THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, June 11, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 10:30 a.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally; and examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good day, honourable senators.
My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
I will now ask committee members to introduce themselves.
[English]
Senator Adler: Charles Adler, Manitoba.
Senator MacDonald: Senator Michael L. MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
Senator Ataullahjan: Senator Salma Ataullahjan, Toronto, Ontario.
Senator Woo: Good morning. Senator Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome. Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Harder: Senator Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Martine Hébert from Quebec.
[English]
Senator White: Senator Judy A. White, Newfoundland and Labrador.
The Chair: Thank you. Welcome senators, and a special welcome to Senator White, who is joining us today as a guest. I also wish to welcome all who may be watching us across the country today.
Colleagues, we are meeting today to discuss, for the first part of our meeting, the situation in Cuba.
Today, we have the pleasure of welcoming to the committee from Global Affairs Canada, Mark Richardson, Director General, Central America and Caribbean Bureau; Carolyn Knobel, Executive Director, Central America, Cuba and Dominican Republic Integrated Division; Brigitte Duchesne, Director, Travel Advice, Outreach and Engagement Division, Global Affairs Canada; and Tara Carney, Director, International Humanitarian Assistance Division.
Welcome to all of you. Thank you for taking the time to be with us today.
Before we hear opening remarks and go to questions and answers, I ask everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices and observe the instructions on the card in front of you with respect to the use of your earpiece and microphone. We wish to avoid audio feedback that would be injurious to interpreters and other staff.
I wish to acknowledge that Senator Ravalia of Newfoundland and Labrador has joined us.
Mr. Richardson, you have the floor.
Mark Richardson, Director General, Central America and Caribbean Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Committee members, thank you for inviting my colleagues and me to appear before your committee today.
Cuba is experiencing the worst economic and energy crisis in its history. The country is experiencing repeated nationwide power grid failures, with blackouts lasting up to 48 hours, which, combined with fuel shortages, are severely disrupting access to food, clean water, health care and other essential services.
At the same time, its government continues to restrict the political and economic rights of its people and to keep hundreds of political prisoners in detention. This means there is no viable opposition within the country. Cuba is at the crossroads. The government currently has the opportunity to make needed changes to respect the rights of its citizens and to open up its economy to provide opportunities to its future generations.
Canada’s strong preference is for a peaceful Cuban-led transition that respects international law, including the principle of state sovereignty. A modern Cuba that respects the rights of its citizens would contribute greatly to the security and prosperity of the Americas and provide greater opportunities for Cubans and Canadians.
[Translation]
Meanwhile, Global Affairs Canada is closely monitoring the situation and focusing on two priorities: first, the safety of Canadians, and second, the humanitarian impact on the Cuban population, particularly the most vulnerable groups.
On February 11, we updated our travel advice recommending that Canadians avoid all non-essential travel to Cuba due to the deteriorating situation.
Given that Canadian airlines have suspended their flights to Cuba, we also encourage Canadians who are still on the island to leave while options are still available. We have also indicated that the operations of our embassy are being affected and that consular services may become limited, especially if the situation continues to deteriorate.
In terms of international assistance, Canada has been providing development co-operation to Cuba for 50 years, with disbursements totalling $8.3 million in 2024–25. We also provide humanitarian aid in response to crises, including more than $3 million immediately following Hurricane Melissa last year.
Since February 2026, Canada has announced $13.5 million in international assistance for Cuba, starting with an accelerated disbursement of $8 million for an existing program run by the World Food Program and UNICEF to support food security and nutrition for vulnerable Cubans.
Canada has also made a $5 million contribution to the Pan American Health Organization to provide essential medication, medical supplies and solar equipment to primary health care facilities.
Finally, Canada is providing $500,000 to the World Food Program for food aid and logistical support.
All of our aid is channelled through trusted international and Canadian partners to ensure that it directly benefits Cubans, not the government.
[English]
On the commercial front, challenges created by the ongoing economic and energy crisis along with recent U.S. measures have led some Canadian firms to scale back, suspend operations or exit the market. We encourage Canadian firms to exercise appropriate due diligence and to carefully assess the risks associated with their specific activities in or within Cuba. This includes seeking independent legal counsel as appropriate.
In closing, Canada continues to maintain an open and frank dialogue with Cuba’s government, recognizing the importance of engagement even and especially where differences exist. During our discussions, we regularly raise concerns about the lack of economic and political freedoms and call for the release of political prisoners. We also remain in contact with the United States and other regional partners regarding the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cuba.
During this difficult and uncertain time, Canada will continue to monitor for implications on the safety of Canadian citizens on the island and remains committed to providing direct support to the Cuban people, particularly the most vulnerable.
[Translation]
Thank you. We look forward to answering your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Richardson.
I would like to remind senators that they have a maximum of three minutes each for the first round of questions, including the response. I therefore ask the witnesses to be concise. We may hold a second round if time permits.
Senator Gerba: Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Richardson.
My question is for you.
Canada is the second-largest foreign investor in Cuba, with significant investments in many sectors. How is the crisis affecting Canadian companies operating in Cuba, and what is the Government of Canada doing to protect the interests of Canadian investors in Cuba?
Mr. Richardson: Thank you. Yes, that is correct — Canada is the second-largest foreign investor in Cuba — or, at least, it used to be. We are in contact with the largest companies based there.
We are monitoring the situation closely to ensure that our companies are fully aware of the circumstances and are receiving legal and other advice to properly assess the current situation.
[English]
Canadian companies that have been operating in Cuba for some time know that it is a risky place to be doing business and are aware of those risks. We have been encouraging them to take measures in order to ensure that not only are they aware but that they take steps to mitigate them as best as possible.
I turn to my colleague, Ms. Knobel, to add anything.
Carolyn Knobel, Executive Director, Central America, Cuba and Dominican Republic Integrated Division, Global Affairs Canada: The only thing that I would add is to reflect back to the opening comments that a more open Cuban economy would be beneficial to the Cuban population, of course, but also to Canadian businesses operating in that environment.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you. I understand that you are monitoring the situation. I understand that some companies have stayed and others have left, and that there are opportunities in the country. According to the 2021 census, the Cuban-Canadian community numbers approximately 30,000 people in Canada. Has the government been in contact with the Cuban diaspora? How would you characterize the community’s views on recent events?
Mr. Richardson: For my part, I am not aware of any commitments made to the Cuban diaspora. As a Global Affairs Canada official, I cannot comment on political commitments; that said, however, we have not made any commitments to this diaspora to date. Of course, we sometimes receive letters from Canadians expressing concerns and complaints about the situation in Cuba. We do our best to respond to these letters by providing facts and information about Canada’s achievements.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Woo: Thank you, Mr. Richardson and officials.
Mr. Richardson, you began your presentation by talking about the gravest humanitarian crisis facing Cuba and then quickly pivoted to the lack of political freedoms in the country. Are you trying to suggest that the gravest humanitarian crisis facing Cuba today is because of the Cuban government, and, if not, can you properly attribute the proximate cause for this grave, grave humanitarian crisis?
Mr. Richardson: Thank you, senator and chair. The senator asks an excellent question in terms of the causes of the current crisis today.
I think, historically, we have seen that Cuba has faced significant economic and political challenges for quite some time. Our focus currently is on supporting the Cuban people at this time. I cannot pretend to digest all of the causes for their situation, but, certainly, I can tell you that we take the humanitarian situation that the Cuban people are facing very seriously, and we have responded in kind with a significant package of development and humanitarian assistance, even just since February of this year.
Senator Woo: You would draw the conclusion that the gravest humanitarian crisis facing Cuba today is the cause of the Cuban government. Is that what you are trying to convey?
Mr. Richardson: Senator, I’m not trying to convey cause for the current situation.
Senator Woo: What is the cause?
Mr. Richardson: It is a very complex question, senator, in terms of what the cause of the situation is.
Senator Woo: Let me ask you another question then. You talked about how Canada prefers a transition in the political system — which I support — to a freer Cuba coming from within. Does that mean to say that you would also support, as a second-best solution, a change that is imposed from the outside?
Mr. Richardson: Chair and honourable senator, just to clarify, in my opening statement, I did not say that the Government of Canada is calling for a transition. What I said is that Cuba is at a crossroads and that our strong preference is for a peaceful Cuban-led transition should one take place, one that respects international law and the principle of state sovereignty.
Senator Woo: Can you confirm that the blockade on Cuba since 1962 is in violation of international law?
Mr. Richardson: Senator, chair, what I can state is that Canada has traditionally voted against the embargo at the UN, that our position traditionally has been to respect international law and to oppose the application of extraterritorial measures such as the embargo.
Senator Woo: This gets us back to the original question. Would you agree the current extreme embargo and blockade on Cuba is the immediate cause of the dire humanitarian situation in Cuba today?
Mr. Richardson: Chair, it is an excellent question. Again, I think our position is that the current situation today is caused by an extremely complex geopolitical situation by measures, international and domestic, that are long-standing and have compounded the actual situation on the ground.
Our principal concern is for our Canadian citizens who remain in the country, as well as for the humanitarian situation on the ground and the Cuban people.
The Chair: Thank you. I think we are going to get more questioning like this as we get into the geopolitical aspects. I am just signalling this.
Senator Ataullahjan: You just said that the situation is caused by the extreme and complex geopolitical situation. Would you like to expand on that a bit?
Mr. Richardson: Thank you, chair. At this time, as you are well aware, historically Cuba has faced an embargo since the 1960s. Canada’s position has been to oppose that embargo and to oppose the application of extraterritorial measures by other countries.
The situation is also compounded by the economic and political policies that the Cuban government has put in place. As I stated, Canada has been direct in talking about those and our concerns regarding those with the Cuban government. We have maintained an open and direct dialogue with them.
Senator Ataullahjan: Listening to everything, what kind of positive role can Canada play? We’re hearing people are suffering. There are human rights violations. You are in conversation with the government. What are the conversations? You might not be privy to that, but what kinds of conversations are happening, and how positive is Canada’s role?
Mr. Richardson: Chair, I’m not privy to the conversations that are ongoing between the United States and —
Senator Ataullahjan: Thumbs down, right, around the line that we are engaging with Cuba, and this is how we want our policies to go?
Mr. Richardson: Senator, you are asking me to opine on the conversations between the U.S. —
Senator Ataullahjan: I’m saying what kind of positive role can we play? There is, obviously, engagement between the two governments if we have a role to play. A positive role, I hope. What kind of contact is there? Surely you must know something about the state of the relationship between Cuba and Canada.
Mr. Richardson: Chair, of course. Yes, we maintain regular, open and constructive dialogue with the Cuban government. We have traditionally and regularly had bilateral consultations with them on an annual basis. During those conversations, we have used the opportunity to encourage the Cuban government to make reforms, economic and political, to respect the economic and political rights of its people. We’ve used every opportunity at our disposal to raise our concerns regarding the detention of political prisoners and concerns over their human rights.
We continue to play this role. We continue to engage with the Cuban embassy here and with the Cuban government through our embassy in Havana, and we have made it clear. We have communicated our view that this is an opportunity at this time for the Cuban government to continue making positive changes on behalf of their people.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to all of you for being here and the work that you are doing on the ground.
To follow up on Senator Ataullahjan’s questioning, Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026 reported that the Cuban government continues to repress and punish, virtually, dissent and public criticism.
In the many years that we have been dialoguing, trading and attempting to enhance our relationships with Cuba, what leverage have we used to try and induce a state of democracy and greater freedom for individuals?
We realize that it is a Communist state, that there is significant repression, and that there is a huge gap between the haves and the have-nots. Have we had an opportunity to break through with the Cuban regime to actually foster dialogue and to enhance democratic reform through the many years that we have been there?
Mr. Richardson: Chair, thank you for the question. Through the many years that we have been engaging with the Cuban government, we have maintained an open and honest dialogue with them, including regarding our concerns about the lack of transparency and the need for increased democratic opening. We have also, as I have said before, urged respect for human rights that are consistent with international norms.
We have seen, of late, that the Cuban government has been making economic reforms to open up their country to allow for small- and medium-sized companies to undertake private transactions, which is an encouraging sign.
We have had positive engagements with the Cuban government on human rights, including on matters related to LGBTQI+ concerns, and seen positive reflections in terms of Cuban policies with respect to the LGBTQI+ community, as well as with the economic empowerment of women and on measures to protect women and children. We have seen positive developments in our engagement with the Cuban government with respect to how they treat their people and the policies they put in place on human rights.
Senator Ravalia: Is some of this engagement with civil society on the ground as well?
Mr. Richardson: We do engage with certain civil society actors. For more detail on that, I would turn to my colleague Carolyn Knobel.
Ms. Knobel: Yes. Our embassy in Havana engages with civil society in the country, as do we here in Canada. That dialogue is part of what informs our policy-making, of course.
Senator MacDonald: Mr. Richardson, I’m one of those people who won’t go to Cuba out of principle. I believe we’re propping up a communist and dictatorial government by going to Cuba. I have Cuban friends in Halifax who agree with me. They tell me one of the worst things we can do is spend our tourism money in Cuba because all of that money goes to prop the army up. It goes to the army.
I’m curious what your opinion is on that. Should Canadians be spending their money down there? Are we exacerbating the problem by doing so? These Cubans certainly tell me that we are.
Mr. Richardson: Chair, that is an interesting question from the senator.
I’m not here to express my personal opinion, but I can tell you that we have traditionally had anywhere from 700,000 to 1 million Canadian tourists travelling to Cuba on an annual basis. Of course, since the operations of Canadian airlines have ceased, that has come down significantly to very small numbers.
Canadian companies have been active operators of tourism, hotels and resorts in Cuba for many decades now, and given the current situation and the complexities that they have faced, some have made the decision to withdraw their operations from the country.
In terms of opining as to whether Canadians should be travelling to Cuba or not, I think that is a question for individual citizens to assess.
Senator MacDonald: You mentioned we were second in terms of foreign aid. I believe that was mentioned. I am curious as to who is first. Does Spain spend any money on foreign aid in Cuba?
Mr. Richardson: In my one comment, I referred to investment, and based on statistics and information we have been provided by the Cuban government, we understand we were the second-largest foreign investor in that country.
In terms of humanitarian and international assistance, I am unaware as to where we rate compared to other donors. I believe we are one of the largest, if not the largest, Western donors. Spain does provide assistance as well.
My colleague Ms. Knobel has something to add.
Ms. Knobel: I would echo what you said. We are one of the largest. I do not have an exact breakdown as to where we reside compared to others at this time.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Mr. Richardson, in your introduction, you mentioned the serious energy crisis facing the Cuban people. Do you know exactly where things stand with oil supplies? Have most countries stopped supplying oil to Cuba? We know there is a threat from the United States, but what is the current situation? We also know that Mexico had sent oil, but what is the situation today?
Mr. Richardson: With your permission, senator, I will answer your question in more general terms, and then I will turn the floor over to my colleague, who can provide additional details on international aid and the humanitarian situation.
With regard to oil, a few weeks ago, the Cubans said they had not received an oil shipment for about a month. They currently have no diesel fuel, although Cuba does produce its own oil.
Using their own refineries, the Cubans can produce enough to meet a small percentage of their needs. However, when it comes to gasoline, the situation is complicated. What has changed is that small and medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs, can now import gasoline from the United States. We have received information indicating that the number of shipments has quadrupled in recent weeks.
Senator Hébert: That answers my question, thank you. I would like to broaden my question, and perhaps your colleague can add to your answer. Regarding trade in general, looking at the figures from 2025, Canada had about $1 billion in trade with Cuba. Some products manufactured in Cuba are exported. I am thinking in particular of seafood, tobacco products and rum.
Do you have a current overview of the state of Cuban trade with its partners worldwide, including Canada?
The Chair: Please give a brief response.
Mr. Richardson: Unfortunately, I do not have any up-to-date data on trade or the current situation. We have data on trade between Cuba and Canada through the end of 2025. If you wish, we can provide you with that information.
The Chair: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Thank you to our witnesses.
I wish to get back to the political situation if we could. I do also have a humanitarian question.
First, on the political, we are all waiting for the U.S. to finish what they are doing in the Middle East and move their attention back to our hemisphere. We’re concerned about that.
I appreciate Canada’s position in terms of Cuba’s sovereignty. Are we in contact with or do we know of emerging Cuban leadership that is working as they can in that environment toward a greater democratic system for the country? I know we have talked about the economy opening up bit by bit. Are we aware of Cuban efforts, however, that can happen in that environment, to organize toward what might be in place after this regime?
Mr. Richardson: Regarding the political situation and in terms of whether we’re aware of anyone trying to organize a more democratic approach, we are certainly aware that numerous political prisoners have been opposed to the regime and are in prison because of their efforts in the past.
As I mentioned in the opening statement, there is no viable opposition at this time. The Cuban government and the party that controls it are truly infused in all, if not most, elements of society. Part of our concerns and our communications with the Cuban government have been over how they treat political opposition members, many of whom have been detained and put into prison.
We are aware that there have been efforts. Most of those have been stopped. We are aware of the ongoing conversations between the United States and Cuba in terms of what they are demanding and in terms of political change and opening. We don’t know the terms and conditions for that beyond what is in the papers.
Senator Coyle: Are we talking to the Americans?
Mr. Richardson: We are regularly in communication with the Americans on numerous matters, including on Cuba. We use every opportunity when we speak to them to flag our concerns about the humanitarian situation of the Cuban people on the ground and to seek any information they will provide.
Senator Harder: Thank you all for being here.
Director General Richardson, I appreciate the fine line you’re drawing, and I want to test you on that fine line again. Earlier, you referenced the basis of Canadian support for the rule of international law in this matter. Can you describe whether that view is shared by our hemispheric colleagues and how those conversations are reflective of that commitment?
Mr. Richardson: As the senator knows, we engage in many conversations in many fora with our partners in the region, including in the Organization of American States, or OAS. Consistently, we find common ground when desiring to see respect for international law and state sovereignty. Specific to Cuba, we have engaged in a number of conversations with our regional partners, in fora like the OAS. In terms of the specifics of those conversations, I’m unable to go into detail at this time.
Senator Harder: Have those conversations changed after the events in Venezuela?
Mr. Richardson: Has the nature of those conversations changed?
Senator Harder: Yes.
Mr. Richardson: I would say that there are more of them. There is, obviously, a desire to engage and to talk about the changes in the hemisphere and what we’re seeing in terms of different countries’ actions.
That’s no different than any other period where there are strong actions being taken and countries wanting to speak with us. That’s, perhaps, a question specific to Venezuela that you could ask my colleague a bit later on as well.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
Ms. Carney, you will probably be constrained by what you can say at this moment. However, I assume there are conversations going on with our “like-mindeds” in the hemisphere, if I can put it that way, on coordinating humanitarian responses in certain scenarios you might be facing. Can you confirm that those conversations are at least taking place and that Canada is part of them?
Tara Carney, Director, International Humanitarian Assistance Division, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for the question. The humanitarian response has the luxury of working within a coordinated international system, so those conversations are always happening in the context where there is a current, a potential new or an increase to a humanitarian crisis, so absolutely. Scenario planning is always happening in case things deteriorate to a certain point.
For context, the trigger that the international community is looking for would be that coordinated understanding of new needs and an appeal that aligns with what would be needed to respond to those. Canada is part of those conversations.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
Senator Adler: Mr. Richardson, I think there might be consensus in this room and with others in this country that various forms of authoritarianism have mothered humanitarian disasters. As a refugee from communism in Eastern Europe, I would personally argue that communism has been a series of humanitarian disasters since Joe Stalin was in diapers.
Isn’t it true that our country is involved in NATO for several reasons, one of which is to prevent countries in Eastern Europe, like the one I was born in, from becoming a Cuba?
Mr. Richardson: Senator, as you correctly pointed out, we are a member of NATO. Unfortunately, that is not an area of expertise I can speak to. But I understand your point in terms of your view with regard to the communist government in Cuba having contributed to the humanitarian crisis that is ongoing there. I hear what you’re saying.
Senator Adler: Thank you.
The Chair: We’re at the end of round one. I’m going to make a comment and probably ask a question that you won’t feel comfortable answering, any of you.
My association with Cuba goes back to my first posting in the foreign service. I was a junior officer who went out to speak with dissidents in various places in the country. The Cuban government knew I was doing that. Later on in my career, I was the one who led deputy ministerial consultations with the government of Cuba, so I’ve watched Cuba for a long time.
The current situation is unprecedented in the sense that the U.S. is moving in a manner all on its own with no regard for the OAS and no regard for the hemisphere. I suppose the consultation with us is minimal. Yet, way back, when it came time for the break in Cuba in 1959, there were two countries in the hemisphere that did not break the relationship. One was Mexico; the other was Canada under John Diefenbaker, Senator MacDonald. That connection continued.
Cuba is on the ropes. It’s entirely true. Cuba needs friends. There is a high-level delegation coming here soon, I understand. Some of us will be meeting with them. Is there any consultation going on — Senator Harder mentioned Mexico before, as did Senator Hébert — with Mexico in this particular context? Because if we are looking at a scenario where the assumption is that the leadership in Cuba will change but not the system, then we’re in for more strife and concerns. If you’re able to make a comment on my comment and question, I would be grateful.
Mr. Richardson: Chair, you have far more experience with Cuba than I do, so I am intimidated by your questions and your insights. In fact, as the honourable senator said, I would love to ask you a question or two.
With respect to the ongoing situation, I would reflect on something I said previously. We have intentionally maintained an open and honest dialogue with Cuba for many years. This has benefited both our societies, as well as outside and regional benefits for others as well.
In terms of our communications with Mexico on Cuba, as you’re well aware, and as Minister Leblanc and others have stated, and the Prime Minister in his conversations with President Sheinbaum, there have been conversations at the highest levels on Cuba and comparing of notes about views on the humanitarian situation in particular.
We have had contact with the Mexican government, and their embassy in Mexico City regularly engages with them on many issues, including on Cuba, and we have had meetings specific to the humanitarian situation, and we are looking at possible means of collaborating with them on the humanitarian situation.
Those are ongoing conversations, so I can’t prejudge where they will go, but I can confirm that we have had those conversations.
The Chair: Thank you. I appreciate that answer.
Senator Ravalia: Ms. Carney, could you give me an update with respect to health? How would you describe the situation in Cuba at the moment, given the strain on hospitals, shortages of medicine, power cuts impacting emergency care, and the fact that Cuba is one of the largest exporters of health care professionals to the hemisphere and how that has been impacted post the Venezuela change?
Ms. Carney: Thank you for the question. In terms of the impact of the ongoing crisis and the different elements on the Cuban population, a number of sectors are feeling the impact. Health, as you pointed out, is one of the sectors that is feeling the impact, probably the most significantly.
I have a few stats to just give you a sense of what that looks like. We’re hearing from the UN that infant mortality has doubled, survival rates for children with cancer have dropped from 85% to 65%; and of course, we’re seeing the provision of medical care delayed, including over 100,000 surgeries that have been delayed.
I give you these numbers. This is not a humanitarian case load, but what is being watched right now, because of the disruptions in the health sector, is these populations are falling into a further level of need, which creates the humanitarian case load at a certain point in time.
It is a big piece that is being watched, and health work continues to be a big part of the humanitarian response that does continue to be delivered in the context.
I will point out it’s not just direct health either. We’re also seeing impacts on the WASH sector — water, sanitation and hygiene — which have strong links to the provision of health as well; as well as delays in the distribution of food assistance and/or even just the market level of food availability. The health impacts that derive from that are of significant concern to the humanitarians on the ground who are watching the evolution of the crisis; it’s part of that scenario planning that was mentioned earlier.
In terms of the health professionals who leave the country to work elsewhere, I don’t have a line of sight on that information.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much.
Senator Woo: To pick up on our star witness’ commentary previously, it was also Diefenbaker who found a way to sell wheat to China at a time when the U.S. opposed that action.
I would ask about LNG sales to Cuba. I presume it’s not part of the humanitarian package that we are offering currently. I want to understand in what way LNG is being stopped from being provided to Cuba. What are the disincentives and penalties that are being threatened against providing energy? Energy would be the key to solving most, if not all, of the acute crises that Ms. Carney just described.
Mr. Richardson: Senator, as you’re alluding to, there was a measure put in place by the U.S. government under an executive order at the end of January effectively threatening tariffs on any country that directly or indirectly exports fuel products to Cuba.
Since that time, virtually all countries have ceased shipping fuel or oil to Cuba, with the exception of Russia, which did have one tanker arrive. Based on the timing, we understand that it had already departed port before those sanctions were threatened, so the Americans allowed it through.
Since that time, the U.S. has also put in place measures to encourage the import of fuel by small- and medium-sized companies, including two that store fuel. That recent change by the Cuban government to allow that storage of fuel by those small- and medium-sized companies has been a game changer in the amount of fuel coming in.
Specifically on the humanitarian side, part of the funding we provided most recently in the $500,000 we gave to WFP, the World Food Programme, was to help support critical logistics, such as the purchase of fuel, in order to facilitate the delivery of aid on the island.
Senator Woo: The exception, as you mentioned before, is that U.S. providers can still sell oil to Cuba directly to private sector companies, correct?
Mr. Richardson: That is our understanding of the situation.
Senator Woo: The blockade on oil and the threat of tariffs and so on, does that apply to other sources of renewable energy? For example, are solar panels included?
Mr. Richardson: That’s an excellent question. In fact, it does not. At this time, part of our development assistance is going specifically to that. In some of the projects that we have accelerated funding for since February of this year, part of what we’re doing is purchasing solar equipment to help increase the resilience of critical infrastructure, including medical clinics, schools and a few other places.
We’re also aware that a number of private companies of Chinese origin are very active in undertaking construction of solar facilities to help them increase the solar complement of the electrical grid in Cuba.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: I am going to give Ms. Carney the opportunity to respond. I did not want to cut you off earlier when your colleague gave you the chance to follow up on his answer. I would like to hear your thoughts on this follow-up regarding humanitarian aid. You mentioned the distribution of food, water and sanitation services. What measures is Canada currently taking? We are in a unique situation where we know that when aid is sent, if there’s no fuel in the cars or trucks to deliver it, it’s a waste of effort. What is the current situation, Ms. Carney?
Ms. Carney: Thank you for the question.
[English]
The humanitarian community actually benefits from some similar ability to import fuel for their own use into Cuba, so they are getting fuel in. The issue is there are delays in getting the fuel in. There are some challenges in terms of provider concerns possibly being impacted by sanctions, and then just simply the quantity that they need to get in isn’t allowing them to deliver their response at the scale that they are ready to deliver it at, but it is happening.
Maybe to give you a bit of a picture, in the last month, we have seen the UN reaching over a million people with health assistance, 900,000 people with food assistance, and almost 800,000 with WASH support. The humanitarian response is rolling out. As in a lot of challenging contexts, though, it’s never at the speed or scale that we as humanitarians would hope to see.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Coyle: We have heard about Canada’s business footprint in Cuba. I’m curious about Canadian civil society, what that looks like, and how engaged Canadian civil society is either on the development side or on the humanitarian side.
Mr. Richardson: Thank you for the question. We do regularly partner with a number of Canadian civil society members, particularly on the humanitarian side, to help deliver some of our aid.
I personally am not familiar with the details of any Canadian civil society organizations that we have dealt with more on the political side. I might turn to my colleagues Ms. Carney and Ms. Knobel to add further details if you’ll allow.
Ms. Knobel: On the development side, there are certain Canadian civil society actors whom we partner with and implement — it is a complicated environment, so it is not as great a number as perhaps in some other countries. For example, one of our projects is with CARE Canada, who had a long-standing presence operating there. We do deal with umbrella organizations here in Canada on the civil society front, on the raft of issues that are Cuba, including human-rights situations.
As I mentioned earlier, does our mission in Havana deal with civil society colleagues there? I’m not sure how many of them actually have connections to Canada directly in-country, though.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: I want to go back to the diaspora in Canada. I mentioned some of the friends I have in Cuba. I have to say that they are well educated, and you wouldn’t meet more humble, nice people than the people I know.
What interaction does the Canadian government have with the diaspora here? Do you have their opinions on anything? Do they have any input into what the Canadian government is doing with Cuba and their approach?
Mr. Richardson: Senator, as I mentioned in my previous answer, we don’t currently have any formal dialogues or engagement with the Cuban diaspora here. However, we do receive letters and emails, all of which we receive and take seriously and try to respond to.
Of course, we hear, including from our own colleagues of Cuban origin, from Cuban Canadians who work in the ministry in terms of their perspectives on how they see the situation in the country and what they believe we, as an organization and as a government, should be doing.
In terms of a formal mechanism in place with the Cuban diaspora, Global Affairs Canada does not have one at this time.
Going back to a question you asked before in terms of travel and Canadians, if I could just return to that quickly. You asked, “Should Canadians go?” I was remiss in not referring to our travel advisory, which, in fact, tells Canadians to avoid non‑essential travel to Cuba at this time. That’s principally because of the complexity of the situation on the ground with the lack of power, water shortages and health concerns in and around that.
Senator MacDonald: Is there any sort of organized Cuban organization in Canada that you can interact with, and if not, is there a way we can help to create one or motivate one?
Mr. Richardson: Chair, it seems that some of your colleagues are aware of certain organizations. There are many organizations of Canadians, including Canadians of Cuban origin, who have concerns about Cuba and who are regularly working to advocate on behalf of the Cuban people. The United Church, the Anglican Church — there are a variety of different organizations who have come together under the umbrella of certain different organizations. Their names escape me now, but if the senator would like, we can follow up with some of the details of the organizations that we are aware of.
I would be remiss in not recognizing as well that there is a friendship group for Cuba within Parliament as well.
The Chair: The chair is with us as a guest. Thank you. If you could send that to the clerk of the committee, that would be great.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Mr. Richardson, you mentioned that you are in constant contact with the U.S. government. Without revealing any diplomatic secrets, can you tell us about the nature of these discussions? Canada, like Mexico, has never severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, unlike the United States. What exactly are you discussing with the U.S. government?
Mr. Richardson: Senator Gerba, that’s a great question.
When I mentioned that we have smooth and constant contact with the U.S. government, I was referring to the highest level — the Government of Canada. Even though I work on the Cuba file, I do not have daily or weekly contact with the U.S. government. At many levels, when we meet with officials responsible for the Americas, the Caribbean and Cuba, we take advantage of these interactions to ask them questions about their policies and plans.
We also use these opportunities to advocate, particularly on behalf of the Cuban people. We have exchanged public — but not classified — information regarding our commitments to Cuba. For example, we provide information about our international assistance projects. The goal is to ensure that Americans are aware of the humanitarian situation facing the Cuban people on the ground.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. I’ll ask the last question. Ms. Duchesne, you have not had an opportunity yet to be questioned by us. I’m going to direct it at you. All those years ago, when I was in Cuba, I was also the consular officer. That meant helping distressed Canadians. Sometimes it was a simple thing, such as passport replacement, and sometimes it was very serious, such as when you’re looking at death and other issues.
In providing your advice, I would imagine you’re also checking with partner countries to see what advice they are providing. But it would not surprise me at all if there are still Canadians who are travelling to Cuba, given the volume, even if the regular airlines and charter services are not really operating right now.
Do you have a comment on that?
Brigitte Duchesne, Director, Travel Advice, Outreach and Engagement Division, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much, chair. Thank you for calling on me.
There are still Canadians going. As Mr. Richardson did point out, we have raised the level of travel advice to Level 3, non‑essential travel. These discussions do happen, and I was just going to point out that we are always in contact with Five Eyes and some like-minded countries as well.
Our advice is the same with Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. The U.S. is not at Level 3 but at Level 2, which is a lower level. But they usually put out alerts. It’s just that certain countries do their travel advice slightly differently. So we’re always in contact.
We also have registration of Canadians overseas, which is an important piece. It was very interesting to see, back in January, where we were as far as the number of Canadians that were registered, over 3,000, and it went up to over 8,000 back in February, and now hovers around 1,395 as of yesterday. It doesn’t mean that those numbers are all in-country. They could be people who are just following how Cuba is doing and want to know whenever we’re changing our travel advice. We have changed our travel advice many times over the last little bit. Definitely on February 11 and again on February 19, when Canadian airline carriers were no longer flying in or out of Cuba and also urging Canadians to leave while other international airlines were available.
More recently, on May 29, we put out another travel advisory, a change in the document, because it is also hurricane season starting, so just to alert people about that.
Finally, the last update was June 4 because of the Visa and Mastercard restrictions, and urging anyone to have enough cash on them given the situation.
This is a way to tell Canadians. We always hope that Canadians check travel advice, register and also follow us on social media and find out how things are.
To answer your question on the consular piece, we have our embassy in Havana that continues. It is slightly restricted. We are working, but because of the fuel situation, we are only able to work four days a week from the office. It doesn’t mean that people are not being attended to. As you know, for emergencies, the emergency watch is always there 24-7, and we are always happy to help Canadians in need.
The Chair: Thank you for that useful information. It is great for Canadians to have it as well.
We have come to the end of this panel. I know that it is sometimes difficult to answer questions that are put by parliamentarians. Some of us have sat where you are sitting now as witnesses. We appreciate your candour. I think you also appreciate the concerns of this committee with the situation in Cuba at the present time.
Tara Carney, Carolyn Knobel, Mark Richardson and Brigitte Duchesne; thank you for the work that you do for Canada and Canadians, and thank your teams as well.
The Chair: Colleagues, we will now begin our second panel with a focus on the situation in Venezuela. We welcome Wendy Drukier, Director General, South America and Hemispheric Affairs Bureau, from Global Affairs Canada. She is also our former ambassador to Spain and our former ambassador to Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras.
Thank you for being with us today. We are ready to hear your opening remarks, and, of course, the questions will come afterwards. Please go ahead.
Wendy Drukier, Director General, South America and Hemispheric Affairs Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, chair. Honourable senators, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
[Translation]
Prior to his capture by U.S. forces on January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro’s de facto regime had plunged Venezuela into a multi‑faceted national crisis.
[English]
The combination of systemic corruption, gross mismanagement of natural resources and strict international sanctions triggered an 80% contraction of Venezuela’s GDP between 2013 and 2021. This led to hyperinflation, continuous power failures and acute nationwide shortages of fuel, food and basic medical supplies.
The combination of staggering poverty, political persecution and lack of basic services forced more than 7.9 million citizens to flee the country, causing a historic, regional migrant crisis. Domestically, the regime controlled dissent through state police, military, paramilitary forces and arbitrary detentions.
Following the July 2024 presidential election, Maduro claimed a victory that was unsubstantiated and was rejected by the Venezuelan opposition and democratic nations. Popular opposition figures led by Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo González presented strong paper-trail evidence of victory, resulting in global isolation for Maduro’s regime.
[Translation]
The U.S. administration repeatedly accused the Maduro government of functioning as a narco-state. The Maduro regime was subject to federal indictments dating back to 2020 for conspiracy to flood the United States with cocaine. The U.S. military rhetoric escalated dramatically through late 2025, ultimately culminating in the raid known as Operation Absolute Resolve.
Following the military intervention, the U.S. administration announced a three-point plan for a post-Maduro Venezuela: a stabilization phase, an economic recovery phase and a democratic transition phase.
[English]
Since then, the regime has made changes. On February 20, it officially adopted a new amnesty law to create a legal pathway for releasing political detainees, which it has conducted in waves, freeing several high-profile opposition politicians and figures.
It has passed oil and gas legislation to aggressively court international corporate investment, capitalizing on the lifting of some U.S. oil sanctions.
Diplomatically, the U.S. and the regime have formally re‑established diplomatic and consular relations. The U.S. government reopened its embassy in Caracas on March 30, and U.S. officials now consider that phase one of their plan has been achieved.
There have been modest economic improvements under the interim government. Efforts to stabilize the exchange rate have slowed hyperinflation, increasing state revenues are being used to finance social cash transfers, and access to previously frozen offshore assets has been used to fund health infrastructure at major hospitals. However, with oil making up about 90% of Venezuela’s exports, a meaningful economic recovery will hinge on attracting major foreign investment to rebuild its oil production capacity as well as the restoration of infrastructure such as the electricity grid.
At the same time and despite the welcome release of some political prisoners, state repression and torture continue in Venezuela, and hundreds remain arbitrarily detained. Transnational criminal organizations continue to operate with relative impunity in the country, contributing to regional insecurity that can impact Canadian interests and our partners. Illegal mining and trafficking flows have not been curtailed, and most migrants have not returned.
[Translation]
Canada’s partners in Europe, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, have varied in their responses to the current situation.
However, they have maintained their diplomatic presence in the country, as well as their commercial interests.
Canada stands ready to support a Venezuelan-led transition to democracy. A clear and public road map and timeline for this transition are integral to maintaining stability in such a volatile context.
[English]
Trade between Canada and Venezuela is currently modest, at $348 million in 2025, almost all of which was staple food exports. If conditions improve, substantial trade and investment opportunities could arise for Canada, particularly in energy, infrastructure, mining and agri-food and related services.
While Canada may explore emerging opportunities, we will continue to press for the full protection of human rights, the rule of law and democratic accountability. Not only are these are important for Venezuelans, but they directly contribute to our own Canadian interests.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you for your comments.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Thank you for your remarks, Ms. Drukier. My question will be somewhat provocative. We have some questions, and I would like to hear your thoughts on this situation. No one doubts what has been happening in Venezuela for years. I would like to know if another country would have been allowed to do what the United States did in Venezuela—that is, to remove a sitting head of state for all sorts of reasons. When Russia did that in Ukraine, the whole world was outraged. Would that be acceptable coming from another country? Do you agree with that?
Ms. Drukier: Thank you for the question, senator. It’s a difficult question. This is not an easy situation. First of all, I would probably say that no one authorized the United States’ actions. They took these actions on their own, without consulting Canada. We were not part of the operation, and we weren’t even aware of it until it happened. I also appreciate the comments regarding the nature of the Venezuelan regime. As our Minister of Global Affairs has said, these are matters of international law. It is really up to the countries themselves to determine whether they have followed the rules of international law. I am not a lawyer; this is not within my area of expertise. However, we often speak — as we do with Cuba — about the need to respect international law in everything we undertake on the international stage.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Thank you for being here today.
Despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition, what channels of communication or engagement does Canada currently maintain with Venezuela? Given suggestions that the EU is considering lifting sanctions and perhaps enhancing relationships, where do we stand in terms of our position and, more globally, our ties with similar-minded countries?
Ms. Drukier: Thank you for the question, senator and chair.
In terms of diplomatic recognition, we do not recognize the current regime, which is why, in official communications, we often mention de facto, which is what I used in my remarks. We have not recognized the current regime since 2018, when the elections were fraudulent for the re-election of President Maduro. That being said, we never suspended diplomatic relations. We haven’t cut off diplomatic relations, as happens in some bilateral relationships, but we have downgraded and maintained those relationships at an operational, necessary level. For example, on technical issues on consular cases, we have continued to engage with the Venezuelan authorities at a low level.
In terms of sanctions, we regularly review our sanctions regime to determine whether it is appropriate to maintain, increase or remove them. At the same time, the regime is still the same regime, even with Nicolás Maduro removed, and there are still significant human rights violations. We do not have a path toward a democratic transition.
For the moment, the sanctions regime remains as it is, but we do consult with our like-minded partners on this, including the U.K. and the European Union.
Senator Ravalia: With respect to like-minded partners in the current context, to what extent are we dialoguing with the U.S., considering its relationship with Venezuela is so rapidly enhancing?
Ms. Drukier: Canada, Canadian officials and senior officials discuss the situation in Venezuela regularly with the United States. In particular, we’ve mentioned — and I believe we’ve said this publicly — that we stand ready to support a democratic transition in whatever way we might be able to provide that support, and the situation is discussed, but I wouldn’t be able to comment on the details of those conversations.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you for being here.
I’m someone who has heard about the situation in Venezuela in this committee for many years, and it has gotten progressively worse.
I want to talk about the plight of the refugees. A few months ago, I was in Costa Rica. We heard from government officials, cab drivers and people on the street. You could see the hatred that was there toward these refugees, and they were being blamed for everything that was going wrong in that society.
We also visited a refugee centre, where we heard the horror stories of what some of these refugees had to face, and some decided it was too painful to continue the journey, and they turned back.
Can you give us an update? It is a staggering number. I think that you said it is over 7 million.
Ms. Drukier: Thank you for the question, senator.
The refugee and migrant situation is quite critical in that region in particular. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans have left the country. The vast majority have stayed in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are, in most cases, trying to establish a livelihood and a life in the host countries. Canada has supported that through our development assistance to help with integration and skills development for those migrants and refugees.
I would agree. We’ve also seen an increase, in some places, in negative rhetoric about refugees and negative feelings toward refugees and migrants, in part because of their large numbers. Some political figures have associated these migrants with criminal activity, and of course, it cannot be ruled out that some migrants may be engaged in that, but painting all of them with that brush would be unfair and inaccurate.
It is a situation we are seized by. Canada has hosted or co‑hosted two different international conferences to raise money for migrants in their host communities in the region over the years. It is a situation that we follow closely, in particular, because it is very important that these people be able to live their lives in their host countries if they cannot return to Venezuela.
Senator Ataullahjan: Regarding the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, there is the issue of the 454 individuals who were imprisoned as political prisoners in inhumane conditions. Are we raising that issue at all? Can you can give us an update on that?
Ms. Drukier: Absolutely. We’re raising that on a regular basis. There have been two sessions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights within OAS this year to talk about political prisoners.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, several hundred have been released, but they still remain, more than 400 according to civil society calculations.
Repeatedly and publicly, we call for the end to arbitrary detentions, the release of political prisoners and the closing of the many torture centres across Venezuela that the government has maintained.
Senator Woo: Thank you, Director General.
Can I first get clarification on our official position vis-à-vis the American intervention in Venezuela? I think you repeated Minister Anand’s comment, which is that we do not know if international law has been violated; that is up to the Americans to decide for themselves. Is that our official position?
Ms. Drukier: Our official position is that it is up to the Americans to determine — to ensure that they follow international law.
I would not necessarily say we don’t know. But I’m not a lawyer. I’m not from our legal bureau. I couldn’t pronounce on that question.
Senator Woo: What has been said about whether the intervention was in contravention of international law. Have we said anything about that? No? Okay.
Ms. Drukier: We have not.
Senator Woo: Okay. So if I may extrapolate, by default we haven’t said that there was a violation of international law.
Are we in contact with Maria Corina Machado? And what is your sense of her position and prospects, I guess, for having some role in the government? Have they improved? Have they worsened? Are they the same?
Ms. Drukier: On the first part of the question, we have been in touch with various figures within the Venezuelan opposition. The Prime Minister spoke with Maria Corina Machado shortly after January 3 as well, but we do speak with them.
There was a meeting of opposition in Panama a few days ago, where they made some statements about their expectations for a democratic transition and the need for new elections.
Recent polling would show that Maria Corina Machado still enjoys quite a high level of support among the Venezuelan people. But we don’t take a position on who should be the next leader of Venezuela.
Senator Woo: Sure.
Ms. Drukier: That is up to Venezuelans to decide.
Senator Woo: Would it be correct to say that the current government in Venezuela is strongly influenced by the preferences and views of Washington, D.C.?
Ms. Drukier: I don’t think I would be going out on a limb to say that you are correct.
Senator Woo: Would it not be correct that the best way to press for the release of political prisoners and other human rights violations in Venezuela is to talk to the United States?
Ms. Drukier: That is certainly an important avenue, and that issue has been raised.
Senator Woo: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Thank you for being here, Ambassador Drukier.
You said that Canada wants to help restore democracy, particularly by working with the people of Venezuela. I would like to stay on the topic my colleague raised — namely, the three-way relationship between Canada, the United States and Venezuela. Are you aware of any talks between Canada and the United States aimed at restoring a free democracy in Venezuela, or is each country developing its own policies independently? Given the delicate situation Canada finds itself in with its southern neighbours, I am very interested in your response.
Ms. Drukier: Thank you for your question.
Canada discusses many topics, including Venezuela, on a regular basis with the United States. The topic comes up whenever we discuss the region, for example.
Are we on the same page? Canada supports the goal of a transition to democracy. Ensuring a transition to democracy is part of the U.S. government’s stated plan, so we are continuing these discussions.
Senator Hébert: With regard to the conditions set forth by Canada for a diplomatic return to Venezuela and official recognition of a free and democratic government, do Canada’s criteria seem to align with those of our southern neighbours, or are they different? What are our criteria?
Ms. Drukier: First, if we decide to reestablish a diplomatic presence, our criteria are, above all, to ensure the safety of any Canadian diplomat who would be stationed in Venezuela and to secure diplomatic immunity and recognition from the Venezuelan authorities. We are currently assessing this situation and determining whether the conditions are right for Canada’s return.
The United States has already established an embassy. They have a chargé d’affaires in Caracas, so they have their criteria and we have our own, in accordance with our responsibilities toward our diplomats and the bilateral relationship.
Senator Hébert: Thank you.
[English]
Senator MacDonald: Thank you for being here today.
I have spent a lot of time on the ParlAmericas Council and spent a lot of time in South America over the years. I recall down there, we had a meeting at the same time the G7 was going on. We had an impromptu meeting with about 20 Venezuelans. They were all out of the country. They had no passports. All of their passports had been seized. These were all doctors, professors or engineers. Eight million people have left. There is a huge brain drain in this country. All of these people wanted to go back. They wanted their country salvaged and wanted to go back.
I’m curious. Has there been any indication that any of these expatriates are drifting back now with the changes that seem to be on the cusp in Venezuela?
Ms. Drukier: The information we have on this question is that there has not been a significant wave of returns to Venezuela. I would venture to say that conditions have not changed enough to encourage people to return.
The Venezuelan government has enacted, as of the beginning of this week, I think, an electronic travel document for Venezuelans who wish to travel to Venezuela. So even those with expired or no passports, there is now a way for them to return. But this is very early days. It has only been a few days. It remains to be seen whether that has any influence on returns.
Senator MacDonald: As Senator Woo pointed out, maybe the Americans have to push a little harder for this stuff.
Senator Woo: Take responsibility.
Senator MacDonald: Yes.
Ms. Drukier: Our assessment is that there is a give and take between the Venezuelan authorities and the U.S. government. We are not party to the conversations between the two governments. It is very difficult to say where we are on that.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you, chair.
Senator Harder: Thank you for being here.
It seems to me, from what I have read and from the testimony that you have given in response to the questions that we, like many of our “like-mindeds,” both in the region and outside — and I’m not talking about the “like-mindeds” including the United States, obviously — have a common set of what we would wish to see and no road map to get there, and that the only road map to get there goes through Washington. At this point, for a number of reasons, that is the status quo. I don’t see the Venezuelan opposition as being a vehicle for this. They are as much on the sidelines, articulating what the dream is as we are. How long can this be sustained?
Obviously, it would be inappropriate for you to comment on what private conversations are held with the Americans. But I would argue, at least, that the status quo can last for quite a while and create quite a lot of damage. We’re fooling ourselves if we think that this is off our agenda, although it doesn’t appear on anybody’s international agenda where an American might be present — the G7, for example.
Ms. Drukier: Well, it certainly appears on this committee’s agenda.
Senator Harder: A very powerful committee, I should add.
Ms. Drukier: It’s a critical question. I don’t have a crystal ball. I think Venezuelans have put up with a lot over the years. When they might reach the end of their rope in terms of waiting for more change is anyone’s guess, but I don’t think that patience is infinite.
The question of a road map and timing of a transition is not clear. No one has pronounced on that. I believe that if the situation doesn’t improve, timing may be shorter rather than longer in terms of what Venezuelans are willing to put up. We understand, for example, the economy needs major investment. That is something that the government has been looking for. But companies won’t go in until there is certainty as well.
Senator Harder: But in the scenario I’m describing, it’s not what the Venezuelans will put up with, it’s what the Americans will put up with. In other words, the cards are all being held by the Americans, not, unfortunately, by Venezuelans.
Ms. Drukier: I would say that’s a bit of both. The people there are not simply sitting and waiting.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Coyle: Thank you. A number of years ago, we were part of a like-minded group that was working behind the scenes before this latest so-called solution came forward to really support the opposition and a certain opposition leader and a process. That like-minded group that we worked with, other than the U.S., is it still active on this now? If so, how is that working?
Ms. Drukier: You may be referring to the Lima Group?
Senator Coyle: Yes.
Ms. Drukier: So the Lima Group functioned for a number of years, essentially supporting the interim government of Juan Guaidó with the National Assembly. That group itself is no longer functioning partially because there is no longer an interim government that is recognized and that National Assembly dissolved.
But Canada does continue to collaborate with like-minded countries on this. We discuss the situation in Venezuela with like-minded in the region on a regular basis. We discuss it with them at the UN. We discuss it bilaterally.
Senator Coyle: Is it some of the same actors?
Ms. Drukier: It is, indeed.
Senator Coyle: You mentioned transnational criminal organizations. Could you give us a little more detail on what that looks like on the ground in Venezuela?
Ms. Drukier: There are a number of transnational and local criminal organizations functioning in Venezuela. Some of them are purely criminal. Some of them are actually guerrilla groups from Columbia that are also operating in Venezuelan territory. The FARC dissident group and the ELN, two of the largest, have for many years worked on both sides of the border and are involved in drug trafficking.
There is also involvement of all these groups in, for example, illegal mining, illegal gold mining and trafficking in persons. You’ll have heard talk of the Tren de Aragua, which is a criminal organization that started in Venezuela. All of that is going on. Many of them are working with the tacit permission of the Venezuelan military, or there are arrangements in terms of payoffs. There is often reference to the Cartel de los Soles. The sol or the sun that is referred to in that, Venezuelan generals wear it on their uniforms.
There is a lot of criminal activity. There is a lot of illegal enrichment by government and military authorities that’s related to that. Much of it is related to cocaine trafficking that goes off the Venezuelan coast, mostly going to Europe.
The Deputy Chair: That ends round one. We’ll go to round two.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Ms. Drukier, Acting President Delcy Rodriguez has enacted reforms to Venezuela’s oil and gas regime and reached an agreement with the Trump administration on this matter. What is the Canadian government’s understanding of this agreement between Venezuela and the United States?
Ms. Drukier: We are monitoring this situation closely. The agreement is generally aimed at liberalizing the oil and gas sector; exports have increased significantly since January, and the agreement is designed to ensure that the revenues from these exports are controlled by the United States so that they are spent for the benefit of the Venezuelan people — in particular, for teachers’ salaries, the health care sector, and so on.
Senator Gerba: Is there any transparency regarding the claim that the United States will spend this money for the benefit of Venezuelans? Does Canada agree with this claim?
Ms. Drukier: As we understand it, the revenue is deposited into a bank account. After that, the Venezuelan government submits a spending plan to the United States, and then the funds are transferred to local banks to be used as intended by the Venezuelan authorities.
As for whether Canada is satisfied, it is difficult to comment on that, since we are not involved in the transactions and do not have all the information.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Excellency, I’m wondering how closely we’re monitoring the Venezuela-Guyana dispute in the Essequibo region given the huge implications of oil and gas and the potential wealth. Although we have not seen a regime change in Venezuela, the potential for that area to become a future oil producer has huge implications.
Ms. Drukier: I thank the senator for the question. This is an issue that we have been following quite closely. The case is before the International Court of Justice, or ICJ, and both countries have presented their arguments just recently, in the last couple of months. We have full confidence in the ICJ and hope for a resolution of the dispute through that mechanism.
In 2026, there has been very little action on the part of the Venezuelan regime as regards the Essequibo region.
Senator Woo: I want to pick up on Senator Gerba’s question on the oil industry. What is your assessment of how quickly they are able to resuscitate the oil industry? What is your assessment of the longer-term threat to Canada’s own industry? You recall when this first happened, everyone was worried that this would be a mortal threat to Canadian heavy oil?
Ms. Drukier: That is an important question from the senator. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I am not an expert on the oil sector, so I won’t venture very far along this road. I would encourage you to invite colleagues from Natural Resources Canada to talk about this in more detail.
What we do know is that to rehabilitate the oil infrastructure in Venezuela, it will take a number of years and massive investment. The need for that versus stability in the country and the willingness of the private sector to go in and make those investments are a little bit difficult to judge at the moment, although more private companies are going into Venezuela right now to try and work on that. Production has increased up to, I believe, 1.3 million barrels a day now from a lower level prior to January 3, 2026.
We have read expert analysis that said the threat to Canadian heavy oil exports is not necessarily that significant. It would take at least a decade before production would reach that kind of level where Canada would need to consider the impact on our exports. At the same time, more heavy oil on the market may lead to more refinery capacity to process that oil, so it may be of benefit in the end. It’s difficult to say at this point.
The Chair: Thank you. For someone who just said she was not that well versed on oil, that sounded very good to me, Ms. Drukier.
Senator Ataullahjan: Just listening to everything over the years, every section of that society is dysfunctional. The government is not functioning; there are human rights abuses, corruption, and drug dealing. What hope do we have? What role is civil society playing?
Ms. Drukier: It’s difficult for me to see the future, as I said before, but we can have hope. There is a strong civil society. Compared to what you heard earlier about the lack of opposition and a weak civil society in Cuba, there is a strong civil society in Venezuela. They have fought through difficult situations to continue their work. Many have been imprisoned, but they are still there and active.
The civic space has shrunk considerably in the last years with significant additional shrinking after the 2024 elections that were fraudulently declared a win for Nicolás Maduro, but they are still functioning. They are doing humanitarian work and local work as well.
Many civil society leaders and advocates are outside the country but still working on issues within Venezuela. We can have hope on that front for Venezuela.
Senator Ataullahjan: Thank you.
Senator Harder: I would like your views on the neighbourhood. Much has been asked of the neighbourhood over the last 10 years, and they have shouldered a good deal of the burden, if I could put it that way, of the migrants and the displaced, let alone the economic consequences of the collapse of the economy.
What are they telling our officials with respect to the events post January 3, their patience for watching this unfold, and their desire to be helpful but also not in the line of sight of certain larger powers?
Ms. Drukier: On this and many issues, the hemisphere is divided. Neighbours are divided. These were public statements. Some of them welcomed the U.S. intervention, and others condemned it. On that front, definitely there is division, but I would say that the region is united in concern for the Venezuelan people and wanting to see the situation improve.
Senator Harder: Is the enthusiasm that some showed diminishing after six months of, basically, no progress?
Ms. Drukier: Many countries share the concerns of wanting to see progress.
Senator Harder: Yes.
Ms. Drukier: As to enthusiasm diminishing, it depends on who you talk to.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
The Chair: Following up on Senator Harder’s question, as I recall a long time ago when I was our permanent representative at the OAS, President Hugo Chávez came to town. He and I ended up having a conversation because, as president-elect, he had visited Ottawa and met Prime Minister Chrétien in the day.
Our discussion was based on the virtues of representative democracy — ours — and what he called participatory democracy — his. Obviously, we have seen what has happened.
Our support in Canada for hemispheric institutions has been very consistent. We helped set up the unit for the promotion of democracy at the OAS. We regularly support electoral observation missions.
In the current situation, where President Trump has said he’s not sure about regime change at all now that former president Maduro is out and we can work with Venezuela, it seems that the U.S., which had always been pushing for democratic institutions and for the hemisphere — all the hemispheres — to become democratic, is somehow missing that part of the plot or is disinterested. This is perhaps an unfair question, but in conversations that you may be having with U.S. officials, is anyone raising the prospect of looking at democratic institutions and having elections? It seems to me that was always a fundamental aspect of U.S. policy in the region.
Ms. Drukier: We are certainly raising that and discussing it with U.S. officials. It is part of the three-phase plan that was announced by Secretary of State Rubio. The third phase was a democratic transition. I certainly couldn’t comment on differences in comments of senior leadership in the U.S. administration, but it is certainly an issue that we are discussing and that is raised with the U.S. and is part of this three-point plan.
The Chair: Is the OAS playing at all on this?
Ms. Drukier: There has been a session. There was one session in January at the OAS to discuss the situation, but as I mentioned in response to Senator Harder’s question, the membership is quite divided on this issue.
There is also the question of some countries that believe that because Venezuela is not an active member of the OAS that it is difficult to take action on that front with a country that is not at the table in terms of OAS support for democracy and for a transition, but the OAS has also indicated that it stands ready to support when that happens.
The Chair: Thank you. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Wendy Drukier for being with us today. Thank you for your candour. We know this is a difficult subject area, but we thought that the committee needed to address it. Thank your teams for all the good work that they do.
(The committee adjourned.)