THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, May 28, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 10:30 a.m. [ET] to examine, and report on, such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Honourable senators, I’m Peter Boehm, a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
I will now ask the committee members to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
Senator Ravalia: Good morning and welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Wilson: Good morning. Duncan Wilson, British Columbia.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: I am Martine Hébert from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome, senators and everyone watching us across the country today on ParlVU.
We are meeting today to discuss the situation in Sudan. It is a very serious subject, obviously, and I would encourage you to please mute your devices so that we can have everyone’s attention as we discuss the issues.
We have the pleasure of welcoming to the committee, from Global Affairs Canada, Nicolas Simard, Head of Mission for Sudan and Ambassador of Canada to Ethiopia and Djibouti. He will be joining us by video conference. We also have Ryan Clark, Director General of the Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau; and Tara Carney, Director of the International Humanitarian Assistance Division. Welcome to all of you. Thank you for taking the time to be with us today.
Before we hear your opening statement and proceed to questions and answers, I would like to remind senators to look at the best practices card with respect to the proper use of microphones and earpieces.
We’re ready to hear your remarks. As usual, there will be questions from the senators and answers from the witnesses. Mr. Clark, you have the floor.
Ryan Clark, Director General, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, chair, for the opportunity to be here today.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, my name is Ryan Clark. I am the Director General of the Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau at Global Affairs Canada.
With me is Tara Carney, Director of the International Humanitarian Assistance Division, and Nicolas Simard, Ambassador of Canada to Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Canada’s representative in Sudan.
Today, I’ll be providing an overview of the crisis in Sudan and Canada’s response.
[English]
In its fourth year, the conflict in Sudan between the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, and their allies continues, with devastating consequences for civilians. Sudan is now effectively divided between the RSF and the SAF, with multiple external actors fuelling the conflict.
[Translation]
As we speak, some 33 million people in Sudan are in need of emergency humanitarian assistance, the highest number anywhere in the world, and nearly 20 million are facing acute food insecurity.
Of the 17 million school-age children, 8 million are affected by prolonged school closures, putting them at risk of violence, exploitation and recruitment by armed groups. Action is urgently needed to protect this generation from long-lasting consequences.
Credible UN reports reveal that both sides of the conflict have committed war crimes and that the RSF has committed crimes against humanity.
According to reports, after the RSF took control of El Fasher, it slaughtered up to 6,000 people in the first three days and carried out widespread sexual violence.
We are greatly concerned by the patterns of violence currently unfolding in Kordofan, violence that bears troubling similarities to that seen in El Fasher, especially in areas like Dilling.
[English]
In response, Canada continues to act with urgency to help meet the immense needs of the people of Sudan.
On April 15, 2026, at the International Sudan Conference in Berlin, the Honourable Randeep Sarai, Secretary of State for International Development, announced more than $120 million in new funding to support people in Sudan and neighbouring countries. This includes $94 million in humanitarian assistance to deliver life-saving support to vulnerable populations in Sudan, South Sudan and Chad; $25 million in development assistance focused on providing safe, quality education to over 60,000 children, and strengthening prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence; and $1.25 million to support peace and stabilization efforts, including civilian-led dialogue initiatives.
Canada remains actively engaged across multilateral fora to advance a coordinated international response to the crisis in Sudan. At the United Nations Human Rights Council, Canada co-sponsored the resolution renewing the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, an essential mechanism to document violations and advance accountability, and delivered national statements to underscore the urgent need to protect civilians.
Canada leveraged its G7 presidency to keep Sudan high on the international agenda, including through a G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement calling for a ceasefire, unimpeded humanitarian access and a transition to a civilian-led government. In April 2026, Canada joined the Coalition for Atrocity Prevention and Justice, alongside the U.K., Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, France and the EU, strengthening coordination with partners to advance accountability.
[Translation]
It’s important to note that a viable and lasting resolution to the conflict is impossible without significant civilian involvement and better long-term governance.
That is why Canada is committed to supporting Sudanese civilian voices, mainly civil society actors, women’s groups and community initiatives. These efforts are crucial to advance dialogue, promote the protection of civilians, and ensure that any future political process is credible and inclusive, while reflecting the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people, who have shown great resilience.
The conflict in Sudan must not be ignored. Canada will continue to work with international and regional partners to address the urgent humanitarian needs, promote accountability and support the people of Sudan in their pursuit of a peaceful future.
Recognizing that progress towards a peaceful resolution depends on sustained and coordinated international engagement, we remain committed to supporting the peace efforts currently being led by the Quad and the Quintet.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Clark.
I would like to acknowledge that Senator Deacon of Ontario has joined the meeting.
[Translation]
Ambassador Nicolas Simard, you may go ahead.
Nicolas Simard, Head of Mission for Sudan and Ambassador of Canada to Ethiopia and Djibouti, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I’m speaking to you from Addis Ababa, so I hope you can hear me clearly. I also hope the connection remains stable, because it cuts out sometimes. Let’s hope technology is on our side today.
Mr. Chair, honourable senators, thank you for the opportunity to before you today. My name is Nicolas Simard, and I am Canada’s Head of Mission for Sudan, in addition to my role as Ambassador to Ethiopia and Djibouti.
My role is to achieve meaningful engagement with regional, diplomatic, humanitarian and Sudanese partners that reflects Canada’s policy priorities.
With that in mind, I will focus on two aspects: the evolution of the conflict as observed in the region and the contribution of our mission in Addis Ababa to a more consistent and effective international response.
[English]
From Addis Ababa, we would underscore that this is not a static conflict. Even where the front lines appear relatively unchanged, conditions for civilians continue to deteriorate due to increased drone use, continued attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and growing fragmentation that complicates both humanitarian access and political engagement.
A second perspective is that the diplomatic architecture is beginning to take a more practical shape. As Mr. Clark mentioned, the Quad, that is, the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, continues to play a key role in advancing ceasefire efforts, while the Quintet — composed of the UN; the African Union, or AU; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD; the League of Arab States and the European Union — is increasingly focused on political coordination and civilian engagement. So the Quad is focusing on stopping the conflict, and the Quintet on ending the war and preparing for peace.
From our perspective, progress on both tracks — reducing hostilities and supporting an inclusive Sudanese civilian-led political process — is essential, and we see these efforts as mutually reinforcing elements of a viable path forward for a peaceful and united Sudan.
[Translation]
One of the core responsibilities of our mission in Addis Ababa is to ensure consistency across the various pillars of diplomatic engagement. Earlier this month, Canada joined France, Germany and Italy in bringing together heads of missions from like-minded countries in Addis Ababa, to strengthen coordination and respond more effectively to the crisis in Sudan.
Diplomatic partners and the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Pekka Haavisto, came together to align our assessment, messaging and actions regarding the political, humanitarian, economic and civilian dimensions of the conflict. On a humanitarian level, the mission works in close coordination with partners to ensure that international assistance remains impartial and facilitate access for vulnerable populations.
Our mission also ensures that Canada’s diplomacy in Sudan remains centred on the protection of civilians. In recent months, our embassy, together with other embassies, publicly issued targeted joint statements regarding the escalating violence in Kordofan and the grave violations against children. These actions help to promote respect for international humanitarian law, to ensure that international engagement remains centred on the protection of civilians and to support efforts to prevent further atrocities.
[English]
The Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa also supports engagement with the international donor community on Sudan. From our regional vantage point, we actively coordinate actions with like-minded partners, the UN system, international NGOs and Sudanese aid actors, including in the diaspora, to promote greater coherence in the response. This includes encouraging better alignment between humanitarian action and longer-term development and stabilization efforts so that international support addresses urgent needs while also helping to build resilience, recovery and sustainable peace in Sudan.
Finally, the mission also uses the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, or CFLI, to support small high-impact projects led by local partners, and we remain engaged with Sudanese and Sudan-affected communities outside Sudan. For example, during my March visit to the Tsore refugee camp in western Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, near the border with Sudan, I saw first-hand how our embassy-funded initiative was helping reduce tensions between Sudanese refugees and Ethiopian host communities by supporting peacebuilding, dialogue and social cohesion, while strengthening local leadership, particularly among women and youth.
[Translation]
In closing, if I can leave the committee with just one take-away, it is this: From our vantage point in Addis Ababa, we are seeing that the biggest contribution Canada can make to Sudan is to connect diplomatic coordination and international aid, protection of civilians and support for local civilian actors. That means advancing diplomatic efforts in a complementary way, reaffirming the importance of international humanitarian law, and investing in community-level resilience, leadership and peacebuilding. Canada cannot resolve the crisis on its own, of course, but it can make a meaningful contribution to a more credible, principled and consistent international response. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you for your presentation, ambassador. I would like to remind the members of the committee that they have three minutes each, including questions and answers, in the first round.
[English]
In your questions, please be as concise as you possibly can. We will kick off the first round with Senator Harder, the deputy chair.
Senator Harder: Thank you to the officials for being here, as well as to the ambassador for joining us. I think this hearing is very relevant to the ongoing interest in the Senate on these issues. My comments have nothing to do with how we are not doing the right things or not doing enough. But I do see, from the statements that have been made, that this is not a static situation, and it is going in the wrong direction, and while we are increasing our efforts — all doing the right stuff — it is not an optimistic forecast, I guess.
I would like to understand better if there are points of leverage that you see that the Quad or the Quintet or other collections of interested parties could exercise greater effort on. To what extent are the present events in the region, in Iran and in the Gulf states, not only taking the focus off but reducing the capacity for leverage?
Mr. Clark: An easy one right off the bat. Thank you. You are absolutely right that the situation does not seem to be on a progressive and positive track.
Canada’s strategy and the strategy of our allies are to continue to support the Quad and its members in their efforts to bring a ceasefire or some semblance of a ceasefire. Where we can do that with them collectively and bilaterally, we are actively asking where and how we can support those efforts.
With the Quintet, the important group that Mr. Simard mentioned, with the UN, the AU, IGAD and the regional community playing a significant role there, we are working very closely with them to ensure that when there is a ceasefire — let’s remain optimistic — there is a process in place to quickly be deployed to try and ensure that there is a transition to more sustainable peace.
When it comes to leverage, I think that Canada’s role, what we can leverage is our brand, our leadership, and our financial contributions do not go unnoticed. They are extremely impactful. But is that going to be resulting in contributing to a ceasefire? It’s unlikely that the spend will.
But by virtue of our leadership in that space, it does give us a voice with the members of the Quad and with the members of the Quintet, and people do listen to what Canada has to say. They certainly listen to what the ambassador has to say on the ground, and we are using every ounce of that influence that we can. I can assure you of that. Pardon me, senator, but what was the second part of your question?
The Chair: I’m afraid we’re out of time. Can you do 30 seconds?
Mr. Clark: Fuel, the prices. It is making it harder for civilians to get access to anything, but is it making it harder for the belligerents getting access to weapons? It doesn’t appear so. It’s a disproportionate impact on civilians.
Senator Coyle: I have two very different questions. We have heard about the various coalitions working to bring about a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance and all of the things that need to happen for the good of the people of Sudan. We haven’t heard a whole lot about those who are working together or individually to not have that happen. There are forces at play that are not the good forces that you are talking about. I would like to know a little bit more if anybody can speak to those who are working counter to the intent that we have, which is to bring peace and safety to the people of Sudan. That’s one thing.
Second, if anybody is able at this point — I know it is early days, but the risk of Ebola spread to Sudan is on everyone’s minds. What is being done, if anything, to track and counter that?
Mr. Clark: I will provide a quick immediate response, and then I will ask Mr. Simard to come in behind.
On the other actors, we’re very aware of the multitude of different influences and interests that are at play in this region. It is incredibly complex. It is something that informs our analysis and our diplomacy. In our engagements with members of the Quad and the Quintet, this is how we share what we know and ask members of those groups to be aware of what they are doing and how they are supporting others in the region in their actions. It requires delicate diplomacy, but it is something that we do on a daily basis. Nicolas, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Simard: Thank you so much for the question. On the actors, of course, there is a variety of regional actors that we are aware have been involved in this conflict for quite some time and, more broadly, in the Horn of Africa, if you look at Ethiopia, Eritrea or other countries.
We are very engaged with our diplomatic partners to raise those issues when we can, including at the foreign minister level but also at my level, with ambassadors here in the region, to advocate for a ceasefire and for a return to a civilian-led transition that will bring back a democratic government in Sudan. We are making our best efforts to engage with those actors to convey our views, and I think they understand where we are coming from. That’s a contribution we are making to make some progress.
On the questions of the Ebola spread, as a matter of fact, I was the ambassador to the DRC between 2017 and 2020, and during my three years in Kinshasa, I went through three Ebola outbreaks at the time. It was the Zaire version of the disease, not the current version, which is more complicated to tackle because we don’t have a vaccine for that virus. So far, we have not heard anything about a case in Sudan. Of course, we know that the borders have been very porous. There is a risk that South Sudan might be affected even if, at this stage, there is confirmation of cases only for the DRC and Uganda.
This is something we are very concerned about for the region. We are in very close coordination with the United Nations, the World Health Organization, or WHO, and other organizations, including Denise Brown, who is the Canadian leading the UN efforts as Humanitarian Coordinator in Port Sudan and in Khartoum now who is very engaged on those issues.
So far, knock on wood, there has been no impact on Sudan in terms of the Ebola outbreak, but we have to keep a clear eye on this.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here. Thank you, Ambassador Simard, for joining us today.
I appreciated hearing your words about the importance of building coherence and decreasing hostility and having an inclusive Sudanese process here. I understand that. I’m thinking about the conversations you might be having and observing.
We know the Sudan war is highly interconnected and international. We know that this ongoing conflict in Iran is still under way and that the broader Middle East has shifted the balance of power and the dynamics of the war in Sudan. From your perspective — and I will open it up to both, but I will start with the ambassador — what do you think the impact is? Is the impact there? What do you see in that shift? And then I will have a quick follow-up.
Mr. Simard: Thank you so much, Senator Deacon. That’s a great question. The impact of the conflict in the Middle East has been very significant in the Horn of Africa. We still see it today, including here in Addis Ababa, where it has been a very significant shortage of oil for the last two months. So that limits our operation. Of course, there is the increase of the price of oil, but the main issue is the availability of oil, and there have been some limitations in our travel and also operations in relation to that situation.
That’s very specific about the oil situation, but also it has a huge impact on Sudan. It will increase the cost of aid delivery and humanitarian assistance. It is not just about oil; it is the question of fertilizers. There are lots of fertilizers coming from the Gulf, and with restrictions on accessing fertilizer, we can expect a worsening and an increase in food prices; that could further undermine food security in Sudan.
The war is directly affecting 33 million people; that’s 64% of the population who are in need of humanitarian assistance. But imagine the additional impact or the “polycrisis” dimension that brings the war in Iran in addition to what is going on in the Horn of Africa.
So that’s a very concrete impact, and earlier we talked about the role of regional actors. Those regional actors are obviously impacted by what is going on in the Gulf. It remains to be seen what the implications for the war in Sudan will be and the role that they can play. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. I wasn’t sure if Mr. Clark wanted to respond.
Mr. Clark: I will double down on the shortage and inflationary impacts that the war is having and will have. It will just erode the purchasing power of our assistance, if you will. The assistance dollar won’t be able to go as far as costs increase.
When you look at the numbers year on year, you can see that we have been increasing a little bit overall over the last few years, but we won’t get the same bang for the buck as prices go up — not to mention just shortages and availability, let alone access and being able to get in as the war continues. Just getting access — safe access — for humanitarian assistance providers, in particular, is extremely difficult and something that we continue to advocate for internationally and also on the ground through our embassies.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much to our witnesses for being here. You have earlier alluded to Canada’s $120-million assistance package. In a complex, volatile situation that exists in Sudan, how do we avert aid diversion? How can we ensure that the money is getting to whom it really has to, in particular, the operation of critical supply lines such as the Adre border crossing with Chad? Are we working with the World Food Programme, or WFP, and other agencies to ensure that the money and the aid actually get to people on the ground?
Mr. Clark: Thank you for the question; it’s great. This is something that preoccupies all of us every single day as custodians of taxpayer money. I will ask Tara Carney to go first, as she represents humanitarian assistance, which is the largest component, and then Mr. Simard can add a bit if there is time.
Tara Carney, Director, International Humanitarian Assistance Division, Global Affairs Canada: Thanks very much for the question. As Mr. Clark said, diversion is obviously something that is top of mind. We all recognize that humanitarian assistance is delivered in inherently risky contexts. This one is particularly risky.
That is actually why our humanitarian assistance is always delivered through experienced partners, not through governments, not through authorities. We choose these partners who have the ability to put safeguards in place as best as possible to ensure that aid reaches the end-state beneficiary. That will include things like having the right financial controls and having independent beneficiary selection mechanisms and having on-the-ground monitoring of aid going from point A to point Z in the process. So this is key. Is it always perfect? No, but now we are seeing a world in which where it is imperfect, we are finding out about those cases and every mitigation effort that is possible is made.
On the question of access and border crossings, and particularly the Adre border, I’d say that there is a lot of work that is being done by the UN and other humanitarian partners to work with governments to ensure as much as possible borders stay open. Most often, it’s under the leadership of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA, but you will see key actors like WFP playing those roles, too, whether it is border crossings, or whether it is with different authorities to negotiate under the principled and neutral positions that they have to keep aid flowing as much as possible.
Again, it’s imperfect, but systems are in place and work does continue, so things do keep happening, possibly not at the scale we want, but still moving.
Ambassador Simard, I don’t know if you would like to complement that.
Mr. Simard: I will just add a few thoughts. As you said, the selection of partners is crucial, and we work very closely with reputable organizations: UN organizations and international NGOs. We have a very good track record in managing their funds and managing our contributions.
That is the first thing that Ms. Carney mentioned, but there is also humanitarian diplomacy, engaging with authorities to talk about humanitarian assistance and coordination among donors. Meetings like the one in Addis Ababa a couple of weeks ago are crucial so that all donors look into this and make sure our collective assistance is being very well managed.
I will also add at the end that we’re very lucky to have a strong UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Canadian Denise Brown. She is a strong advocate and manager of international assistance and plays a leadership role in the UN system to manage these funds in the best manner. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, ambassador.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Ambassador, at the end of your remarks, you urged us to focus on supporting local civilian actors. What exactly do you mean?
Do we need to establish priorities? Is coverage missing in certain areas? What were you referring to when you said that?
Mr. Simard: Thank you, Senator Hébert. Certainly, local actors must play a crucial role in bringing peace and security to Sudan.
For most of its existence, the country has unfortunately been under military rule. Numerous coups d’état and regime overthrows have led to a fragile situation in the country. We believe civil society organizations and civilian groups need to be supported, so they can agree amongst themselves on pursuing a civilian-led, not military-led, peace process and political transition.
To that end, Canada uses peace and stabilization programming to support civil society groups, so they can work together to foster a return to democratic rule and bring the country back to where it was in 2018-19, when the al-Bashir regime ended.
If civil society organizations are not supported, the country could easily see a return to military rule, which would make for a future filled with further devastation.
Senator, that is why we believe civil society plays a crucial role, particularly women’s groups and youth groups, whose involvement in the peace process and political transition is fundamental.
The Sudan conference was held in Berlin, Germany, this past April 15, and I was pleased to see significant progress on the coordination of civil society efforts. That’s encouraging. Certainly, the conflict, which has created the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, has negative and troubling facets, but it also has positive aspects.
Senator Hébert: You mentioned women’s groups. I’d like one or two practical examples of that support. If we look at women’s groups, how do you provide that support? I imagine you provide financial support, but do you support them in other ways?
Mr. Simard: We support them through peace and stabilization programming. We support women’s groups, mainly by advocating for their involvement in peace and security efforts and the return to a democratic transition.
We also provide considerable support for anti-sexual violence initiatives. In Sudan, we’ve seen actors in the conflict use what is known as sexual torture for political purposes. We support women’s groups to combat sexual violence and gender-based violence, and to hold those on the ground who have committed these war crimes to account.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
I have a question for Ms. Carney, and it relates to the evisceration of USAID and what kind of an impact that has had on Sudan and the ongoing situation with respect to humanitarian aid. On the next panel, we will hear from the World Food Programme, and I know there has been a fairly big impact there. Has this led to any increased efforts in terms of coordination between traditional donor countries? If you could comment on that, and perhaps the ambassador might have a comment on that as well.
Ms. Carney: Thank you for the question. The change in the U.S. approach to humanitarian assistance, to international assistance, has had impacts on the system. They are not the only ones around the world where we have seen a decrease in humanitarian assistance. So the world is adjusting, and the system is adjusting to the new reality.
Partners are feeling the changes. We are seeing reduced footprints, both at headquarters and in the field, including in Sudan. Obviously, less money means it is harder to have the scale of assistance that is needed.
That being said, the U.S. has put money back into humanitarian assistance. They’ve just made their second allocation, and I think the total is close to $4 billion at this point that they have given to OCHA to run through pooled funds, including in Sudan. So there is money flowing again from the U.S. into the Sudan context, as well as many others.
That being said, the challenge is there, and there is a bit of a sense of trying to figure out, as a system, how to prioritize the most acute of needs. Donors like Canada are trying to figure out how to support that provision of assistance to where the most acute needs are.
You will probably hear from WFP colleagues on the next panel that what that has functionally meant is taking food from the extremely hungry to feed the starving. So you are seeing a gap in the ability to meet the needs across everybody who actually requires assistance.
The Chair: Following on Senator Hébert’s comment, is our focus on women and girls continuing? This is less so on the humanitarian side, but whatever we can do through the CFLI or through other funds. Maybe I’ll put that question to the ambassador.
Mr. Simard: Thank you. Of course, the focus on women and girls remains extremely important. As part of the announcement made in Berlin by Secretary of State Sarai, there is a contribution to the United Nations Population Fund, the UNFPA, for fighting sexual violence against women and ensuring proper care for women and girls in Sudan.
These are concrete examples from development programs, in addition to humanitarian assistance and the peace and security examples that I have mentioned. There is significant attention given to that, in addition to the role played by women in peace and security efforts.
Senator Coyle: My questions will jump all around because others have asked them.
I think I’m going to go back to where Senator Harder started this conversation with our witnesses today. We’re doing so much, we’re doing our best with our partners, and the situation is getting worse — on the humanitarian side, on the disruption in people’s lives and the violence being experienced — and it looks to be intractable in terms of a solution that is moving toward peace.
For whoever would like to answer this question, do you see any glimmers of hope? Are there indicators anywhere that we can point to where there is some light starting to shine through that we can start to build on?
Mr. Clark: We search for glimmers of hope every day in all that we do. I witnessed one first-hand when I was in Addis Ababa a week ago, I think. I can’t remember; I’m still jet-lagged. Mr. Simard hosted a meeting of all of his counterparts who cover Sudan from Ethiopia, and we were able to talk about how all systems are mobilizing and preparing.
Is there a glimmer of hope of conflict ending tomorrow? No. But is the international community working hand in hand and as prepared as possible for when there is a ceasefire? Yes.
Seeing first-hand the enhanced coordination and the leadership that our ambassador is playing on the ground there in convening all the right players gave me a glimmer of hope. Sometimes, from Ottawa, when we read and write about these things, but you don’t see it every day — although the ambassador and I speak quite frequently online — seeing first-hand the level of passion and commitment was a glimmer of hope for me just from a purely preparatory perspective, which is what we can do right now.
Ambassador, would you like to add to that?
Mr. Simard: Thank you, Ryan.
There is a reason for hope. I’m an optimist, so I’m always looking for that. We have to. I have been in tough places. I come from the Sahara. I was in Mali for the last two years. These are tough environments.
But as Mr. Clark mentioned, since I arrived in Addis in September last year, we have had regular meetings; we had regional meetings in Nairobi, Cairo and now in Addis. I have seen an increase in the coordination between principal donors and international actors on Sudan.
As I mentioned earlier, the Berlin conference was a success. It doesn’t bring peace immediately to Sudan, but there was a significant pledge; €1.5 billion was pledged in Berlin. If you look at all the international crises and the international attention going to other places, it’s a significant achievement. We have seen the adoption of the Berlin principles, which bring together countries like the U.S., the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia and other actors together in support for those principles that call for the end of the conflict. That is positive.
In addition, to go back to Senator Hébert’s question, we are seeing much more cohesion than before between the civilian groups. It is not all the civilian groups; I would say those that are affiliated with the RSF don’t have the same level of inclusion as other groups. But there was real progress made in Berlin and after Berlin for the cohesion of civilians together to bring back democracy in a civilian-led transition.
The Chair: Thank you, ambassador.
Senator Harder: I’m happy to hear about the glimmers of hope and your ongoing persistence in seeking them.
I want to talk about the glimmers of hope on the supply of arms. Are there any? Despite sanctions and embargoes, arms are still getting through. Your reference to drones tells me that new technologies are getting through, as well. Are there any points of leverage on this that are untested, or are we being too polite to the arms suppliers?
Mr. Clark: Thank you for the easy question, senator. I believe you mentioned drones, and I may have acknowledged and nodded.
We’re aware of different actors that are supporting the belligerents in this conflict. We speak with many of the sovereign states that some reports have accused of being involved, and we engage in active diplomacy around these issues to encourage the cessation of the provisioning of arms and the cessation of hostilities. We call for it publicly frequently at the ministerial level. At the working level, with the diplomats, the ambassador and I take every opportunity we can to raise these issues and encourage the stopping of arms getting in and fuelling the conflict.
Senator Harder: Are there international actors that aren’t using the leverage they have with those states?
Mr. Clark: To the best of my knowledge, I believe that all international actors committed to realizing a ceasefire and, ultimately, peace in Sudan are doing what they can.
Senator M. Deacon: Most of my responses have come from the questions around hope and women and girls, which have just been addressed. However, the one other piece I’m trying to think about is education and learning. We’ve certainly learned some things from other countries that have had to try and embrace this, engage this, sustain this — do something.
Ambassador, do you have any insights as to what pockets of anything are happening on the ground related to learning?
Mr. Simard: That is an excellent question.
As you mentioned, the conflict has forced the majority of Sudan’s 17 million children out of school. That is a major impact when you think about the longer-term prospects for the development of the country and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts that will take place at some point. If the conflict continues and you don’t see these kids accessing education, that might mean a sacrificed generation in the conflict. That is extremely important.
That is why I come back to the Berlin conference. As part of the announcement that we made in Berlin, there is support for education in conflict with Save the Children. That is a significant contribution as part of the $25 million that was announced specifically on development efforts, in addition to humanitarian efforts, and peace and security.
We really believe that education is fundamental. Sometimes, it is the thing you don’t think about. You think about shelter, food, water and sanitation, but health and basic services are crucial for the development of the country and for helping these kids, families, girls and boys to get back on their feet once the conflict is over.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: This civil war has severely destabilized the greater Horn of Africa and North Africa. As the conflict enters its fourth year, with more than 4.5 million refugees now traversing its borders, collapsing trade routes and pulling neighbouring states into volatile political and military proxy dynamics, are we monitoring the situation that is happening in Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia and the huge potential political implications there?
Mr. Clark: With the capacities that we have, yes. With our missions on the ground where we have them and where we have representatives, yes. Where we have trusted partners that can share information with us, we absolutely do receive that, and it helps to increase our awareness and helps us with decision making when we have to do so.
I’ll ask Ms. Carney to speak a bit more of the humanitarian coordination around the region. Then, if there is time left, Mr. Simard can certainly speak to how he stays in close touch with the other ambassadors and representatives on the ground from an information-sharing perspective. We don’t have representation in all of those countries, so we do have to deploy a very flexible form of diplomacy. Addis Ababa is a very important hub and the reason we have such strong representation there.
Ms. Carney: On the humanitarian side, it is a bit easier because we have humanitarian partners that are active in almost every neighbouring country and then a bit further afield into the region. There is a flow of information on how populations are moving and the impacts and needs with those populations as they move, but also on the host communities they are moving to. We provide humanitarian assistance in neighbouring countries, as well.
The announcement that was made in Berlin on the humanitarian assistance side included significant funding to Chad and South Sudan, both of which have their own issues but are also hosting a significant number of Sudanese refugees. It is a concern.
This is the world’s largest displacement crisis at the moment, and that has impacts in places that didn’t previously have to deal with populations with these levels of need. It’s on the radar. We’re paying attention.
Ambassador, anything to add?
Mr. Simard: Thank you for the question, Senator Ravalia.
From here, I look at, of course, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan. With my colleagues in Nairobi, we also look at other countries in the Horn of Africa — Somalia and Eritrea — and then we have an embassy in Juba, in South Sudan.
We have this overview of the situation in the Horn of Africa, which is very fragile, as you have mentioned. There is a significant number of refugees in Ethiopia. We have to acknowledge all the support that the authorities here in Ethiopia and also the population are giving to more than 1 million people coming from Sudan. That is massive. If you think about it, that is a significant number of people who are flowing through the borders, not talking about South Sudan or Somalia.
The other thing I want to mention is that since I have covered Djibouti, I have been able to observe, myself, first-hand, what we call the Eastern Route migration flows going through the Red Sea and going to the Gulf states. It is massive. We don’t talk about it because we focus on the situation of migration to Europe or other parts of the world, but it is also a humanitarian disaster when we think about those young women and boys who are risking their lives to cross to the Gulf states.
To come back to your question on proxies, of course, there are proxy dynamics in the region, and this is really core to our political messaging in our engagement at the highest level in all of these countries and also with the ambassadors with whom I meet regularly in Addis Ababa.
The Chair: I think we have come to the end of our deliberations today. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Ambassador Simard, Ryan Clark and Tara Carney for being with us today and for being forthright. You are all fine public servants, and we appreciate the work that you do and that of your teams. Thank you very much.
For our second panel, we welcome, from the World Food Programme, Matthew Hollingworth, Assistant Executive Director, Department of Programme Operations. He is joining us by video conference from Rome. From Project Ploughshares, we have Kelsey Gallagher, Senior Researcher, also by video conference. From World Vision Canada, we have Martin Fischer, Head of Policy and Government Relations, here in the room — welcome — and Helen Barclay-Hollands, Head of Fragile and Humanitarian Affairs. Thank you all for being with us today.
We are ready to hear opening remarks. Mr. Hollingworth, you will have the floor first. Please go ahead.
Matthew Hollingworth, Assistant Executive Director, Department of Programme Operations, World Food Programme: Honourable chair, senators and distinguished witnesses, thanks very much for the opportunity to appear before you today to speak about Sudan. I will share an overview of the food security situation, and then I will present our work through the World Food Programme, or WFP, and our asks as the World Food Programme.
Clearly, Sudan is facing one of the world’s gravest food security crises. Four in every ten Sudanese are acutely food insecure, which means around 19.5 million people are not eating enough to survive. More than 5 million people are in emergency conditions, while 135,000 faced catastrophic hunger. “Catastrophic hunger” means famine, which continues to loom across entire regions, especially across Darfur and Kordofan.
At the peak of the crisis, in September of last year, the situation was even worse. Famine was then confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli when around 2 million or more people faced acute food insecurity.
Honourable chair, senators and distinguished witnesses, while seasonal factors and humanitarian efforts may have helped prevent further deterioration, we now again risk losing the gains that have been made on food security.
It is extremely worrying, and should worry all of us, that after the harvest period, when food availability should be improving, 41% of Sudan’s population remains in crisis hunger or worse.
Sharp funding cuts, combined with rising costs driven by, in particular, the Middle East crisis, are forcing really difficult choices. “Hyper-prioritization” of those whom we serve means that we are leaving entire communities behind.
WFP continues to deliver, I would say, but the response, as I have noted, is under serious strain. In April, we reached over 3 million people with food, cash and nutrition support, most of them in Darfur and Kordofan. This includes targeted nutrition support for children and breastfeeding women and girls, reaching over 200,000 people in April. On a monthly basis, our goal is to deliver these kinds of numbers, but sustaining that is becoming increasingly difficult.
Funding fell sharply, as I have noted, and WFP Sudan has only received 13% of the resources that we received this time last year. By July, the food pipeline will be 97% depleted, and cash transfers only half-funded.
These shortfalls have already meant that our annual reach has reduced by 3 million people compared with last year, so around half of what we were doing previously. Without new funding, assistance to people in need will continue to fall throughout the year.
Conflict, insecurity and bureaucratic obstacles also constrain our delivery. The conflict still remains very active. There are drone strikes every single day. Movements in key locations, like the Kordofan, in Kadugli and Dilling, are severely affected.
In addition, earlier this month, some 2,600 metric tons of food, which is equivalent to 130 truckloads of food assistance, was stuck for an extended period awaiting clearances from Northern Sudan, delaying assistance to some 300,000 people for a month.
Despite these constraints, we are trying to maximize food deliveries across the country. We are working with 40 partners to expand cross-border and cross-line deliveries and maintain open corridors to the country. We are expanding operations currently in Darfur, mapping needs and deploying cash-based transfers at scale, including to Tawila camp, where there was famine noted last year.
We are maximizing procurement of commodities locally, including sorghum and wheat, in areas of the country where we can buy locally produced food. But with the rainy season approaching, the window to pre-position food around the country to avert further deterioration is narrowing, and that’s a big concern.
Honourable chair, senators and distinguished witnesses, let’s keep the humanitarian lifeline moving. Canada’s voice, in particular, and support are essential in doing so. Our appeals to you are straightforward.
First, Canada must continue to advocate for expanded humanitarian access and the removal of barriers that delay all kinds of life-saving assistance.
Second, we need continued support for humanitarian principles and the protection of humanitarian space, which is critical as needs deepen and conditions worsen.
Third, we need sustained, flexible and multi-year funding. That is essential.
We thank Canada always for its support. Your support enables us to pre-position supplies, act early and reach the most fragile and hard-to-reach areas. Canada’s support is making a real difference at a critical moment. We urge you to continue sustaining the life-saving support and to use your influence to press for access and conditions needed to end this conflict, which is ultimately what is causing this desperate situation.
In Sudan today, the trajectory is very clear. Either we secure better access and scale our approach and we move forward in that sense to end the conflict, or more and more people will be pushed into catastrophic levels of hunger.
Thank you very much. Back to you, chair.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hollingworth. We will now hear from Kelsey Gallagher.
Kelsey Gallagher, Senior Researcher, Project Ploughshares: Chair and honourable senators, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. My name is Kelsey Gallagher, Senior Researcher with Project Ploughshares.
Established in 1976, Ploughshares has conducted research and policy advocacy related to peace, security and disarmament at both the national and the international level for the last five decades.
The conflict in Sudan, which escalated into a full-scale civil war in April 2023, has been described by UN officials as one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century. The death toll, estimated by various sources to range from tens of thousands to over 100,000, cannot be confirmed due in part to severe restrictions on humanitarian access amid ongoing conflict.
According to Amnesty International, all parties to the conflict are using a wide variety of arms to commit serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, in some instances amounting to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Despite a UN arms embargo on parts of the country, the conflict has been fuelled by a near-uninterrupted flow of conventional weapons that continue to sustain the violence. And, regrettably, Canadian-produced armaments have appeared among them.
Dozens of images recently verified by the CBC show XLCR sniper rifles, produced by Sterling Cross Defense Systems in Abbotsford, British Columbia, in the possession of the Rapid Support Forces.
The RSF has faced consistent allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, particularly in and around El Fasher in Darfur. Findings by UN investigators allege that RSF forces carried out mass killings, ethnically targeted attacks against non-Arab communities, widespread sexual violence, torture, looting and attacks on displacement camps, hospitals and humanitarian infrastructure. Some UN investigators have stated the pattern of abuses bears the “hallmarks of genocide.”
Canada has maintained an arms embargo on parts of Sudan since 2004. There is no credible indication these weapons were authorized for transfer to Sudan by Canadian officials. How these weapon systems have nonetheless proliferated in the conflict remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Canada’s export control regime has significant vulnerabilities that must be addressed.
A separate case concerns a Canadian-origin company that has reportedly violated the Sudanese arms embargo on multiple occasions. The STREIT Group produces armoured combat vehicles and was originally established in Canada in 1993. It has grown into one of the world’s largest privately owned producers of armoured combat vehicles, reportedly manufacturing up to 500 units a month.
Since the 2010s, the company has expanded its overseas manufacturing capacity through a network of offshore facilities, particularly in jurisdictions with poor human rights records and comparatively weak arms export controls. Its largest facility is now located in the United Arab Emirates, a country UN experts have alleged as being a key source of conventional arms to the RSF.
The STREIT Group’s vehicles have long been present in Sudan. In 2016, a UN panel report directly named the company for violating the standing UN arms embargo. More recently, human rights monitors and journalists have identified several STREIT Group vehicles in the RSF’s arsenal since the renewal of the conflict, including the Cougar, Gladiator and Spartan armoured combat vehicle variants. These vehicles were not exported from Canada but rather from one of the company’s overseas facilities, widely assumed to be its U.A.E. operation.
Canada is a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty, which bars Canadian officials from authorizing the transfer of conventional weapons that pose a substantial risk of being used in serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, a threshold evidently reached in the conflict in Sudan.
However, Canadian officials have not taken further regulatory action, largely because the vehicles are produced and transferred from the company’s overseas facilities rather than from Canada itself, a regulatory gap the STREIT Group has effectively exploited, circumventing Canadian export controls in the process.
Chair and honourable senators, the relationship between the proliferation of conventional weapons and serious human rights abuses is well established, and nowhere is this more evident today than in Sudan. As such, Project Ploughshares recommends that the federal government take the following steps to strengthen Canada’s arms export control regime to ensure Canadian-linked weapons are not contributing to the violence in Sudan:
First, regarding the diversion of Canadian firearms to the conflict, Global Affairs Canada should conduct a pilot study on the adoption of post-shipment controls into Canada’s conventional arms-control regime. Post-shipment controls are measures that enable proactive monitoring and verification of exported materiel following its departure from the exporter’s territory, providing safeguards against diversion. The study should draw on post-shipment control regimes implemented by European allies, with attention to their legal basis, scope and challenges to implementation.
Second, regarding the proliferation of STREIT-produced vehicles in the conflict, Global Affairs Canada should review Canada’s brokering controls under the Export and Import Permits Act to ensure effective regulation of brokering activities conducted by Canadian persons and entities through third countries, including offshore subsidiaries and foreign production arrangements in jurisdictions with weak export controls or inadequate transparency mechanisms. The review should further examine mechanisms for proactive compliance monitoring within Global Affairs Canada.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions regarding our recommendations following the conclusion of opening statements.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Now, we will hear from Martin Fischer.
Martin Fischer, Head of Policy and Government Relations, World Vision Canada: Chair and honourable senators, thank you for the invitation to appear today and for taking your time to shed light on the crisis in Sudan.
World Vision Canada is a Christian global relief, development and advocacy organization focused on the needs and rights of children. In Canada, we are supported by 220,000 supporters who give, on average, $473 per year to fund our work in 55 countries, including Sudan.
We began working in Sudan in 1983. Then, due to the civil war, we had to take a pause, but resumed our work in 2004. Currently, we work across South Darfur, Blue Nile, East Darfur and South Kordofan, providing life-saving and longer-term support alongside local and international partners.
Since April 2023, when the current crisis broke out, our response in Sudan and neighbouring countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda, has reached 5.6 million people, including 3.2 million children.
After more than three years of conflict, Sudan, as we have heard, is one of the world’s most severe and dangerous humanitarian crises and the world’s largest displacement crisis. More than 33 million people require humanitarian assistance; roughly half are children. Millions have been forced from their homes. Children are being pushed out of school, separated from family, exposed to hunger and disease and forced to survive a conflict they did not choose and cannot escape.
Across Sudan, as we have heard, humanitarian access is being restricted and politicized. Aid organizations face blocked routes, looting, insecurity, administrative delays, checkpoints, movement restrictions and repeated and violent direct attacks that turn deadly. These are not technical obstacles. They are life-and-death barriers that determine whether children receive food, clean water, health care and protection and whether our colleagues are able to work in safety.
To make this concrete, the World Vision Sudan colleagues describe visa approvals that can take weeks or months, sometimes only arriving at the end of a deployment after sequential approvals through multiple authorities.
Accessing communities in Darfur, specifically, can require travel through Juba, in South Sudan, thus necessitating additional visas and permits for that country and a border crossing back into Sudan before teams can reach project sites. Not only is it expensive, it is delayed.
Even routine project monitoring visits may require travel permits and passage through multiple checkpoints, sometimes as many as 15 in one day, each adding time, cost and uncertainty. These barriers slow assistance and make it harder to reach children and families when needs are most acute.
International humanitarian law is clear. Humanitarian relief must be allowed to reach those in need. They’re not abstract legal principles. They are the rules meant to protect human life when conflict erupts.
As Sudan fades from public view, Canada, and its foreign policy, faces a test of its principles. We’re deeply concerned by — and heard more in detail from Mr. Gallagher about — public reporting that Canadian-made weapons have appeared on Sudan’s front lines, namely, military-grade precision sniper rifles produced in Abbotsford, B.C.
We want to be precise: We are not alleging that Canada has deliberately armed this conflict. But when Canadian-made weapons or components surface in conflicts marked by atrocities, mass displacement and attacks on civilians, it points to a serious gap in our export control system. Once these weapons reach armed actors, they risk fuelling violence and making humanitarian work even more dangerous.
While it’s not entirely clear how these rifles ended up in Sudan, given that Canada has maintained an arms embargo since 2023, the absence of clear answers does not diminish Canada’s obligations to ensure that Canadian-made weapons do not end up enabling atrocities, worsening conflict or undermining the protection of civilians.
Canada should focus its efforts on areas where practical action can make a real difference, so let me conclude with three recommendations:
We have heard about humanitarian access. Our recommendation is that Canada should champion humanitarian access, specifically for children in Sudan. The government should work with partners and humanitarian agencies to convene a high-level political dialogue in Ottawa — it can also be in Wakefield — on humanitarian access in Sudan. This should bring together existing mechanisms and produce practical protocols for documenting, escalating and responding to aid denial, attacks on aid operations and administrative obstruction.
Concretely, Canada should use its diplomatic voice, including through the UN Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict, to consider co-launching with partners a safeguarding humanitarian access for children initiative. Where actors systematically obstruct life-saving assistance, Canada and its partners should press for consequences.
Second, briefly, to augment what Mr. Gallagher said, Canada should close gaps in its arms export system. The government should review the Export and Import Permits Act and its regulations, with a focus on diversion risks, end-use certification and post-shipment verification. Canada should also work with its allies to adopt comparable safeguards for transfers to states or intermediaries with histories of diversion or serious human rights concerns.
Third and final — directly for senators — senators should explore legislative pathways to make Canada’s response to major humanitarian crises such as Sudan more predictable and accountable. One option would be a humanitarian crisis response accountability act. Such a law would not need to create any new spending, but it could establish objective criteria for whole-of-government action; require the government to assess whether those criteria are met and, as a result, table a response plan; report on key risks, including humanitarian access and arms diversion; consult civil society and affected communities; and, most importantly, return to Parliament with regular updates on what the government has been doing. The core principle is simple: When a crisis reaches a certain scale, Canada should have to assess, respond and explain — predictably, transparently and accountably.
In conclusion, senators, Sudan is testing whether humanitarian principles are defended when attention is low and choices are difficult. Concern alone will not reach children cut off from aid. Statements alone will not stop weapons from flowing into conflict, so Canada, today, must match its principles with consistent and practical action. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Colleagues, as usual, we’ll have three-minute segments. I have three senators who want to ask questions. More are welcome. We’ll start with, Senator Harder, the deputy chair.
Senator Harder: Thank you to our witnesses for your presentations and for your suggestions. I want to follow up with Martin Fischer if I could. I am intrigued by your third option, because it is one that you are putting on our shoulders specifically. Isn’t that done already? And what would be the advantages, as you see it, of legislation? If it is not done, where are the gaps?
Mr. Fischer: Both Senator Boehm and Senator Harder would know this better than anyone, based on their experience in Foreign Affairs. It is done in an ad hoc, disparate approach between departments, but not brought together. I remember when “whole of government” was the term in Ottawa, and everybody was like, “We need to have defence, diplomacy and development around the table and develop country strategies when conflict erupts.” It all kind of fizzled.
While the analysis may exist, what we’re pointing to is that, first, it shouldn’t have to be done for every crisis, but really, when you are looking at severe crises like the current one in Sudan — where different independent indicators that exist in the system have been triggered, whether they are famine crises, famine indicators or, in our case, sort of global category 3 crises — there should be some degree of accountability back to Parliament. To us, that is a key component.
If you look at the current response from the government, yes, the statements are there, the statements of concern, and the funding is there. We appreciate the package that was announced in Berlin. The engagement is there. I have high respect for Ambassador Simard. And then what? How will anybody ever know what happened to the funding or what happened as a consequence of the statements, and how will parliamentarians be able to hold the government to account that what it actually said and the money that it committed made an actual impact on the country? To us, that is the additional dimension. For crises that have reached this degree of severity and this degree of concern, there ought to be a heightened degree of accountability back to Parliament.
Senator Harder: Mr. Gallagher, I’m intrigued by your comments with respect to Canadian arms getting through, and Mr. Fischer spoke to that as well. What reaction are you getting from officials when you engage with them on this issue, and are there obstacles to the actions that you are suggesting that they put forward?
Mr. Gallagher: Thank you for the question, senator. The two examples of Canadian weapons permeating into Sudan are quite distinct. In terms of what we have heard from officials on the second, which is this company — the STREIT Group — and the proliferation of armoured combat vehicles, we have called for brokering controls to be implemented consistently. However, we have been met with a notion that brokering controls — or I should say Canada’s export control regime, more generally — are not extraterritorial in nature. We would disagree with that. Brokering controls are, indeed, extraterritorial in nature, and that is why they exist. They exist to close gaps where bad actors exploit offshore production havens or seek out jurisdiction shopping, that sort of thing.
I think the broader issue with gainfully implementing brokering controls is there are challenges, as you can imagine. These are extraterritorial measures. I think that there need to be resources afforded to the Export Controls Division at Global Affairs Canada to really implement these controls in a wholesome way, and that would include looking at best practices done by other countries.
Senator Harder: And on the first example?
Mr. Gallagher: The issue of sniper rifles appearing in Sudan, this is a relatively new phenomenon; at least it is only recently that it was reported on by Canadian media. This was back in October, I think. Canadian officials, as far as I remember, responded to the story by saying that we did not authorize these transfers to Sudan, which should come as no surprise. As Mr. Fischer said, the Government of Canada is not knowingly transferring weapons to Sudan, which would obviously be a violation of the UN arms embargo and Canadian law.
So Canadian officials don’t really have much to say because they don’t know how these weapons permeated into the conflict, which is an issue in and of itself.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I would like to, before going to Senator Coyle, make a comment based on Senator Harder’s question to Mr. Fischer. The Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, or ODAAA, has been around since 2008. As a former Deputy Minister of International Development, I was certainly, when I was in that position, very mindful of that act, and the act was designed to provide that accountability that you mentioned. I don’t want to get into a debate, but I do not see a scenario in the future where any government would want to legislate something again that is already covered in that particular instrument of legislation.
Mr. Fischer: The ODAAA, which has recently resurfaced in some conversations, was a private member’s bill championed by John McKay and focuses on what the spending should do and how the government ought to be accountable for what the spending does. The suggestion we have made here is that we are not looking at being accountable primarily for spending, but really for ensuring that a structured, predictable and largely directive process is undertaken by the government for crises like this and to report back on the process, not necessarily on the spending.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I would submit that this is what does happen, but that’s fine. We will move on.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to all of our witnesses for being with us and for the work that you are doing.
The word “barriers” has come up on a couple of occasions here on this panel. I believe, Mr. Hollingworth, you spoke about barriers, and I believe, Mr. Fischer, you also spoke about barriers. Could each of you dig more deeply into those barriers and what remedies you would see helping with those?
Mr. Hollingworth: Thank you for your question. When we refer to barriers, we refer primarily to impediments imposed on us by the various authorities, both the government running out of Port Sudan and also the RSF-led government in Darfur that imposes various requirements in order to request access to areas. Those impediments are typically administrative in nature, but they slow things down, or they bring things to a halt.
We have had various cases, as I mentioned, and one where very significant amounts of food to support more than 300,000 people were held in place for many weeks, which stopped us from being able to provide assistance to those people for at least a month. Those are self-imposed administrative barriers on their side.
What we need to break through those barriers is for them to be widely understood and called out and a recognition that they go against international humanitarian law. We need the support being provided to the Humanitarian Coordinator, Denise Brown — who is doing an amazing job, by the way — so that she can help us get that access around the country, as we need it in a timely manner.
Helen Barclay-Hollands, Head of Fragile and Humanitarian Affairs, World Vision Canada: Thank you for the question.
When we speak about barriers, I can maybe give a few specific examples of what that looks like for our field teams. We have mentioned the challenge around visas and travel permits; that is one. Also, when we are looking at our own programming, we have to go through multiple levels of approvals from different actors, not just the donor approvals. These are actors in-country requiring approvals of our projects before we can even start delivering alongside our partner, the WFP.
There are barriers when we have these delays to getting aid to the communities most in need, not to mention issues of security. When we’re even able to get the aid, and we have the approvals, and we’re on our way to the field to deliver this much-needed assistance, we still have to assess the security and the safety of our own personnel before we can even access those areas.
There are multiple multi-faceted barriers, but those are some of the practical examples I can share. Thanks.
Senator Coyle: If I understand what you are asking for, it is assistance from our diplomatic leaders and their counterparts to help to smooth the way for that.
Mr. Hollingworth, I believe you separated out — I think I heard your three things. One was barriers, bringing down the barriers. The other was protection of humanitarian space. I think you have, maybe, put those two together, Ms. Barclay-Hollands. Then the third was, of course, financial support.
Is either of you seeing any action from Canada and our counterparts to help bring down those barriers? What have you seen already, and what more would you like to see?
Mr. Hollingworth: Thank you, senator.
We do see great support in terms of Canada’s engagement, but it just needs to be sustained because you need patience and an enormous amount of perseverance in order to make this happen. There is no easy way to negotiate across the country.
It also means having those conversations with other nations as well and not only with the Sudanese nations that are sponsoring both sides in this conflict. It is about having a broader conversation on the importance of ensuring that hunger and food insecurity are not part of the tools of war but are, rather, kept out of those tools of war. Part of that means that we need to be able to get access in a timely way.
That is a broader conversation and one that, I think, we have had in other countries as well.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our guests for being here and online today. I know I may have brought this up last time, but I want to come back to the issue around the weapons, the rifles and the armoured vehicles. Without flogging it too much, I think this is critical.
I think Senator Harder referred to the actions that you are undertaking, but you talked about how this must be addressed by the government. I would like to, one more time, understand the term “must be addressed.” What is it you need to be really clear to see that it is done and that it is actually going to have action? Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher: Thank you so much for the question.
Our two recommendations are achievable, and they are concrete. This is not reinventing the wheel. One would be for Canada to introduce post-shipment controls. These have different names, depending on whom you’re speaking to. Sometimes these are called post-shipment verification measures, and this is part of an anti-diversion tool kit which would allow Canadian officials to inspect on-site Canadian arms exports after they leave Canadian soil. That is one. This is a concrete measure to interrupt the diversion of material, such as sniper rifles.
Right now, the Government of Canada is unclear how these sniper rifles have permeated into Sudan. They do not have the tools to follow up and figure out where, perhaps, or what route they took. Post-shipment controls would allow for that; that’s number one.
Number two would be for Canada to expand its current regulatory tool kit around brokering. So as per Canada’s obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty, Article 10 of the Arms Trade Treaty requires all states parties — of which Canada has been one since September 2019 — to implement controls on brokering.
What brokering does is it controls the transfer of conventional weapons that happens outside of a state party’s territory. This was introduced, actually, into the Arms Trade Treaty, quite frankly, to address situations like what we’re seeing in Sudan.
What this would mean would be that in any case where a Canadian citizen or a Canadian entity is directing an arms deal — so a transfer of matériel, controlled goods in Canada — they would require a brokering permit. This is already the case in Canada. Canada, on paper, has quite a robust brokering control tool kit, but, from our perspective, it is just currently not being implemented to its full degree.
If you look at the number of export permits for military transfers or for arms sales in a given year, there are more than 5,000 that are approved by Global Affairs Canada. The number of brokering permits last year was 32, so that is less than 0.5% of all export permits. From our perspective, there is brokering that is happening with Canadian entities and Canadian citizens abroad, but it is not captured under Canada’s brokering control regime.
The reason for that is brokering is difficult to regulate, as one can assume. You’re attempting to regulate something that is happening outside of the eyes of Canadian officials, so our recommendation would be for Canada, generally, to not only add onto its brokering controls regime but provide greater resources for Global Affairs Canada so they can proactively monitor and verify when brokering is happening to reduce the likelihood that we see things like Canadian-linked STREIT armoured vehicles violating a UN arms embargo.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much to all of our witnesses. I’d like to address my question to Matthew Hollingworth, and let me acknowledge the work that you are doing in extremely difficult circumstances.
We’ve heard about the collapse of the health care and emergency medical system within the country, destruction of infrastructure — deliberately — medicine deficits and now epidemic outbreaks. I’m wondering to what extent this is impacting your work and how you’re responding to that situation.
Mr. Hollingworth: Thank you, Senator Ravalia. First of all, Eid Mubarak.
In terms of the impact, obviously, it has a great impact on those we serve across the country. It is not just buildings and concrete that are destroyed. There is a lack of electricity and a lack of power. Hospitals go without electricity for hours, if not days. It’s harder to deliver around the country because of the structural damage, and it is much harder for our partners and our operators in the country to function.
There is no question: Every area of development that Sudan once benefited from has gone back many decades, and it will take many, many years to go back to where it once was. People across the country suffer, including in areas that once could have been defined as very well developed. So it is a very difficult situation for all parts and all citizens of that great nation.
Ms. Barclay-Hollands: There are huge challenges in terms of infrastructure, not least because it hinders advances in development and how we can reach those communities. I think it’s raising huge needs and huge questions about how we can get this life-saving assistance to those communities. It is affecting women and children the most, and also affecting our own local staff as well — how they can get to these places with that element of insecurity and not knowing whether the infrastructure we’re accessing will be accessible the next day or even existing the next day as well, due to the ongoing conflict.
Senator Ravalia: Just as a follow-up, I was recently at the Inter-Parliamentary Union meetings in Türkiye. I had an opportunity to speak to delegates from some of the neighbouring countries, and their feeling was that Sudan is kind of a forgotten crisis by the global community, that we have put disproportionate emphasis on the other major conflict and that the world needs to be more responsive. I know this is a philosophical type of question, but Mr. Hollingworth, your comments, please.
Mr. Hollingworth: I don’t disagree. As I have said, we are 13% covered this year in comparison to last year. That is a very serious reduction, when last year we were warning of famines across Sudan. There is no question that there has been some fatigue or weariness that has changed the situation or, indeed, because there are so many others. I would say South Sudan and Somalia are in equal ways forgotten right now and face catastrophic needs for their populations as well. So, unfortunately, there are multiple regions of the world that we could say are similar, Afghanistan included.
It is of great worry to us in Sudan because we worked very hard last year with partners like World Vision to mitigate famine conditions. Those famine conditions are precariously still close to many people across Sudan, and we should be concerned because of that.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: First, I want to commend all of the witnesses for their humanitarian work. I can’t imagine how difficult it is trying to deal with this situation, and how frustrating.
But I have a question, and perhaps I should have asked it in the last panel, but I have to ask it now. I will direct the question to Mr. Hollingworth and Mr. Gallagher. Are there any good guys here between the RSF and the SAF? Who are the good guys here? If one of them wins and takes over the country tomorrow completely, or the other one does, what happens then?
Mr. Hollingworth: Senator MacDonald, you ask the toughest question of the evening. I think there are problems with all sides in this conflict and what they have done in order to win and what they continue to do in order to win. We should bear that absolutely in mind in future conversations. But those are conversations around accountability for the future.
My role within the World Food Programme is actually to look at the real good guys and how we can support them, and those are the people of Sudan who are impacted by this crisis, whom we, our teams and our partners like World Vision work diligently every single day, with enormous perseverance and bravery, to continue to support. They are the ones that our focus is on.
But there will come a time of reckoning and accountability. And, no doubt, we would have confidence that Canada will be one of the nations that is there to try to ensure that this very important part of this triangle is completed. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher: I don’t have much to add over what Mr. Hollingworth included, except to say that all parties to the conflict face credible allegations of violations of international humanitarian law. That includes both the RSF and the government forces under the SAF. I don’t want to say there are no good guys, but I’ll leave it at that.
Senator MacDonald: Mr. Gallagher, you mentioned military stuff coming in from Canada that shouldn’t be there. What is the source of most of the weaponry that is coming into the country? Who is funding most of it?
Mr. Gallagher: Thank you for the question. It’s a broad question —
Senator MacDonald: I guess we know who is funding it, but where are the armaments coming from? What countries?
Mr. Gallagher: All credible assessments of this come down to a few major players. That would include the U.A.E.; it would include parts of Türkiye; it would also include a host of Chinese weapons, including things like UAVs. Generally speaking, there are no Western countries that are knowingly providing weapons into the conflict zone.
Again, this should come as no surprise. It would be a violation of the UN arms embargo to see any weapons transferred into Sudan or, more precisely, Darfur. As well, most of the West are states parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, or ATT. But, yes, so we’re seeing most of the arms flows coming from the U.A.E, Türkiye, China, as well as Egypt.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
Senator Coyle: My question is for Mr. Gallagher. Actually, just a couple of questions. First, have you engaged already with the Canadian government on your proposal or proposals? What has the reaction been?
Second, have you seen other countries whose weapons have been found in the hands that they shouldn’t be in address it in the way that you’re talking about?
Mr. Gallagher: Thank you for the question. We have raised both of these considerations with Canadian officials. As noted in my prior comments, on paper, as it relates to brokering, Canada has a pretty standard and comprehensive approach. But when you talk to Canadian officials, they are forthcoming that there are issues and there are difficulties. I don’t want to repeat myself, but there are concerns from their perspective that they are not catching everything.
There was a good presentation, actually, by Global Affairs officials at the Twelfth Conference of States Parties to the ATT in March, where they spoke openly about this. We see the same thing they see — that it’s hard to capture brokering in Canada when it’s happening outside the country. So, essentially, on that front, they agree with us.
On post-shipment controls, this is something we have raised. Implementing post-shipment controls would require at least two positions within Global Affairs Canada — new positions — if you look at the studies that have been conducted on this. When have we raised it, we have heard, “Well, there are budgetary constraints,” which I can understand.
I don’t want to take too much time, but, just to your second question, yes, there are a number of countries that have introduced post-shipment controls, countries such as Switzerland, Germany, Spain and a few others that escape me right now, but they’re European allies that have been doing this, some of them, for almost 10 years now.
Once again, this is not reinventing the wheel. And those European allies do have success stories. Most of them introduced post-shipment controls because there was matériel that was diverted somewhere where it shouldn’t be — mostly small arms, firearms. So they introduced these controls, and there are success stories. I would be happy to follow up with your office with the exact states in question.
Senator Coyle: Thank you.
Senator Harder: Again, thank you to our witnesses.
My question is for Mr. Hollingworth. You heard Mr. Fischer speak of humanitarian access issues. I assume these are, more broadly, a part of your life in this world of conflict. Are there actions that WFP is undertaking to facilitate humanitarian access, or are there ways in which you could engage “like-mindeds” in providing some relief to some of the humanitarian access issues that were raised by Mr. Fischer?
Mr. Hollingworth: Thank you, Senator Harder. Our access work is done with the coordination of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Denise Brown, and her team. We don’t do this on our own. We make sure that we follow a team approach across the UN for the negotiation of access, the reasons being clear — that we don’t want to start having some organizations with better access than others. This is a team approach. This is a multi-sector crisis. This cannot be about one organization having better access than others; hence, we do it as a team. That has been the process all along, and it will continue to be the way we work.
I know that Denise Brown and her team are certainly speaking with partners, member states and others inside and outside the country — predominantly inside, but also outside the country — in order to improve the ability of humanitarians, writ large, to get access to people and areas in the hard-to-reach zones of the country.
The Chair: I am going to ask the last question. I want to ask our civil society representatives here — Martin Fischer, Helen Barclay-Hollands and Kelsey Gallagher.
This is a long, protracted, difficult, sad — we can find all of the words to describe it — crisis. To what extent are you consulting, collaborating or exchanging ideas with sister and brother civil society organizations, shall we say, in donor countries or in countries that can have some influence where, like you, they will try to influence governments? Mr. Fischer, why don’t you start?
Mr. Fischer: Thank you, Senator Boehm. To a great degree. We have heard repeated references to the April conference in Berlin, which was a one-day high-level political financing track as well as a civil society track.
I would commend the German approach to this, where this was not a one-off; it was well prepared. It allowed both the operational part of civil society and, most importantly, the Sudanese diaspora to engage. In the lead-up to that conference, there was a great degree of collaboration between the different donor country-based offices of various international NGOs, which is typically the approach that we would take on a crisis like this.
Take access issues, for example. Australia has been championing initiatives around the protection of humanitarian workers. There was a thematic resolution last year at the UN General Assembly, so we were in close contact with our office in Australia on that. But it is still not enough.
That is the part of the question that you didn’t ask, Senator Boehm: whether we’re seeing traction on the really gnarly issues, like deliberate denial of humanitarian access, as it affects children. That is a grave violation against children. It is one of the grave violations that is listed. There is an annual report that civil society engages on with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. The report gets written, and then what?
I think you repeatedly asked, Senator Ravalia, whether this is a forgotten crisis. The direction was, “Is it a forgotten crisis by donor countries and partners and parties to the conflict?” Absolutely. Is it a forgotten crisis for Canadians and other populations in northern countries? Absolutely.
We engage hundreds of thousands of Canadians on a regular basis. I can’t tell you how difficult it has become to get any kind of traction on these issues. Our screens are so full. We are so quick in consuming information, and then organizations like ours come and say, “You should care about children in Darfur,” when yesterday we paid $1.92 for a litre of gas in Rockland. Of course that is challenging, but that is precisely why we have found engagement with senators so constructive — because we can take some of the partisan politics and issues of the day out of it and shed light on these complicated issues. We’re really looking to you to help us continue doing that in Ottawa as well as when you go home over the summer. I took that opportunity, Senator Boehm; I had to.
The Chair: That’s okay. Thank you. In Ottawa or in Wakefield, as you mentioned.
Mr. Gallagher: Our broader civil society work is in coalition with literally hundreds of other civil society organizations, or CSOs, around the world. Project Ploughshares is a founder of the Control Arms Coalition, which was the CSO coalition that pushed for the development and, later, creation and moving the force of the Arms Trade Treaty, the treaty I mentioned previously.
At the annual Conferences of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, Control Arms, which, again, is composed of civil society organizations from around the world, continues to raise concerns regarding Sudan, in particular through the prism of arms transfers.
A lot of other conflicts get more airtime. There is this idea — and Mr. Fischer just mentioned it, and it was mentioned previously — of the forgotten conflict, but as it stands, what we’re seeing in Sudan is one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Wars cannot be fought without weapons, and those weapons come from somewhere.
In coalition with our civil society partners at the UN, we continue to bring up Sudan, despite arms transfers to Sudan being quite controversial in the room, because there are States Parties and states in the room that are implicated in arms transfers to Sudan. This is something we need to keep raising; otherwise, it will only slip further into being a forgotten conflict.
The Chair: Thank you very much for your comments. We have come to the end of our hearing today. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Matthew Hollingworth, Kelsey Gallagher, Martin Fischer and Helen Barclay-Hollands for being with us today. Mr. Hollingworth, I know it’s late in Rome, so we thank you for taking that extra time to be with us. It is not an uplifting discussion, but it is an important one to have and to get things on the record. Thank you very much.
(The committee adjourned.)