THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 3, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 4:19 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good afternoon, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I will now invite committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator Ravalia: Welcome. Mohamed Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome. Amina Gerba from Quebec.
Senator Youance: Suze Youance from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Woo: I am Yuen Pau Woo from British Columbia. Welcome.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario. Welcome.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Welcome. Martine Hébert from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: I wish to welcome senators, of course, and anyone who may be watching us across the country today on ParlVU.
Colleagues, we are meeting today to discuss relations between Canada and the European Union. Today, we have the honour of welcoming to the committee Her Excellency Geneviève Tuts, Ambassador of the European Union to Canada, Delegation of the European Union; and the Honourable Stéphane Dion, currently Diplomat-in-Residence, Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the Université de Montréal. Previously, as we all know, Mr. Dion was Ambassador to France and Monaco, Ambassador to Germany and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Canada to Europe. Among his many ministerial roles as a member of Parliament and a member of the Government of Canada, he was, of course, our Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Good to see you, Mr. Dion.
Welcome. Thank you for being with us today. Before we hear your opening statements and proceed to questions and answers, I ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices and be mindful of the best practices on the cards here in terms of the use of the microphone and the earpiece.
I’ve just been given a note, and you can see the lights are flashing. We will have a vote at 4:35 p.m., so we will probably have to interrupt, but I would like to get started right away.
Ambassador Tuts, you have the floor.
Her Excellency Geneviève Tuts, Ambassador of the European Union to Canada, Delegation of the European Union, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, distinguished senators and members of this committee.
[Translation]
I was very pleased to accept your invitation today. It’s a real honour to appear before the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade for the first time.
[English]
The European Union and Canada share a truly exceptional partnership, a partnership rooted in values that we share: freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.
As President von der Leyen recently said, “In a world of growing uncertainty, partnerships between like-minded democracies such as the EU and Canada are more important than ever.”
This is not just a statement. It is a reality. Let me underline three recent developments to illustrate how far our partnership has progressed.
First, in June last year, during our bilateral summit, Canada and the EU agreed on a new partnership for the future and to open new areas of cooperation. The same day, they signed the Security and Defence Partnership, offering a new framework for our cooperation in security and defence.
Second, Canada was the first non-European country to participate in SAFE, our new joint defence investment instrument.
And the third point, which is not strictly EU, but European in geographical terms, is that Canada was also the first non‑European country to be invited by the President of the European Council, António Costa, and the Prime Minister of Armenia to take part in the eighth edition of the EPC, the European Political Community summit in Yerevan on May 5. This reflects the strong and growing alignment between Europe and Canada.
Senators, let me first focus on our trade relationship. We are living in a most fragile international order. Global trade is under pressure. Two of the world’s largest economies stopped playing by the rules. Supply chains are disrupted. Protectionism and nationalism are on the rise.
In this context, our partnership matters more than ever. The EU and Canada must stand together in support of open markets, fair competition and a rules-based trading system.
[Translation]
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, is essential in this regard. It represents our shared commitment to open trade. It has created real opportunities for our businesses. Trade between the European Union and Canada amounts to over 100 billion euros, and this partnership benefits our citizens every day; thousands of jobs depend on it on both sides of the Atlantic. Together, we have built something remarkable, and now we must protect it and make it grow to adapt to new economic realities. It is in this context that we are currently negotiating a digital trade agreement between the European Union and Canada.
[English]
CETA opened a deep bilateral access to our markets. This is a historic achievement, but being close means that decisions of one side are felt strongly by the other side. Therefore, allow me to also be very frank with you today.
The EU and Canada share many of the global trade pressures, but we differ a little bit in our responses. Certain recent economic policies in Canada have created uncertainties for some EU companies. Buy Canadian and similar provincial policies, as well as the steel and steel-derivative tariffs, undermine our balanced access agreed in CETA.
These come on top of some other measures, like the taxation of luxury cars, cheese imports or wines and spirits. We are facing similar external pressures. We both must do what we can to uphold the rules-based trading order when reacting to such pressures because we are in this together.
I am confident that we can find pragmatic solutions. We can find a way to discuss, constructively, those topics.
My second point is related to the digital sphere, another area where our partnership is advancing rapidly. Our digital partnership is an essential instrument. It reflects a simple reality: Economic security increasingly depends on technological security.
Together, we are strengthening cooperation on emerging and critical technologies. This includes artificial intelligence, online safety and digital governance. We are also joining forces on trusted infrastructure. From Arctic connectivity to supercomputers and AI capabilities, we are building more resilient digital ecosystems.
I would like to recall the event hosted in the Senate last October by Senator Colin Deacon, opening the way for our bilateral cooperation on digital identities to foster trusted transactions online. The objective is clear: to foster innovation, strengthen competitiveness and reduce strategic dependencies.
Senators, research and innovation are central in our efforts, and Canada’s association to Horizon Europe in July 2024 marked a major milestone. With a budget exceeding €93 billion, Horizon Europe is the world’s largest research and innovation program. It supports cooperation in critical sectors, from health and aerospace to energy, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. The results are already very tangible. Canadian organizations are already participating in more than 100 collaborative projects, and they have secured nearly €61 million in Horizon Europe funding.
These figures demonstrate the strength of our scientific partnership. More importantly, they show Europe and Canada investing together in the technologies that will shape our future prosperity, resilience and security.
The Chair: Ambassador, I’m sorry to interrupt you, because committee members have to leave for a vote.
We will be back as soon as we can to hear the rest of your statement and then Mr. Dion’s statement. Then we will move to questions and answers, with your indulgence. This is force majeure.
Mr. Dion: Vote well.
(The committee suspended. )
(The committee resumed.)
The Chair: Ambassador, please resume your statement. We have lost some time.
Ms. Tuts: I will do my best. Turning to foreign affairs, I can only say that the EU and Canada are growing closer.
Just to recall the achievements in security and defence, I mentioned SAFE already, as well as the Security and Defence Partnership we signed last year. Close cooperation in terms of security and defence is obvious.
[Translation]
On the major issues dividing the world and on the international stage, I think it’s fair to say that the European Union and Canada are almost entirely aligned. We advocate for a rules-based international order as well as effective multilateralism with the United Nations at its core, of course.
Let me now say a few words about Ukraine, because it is a priority issue for the European Union and for the world. It is our top priority. You know, at this stage, we have financially supported Ukraine to the tune of 200 billion euros. We will continue to support Ukraine —
[English]
— for as long as it takes. And we know we can count on Canada. We highly value your unwavering support, particularly our close coordination on sanctions, as maintaining pressure on Russia remains essential, as well as our efforts on accountability, because justice must be done.
We are very grateful for your support, as well, for the creation and the establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. This is essential, and Canada and the EU are completely aligned on this.
Now a few words about the Arctic. We know we are currently revising our Arctic policy. We should arrive with a new document, a new communication, in the fall, and, of course, security will be part of the reflection, but it has to be a comprehensive approach that we are currently discussing and developing in close association with our Canadian partners.
[Translation]
In closing, let me return to the topic at hand today, which is the future of the relationship between the European Union and Canada. As I said at the outset, we have a strong relationship that is not new, that dates back to 1959 and that has continued to grow. CETA was a major milestone in strengthening our trade and investment relationship. We also know that a trade agreement is much more than trade; it creates opportunities between citizens and businesses. A trade agreement is also an exchange of values, and that is very important to us.
As I said before, CETA will be complemented by a digital agreement currently under negotiation. We will likely have a new summit between the European Union and Canada this fall, which is expected to take place in Canada this time, and for which our respective teams and authorities are exploring ways to further strengthen the relationship, identify sectors where we can work hand in hand, and elevate the partnership once again to a level we’ve not seen before. It’s quite promising. We’ll come back to this after the summit, of course.
Mr. Chair, I will be available to discuss this further. Thank you very much for your attention.
The Honourable Stéphane Dion, P.C., Diplomat in Residence, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Université de Montréal, as an individual: Honourable senators, you have just heard Her Excellency Geneviève Tuts explain why, given the considerations she highlighted, you are right to believe in the need to further improve the already excellent relationship between Canada and Europe. I agree, you agree, and Her Excellency agrees. So, since we are in agreement, we must improve this relationship, which is already excellent.
I’ll get right to my recommendations. Since I only have a few minutes for my opening remarks, I will make three.
[English]
And if it’s possible during the discussion, I will add a fourth one. We will plug it into the discussion after.
[Translation]
My first recommendation is this: Keep our diplomatic resources on the ground in Europe. Our resources are already underdeveloped for a G7 country, and even compared to countries less significant than ours. The competition to capture European market share and attract European investors to Canada is fierce, and we must be on the ground to win.
Global Affairs Canada is required to make cuts to help the government reduce its deficit. I propose that these savings be made in Ottawa, but that we spare the geographic section and our presence on the ground. The number of Global Affairs Canada employees assigned to Ottawa is disproportionate to our overseas deployment, when compared to what our allies are doing. To summarize these two points, we are under-represented compared to comparable countries, and have an employee ratio overseas that is out of balance with the capital.
[English]
I have the numbers to show it. I’m sure you have your own numbers but —
[Translation]
If you would like more details, I will provide them shortly.
My second recommendation is as follows: Propose to the government, to the Prime Minister, that they systematically and officially appoint a senior Canadian official, who, together with their European counterpart, will be responsible for implementing one of the many agreements that the Government of Canada has signed and continues to conclude with European countries and the European Union. There must be clear accountability with clear timelines and objectives for each agreement signed.
[English]
The fact is that Canada is multiplying robust agreements and partnerships with numerous European countries in all areas: trade, of course; defence, of course; security; the environment; civil nuclear; artificial intelligence; quantum; critical minerals, cybersecurity; intelligence; crisis management; oceans; transport; and innovation, in general. The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed almost a year ago, as Her Excellency has explained, with the European Union marks the most comprehensive strategic partnership the EU has ever concluded with a non-EU country.
That’s great. These agreements and partnerships must not remain on paper. They must be fully implemented. Let’s look at CETA, our trade agreement. You should know that, according to the Chief Economist of Global Affairs Canada, only 60% of CETA’s potential is used by our businesses. Reaching 100% may not be realistic, but there is room for improvement.
Signing agreements with Europeans is not too difficult. What is more complicated is implementing them. We must deliver the deliverables. Both in Ottawa and in Brussels and European capitals, we have work to do to ensure our commitments are translated into concrete actions.
My suggestion then is to ensure that, for each signed agreement, there are two senior officials — one Canadian, the other European — who are accountable for the implementation of these specific agreements, with specific objectives and deadlines.
[Translation]
Your committee may wish to consider inviting these senior officials to report back to you on the progress of a specific agreement that you feel is particularly crucial and strategic.
Here is my third and final recommendation: that Canada become a full member of the European Political Community. This does not depend solely on Canada, as acceptance by the community is required, but I am making this recommendation to everyone.
[English]
Created in 2022 at the proposal of President Macron, the European Political Community brings together the leaders of 47 European countries to promote their cooperation on common issues, such as security, stability, sustainability and prosperity. Only two European countries are not invited, and you know which ones — Russia and Belarus — due to their war of aggression against Ukraine.
Prime Minister Carney had just been invited to the last European Political Community summit, which was held in Yerevan, Armenia, as Her Excellency mentioned, on May 4, 2026. This is further evidence of the great interest Europeans have in Canada. So, let’s go further: Canada should become a full and integral member of the European Political Community.
Our membership in this political coordination platform would be entirely beneficial for both sides. It would strengthen our ties with Europe and allow our Prime Minister to consult with the leaders of countries he would otherwise never have time to visit individually. It would consolidate our status as “the most European of non-European countries.”
[Translation]
To conclude, first, we need to maintain our presence in Europe. Second, there should be a clear line of accountability for the numerous agreements we sign with Europeans. Third, we should join the European Political Community. Those are three recommendations — and I will have a fourth — that would go a long way toward strengthening ties between Canada and Europe for the benefit of our people. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Dion. Colleagues, I would like to remind committee members that you have a maximum of three minutes each for the first round; we will likely have time for only one round today. I would ask senators and witnesses to be concise in their questions and answers.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Thank you both for being here today.
Ambassador, if I could just address this question to you, there has been a lot of discourse recently about Canada joining the EU. I appreciate the Honourable Stéphane Dion’s opinions on this. We feel generally that there would potentially be huge benefits to this type of a growing partnership. However, questions remain about feasibility.
I am curious about your perspective on, realistically, Canada becoming part of the EU and, in that way, sort of allowing a greater connectivity between our nations.
Ms. Tuts: Thank you very much for this question. This is not the first time I’ve been asked if it is realistic to see Canada become a member of the European Union.
My reply is twofold. First, you know that we have a legal process to become a member. You need for that to be — in geographical terms — it would need to be a European state, meaning being on the European continent. And, at the same time, you need to respect the values that we are promoting in the EU.
I have absolutely no doubt about the second condition. We share the same values, and I mentioned them at the beginning. On the other hand, being qualified as a European country, I’m not sure this will be possible. But, at the same time, there is a strong willingness on both sides to deepen our cooperation.
We need to find ways. We need to be creative. We need to find solutions and maybe a new model to reinforce our cooperation in many areas, without becoming a member. This is a long way, at the same time, a long path to become a member, but maybe we can cooperate in some sectors that we will identify. In my view, there are other ways better than a full accession.
Mr. Dion: Senators, I strongly think we should be part of the European Political Community, but I strongly think we should not be part of the European Union. I think it is a false good idea.
Look to the European side, first. They need unanimity of the 27 to welcome a new member, and 10 of these countries have not ratified CETA yet. So, imagine all the reasons they would find to have difficulties accepting all the aspects of Canada.
And the 10 countries in Europe that are not part of the EU are knocking on the door. They want to be part of the EU, and they are European countries, so for Canada to jump over them to be recognized first — even before Ukraine, which is at war — I don’t think it would be easy to sell it to our friends in Europe.
Now, from the Canadian perspective — very rapidly — I have 11 reasons why I think it’s a bad idea, but I will go as rapidly as I can.
The Chair: We don’t have enough time for 11 reasons, but I’m sure they will come out.
Mr. Dion: The first reason is that Canadians will not accept this loss of sovereignty. The second reason is that our governments — federal and provincial — in our decentralized federation will never agree about which one will send its power to Brussels, and we would have to maybe reopen the Constitution. Only this first difficulty, I think, kills the idea.
After that, Canada would be a “have country,” so we’d need to give more than what we would receive. And you know how much equalization payments between Canadians are an issue; imagine if we have to do that for foreigners. I don’t think it would be easy to sell.
The regulations would need to be aligned to Brussels, and they are quite demanding: trade, industry, agriculture, free circulation of people, immigration. I think it would be very difficult.
In addition, that means we will even have more difficulty than to align with the U.S. And the big partner will remain the U.S.; whatever we do, the U.S. is 75% of our trade, and Europe is 8%. Imagine that we are good; maybe it would be 60% and 15%, but the U.S. will remain the big partner.
We need to have a consensus.
The Chair: Mr. Dion, I’m going to interrupt you. I’m afraid we have gone way over time on that segment. I’m sure your other six points will somehow emerge in the questioning.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you to Their Excellencies for being here today, ambassador and the Honourable Stéphane Dion.
You mentioned the overrepresentation of public servants at Global Affairs Canada headquarters. We found in a previous study by this committee that staffing levels were considerably higher at headquarters than across our embassies; that’s a reality.
Unfortunately, I think it’s hard to understand how to resolve this situation. Could you explain a little more clearly, given your background in diplomatic missions, how the staff on the ground . . . . How do we reorganize the Global Affairs Canada system here at headquarters?
Mr. Dion: The deputy minister I worked with, David Morrison, made enormous efforts, as did Minister Joly, to find solutions. What I recommended — and I continue to recommend it, now that I’m a free man — is to see if we could reduce the number of these programs that exist to assist the public servants who are responsible for the department’s purpose. The purpose of the department is to represent Canada around the world. All these services we provide could probably be scaled back to protect the geographic area in this city, which is truly struggling. The people working there are heroes; they work extremely hard with very limited resources. I don’t have enough time because the chair is going to cut me off before I finish. We have the figures; in fact, you published a report years ago that said the same thing. I quote from the Senate report, Mr. Chair:
. . . a lack of recruitment and investment in Canada’s diplomatic capacities and capabilities over much of the past two decades has undermined Canada’s ability to influence and shape global issues and effect change.
You were very stern. I wouldn’t go that far, but you are saying it. The figures from Global Affairs Canada released in June 2023 indicated that Canada has a presence in 110 countries. Australia has a presence in 122 countries and is not a member of the G7. Brazil has a presence in 133 countries; it is not that rich. Turkey is present in 136 countries, and South Korea is in 191 countries. In reality, Canada is underdeveloped compared to countries that are not even members of the G7. We need to make an effort to maintain our presence on the ground.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dion.
[English]
I just want to say it pains me a lot to interrupt you because you were my minister, and I never interrupted you then.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: You mentioned the challenges that Canada faces in maximizing the benefits of the comprehensive agreement and the agreements we have with several European Union countries. You talked about Canadian non-tariff barriers; I think that, on the Canadian side, we could also draw up a list.
I would like to hear your thoughts on the solution His Excellency Mr. Dion proposed, according to which we would be able to resolve this kind of irritant and optimize our trade relationship if there were senior officials — or, in any case, someone in charge — on both sides.
Ms. Tuts: Both sides have appointed special representatives. John Hannaford has been appointed the Prime Minister’s personal representative for the implementation of commitments with the European Union. On our side, the European Commission has appointed a special envoy named Joost Korte, a former director-general of the commission who is John Hannaford’s partner, his European counterpart. They have both been given a mandate to ensure the implementation of the commitments made in Brussels in June. They will each report separately.
These two men are expected, in their respective capitals — John Hannaford here and Joost Korte in Brussels — to encourage the relevant directorates-general within their administrations to implement what has been agreed upon. Yes, that is a solution. Now, do we need a representative for every agreement? That’s another question. It was decided that, for this important agreement between the European Union and Canada, there would be two special envoys. They are working hard, I can assure you. I regularly see John Hannaford, who himself meets with all the MPs and ministers here in Canada; in Brussels, Joost Korte is knocking on doors and seeing how all this is being implemented so that we don’t end up wondering what we did three months before the summit. The goal is to implement these agreements. The will exists on both sides. We now have two representatives to do exactly that.
Senator Hébert: We’ve been talking about this for years, but we’re moving forward step by step.
Mr. Dion: What Her Excellency just described is exactly what I had recommended to the Prime Minister. Mr. Hanneford and a European representative are pushing to conclude an agreement. What I’m saying is that if you’re not able to do the same for the other agreements, sign fewer of them. Every time the Prime Minister or minister visits, the Ottawa bureaucracy is forced to produce deliverables; we work very hard on them. Once we’ve produced them, we move on to the next visit where we’ll produce more deliverables; it piles up and remains on paper. We need to stop doing that. We sign fewer agreements, but we implement them. We can’t implement them if we don’t have a clear line of accountability. That would be my recommendation.
The Chair: Thank you. I remember.
[English]
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here today.
One of the areas covered by the strategic partnership signed last year is the fight against climate change and environmental degradation and facilitating the transition to climate neutrality. Some have accused our government, this government, of turning its back on the fight against climate change through the loosening of regulations and other legal changes.
I’m just wondering, from your perspective, how you interpret this part of our strategic partnership. Is Canada falling out of sync or out of commitment from what was established during the time when the strategic partnership was put together?
I’ll ask, if you don’t mind, Ambassador Tuts first, please.
Ms. Tuts: I will not comment on what the Canadian government decides to do on climate change. I can tell you there are some commitments. We are both committed to decarbonization and to keeping the goal of 2050 neutrality.
But we also have to realize we need to keep the right balance, because one other topic, as we know, in Europe is competitiveness. We need to pay attention to our competitiveness because the world is changing. We see others that are more competitive than we are.
The question is always to find a right balance. It is up to each government or the Commission in Europe to decide how to find this balance and keep this goal but, at the same time, not to hamper innovation or competitiveness in Europe. So, we have the same question in Europe. I can tell you that, but, nevertheless, we have decided to keep the same direction and not to derail from what we have agreed.
Senator M. Deacon: Okay. Thank you. Do you want to add anything, Mr. Dion?
Mr. Dion: No, I would speak so long about that.
Humanity is backtracking on climate policies everywhere. As long as it was targets that we thought were pretty removed, politicians were ready to come up with tough targets. Now, it’s about regulations and action, and then the lobbies protest, and everywhere you see setbacks, not only in Canada but in Europe as well. We are in a situation where we rejoice when the “do not so much” wins against the “do nothing.” My hope is that, for my country, but the EU is key in that — the EU is the champion of climate policies in the world. There is a setback in many European countries, but I hope they will resist as much as possible. Madam von der Leyen is quite courageous about that.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Woo: Your Excellency, you talked about the cooperation between the EU and Canada and the digital partnership covering AI, the cloud, digital services and so on.
At the same time, the EU is pursuing a kind of technological sovereignty strategy, I understand, particularly for AI and the cloud. On first blush, that strikes me as excluding other countries, including Canada.
Can you talk about your AI sovereignty strategy? We are struggling with the same thing, of course. Is there room for the two countries to be part of each other’s sovereignty aspirations?
Ms. Tuts: There is no contradiction between sovereignty and partnership. We try to align the two together.
Just to give you an example, we have developed a strategy on AI where we have built some AI factories. What does it mean? An AI factory is like an ecosystem where we have supercomputers, researchers, human resources, data centres and energy. We have 19 AI factories in Europe. There is an openness in Europe to try to work together with Canada on these possible AI factories.
So, sovereignty doesn’t mean that we are closing doors. Sovereignty means that we need to protect the way we are collecting and using our data and the way we work. You know that Canada is a reliable partner. For that reason, we have a digital partnership. We don’t have digital partnerships with just any country in the world. We did it with Canada, Japan, South Korea. We have developed all of those digital partnerships with key and reliable partners. With these partners, the objective is not to close doors. We believe in open and fair societies for our trade, but not just for trade but for AI and research innovation, as well.
Mr. Dion: If I may, I would like to take the opportunity to plug my fourth recommendation because it’s about the AI and about —
The Chair: You don’t have much time, but please go ahead.
Mr. Dion: It’s about scientific diplomacy. Her Excellency mentioned Horizon Europe, where Canada is a full participant. Horizon Europe is the largest research and innovation funding program in the world. The problem is that this program will end at the end of 2027 and will be replaced by Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, or FP10. With FP10, we need to be as much involved as in Horizon Europe. It’s under discussion at the European Parliament as we speak. It’s not a given that Canada will be as strong a partner in this new program as it is in Horizon Europe, so I want your committee to have that in mind. As parliamentarians, you may help.
There is a risk that, especially in some specific strategic sectors — AI, quantic, cybersecurity — there is a sense that it should be only within the EU and that a strong ally like Canada will not have access. We should not accept that. We should work very hard to ensure that we will be a full ally with the EU and be fully involved. That will be key. I’m sure our embassy in Brussels is working hard on that.
As parliamentarians, if you can help, that would be good. It’s about scientific diplomacy.
The Chair: Thank you for the recommendation.
Senator Al Zaibak: Mr. Dion, since CETA’s provisional application, trade in goods and services has increased significantly. In your view, what have been the most tangible benefits of CETA for Canada, and where has it fallen short of expectations?
Mr. Dion: Yes, it has been quite positive for everyone — a growth of 60% since its implementation.
The reason why 10 countries have difficulty with ratifying it is because they don’t see why they would ratify it, since it’s working in a way. Ratifying it will make some lobbies they have unhappy — cheese in Greece and Cyprus, beef in France and pasta in Italy. So it’s working well.
But it may work much better than that. I mentioned the figure of 60% of the potential use on both sides, but focusing on my side, the same study shows that only half of our exporters know about the existence of CETA. Only 5% of them claim that they understand CETA well. If they are not aware of it, how can they use it?
The government has a goal of doubling our exports outside the U.S. over the next 10 years. That’s a growth of 7.18% a year. A figure that recurred for the last 10 years was 3.93%. So, we almost need to double our performance of the last 10 years. This will not be possible if we don’t take our enterprises by the hand and say to them that, yes, they have Oregon, Maine and New York, but maybe they have partners and clients waiting for them somewhere in Provence or Bavaria. Let’s go together. We have excellent trade commissioners to help on the ground. We are not cutting them. We will make sure they are still there. They are there for you; use them.
We need to work with the chambers of commerce. It will not happen by accident. If we are able to double our trade with the EU, it will be a lot of work from us and for them.
Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you.
Ambassador Tuts, Canada recently joined the EU’s €150‑billion Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, a defence procurement initiative. How do you see this benefiting Canadian defence firms? What opportunities does it create for deeper transatlantic defence industrial cooperation?
The Chair: A quick answer, please.
Ms. Tuts: There are some conversations these days between European and Canadian companies working together. The system is very simple. SAFE is €150 billion in the form of loans given to the member states. You need to have at least two member states plus one external partner, Canada being the only one that is non-EU. So Canadian companies could join EU companies and have access to these loans. It happens in some European countries — it is not a secret, as your Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned recently. At least three EU member states have contact with Canadian companies. This is only the beginning, but it gives you an idea that cooperation between defence and procurement is possible. We now have a new avenue for more cooperation in defence.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Harder: Mr. Dion, you will be pleased to know — because you already cited it — that the Senate committee report underscored and even provided you ammunition for your first point. Each time this committee has approved a free trade agreement, we have also observed officially the need for resources, both locally engaged and foreign services, to ensure we can live up to the commitments of that. So I totally share your three recommendations, but I think you’re not ambitious enough.
I think there is an area around, what I would say, defence, security, SAFE and industrial strategy on which we could predict an architecture for 10 years from now. Maybe not today, but could there be an architecture in which we cooperate more in this area — which, by the way, could include development assistance as well, so the soft tools of foreign policy along with this — so that — I will assert this — as the U.S. becomes less engaged in NATO, there is a core of Europe and Canada that is working forward and in a more organized fashion?
Mr. Dion: Surely. It’s why we had this comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement last year.
Senator Harder: But we need it institutionalized.
Mr. Dion: [Technical difficulties] Her Excellency spoke about it. It’s exactly what you described, what we are trying to do. Would I do that personally? I know that we need to bring the U.S. back in a normal — the EU cannot replace the U.S. for us. That’s not realistic. The U.S. is 70% of NATO.
Three years from now, I hope we’ll have a president of the United States as friendly with Canada as all the predecessors of Mr. Trump were. We’ll still have problems with the U.S. We should learn our lesson that putting all our eggs in the same basket is not a good idea. It is not only for the current moment. It’s for the long haul that we need to strengthen our relationship with the EU — not to replace the U.S., but because we need diversification, and diversification is something we have spoken about since Pierre Elliot Trudeau.
Now, Prime Minister Carney wants us to double our support with the other countries not only for trade, but for security as well. It’s why I mentioned the necessity to have scientific diplomacy and to ensure that we will be a full member as a friend of the EU, including for sensitive issues, like artificial intelligence, quantum and cybersecurity.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Wilson: I want to go back to the issue of Canada only utilizing or taking advantage of about 60% of the CETA. As Senator Harder pointed out, a major concern of this committee is that we have these agreements, and we want to take advantage of them and fully engage.
Given that the highest determinant of friendship is proximity, that explains the relationship with the United States and the amount of trade we do with the United States. Are there things we might want to consider with Europe to try to knit that relationship more tightly? The one thing that comes to mind for me is increased labour mobility between Canada and Europe to live and work. It seems to me that would help build some of those connections.
I don’t know if that’s something that has been discussed or not. I would be interested in both of our distinguished witnesses’ perspectives on that.
Ms. Tuts: I cannot agree more. Labour mobility — let’s work on that. We now have an agreement on architects, the possibility for architects from both sides to work without any difficulties. We need to continue this work and to maybe envisage all the professions.
This is obviously a good point, but there is maybe more we can do in terms of raising awareness on CETA. Maybe to come back to the figures, you mentioned 60% only. I would just mention that if we are looking at the figures for the level of trade since 2017 between the EU and Canada, in goods and services, we have seen an increase of 71%. That’s a lot, but that is not enough. So we are reflecting on how to raise awareness and how to combine this B2B, the matching between EU and Canadian companies. There are some reflections ongoing to find — maybe using AI, for example, to develop an application to organize this matching.
But I agree with Mr. Dion that we could also use more chambers of commerce and organize some events in some EU countries, like the Hannover fair last year. Anything that could help raise awareness would be welcome, but we are working on that.
Mr. Dion: I fully agree. There are also the Canadian chambers of commerce in Europe that we don’t use enough. We have done well to make Canada the country of honour in very important events: the Hannover Messe and the VivaTech in France. But the follow-up must be made once you have done that. It’s not a single shot. It should give you new momentum.
If I may add cultural diplomacy, because culture is big in Europe, very big. If you go to the cultural centres in Europe, all the countries have one. If you are in Paris, we have one in Paris, but we need to save it because some people will say we need to cut it. Well, no; you exist in Europe when you show that you have a good place and good pieces of music. Then they’ll think, “Oh, they should be good in building cars.” There is this sense that if you’re good in culture, you’re good everywhere. That’s very strong in Europe. Don’t underestimate the importance of culture as a way to strengthen Canada’s presence in Europe.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Adler: Professor Dion, I know that based on your professional life, you’re well aware that when you offer a sales pitch on an idea that you really deeply believe in, you want to make sure it doesn’t become an object of mockery for your critics. Is it fair to say that is something that you —
Mr. Dion: If they want to have a mockery of my ideas, I don’t care. I know they are good.
Senator Adler: This isn’t about whether or not you’re interested in my opinion. I’m just asking if you’re serious about selling something. When you say to the public, whether it’s in this room or elsewhere, that Canada ought to be part of the European Union because it’s the most European of non‑European countries, people will say, “Well, Antarctica should join Europe because it’s the most European of the non-European continents.”
Mr. Dion: Senator, I don’t recommend Canada being a part of the EU. I’m against this idea. Your chair stopped me in the middle. I have other reasons why I’m against it. One of the reasons is because there is no clear majority among Canadians to be part of the EU, and if we start this tough negotiation with very uncertain people, a majority, after a while, will decrease. At each compromise you will have to make with the EU, the support of Canadians would disappear.
What I’m proposing is to be part of the European Political Community, which is something else.
Senator Adler: Fine. I don’t want to argue with you about this because that’s not my role here. If you say you want to be part of the European Political Community, people will naturally interpret that as being part of the EU.
Mr. Dion: Yes, but I’m facing senators, who would know more.
Senator Adler: All right. Thank you.
The Chair: I don’t have a chance to ask a question, but I think the counter-argument is that if we were to become a bona fide member of the EU, we would be very limited in terms of our abilities to act separately in other parts of the world, particularly in this hemisphere.
With that, we’re going to conclude this panel. I apologize for the vote interrupting our proceedings. I apologize to the next panel because your panel will be cut short. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Her Excellency Geneviève Tuts and the Honourable Stéphane Dion for being with us today. Your commentary was lively and very useful for the purposes of this committee.
For our second panel, we welcome, as individuals, Achim Hurrelmann, Professor of Political Science and European Studies at Carleton University; and Amy Verdun, Full Professor of Political Science, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada at the University of Victoria, way out on the West Coast. She is joining us by video conference.
Thank you both for being with us today. We are now ready to hear your opening remarks. Professor Hurrelmann, you will have the floor first.
Achim Hurrelmann, Professor of Political Science and European Studies, Carleton University, as an individual: Thank you very much. I am grateful for the opportunity to present a few brief thoughts on the state and prospects of Canada and EU relations. As we’ve already heard, there is currently a lot of optimism about this relationship, and, indeed, it can be portrayed as a particularly compelling and promising example of the collaboration of middle powers that the Prime Minister called for in his Davos speech.
However, this is not the first time in history that Canada and the EU have looked to each other in periods when their relations with the United States were difficult. When they did so, they always found a lot of alignment on values and high-level objectives, but substantive progress in intensifying economic and political relations was often much more difficult. We’ve already mentioned that previously.
This raises two questions. First, does today’s situation offer better opportunities for strengthening Canada-EU relations than previous episodes in the relationship? Second, what are concrete challenges that would need to be addressed to make further strides in the relationship?
My answer to the first question is cautiously optimistic. Opportunities for greater collaboration are promising for two main reasons. First, the current rift with the United States is deeper than previous crises in the transatlantic relationship, such as the disagreements under the Nixon or Bush Jr. presidencies.
In addition, and perhaps less obviously, there’s also a second reason for optimism. The EU has, in recent years, made strategic changes to its external policies that make it more predisposed to intensifying relations with Canada. In its external economic policies, it has put the focus on economic security and the risk of strategic dependencies. Scholars have called this a geo-economic turn. Canada is a natural ally in the pursuit of this agenda because of similar geopolitical priorities and because of its energy and resource wealth.
The EU’s security and defence policies have also shifted from a focus on international crisis intervention to a focus on defence capacity building through programs such as the Security Action for Europe. This alleviates previous Canadian concerns about their Common Security and Defence Policy duplicating efforts with NATO, and it provides concrete opportunities for defence collaboration.
This brings us to my second question: What would need to happen to truly take the next step in intensifying Canada-EU relations? I want to briefly highlight three points.
First, many of the collaboration opportunities with the greatest potential — in fields like energy, resources and defence — require significant long-term investments. Private investment has not been forthcoming as readily as some may have expected. If Canada and the EU are serious about strategic collaboration, they will need to mobilize public funds to back up private investment, and they will need to work with individual member states to identify concrete joint projects. It really requires a multi-level approach.
A promising initiative in this respect is the letter of intent signed earlier this year with the European Investment Bank. And a recent success story, of course, is the investment by a German state-owned company in a B.C. LNG project that was announced last week.
Second, closer Canada-EU collaboration requires a serious analysis of the obstacles that currently stand in the way of deeper relations. Here, I want to highlight in particular that despite CETA and all its successes, significant non-tariff trade barriers remain, which derive, for instance, from the EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary measures, from Canada’s rules for allocating its dairy quota, from internal trade barriers in both markets, from “buy local” policies that have been mentioned and from regulatory differences. There are often very legitimate reasons for these rules and regulations, but they do constitute trade barriers that impede bilateral trade. Progress in regulatory alignment, which has been very slow under CETA, must be accelerated, and reciprocity agreements on industrial policy must be negotiated.
Finally, it’s very important, I think, that Canada-EU relations are approached with realistic expectations. We need to manage expectations. For reasons of geography alone, the EU will not replace the United States as Canada’s most important economic and security partner. This is why I find the media debate about Canada’s membership in the EU and the way in which some European politicians have half-jokingly played into it recently rather irritating. I think this debate could actually become politically quite dangerous, especially in the context of debates such as Alberta separatism.
I think it’s important that Canadian policy-makers focus on concrete and realistic steps that can be taken to improve Canada‑EU relations, and it’s also important that Canadian policy-makers ask their European counterparts to do the same.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Professor Verdun, please.
Amy Verdun, Full Professor of Political Science, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, University of Victoria, as an individual: Honourable senators, thank you for the invitation to appear today.
My name is Amy Verdun, and I am a Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria in British Columbia, where I served as the inaugural director of its European Studies program. I have taught and conducted research at the University of Victoria since 1997. I am an Elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and my work focuses on European integration, political economy and Canada-European Union relations. I have published widely in this field over several decades, and most recently co-edited a volume published by Routledge titled The Canada Model and Post-Brexit EU Trade Relations: Insights from the ‘Other’ Transatlantic Partner. I hope to bring both an academic and a policy-relevant perspective to your discussion today.
I would like to make five brief points about Canada-EU relations.
First, as we heard before, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, has been a clear success, even in its provisional form. Even without full ratification, CETA has already delivered measurable gains. Since 2017, trade between Canada and the European Union has increased significantly, Canadian exports have expanded, and more firms, including small- and medium-sized enterprises, have entered transatlantic markets. In short, CETA is already working in practice.
At the same time, it remains incomplete. As we have heard already today, full ratification has not yet occurred across all EU member states, meaning some provisions, particularly on investment, are still not fully in force.
There is, of course, a limit to what Canada can do. Ratification is an internal process within the European Union in its member states. However, continued diplomatic engagement and steady encouragement remain both appropriate and useful.
My second point is that Canadians are ready for closer relations with Europe, although there is some uncertainty about what that means. Public opinion suggests a growing openness to strengthening ties with the EU. At the same time, there is ambiguity about what moving closer would entail, and most experts, as we’ve heard today, agree that full European Union membership is not a realistic scenario. That leaves significant room for practical and incremental cooperation.
In particular, there is scope to deepen cooperation in areas such as defence and security, public procurement and the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, which could facilitate labour mobility and services trade. These are concrete steps that can bring Canada and the European Union closer in meaningful ways.
Third, diversification remains a strategic necessity. Canada’s economy is deeply integrated with the United States, and this will not change. Canada has also strengthened its ties with Asia. Within this broader context, the European Union is a critical anchor for diversification. The goal is not substitution but resilience. Strengthening Canada-EU relations allows Canada to expand market access, mitigate risk and strengthen supply chains. For these reasons, Europe should be understood not as a secondary partner but as a core pillar of Canada’s long-term economic strategy.
My fourth point is that shared values make this partnership strategically important beyond bilateral trade. Canada and the European Union are not only economic partners but also like‑minded actors in the international system. Both support rules‑based trade, multilateral institutions and democratic governance. At a time when elements of the global trading system are under strain, this common foundation matters. In practical terms, it means that Canada and the European Union have strong incentives to work together not only bilaterally but also to sustain and modernize the broader international economic order.
Fifth, Canada should carefully orient itself in the regulation of the digital economy. This is an area where Canada faces important strategic choices. The European Union has developed one of the world’s most comprehensive regulatory frameworks for the digital economy, including strong rules on privacy, data protection and platform governance. Canada, by contrast, sits somewhere in between regulatory models, and its current federal framework remains incomplete.
Looking ahead, the key challenge is not whether Canada should replicate the European approach in full. Rather, it is how Canada can ensure compatibility and interoperability with it. Maintaining alignment, particularly in areas such as privacy protection and data governance, is important for sustaining trusted data flows and deepening economic relations with Europe.
At the same time, Canada must retain sufficient flexibility to remain competitive across North American and Indo-Pacific markets. In that sense, digital regulation represents both a challenge and an opportunity — an opportunity for Canada not only to align with key partners but also to help shape emerging global rules.
To conclude, the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement has delivered real benefits, even if unfinished. Canadians support closer ties but need clarity on how to achieve them. Europe is central to Canada’s diversification strategy. Shared values and regulatory cooperation make this partnership globally significant. Taken together, these points suggest that Canada-EU relations are not only strong but also well positioned for thoughtful and strategic deepening. At a moment of uncertainty in the global economy, this is a partnership Canada can build on with confidence.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Verdun.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here today. I really appreciate it. I’ll build a next-step question from my colleague in the last panel, Senator Woo, but I do want to come back to the importance that Canada and the EU both express on developing sovereign AI. You’ve talked about digital, but what about developing sovereign AI, with both countries recognizing that we have a strong reliance on American tech companies in this regard?
What is stopping us from increasing our cooperation in this area, given what you’ve just mentioned — our commonly held principles and educated populations that we could build better capability and capacity with? Mr. Hurrelmann, would you like to go first? And then I will ask Ms. Verdun.
Mr. Hurrelmann: Yes, there is definitely potential for closer collaboration on AI. This may be part of the digital trade agreement that is being negotiated between Canada and the European Union. I hear there is also a close exchange between Canada’s Minister of Artificial Intelligence and his counterparts at the EU and member state levels. The key challenge is the elephant in the room, the United States. Neither of these two powers, Canada and the EU, want to regulate AI in a way that undermines their competitiveness or triggers sanctions of some kind by the U.S. administration because it is seen as an attack on American companies.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Ms. Verdun: I would add to that the difference between the North American model of how one deals with the digital economy and everything to do with internet privacy and safety, which has been much more free-market-oriented, so not having as many restrictions and being less involved in government regulation.
The EU has taken a different path, where the role of public authorities in regulating privacy and digital matters is stronger. Canada has traditionally been closer to the United States’ model, which is more market-oriented and less interventionalist. Our citizens are much more interested in having the government be involved in ensuring their data privacy and more data security. There is also an awareness that these large companies are so much larger than any small- or medium-sized enterprises and that they play an oversized role in the marketplace. So not only is there a philosophical difference about the role of the state in regulation, but the players in the market are fundamentally much larger in your day-to-day than in other marketplaces, so to say.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here. Just on the security and defence viewpoint, what do you think the repercussions may be for Canada if we were to choose the Gripen aircraft from Sweden versus the F-35? Do we put ourselves in a little bit of a hole with respect to ongoing relations and negotiations with the U.S.?
Mr. Hurrelmann: Possibly, yes. The question is whether it is still a useful choice to emphasize Canadian sovereignty. Of course, there are a lot of technical questions involved, which I am no expert on, so I hesitate to comment on military procurement.
The premise of your question is absolutely correct; moving away from the F-35 would certainly be noticed in Washington.
Senator Ravalia: Ms. Verdun, do you have any comments there?
Ms. Verdun: I would second those same comments. We’ve seen from the administration that choices around military expenditure or choices of public procurement in the direction of diversifying away from U.S. practices to European practices, for example, have been met with the wrath of the U.S. administration.
Having said that, that is one of the reasons why there is an increasing uneasiness about spending military dollars so much on U.S.-based companies. There is a desire to diversify also in this area. The bigger the investment or the larger the diversification, the bigger the chance there will be political backlash.
On the other hand, by not making those considerations, it is just reinforcing the same asymmetrical relationship Canada has toward investments in U.S.-based military equipment.
Senator Ravalia: Just to extend that, if we are to develop a stronger relationship with Europe and, again, on the question of military procurement, if we were to choose South Korean submarines versus German submarines, do we, in some way, deter that burgeoning relationship we’re hoping to build with Europe while looking to the East for further development?
Ms. Verdun: I mean, I could just take an example from the British Columbia environment. We do public procurement to buy, let’s say, B.C. ferries. And what we’ve always done, in a public procurement environment, is look at the quality one gets for the investment made, and then consider the security in the long run about whether we think this partner will also deliver the follow-up services and so on. I think it is still the same; there is a trade-off between the quality of the products one expects to have and the relationship it gives down the road.
For sure, being able to invest more, in this case, in European technology also has the effect of deepening our bonds with Europe. But again, it would need to come at a proper trade-off between the quality, the investment and the geopolitical considerations.
Senator Ravalia: And job creation and other factors. Thank you.
Senator Harder: Thank you, panel, for being here virtually and in person.
The last panel and this panel have made the case for diversification and why Canada should pay greater attention and build some of the institutions that some have spoken of. I would like you to comment on the other side: What is in it for Europe? Where are the strongest European arguments coming from for taking advantage of this interest that Canada is showing? In other words, give us your assessment of how our potential partners are viewing us and what is driving them to be interested?
Mr. Hurrelmann: First of all, I think there is a strong geopolitical interest in having a partner in North America that is reliable and reliably aligned on European values, on multilateralism and has a compatible view of many international crises and challenges; that’s one factor.
Second, economically, the main potential seen in Europe is in Canadian resources. Not everyone might like that because some people might have the ambition for Canada to move away from a primarily resource-defined view of the economy. But certainly this plays into the European ambitions of strategic diversification, becoming less reliant on energy supplies and technology necessary for the green transition, where the European assessments show there is a huge dependency, specifically on China.
That is what is seen — at least by policy-makers in Europe — as something that Canada has to offer: these strategic minerals, rare earth minerals and so on that could be mined in Canada.
The challenge is that they are not readily available; it would require longer-term investments, as I mentioned. These are systematically uncertain because we do not know what the relationship with China will look like in 8 to 10 years when a mine comes on line. That is what has been the challenge in attracting private investment from Europe into these types of projects.
I do still think this is the primary economic attraction Europeans see when they think about Canada.
Ms. Verdun: I would echo those points and add to those two other points worth thinking about.
Some have worried that Canada has a very poor profile across the globe. You would not think about that today when our Prime Minister trots around and mentions “the most European of non‑European countries.” But ultimately, when Europeans think of North America, they often think of the United States — to the chagrin of Canadians, who think others should also notice us.
The period we are witnessing today is one where some Europeans who are generally interested in North America but have traditionally gone to the U.S. now say, “Oh, but there’s Canada. That, in many ways, resembles all things we thought about as the United States, but it’s actually a different country; isn’t that cool?”
That means a lot of the things they associate North America with — like a market-oriented economy, a very hard-working environment where entrepreneurship is favoured, where you can have a diverse labour pool, highly educated, with values around a social welfare state, in addition to liberal market economy principles — that Canada can be that country, when traditionally the Europeans would go to the United States.
The question in the previous panel was how we can do more things on labour mobility. That’s also an area where Europeans are happy to collaborate with Canada and learn more about some of the practices. In Canada, we use our labour to its full, even though people come from all over the place; it is integration of migrants and people with different backgrounds, which is not necessarily the strongest suit in Europe.
There are other factors where Canada is similar to the United States on a number of dimensions, where Europeans didn’t necessarily look to Canada and now are increasingly going, “Okay, we get North America without the parts of the United States that today we are not so appreciative of.”
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome to our panel. Ms. Verdun, you said in your remarks that the European Union should not be a secondary pillar of Canada’s diversification strategy, but that it should play a central role, at the very heart of this strategy.
However, when we look at the figures, we realize that our trade currently accounts for only 5.5% of the total. How do we ensure that our companies take greater advantage of the opportunities offered by the European single market?
[English]
Ms. Verdun: Thanks for the question. We also heard in the previous panel that our aspiration is to increase. Obviously, we’re coming from low numbers. Also, as my fellow professor just mentioned, if we look at historical times when the Canadian government realized its extreme focus on the U.S. market, and if something goes wrong, everybody goes, “Why is it 75% or 85%? It needs to be a little bit lower.”
In that sense, a central pillar is to ensure that increasingly more trade goes to the European Union. It is good practice to realize that when the circumstances are like they are today, you could be held hostage too quickly with a very asymmetric relationship. That’s a core point.
What can we learn from trade with the EU? We have already mentioned that architects now have a certification possibility, that they could get their degrees in each of these jurisdictions and then come and work in one another’s jurisdiction much more easily. This might be expanded, for example, to engineers or other fields, like nursing. We have a shortage of nurses. It would be wonderful if it were easier for us to take advantage of nurses trained elsewhere.
Also an element that we need to think about is that Europe has an internal, single market where trade is easier than even within Canada. In the last few years, we have been thinking about how we can learn from the European Union to make our own trade amongst the various provinces a little bit better. Those are just a few ideas. I can elaborate on more, but I don’t want to take too much time.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
Mr. Hurrelmann: I agree. I would add, as was mentioned in the previous panel, that concrete matchmaking between companies is something that, obviously, Canadian diplomats and trade agents are working on. This is very important. It’s also important that the personnel for this important work remains available.
I mentioned non-tariff barriers that are still regularly mentioned when I talk to business people about what the concrete challenges are that they face in trading with Europe. That comes up.
I also mentioned progress under CETA on these regulatory alignment issues has actually been fairly disappointing. Maybe that’s a strong word, but it has taken a long time. We always hear the reference to the agreement on architects. To be honest, I heard that for the first time 10 years ago, so this agreement took a very long time to negotiate and has remained the only such agreement, which shows us that something is not working as it should. We really do need to look at how processes of regulatory collaboration under CETA can be accelerated.
At the same time, expectations have to be realistic. The European market will always be at a disadvantage compared to the American market because of proximity, language barriers and different regulatory philosophies. So there are some clear challenges that are difficult to overcome.
The Chair: Thank you. We’re at the end of the first round. I didn’t want to ask this question before. Of course, I didn’t have a chance to ask it before because we were short on time.
I would like comments from both of you. Is the European project in danger? I ask the question, recognizing that there has been a big shift and a change in one member country, in Hungary, after the elections. But there is an election coming up in France very soon. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD, is anti-EU and anti-immigration in its focus. We have all seen what happened with Brexit. It’s easy to blame the EU for overregulation affecting the sovereignty of member states. There are certain special interests — I think Stéphane Dion touched on that in his commentary — that could endanger the project.
So, I would like a candid assessment from both of you as to whether the entire EU project is in some danger.
Ms. Verdun: Thank you very much for the question. I think we have had this question, at least I have, at least once every five years for the last 30 or 35 years. I think the EU is always sitting at a particular crossroad where it’s attacked, either by a migration crisis or a banking crisis or the Brexit crisis, or even, more recently, the Ukraine crisis, the energy crisis. I think it’s almost a part of the EU project that it’s perennially in crisis.
If you were to ask me today whether the EU is really seriously in crisis, I would say no. It is a very ambitious project that has been around for about 75 years, and if you go to the origins and to where it is today, it has made remarkable progress.
If we look at public opinion on the European Union, the Eurobarometer keeps track of what citizens think of the European Union. It has much higher support now. There is more trust in public institutions; EU institutions are trusted more than their national institutions. Trust in the euro is very high.
You mentioned the change in Hungary. It is actually a very remarkable change that the Hungarians themselves decided they were done with Orbán and would like a different political wind.
I don’t think all things are only good. You mentioned AfD and the elections coming up in France. These are serious concerns not only because it could threaten the European project, but also the people who are in those countries worry about what it is that makes a significant number of people be interested in voting for right-of-centre-right parties, which also includes memories of a distant past that people would like to have stayed in the past.
It’s a problem that we are facing and something that one needs to look at the underlying reasons why so many people favour those kinds of policies. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Mr. Hurrelmann: I’m basically on the same side. I often tell my students to never underestimate the ability of the EU to muddle through. I think we have seen some remarkable examples of that muddling through in its response to the recent crises over the years, which generally have not triggered large-scale reforms but new mechanisms, without changing the treaties, that have allowed it to address questions such as the euro crisis, such as the very divisive refugee crisis, and also to cope with countries such as Hungary.
At the same time, this muddling through does require that national leaders are willing to pursue solutions with their European peers. If major countries such as France were governed by a government that was no longer willing to pursue that general approach, that would be a challenge.
But given the public opinion figures that Professor Verdun mentioned, we have seen that many of the radical right parties in Europe have actually, in recent years, softened their stance on European issues, are no longer calling for withdrawing their countries from the European Union and have pursued relatively mainstream approaches when it comes to the European level.
So, I would also be fairly optimistic that the European project will continue to muddle through. That also means I do not anticipate any major shifts toward stronger integration, for instance, when it comes to security and defence policy, because that is nothing that could be done through that particular strategy of integration.
The Chair: Thank you very much. With that, we have come to the end of our meeting. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Professor Hurrelmann and Professor Verdun for joining us today. Your testimony was very valuable. We appreciate it very much. I dare say we will be returning to the theme of Europe and Canada in the near future.
Colleagues, we will reconvene tomorrow morning at a special time, at 11 o’clock, not 10:30. If you see some of the other colleagues, let them know, but it is in the meeting notice. It is in this room. We will discuss then the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. It will be a 90-minute panel, so we’ll start at 11 and we’ll go 90 minutes to our normal end time of 12:30.
(The committee adjourned.)