National Security and Defence
Motion to Authorize Committee to Study the Prospect of Allowing Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. to be Part of Canada's 5G Network--Debate Adjourned
February 18, 2020
Pursuant to notice of December 10, 2019, moved:
That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the prospect of allowing Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. to be part of Canada’s 5G network, when and if the committee is formed; and
That the committee submit its final report no later than April 30, 2020.
He said: Honourable senators, I rise today to propose that the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence look carefully at an issue of pivotal importance for this country and our relationships with our closest allies — the implications of allowing the Chinese multinational company Huawei to become part of our 5G network.
As senators will know, 5G is the next generation — the fifth generation — of mobile broadband to replace the 4G network that we use today. The 5G network will allow for download and upload speeds that will be 10 to 20 times faster than current 4G technology. In this regard, it will greatly expand mobile data traffic and will be the foundation of future emerging technologies such as autonomous devices operating automobiles, unmanned vehicles of all types, homes and factories. The 5G network will permit the sharing of data on an unprecedented scale and it will constitute the basis of not only our future economy but, indeed, the entire structure of our society.
The economic stakes are massive, but so too are the national security implications. It is these national security implications that I wish to focus on.
There are several questions that I believe are important in this regard: Which companies and core service providers should be engaged to provide the technology for the future 5G network? How integrated should we permit various actors to be? Should we permit some companies to operate only a “non-core” 5G network? Can we clearly identify what the non-core networks will be? Should some companies not be permitted to operate within our 5G network at all, given their links to foreign intelligence services that may not only be seeking to steal technologies from Canada and that of other countries, but may also have an objective to disrupt our own 5G networks?
Experts may well have different views on these matters, and we should be prepared to hear from a broad cross-section of these analysts. However, I do believe that a core element of this examination must include what the implications of a Canadian decision will be in terms of Canada’s membership in the Five Eyes group of countries.
Canada has always closely cooperated with the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand on intelligence and security matters. The issue of whom we allow access to our 5G network is something that all our Five Eyes partners have been grappling with. Much the focus of discussion has understandably been on the People’s Republic of China and the role that the PRC companies play in China’s worldwide intelligence activities.
In 2018, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service hosted a comprehensive workshop of international experts on Chinese policy and strategic intentions. Papers presented at that workshop formed the basis of a report that was published in 2018. The extensive report included the following conclusions.
The current Chinese regime is:
. . . driving a multi-dimensional strategy to lift China to global dominance. This strategy integrates aggressive diplomacy, asymmetrical economic agreements, technological innovation, as well as escalating military expenditures. . . .”
Later, the report goes on to say that:
Trading partners have quickly found that China uses its commercial status and influence networks to advance regime goals.
Whether a Chinese partner company is a state-owned enterprise or a private one, it will have close and increasingly explicit ties to the CCP.
Beijing will use its commercial position to gain access to businesses, technologies and infrastructure that can be exploited for intelligence objectives, or to potentially compromise a partner’s security.
These considerations are important in forming how we will approach the issue of the Chinese corporate role, particularly that of Huawei, in the future 5G network. We need to consider how our Five Eyes allies are considering this matter.
The American position was clearly articulated by Robert O’Brien, the U.S. national security adviser, at the Halifax International Security Forum last month. Mr. O’Brien pulled no punches in describing Huawei as a Trojan Horse. He stated the following:
The technology allows China to put together profiles of the most intimate details, intimate personal details, of every single man, woman and child in China. When they get Huawei into Canada or other Western countries, they’re going to know every health record, every banking record, every social media post; they’re going to know everything about every single Canadian.
I know that some in this chamber will instinctively reject all analysis that comes from a representative of the current administration to the south. However, we need to remember the close security relations that exist between Canada and the United States. It is also important to remind ourselves that there is actually little daylight between the positions of Republicans and Democrats in the United States when it comes to the challenge posed by China and security to North America.
Last June, Eliot Engel, the Democrat Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated:
More and more, the Chinese Communist Party exports its repressive values, whether by spreading surveillance technologies or trying to silence international criticism of its actions through economic coercion or reshaping international institutions to better reflect Beijing’s views . . . .
Just this month, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said that accepting Chinese domination of 5G would be akin to “choosing autocracy over democracy.”
In terms of our other Five Eyes partners, Australia, like the United States, has also banned Huawei from its 5G network. In New Zealand, the Government Communications Security Bureau rejected the telecom industry’s first request to use 5G equipment provided by Huawei. The review is ongoing, but the security concerns are clearly apparent. In the United Kingdom, Huawei has been blocked from what are described as “core” parts of the 5G network.
It is a decision that has not been without its critics, but the company is banned from supplying kit to the “sensitive part” of the U.K. network, including from any areas near military bases and similarly sensitive sites. And it will only be allowed to account for 35% of the kit in a network’s periphery.
That brings me to the position of the Canadian government — or is it better described as a non-position? It probably should not come as a surprise that we cannot really be sure what the position of the current Trudeau government is on this matter. To put it charitably, the government has, in general terms, had a very pro-China policy. And it has maintained that orientation even in the face of unprecedented provocations. I need not remind senators that two Canadians have essentially been kidnapped by Chinese authorities in response to a legal process in Canada related to Huawei’s chief financial officer, while two other Canadians, who may or may not be guilty of drug trafficking — honestly, we cannot be sure in China — have been sentenced to death and imposed on them. Canadian agricultural exports, in turn, have their goods blocked from entering China on the most specious of reasons. It is a ban that the Chinese only lifted because of the damage done by disease to their own industry.
On all of these issues, we are still awaiting any kind of substantive response by the current government — a fact which is very concerning. Canada’s Minister of National Defence, at the Halifax International Security Forum, stated, “We don’t consider China as an adversary.”
The problem is that this view is not one that the PRC leadership seems to share. To again quote the views of experts in last year’s workshop sponsored by CSIS:
. . . Beijing will use its commercial position to gain access to businesses, technologies and infrastructure that can be exploited for intelligence objectives, or to potentially compromise a partner’s security.
It is my view, therefore, on the matter of the participation of a major Chinese company in our 5G network, this chamber should not simply wait for the government to take a decision. That would be a serious mistake, colleagues. We have seen this government’s inaction when it comes to dealing with China. In my view, the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence should start to hear from witnesses on all sides of this issue as soon as possible. It’s our responsibility and our role as the upper chamber. This is not only entirely appropriate, I would argue, but it is very necessary given the context and circumstances.
Parliamentary committees in other Five Eyes countries are doing that very thing as we speak. In Australia, for example, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications and the Arts is enquiring into the deployment, adoption and application of 5G in Australia. Here in our Senate, our Standing Committee on Transport and Communications spent a considerable amount of time in the last Parliament looking at all the implications of the introduction of automated vehicles in Canada. It can be legitimately argued, I think, that the matter of the 5G network is even more significant, particularly given the national security implications.
I therefore hope that I can count on your support in asking that the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the prospect of allowing Huawei Technology Corporation to be part of Canada’s 5G network, when and if the committee is formed, and that the committee submit its final report no later than April 30, 2020. Thank you, colleagues.