter-revolutionary war that is meant to foreclose the possibility of civilian rule and democracy, and these grassroots civil society groups and Emergency Response Rooms have been able to reach — and I’ll give you the statistics — 80% to 95% of the population, compared to 16% to 65% for international organizations, yet only 1.5% of funding reaches these local groups.
I think Canada could play a role in actually supporting local responders and even provide farmers, for example, with support to grow food in areas where it is safe to do so. Sudan is facing the world’s largest hunger crisis in a country that could easily feed itself and the entire region. I think on that front, Canada could do more and, of course, as mentioned, also on the immigration front to address the racist discrepancy between the response to Ukrainian refugees in comparison to Sudanese refugees.
Senator Wilson: My question is along the same lines as those of Senator Harder and Senator MacDonald.
All of you identified a number of steps that Canada can take that sound very constructive. However, even if Canada were able to move quickly and implement all those steps, acting alone, we’re not likely to have the desired effect on what is very much an urgent situation in Sudan. What should Canada be calling for, and what should we be doing on more of an international, multi-party basis? What should we be doing with the United Nations? What other steps can we take?
I was interested in the comments about what some of the European countries are doing. It feels to me like we need to find some kind of a coalition of the willing, a term used in another situation, to be able to move the dial on this. I’m just interested in all of your thoughts about where we could play a role in terms of that and what that should be.
Mr. Badi: I think the multilateral efforts and the national efforts shouldn’t be mutually exclusive, because to many other countries that are operating, they are not viewed as mutually exclusive. You can make a national contribution. You can look at what policies you can amend at home. You can apply unilateral pressure and lead by example because that’s generally what happened; several states get emboldened after you take certain steps. It’s almost like they’re ashamed. That’s one way of going about it, especially given how some state leaders operate on big egos nowadays. That’s also an option, I would think.
Then on the multilateral front, I think Canada, ironically, despite the direct and indirect ways in which it has been complicit, is relatively removed from that context. It could still salvage its reputation, let’s say, by acting as a mediator. Because the space is not exactly filled with stakeholders who want peace, Canada could be positioned as a stakeholder that would advocate for a civilian-led transition, et cetera.
What is missing from formats like the Quad is specifically the voice that calls for re-empowering civilians, for democratic transition. I think that could be Canada’s both unilateral and multilateral contribution. That’s beside all the steps that Dr. Elamin mentioned should be taken at home relative to how we deal with this.
The Chair: I know other panellists will want to jump in on this, but we’re out of time. Maybe this is something that can carry over into the second round. To close the first round, I would like to ask a question, and anyone can comment on it.
USAID has collapsed, has ended, has been reformed. My understanding — and I might not be quite accurate on this, but I think I’m pretty close — is that 60% of the funding for the World Food Programme in Sudan came from USAID. It’s not like there are a lot of donors who have the capacity to step up to fill the gap.
My other understanding is the UN Special Fund only has 27% of its target fulfilled. That is pretty serious. Perhaps we can start with Professor Elamin’s sense on this because the food crisis is huge. It’s horrendous. We know this. Is there a way forward?
Ms. Elamin: Thank you for that question. I think, as you mentioned, the current relief effort has not been adequately funded, and Canada could certainly contribute to getting to a higher number than 26%. Another way is to really direct that funding to local responders, to the Emergency Response Rooms that were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize twice in a row. They are doing tremendous work on the ground and at great risk to themselves.
Also, as I mentioned, farmers can be supported to grow food. There are a lot of arable land and water in Sudan. In areas where it is relatively safe to farm, people could be supported through inputs.
I wanted to mention on this point, and I know this is off topic, but in terms of the peace negotiations or the talks that are currently happening in Washington, D.C., I want to mention that Sudanese military elites have become experts at negotiating peace without ever implementing it. There is evidence now that with the RSF having accepted the humanitarian truce on the ground, they are actually intensifying their violence. The high-level peace negotiation mechanisms do not work. We need to centre civilians and not civilian elites, but those who are actually experiencing the catastrophe of this war and who are organized through the resistance committees and the Emergency Response Rooms that I just mentioned. I think that is incredibly important. If we don’t stop the flow of arms into the country and the resource plunder, we are not going to get any closer to peace.
The Chair: I’m afraid I have to observe my own guidelines, so we’re out of time on that segment.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Professor Elamin, in your opening remarks, you spoke about systemic racism in the immigration system.
You recommend that the program for Sudanese nationals should be moved. In your opinion, what are the key elements that could be included in this program to make it more efficient in responding to the needs of the impacted individuals?
Ms. Delorme, you have told us clearly that there is a double standards policy. You don’t get any funding from Canada. Do you have any explanation for that?
[English]
Ms. Elamin: Thank you for that question. There are two ways that Sudanese are currently entering the country. The refugee program, as I mentioned, needs to actually reflect the scale of the crisis. There needs to be a special program for Sudanese refugees that is expedited, that is free and that is not included in the larger cap that exists for refugees.
On the family reunification front, there have been extreme delays to the point where relatives who have applied for their loved ones to join them in Canada have been waiting for so long that people have died. There are financial requirements that are associated with sponsoring relatives that are highly prohibitive, and that only exists for Sudanese, as far as I know. So those need to be removed.
There is so much that can be done on that front. As I said, to date, only 3,000 Sudanese have arrived in Canada, in comparison to the 300,000 Ukrainians who were admitted after the war in Ukraine started. I just want to highlight that and say I think it is high time, given the scale of the crisis and given that Sudan constitutes the largest displacement crisis in the world, that Canada’s immigration response reflect that. Thank you.
Senator Ataullahjan: Professor Badi, I asked you about the role of the U.S. If possible, I would like you to expand on that.
Professor Elamin, you spoke of systemic racism. We’ve seen that. I want you to very briefly, if we have the time — hopefully we will — talk about the role that the media plays where certain conflicts are consistently in the headlines and certain conflicts are ignored.
Mr. Badi: So on the role of the United States, I mean, it is influential as the power that it is, and it also has this convening power for multiple stakeholders. However, I would want to stress that, especially under the Trump presidency, this in large part tends to be elite deals with stakeholders in conflict zones. It is not the recipe for long-term peace. It is very much flashy conferences, flashy power-sharing deals that sideline, in many cases, civilians just for — and here that is why I mentioned egos — and also that do not necessarily admonish many of the external intervenors, at least in this case, for the Quad. Within the Quad set-up, it is to potentially discuss what a power-sharing deal would look like, with occasional very recent admonishments of the U.A.E. in this particular case.
It has also elevated the two stakeholders that want to sideline civilians as the two sole, potentially, options for the political future of Sudan, which is a very big problem because one of these, at least at this stage, is complicit in genocide. The other stakeholder enabled a genocide previously. So it is not a force for good, and that’s why within that format or in an alternative format, Canada and a coalition of the willing should step up to rectify where Sudan would be headed regardless.
Ms. Elamin: About the media coverage, there has been a virtual media blackout, I would say, surrounding Sudan. I think not all coverage is good coverage. I think when it does get covered, when the crisis gets covered, it gets depoliticized. The external actors are not exposed, like the U.A.E. I think there is a need for us to consider the fact that the media coverage also aligns with Canadian policy in this case. There is a desire to kind of keep the peace with the U.A.E. because of the Abraham Accords, because of the normalization with Israel. You know the U.S. and Canada are interested, of course, in keeping those accords in place, and I think that is taking precedence over the lives of millions of Sudanese civilians, which is a shame. So, for me, what I would like to see is better coverage, exposure of those who are arming and fuelling this conflict.
The Chair: Thank you very much, and, of course, this meeting is being broadcast, so we’ll see what happens afterwards. I’m going to ask Senator Ravalia and Al Zaibak to ask their questions in sequence because we’re running out of time, and then we’ll allow for the answers.
Senator Ravalia: My question is directed to Professor Elamin. I was curious to know to what extent the broader Sudanese diaspora, both in Canada and globally, is engaged in this conflict in terms of taking sides or being supportive. I’d just be curious to know where that stands.
Senator Al Zaibak: To Dr. Elamin, to what extent has the RSF consolidation of territory in Darfur, including the fall of El Fasher, created a de facto partition of Sudan, and what are the implications for a viable political settlement in your view?
Ms. Elamin: Thank you for those questions. In terms of the RSF consolidating its power in the western region, this is very concerning. It marks a turning point in this war. This is why at the moment — and this also goes to the other question — the Sudanese diaspora is really mobilized around putting pressure on the U.A.E. imposing an arms embargo in order to withdraw the military and logistical support it has provided that has allowed the RSF to gain territory.
I would say the diaspora is very much aligned on this that we need to stop the arms flow to those committing genocide. The diaspora has also been speaking about this for two years, and nobody has really been listening. People have been raising funds. I’m a member of the Sudan Solidarity Collective that has raised over $1 million for Emergency Response Rooms on the ground that are leading relief efforts in the absence of a functional state there, essentially running the country, but also in the face of a barely present international aid response, right? So I think those two things are things that the diaspora is very much mobilized around, the humanitarian aid side and also stopping the weapons flow, especially right now, into Darfur.
There is a danger, for sure, about this kind of fragmentation of Sudan that will further undermine any possibility of civilian governance and popular democracy, which is why diplomatic pressure has to be paired with economic and political leverage around an arms embargo and trade restrictions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Unfortunately, we’ve come to the end of this panel. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Mr. Badi, Ms. Delorme and Professor Elamin for your testimony today. It is all very sobering for us. It is clearly a great tragedy in Sudan. Thank you for what you are doing. We will, no doubt, wish to have you back as we examine the evolving situation in Sudan later. Our deepest thanks for being with us today.
Colleagues, for our second panel, we’re pleased to welcome back to the committee, from Doctors Without Borders, Michael Lawson, Humanitarian Representative to Canada, and Michel-Olivier Lacharité, Head of Emergencies, who is joining us by video conference. From Amnistie internationale Canada francophone, we welcome France-Isabelle Langlois, Executive Director, also by video conference; and from Inter Pares, Rita Morbia, Co-Manager. Thank you for being with us today.
We’re ready to hear your opening remarks. We are looking at five minutes each. I know we had a previous discussion about shortening it, but if you can keep it to five, we’ll be very grateful. We’ll start with Mr. Lawson and Mr. Lacharité; I think you’re sharing your time. They’ll be followed by Ms. Morbia and Ms. Langlois.
Michael Lawson, Humanitarian Representative to Canada, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières: Good morning, and thank you to the members of the committee for having us here today.
My colleague and I represent Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF, an international aid organization that provides medical care to people affected by armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies around the world.
One of the worst of those crises is taking place right now in Sudan, where, for more than two years, both sides in a brutal ongoing conflict have been carrying out what has essentially become a war on civilians, targeting non-combatants, women, children, aid workers and more. I will let my colleague describe in more detail what our MSF teams on the ground have been witnessing.
Before I do, I want to take the opportunity to remind the members of this committee that Canada has an obligation to prevent violations of international humanitarian law and to hold perpetrators to account. We are urging Canada’s government to live up to its responsibilities and to not sit idly by while atrocities are being carried out in full view of the world.
With that, I’ll pass it to my colleague, Michel-Olivier, to talk more about the details of what we’re seeing on the ground.
[Translation]
Michel-Olivier Lacharité, Head of Emergencies, Doctors Without Borders: Good morning, Mr. Chair and honourable senators.
Three weeks ago, the situation in Sudan reached a new level of severity with the mass violence that accompanied the fall of El Fasher to the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF. The bloodbath that many feared came to pass despite warnings.
This is the third time since the beginning of the conflict that we have witnessed a large-scale ethnically targeted massacre committed by the RSF since that of El Geneina, the capital of Western Darfur, in 2023, and that of Zamzam, the largest camp for displaced persons in Sudan, located on the outskirts of El Fasher, in April of the same year. At the time, I was in Tawila, which is 60 kilometres from the Zamzam camp co-ordinating the operations of Doctors Without Borders, or MSF.
El Fasher was already dealing with an unprecedented humanitarian crisis prior to the weekend of October 25 after more than 500 days of a siege imposed by the RSF. MSF was in the capital of Northern Darfur until last year when attacks on our medical facilities forced us to evacuate.
The killings at El Fasher are indiscriminate and ethnic-based. People are tortured, massacred and summarily executed. Many people are still cut off or missing and thousands have been detained and held for ransom. Those who managed to escape by walking 60 kilometres to Tawila are seriously traumatized, dehydrated and malnourished. MSF runs a 250-bed hospital there with more than 500 employees.
Many have gunshot wounds and shrapnel injuries. Women report harrowing accounts of rape and sexual violence. Children have arrived terrified in the arms of strangers after being orphaned in El Fasher. My Sudanese colleagues are treating patients while waiting for news of their loved ones. Most of them have lost family members, friends or colleagues killed by the RSF in El Fasher.
Death and destruction in Sudan are made possible because too many governments have chosen not to take action. They choose not to use their influence to put pressure on the warring parties and their allies to stop the atrocities and the blockade of humanitarian aid. They choose to passively express their concerns and yet they provide the warring parties with financial and political support and the weapons that destroy, maim and kill.
More than 20 years ago when similar extreme violence was committed, the world mobilized for Darfur. Global leaders spearheaded an extraordinary political and humanitarian effort. The International Criminal Court, the ICC, determined the Janjaweed militia had committed acts of genocide. Today, as similar atrocities are being committed against the same ethnic groups by the RSF and the successors of the Janjaweed militia, the international community cannot look away. While the horrors of El Fasher are likely to fade from the media spotlight, we cannot simply move on. We need political commitment, humanitarian mobilization based on an impartial assessment of the situation and accountability mechanisms.
Last Friday, the Human Rights Council agreed to the deployment of an independent fact-finding investigation mission to Sudan in and around El Fasher, which all states must support and facilitate. We must do more for the people whose lives are still at risk in El Fasher and surrounding towns. We must ensure that the cycles of violence and ethnic cleansing in Darfur come to an end.
I’ll stop there and wait for the question period to go over medical activities in detail. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lacharité.
You have the floor, Ms. Morbia.
[English]
Rita Morbia, Co-Manager, Inter Pares: Thank you for this important opportunity to make recommendations on how Canada can act to better address the conflict in Sudan.
I am here representing Inter Pares, which is a Canadian feminist social justice organization. We have been building relationships with and supporting local women’s rights and gender justice organizations in Sudan for almost 20 years, at times with Global Affairs Canada funding.
In April 2023, when the conflict in Sudan began, I had a personal glimpse of this war. I found myself with colleagues trapped in Khartoum for 10 days as the bombs fell and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces took over the block where we were staying. As harrowing as that was, it pales in comparison to the experience of the Sudanese people who, after two and a half years, find themselves in what the UN Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan calls “a war of atrocities.”
The war in Sudan is not just the world’s largest humanitarian crisis; it is a war on the people of Sudan, and it is a war on women. Women bear an unbearable burden, transformed overnight into sole caregivers and breadwinners while being systematically targeted with sexual violence as well as kidnapping, displacement, forced disappearance and other human rights violations. The health, livelihood and security needs of women and girls are severely under-resourced. The health, communications, education and banking infrastructure has been decimated, and the consequences are devastating.
Since the beginning of the current conflict, sexual violence has been perpetrated against women and girls systematically on a massive scale, especially by the RSF. Most recently, the testimonies coming from El Fasher survivors, as you’ve just been told, are profoundly disturbing. A representative of UN Women described the bodies of women from El Fasher as “a crime scene.”
Food is also being used as a weapon of war, and the impact is gendered. Nearly 11 million women are now acutely food-insecure. Female-headed households are three times more likely than male-headed ones to face extreme hunger.
Yet, 2025 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325. This was an agreement to centre women’s protection, rights, roles and agency in a formal, legal commitment. Resolution 1325 has never been more relevant to Sudan, nor has it been further from reach. It is as if each and every aspect of the resolution has been dismantled, whether relating to prevention, protection, peace building or participation.
In Canada, we have embodied Resolution 1325 in our third national action plan, called Foundations for Peace: Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, otherwise known as CNAP. CNAP is more than a promise; it is an obligation. Two of the six focus areas concern crisis response and sexual and gender-based violence. The former speaks to ensuring that the needs of women, girls and gender-diverse people are addressed in the Government of Canada’s responses to peace and security-focused crises in Canada and abroad; and the latter speaks to reducing sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict, ensuring perpetrators are held accountable. Where is the implementation of the CNAP when it comes to Sudan?
Canada can and must do more, and to this end, Inter Pares has two key recommendations.
First, we recommend that the Government of Canada appoint a special envoy to Sudan. Canada has an opportunity to ramp up its humanitarian commitments, diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions and immigration measures. However, the situation demands a high-level political advocate with dedicated expertise and experience to coordinate our efforts in a coherent approach. An envoy’s mandate could include addressing corporate involvement and conflict financing that perpetuates the war.
Second, Canada must engage with geopolitical actors fuelling the conflict. In particular, the United Arab Emirates must be called to account on its complicity in supporting the genocidal RSF. If we do nothing, Canada risks being complicit in the war crimes taking place. Our counterparts, our local partners on the ground, demand an immediate and permanent end to hostilities. There can be no security for women while the war continues.
I want to end by recognizing the feminist organizations that Inter Pares works with and others who are on the front lines day after day. I welcome your questions and discussion. Thank you all for your important work today.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
You have the floor now, Ms. Langlois.
France-Isabelle Langlois, Executive Director, Amnistie internationale Canada francophone: Good morning, and thank you for the invitation.
As you heard, the situation in Sudan continues to deteriorate. The people of Sudan feel forgotten in the spiral of violence that has engulfed their country where the parties to the conflict are sowing death and destruction with utter disregard for human rights and international humanitarian law.
Since April 2023, the conflict between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced more than 12 million people, becoming the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.
Given the scale of the fighting and organization on both sides, the situation can be considered a non-international armed conflict under the Geneva Convention. It is therefore governed by international humanitarian law, which aims to protect civilians and other non-combatants in armed conflicts.
Amnesty International considers both the RSF and the SAF to be state forces. Various armed groups and nonstate militias are also involved. After investigation, Amnesty International has established that all parties to the conflict have committed serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Some of the violence committed constitutes war crimes and even crimes against humanity.
On October 26, 2025, the RSF claimed it had conquered several areas of El Fasher, the last major city in Darfur controlled by the SAF. On November 3, the office of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court expressed alarm at reports from El Fasher that massacres, rape and other crimes had been committed during attacks by the RSF. El Fasher had a population of more than 1.5 million, including hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. An estimated 260,000 civilians were trapped in the city as the October 26 attacks approached.
Since then, the RSF have seized the town of Bara and continued to lay siege to the town of Kadugli, which are located in North and South Kordofan respectively, in addition to stepping up attacks around El Obeid, where a November 3 drone strike reportedly killed at least 40 people. People were killed in their homes or while desperately searching for food, water and medicine. They were caught in the crossfire as they fled and shot dead in targeted attacks. Women and girls, some as young as 12, were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence by combatants on both sides.
The RSF has committed massive human rights violations for a long time, including targeted attacks on non-Arab communities and massacres reminiscent of those in Darfur two decades ago.
Since 2024, Amnesty International has documented how the conflict in Sudan is fuelled by a constant influx of weapons into the country in flagrant violation of the existing arms embargo on Darfur.
Some of those arms are made in Canada according to a recent CBC report and come from the United Arab Emirates, and may have been used during civilian massacres, including in the town of El Fasher.
Amnesty International therefore calls on Canada to stop its involvement in arming the conflict directly or indirectly; to demand that the UN Security Council extend the arms embargo to the entire country and not just in Darfur; to ask the Security Council to strengthen its monitoring and verification mechanisms to effectively monitor and prevent international transfers and the illicit diversion of arms to the country; to support the mandate of the Human Rights Council’s independent international fact-finding mission, which has just been renewed for one year; and to ask the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the International Criminal Court to cover not only Darfur, but the whole of Sudan so that it can deliver justice to all victims.
Amnesty International also calls on Canada to urgently enforce all outstanding arrest warrants in connection with the situation in Darfur, in particular against former Sudanese president Omar al Bashir, and to strengthen its political and financial support for the court so that the investigation into violations committed in Darfur and other parts of Sudan can take place. Finally, it calls on Canada to show its commitment and support for the victims of Darfur and all situations under investigation by taking concrete action to defend the International Criminal Court from attacks by the United States and other governments. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We will begin the question period. We will have three minutes for questions and answers.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much to our witnesses today. I appreciate your very moving testimonies.
I’d like to direct my question to Mr. Lacharité. The Canadian government’s plan to reduce funding for international assistance in global health programs has undoubtedly had a significant negative impact on your work globally, in particular with the current crisis in Sudan. Could you outline the work that you’re presently doing and how this funding may have negatively impacted some of your activity?
Thank you.
Mr. Lacharité: Thank you for the question. I think it’s good to be reminded that at Doctors Without Borders we are working with 98% of private funds. This is one of the reasons why we are able to go quickly into the different theatres of operations and to deploy as fast as possible. However, we have seen with the major cuts from the U.S. government that in recent months this has had a massive impact on all other non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, on the United Nations system — maybe not on Sudan, because Sudan has been prioritized. However, in several other countries, other actors are not able to respond, so it’s really the capacity for the other ones.
In the situation of Sudan, Doctors Without Borders opened and closed more than 15 new projects in the past year because the conflict passed from Geneina two years ago to Zamzam, to El Fasher, and we are not mentioning the different epidemics that are popping up in the eastern part of the country.
Yes, the budget cuts from Canada and from the U.S. have a major impact on the capacity to do basic humanitarian, medical, food and water interventions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Ataullahjan: I want to commend Doctors Without Borders for the work that you consistently do throughout the world.
Today, however, it is World Children’s Day. That means ensuring their basic human rights, education and health care. Those are things we can’t even talk about in Sudan, but it’s protection from harm. What future awaits the children of Sudan?
Anyone can answer. I want to acknowledge the children.
Ms. Morbia: Thank you for that question. I think the devastation that we’re seeing in Sudan will have generational effects, and I would just say that the scale of the problem is so large at the moment and the atrocities are so difficult.
One of the things I want to draw attention to is the level of trauma that children and others are witnessing and feeling at the moment. It is unprecedented, so I appreciate that.
Mr. Lawson: One particular emphasis to make — and you heard from my colleague’s testimony regarding some of what we’ve witnessed — is just to highlight the direct attacks on the camp in Zamzam. This is a camp that was filled with women and children. We’re looking at a situation in which children are actually being targeted by the violence.
As you have heard from my colleague, we’re looking at long-term trauma. We’re also looking right now at a scenario in which children are — we’re not talking about a possibility of safety, or it’s very difficult. These are some of the people who are fleeing the violence and who are being targeted by the violence.
That’s why it’s important to emphasize that right now what we’re witnessing, what is unfolding, are violations of international humanitarian law in front of us, at the moment, which are going to have these long-term generational impacts as well.
Senator Ataullahjan: I just came back from visiting the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh, and I spoke to children who just casually say, “Yeah, my relatives were murdered, and we had people raped.” There was a 14-year-old who looked as though she was 9 or 10 because she was malnourished. I worry what future awaits that child, and then we are surprised when we see children getting radicalized.
I felt very helpless, and as I listened to the testimony today, that’s the same feeling I have.
Mr. Lawson: If I can speak to that, I would say that this is why it’s of utmost importance that we continue to prioritize humanitarian assistance and we continue to prioritize being able to provide care where it’s needed and be able to prioritize, again, upholding international humanitarian law where it’s necessary. These are the necessary steps to ensure that what you’re talking about can be addressed.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Ms. Morbia. You spoke about Resolution 1325, which includes a commitment binding governments to protect women and girls. However, kidnappings of girls in Sudan are reminiscent of similar occurrences in Ukraine. Could you tell us why the international community has failed to adopt the same response, reaction and strategy regarding the developments in Sudan?
[English]
Ms. Morbia: Thank you for that question. I think Resolution 1325 has a number of different elements to it — protection from sexual and gender-based violence, responsibility to end impunity, equal and full participation of women in peace building — and I think all of these are very, very relevant in Sudan.
The women’s movement in Sudan is, actually, very strong. It was before the war began, and it continues to be. Women are not just victims or survivors; they’re also strong agents of change.
One of the reasons that this conflict does not have — and we’ve been talking about this in the last panel, too — the media attention or the political attention that other conflicts in the world do is because of where it’s located, because of the racism involved, as was mentioned in the last panel as well. I underscore that.
Now is the moment we can start paying attention. Because of the scale of the atrocities, the world has been alerted, and it is a moment where we can turn the tide.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you very much for the answer.
Ms. Langlois, recently, civil society organizations and analysts have said that Canadian-made weapons and weapons components were getting to the RSF through the United Arab Emirates. You alluded to that earlier. This is in contravention of existing embargoes. Can Amnistie internationale Canada francophone corroborate those allegations? What monitoring mechanisms can be put in place for more effective monitoring?
Ms. Langlois: Thank you for the question. The issue of the influx of arms into Sudan is of great concern to Amnistie internationale Canada francophone and it’s one of the main causes that the international community, including Canada, must act upon.
At the moment, while Amnistie internationale Canada francophone has not been able to verify the presence of Canadian-made weapons, other groups have done so, and this is deeply troubling.
In any event, we are calling on Canada to stop selling weapons directly or indirectly via the United Arab Emirates, which, we can confirm, contributes to the shipment of arms to Sudan.
In any case, Canada must act on the embargo and demand that it be extended to the whole country and not limited to Darfur and ensure that monitoring mechanisms in place. . . While monitoring mechanisms do exist, the international community has yet to utilize or manage them as effectively as necessary.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
We’ve talked about women, girls and children, and you’ve touched, Ms. Morbia, on something I would like to come back to, which is the role of women in any potential peace negotiations and settlement. Of course, we’ve heard women are bearing the brunt of so much conflict and of rape being used as a weapon of war on both sides. Despite this — we heard this somewhere else yesterday — they are also negotiating safe passage for their people, their families fleeing violence, and they are providing life-saving support.
Despite this, women appear to be excluded from diplomatic talks. I know that Canada is on the sidelines of the Quad, but what role, if any, could our country play in seeing a role for Sudanese women in these talks and any potential peace?
Ms. Morbia: Thank you for your question. It is an important one. The role of women in peace building in Sudan is critical. I point not only to the very strong Sudanese women’s movement that has been active for decades but also to the fact that in 2019 it was a popular women- and youth-led movement that toppled the 30-year dictatorship. Women are a political force in Sudan. They are not just victims. They are not just survivors.
For any peace process that takes place, it is absolutely critical that women are involved, and it is absolutely critical that they are resourced, that their involvement is meaningful and that some of the root causes of the conflict are addressed. I absolutely echo both your sentiments and your concerns about the importance of women being involved in any lasting peace in Sudan.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. What about a role specifically for Canada?
Ms. Morbia: I’ll bring back the idea of a special envoy. I think that Canada can be a bit of an ambassador for the role of women, and we have, in fact, been in the past. We can continue to do that in a more forceful way. We need a special envoy to Sudan because the cohesiveness and coherence of our response are really important, and we haven’t seen that to date.
This is not an idea that is unprecedented. Bob Rae was our Special Envoy to Myanmar between 2017 and 2020. He was quite successful. Chrystia Freeland has just been named Special Representative for the Reconstruction of Ukraine. On a different note, Jacqueline O’Neill was our Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security, so on a thematic level, she really raised the issue of women, peace and security. This is something that Canada has done in the past, has expertise in and could do for Sudan.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Woo: Thank you to the witnesses.
To the extent that the international community can mount a massive increase in humanitarian assistance, including medical supplies and personnel, what are the practical obstacles to getting these supplies and assistance to the places that most need them?
Mr. Lawson: One very important impediment is that we see a routine blockage of our ability to bring any supplies in. Maybe I’ll pass it to my colleague, Mr. Lacharité, to speak in a bit more detail what form those blockages take.
[Translation]
Mr. Lacharité: The siege of El Fasher effectively created a blockade that prevented food trucks from getting to the towns of El Fasher and Zamzam.
The media makes occasional attempts to describe the actions of the RSF as the acts of an individual or a group of individuals. However, berms have been built around the town and surrounding trenches have been dug to block water. This system has been created to prevent assistance from reaching the people.
That is one of the principal points of the blockade.
The second one is security. Many regions of Sudan are not accessible for security reasons. This is the second point, in addition to the siege of El Fasher.
The third point is the administrative gridlock. While it is true that for now, entering or passing through RSF-controlled areas is relatively easy for non-governmental organizations, the UN must declare all goods before the government of Port Sudan can deploy assistance, and this is extremely time-consuming and burdensome. Administrative gridlocks can last weeks or even months in the eastern part of the country. Khartoum and other cities are in critical need of reconstruction.
In short, there are security concerns, administrative hurdles and political gridlock on both sides of the conflict.
[English]
Mr. Lawson: This has been a perpetual part of this conflict from both sides, so we see this confluence of things where we see a reduction in humanitarian assistance and a reduction in aid. We’ve already heard this mentioned several times — the level of cuts at the same time as accelerating needs — but on top of this, we have the very specific blockages that we see from both sides in this conflict.
Ms. Morbia: Humanitarian access has also been used as a negotiating tool and has been weaponized by both sides. That is also quite a problem.
The Chair: Just to follow up a bit on Senator Woo’s question, have any of you developed any best practices in situations like this — recognizing that every situation is different — when you cannot get through? Do you go to third parties, or do you try to negotiate on the ground?
Mr. Lawson: We’re perpetually needing to negotiate on the ground. It depends on the case and it depends on the parties, but, absolutely, it’s essential that we try to continue to negotiate with whatever actors we speak with. Mr. Lacharité might have more specifics to speak to this context.
[Translation]
Mr. Lacharité: Today we’ve talked a lot about the RSF and the Sudanese government when it comes to getting certain goods through.
However, getting to El Fasher and other areas involves negotiating with five to seven armed militia groups who are also political organizations.
For example, to go from Chad and El Geneina to El Fasher means negotiating with the RSF, the Sudanese Liberation Army and various factions and tribal militia for each passage, one kilometre at a time. It is extremely complicated.
To build on the insights shared during your first panel, the conflict in Sudan has been going on for two years and very little is changing. Doctors Without Borders initially appealed to the parties to the conflict, without success. The organization has appealed to the international community, also without success. UN resolutions have not worked well either. We are now calling on allies of the parties to the conflict belonging to the QUAD, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and the Saudi Arabia. Canada’s role is also to appeal to these governments, which are allies to the parties to the conflict. Best practices for negotiations can only be found with stakeholders who can exert influence on the parties to the conflict.
Senator Hébert: Thank you all for your testimony and the work you are doing to help people facing hardship on the ground. My question is for Ms. Morbia. I want to ask you about the special envoy.
You gave some past examples. Has your organization or other organizations brought up this request with the Canadian government and if so, how has the government responded so far?
[English]
Ms. Morbia: Thank you for the question. Yes, we are calling on the Canadian government to appoint a special envoy to Sudan. So far, we haven’t heard an official response to this suggestion, but it’s a strong recommendation.
There are so many things a special envoy could do in terms of our coordinated response. They could inform cabinet, support peace-building efforts, rally the media, engage civil society groups in diaspora, take testimonies, listen to those on the ground and issue reports. They could look at the effectiveness of sanctions, look at further government actions and make recommendations, as well as look at the issue of conflict financing and corporate involvement.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: You say you have not had a response. In your opinion and based on what you’ve shared, why do you think the government has chosen to ignore this suggestion despite its apparent merit?
[English]
Ms. Morbia: Maybe that’s something that this committee could help us with in terms of amplifying a request if you also feel that this is something that could be helpful.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: I’d like to build on my previous question — and thank you for your answer. Perhaps I should address my question to Ms. Langlois instead of Ms. Mobia because of your financial structure. Have you received any assistance from the Government of Canada for your ongoing missions in Sudan? Again, what kind of response have you received? Other groups that have come here have told us they have not received any funding, either currently or in the past.
Ms. Langlois: Amnesty International does not receive funding from any government, so this question doesn’t really apply to us.
Senator Hébert: Is your organization similar in nature to Doctors Without Borders, Ms. Morbia?
[English]
Ms. Morbia: We are not a humanitarian agency, so we have not asked for humanitarian funding, and I think that is the focus of Global Affairs Canada’s response at the moment. One of the issues is that other kinds of funding take a long time to roll out. The situation on the ground is ever-changing, and there needs to be a rapid response. We’re not seeing as rapid a response as would be helpful.
Senator Harder: My question is a bit of a follow-up to Senator Woo and, chair, your question. I would like to ask Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières if you would give us more colour on the presence in the area: numbers — how many Canadian nationals, others — what your concerns are with respect to duty of care, and how you work the rotation. This must be a very debilitating experience, frankly, for your well-seasoned staff. Could you give us more detail?
Mr. Lawson: Are you speaking of the presence of our own operations in Sudan?
Senator Harder: Yes.
Mr. Lawson: Yes, we are present across —
Senator Harder: And your fraternal presence.
Mr. Lawson: We are present across 10 different states in Sudan — I’ll actually pass this to Mr. Lacharité, who is probably better equipped to answer that.
Mr. Lacharité: We are present in 10 out of the 18 states in Sudan, so we are really all across. We have more than 2,000 staff. On top of that, we have a lot of Ministry of Health staff whom we pay on incentive. Around El Fasher, we opened this project in Tawila with a 250-bed hospital. But our major concern since the massacre of the city is really to understand where the people are. In the past weeks, we have been trying to look in the different locations, and we have activities in 15 locations. I can name some of them: —, Korma, Kernoi, Um Baru. We are present in these, but we have not seen the different people reaching these cities. Yes, we had initial flow to Tawila for a few days, but there are fewer than 10,000 people who reached Tawila. This is where we are. We have diverse activities. We have a hospital base, outpatient clinics, water distribution, food distribution.
To go to the question of the duty of care, we have fewer than a dozen Canadians on the ground. Our ratio is roughly 5 international staff to 95 Sudanese staff, and among the 5%, we have fewer than a dozen Canadians on the ground.
In terms of duty of care, we worked a lot on the question of informed consent to make sure everyone really understands what they are doing, first and foremost, to make sure that we are clear on the different security incidents. A lot of hospitals have been attacked, and a lot of medical staff were attacked. We experienced two rapes on international staff: one 20 years ago, one three years ago. So there is this first question of informed consent. The second one is the right to withdraw at any moment from any mission. We extend these practices to, of course, all the staff recruited locally, and we provide as well mental health support, a medical check before and after missions.
In terms of duty of care, this is one of the worst countries, of course — Sudan and Ukraine at the moment. We are really concerned about our obligation as an employer to all our staff, both international and national. I hope I answered your question.
Senator Harder: What’s the rotation pace of the international staff?
Mr. Lacharité: For Sudan, it will be linked to the different locations. So at the moment, we have people close to the front line. They will stay, I would say, on average six months, although we can accelerate the turnover of the people. But the situation is really changing. A few days ago, just after the massacre of El Fasher, some area on the road to Chad was droned by the RSF. We had staff over there. They withdrew; they left the country. Now we are re-engaging this week to go back in the different locations. The movement is in a very fluid and dynamic context, and we try to adapt. We always ask this question, “Are you okay to move?” and so on, to really focus on this informed consent and the right of withdrawal. Thank you.
Senator Harder: Thank you very much.
Mr. Lawson: If I can pick up on that with one last point to make, and maybe it goes to the substance of your question, we are talking about, in Sudan, another example of where we’re seeing health facilities actually being targeted. We’re seeing aid workers actually being targeted. This is part of something that we’re seeing in a much bigger trend, and this again goes to the erosion that we’re seeing of the basic, fundamental international law. There is supposed to be protection of aid workers.
To your point about what it’s like for staff to be working, I mean, there used to be much more of an understanding that organizations such as ours, operations such as ours, were operating there entirely on a humanitarian basis. We’re not seeing this only in Sudan but in other contexts as well.
To say the same thing again, it is part of this erosion where we want to see countries like Canada and governments like Canada have a role to uphold these basic norms and basic humanitarian principles, because, otherwise, it’s exceedingly difficult to actually be able to carry out a response and provide any assistance, as we’re seeing in Sudan right now.
Senator Ataullahjan: The one recurring theme we’re hearing, even with the previous witnesses, is talk about Canada’s role and Canada’s new legacy. Again, you’re saying Canada has a role to play.
Do you feel Canada is missing in action? I’ve heard this internationally also that where Canada had a role and would speak up, we are missing now.
Mr. Lawson: Are you asking why?
Senator Ataullahjan: Yes, why do you think Canada is missing in action? We have consistently heard throughout this testimony today — a previous witness talked about Canada’s new legacy. I didn’t have a chance to ask her what the new legacy was, but we heard just now again that Canada has a role to play.
What role would you like to see Canada play, and why is Canada silent?
Mr. Lawson: I can’t speak to why Canada is silent. I can just point to the need for a high level of diplomatic engagement at this time more than any other. Now more than ever, we’re seeing this incredible gap. We’ve had a system that was, for all of its flaws, a basic international humanitarian sector that was able to respond thanks to the support of a multilateral system, including countries like Canada. Again, we’re seeing this under erosion. Yes, there are a high number of different crises and emergencies happening simultaneously right now, but we’re also seeing an inward turn.
I can’t say why that’s happening in Canada, but I can point to the fact that there needs to be a stepping up into that space. This is a country that has consistently stood up for a rules-based world order, that has been a supporter of the humanitarian sector and that has a significant role to play to ensure that this system continues and to ensure that we continue to address these crises.
Ms. Morbia: I would agree with that. I think Canada has been missing in action, and I think we can and must do more.
In terms of the humanitarian landscape, you’ve heard about the role of the Emergency Response Rooms. These are local responders who are situated all over the country, sometimes in very dire circumstances. They’re a local response to food insecurity, humanitarian issues, basic needs and sexual and gender-based violence at times. This is an area, for example, in terms of support, where Canada could also lead.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for Ms. Morbia. You have called for the nomination of a special envoy for Sudan. Canada recently launched Canada’s Africa strategy, and one of the announcements that was made after the strategy was launched was the appointment of a special envoy for Africa and a special envoy for the Sahel. Are you familiar with this strategy and if so, have you tried to reach out to Canada’s special envoy for Africa, who is currently based in Addis Ababa?
[English]
Ms. Morbia: Thank you for the question. I am aware of the strategy. We have not approached them, but I think it’s a great suggestion and we should do that. As you know, Africa is very diverse, and I think with the situation in Sudan, even though it has been two and a half years, things are changing at a rapid pace. It is time for Canada to act in this moment. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. We’ve come to the end of this panel.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Michael Lawson, Michel-Olivier Lacharité, France-Isabelle Langlois and Rita Morbia for your testimony. Everything, of course, that you have said in response to questions will be on the record, but I think I can say on behalf of my colleagues that this was a particularly emotional meeting today. We have learned a lot. It’s an incredible tragedy that is taking place in Sudan. We salute you for your work and for your commitment. In the future, we would wish to hear from you again. Thank you very much on behalf of everyone.
(The committee adjourned.)