THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, February 26, 2026
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 10:30 a.m. [ET] to examine and report on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Good morning, honourable senators. My name is Peter Boehm. I’m a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
[English]
I wish to invite the committee members participating in today’s meeting to introduce themselves.
Senator Adler: Good morning. Charles Adler, Manitoba.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator M. Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario. Welcome.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
Senator Al Zaibak: Mohammad Al Zaibak, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Martine Hébert from Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: Good morning, senators and all who may be watching us across the country on ParlVU. We are meeting today under our general order of reference to discuss the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which was released on December 4, and, in particular, its implications for Canada.
Today, we have the pleasure of welcoming, by video conference, as individuals, Maxwell A. Cameron, Professor, University of British Columbia, who is joining us from Vancouver; and Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Professor of International Security, who is normally in Waterloo but is joining us, I understand, from Addis Ababa today. In the room with us, we welcome Vina Nadjibulla, Vice-President, Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Before we hear opening remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I want to remind everyone present to please mute notifications on your devices, because that is an unnecessary distraction. I’d like you to read the best practices card in terms of the microphone and the earpiece so we can avoid any audio accidents and protect our technical staff, particularly our interpreters.
We’re ready to hear opening remarks, which, as usual, will be followed by questions from senators and answers from our witnesses.
Ms. Nadjibulla, the floor is yours.
Vina Nadjibulla, Vice-President, Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: Mr. Chair, honourable senators, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee.
The review of the U.S. National Security Strategy, or NSS, and its implications for Canada are both timely and important. Before I turn to substance, there is one caveat that should be noted: Strategy documents under President Trump’s presidency should be read differently than in previous administrations. They are directionally important, but they are not a guarantee of execution, so there are a lot of questions remaining in terms of how the strategy will actually be implemented. Even with that caveat, the strategy matters, and Canadians should pay close attention to it.
The most important point to understand about Trump’s NSS is that, at its ideological core, it’s a MAGA document, and it is hostile to liberalism and the liberal international order. The harshest criticism in the document is directed toward Europe, but the underlying logic of it also applies to Canada.
It’s a major departure from all previous such documents, including the national security strategy from 2017 during Trump’s first presidency. It challenges the assumptions that have underpinned Canadian foreign policy for decades, namely, that North America is a space of stable interdependence rather than hierarchy, that the U.S. power operates primarily through multilateral institutions and alliances, and that Canada can exercise meaningful autonomy within a broadly rules-based system. Those assumptions no longer hold.
Now, with that framing, let me say three things: what the NSS says that is most relevant to Canada; what that means specifically for our engagement with China and the Indo-Pacific, the area of the world that I focus on; and then what Canada should do.
In terms of the elements that are most relevant to Canada, the first is that the western hemisphere is elevated as a core priority, and the language is explicitly that of the sphere of influences. The strategy invokes reasserting and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, aimed at denying “. . . non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to . . . own or control strategically vital assets . . .” in the hemisphere.
For Canada, the message is straightforward: Our infrastructure, data ports, research ecosystems and investment choices will increasingly be viewed through a hemispheric security lens, not just a commercial or bilateral economic lens.
Second, economic policy is treated as a national security priority. The NSS links U.S. security strategy, industrial strategy, supply chains and technology, and coordinated economic statecraft with allies becomes a key priority under that. This matters for Canada because, again, all of the issues we have traditionally looked at as economic issues around clean tech, critical minerals or AI cooperation will increasingly be treated as strategic terrain and issues in which the U.S. would want to have allied cooperation.
What is also relevant is that cooperation will not be secured through persuasion or shared values, as we have seen in previous administrations, but, rather, it will be achieved through leverage and conditionality and coercion. We have already seen this in actions taken vis-à-vis Greenland, Venezuela and so on.
What does this mean specifically with respect to China and the Indo-Pacific? The western hemisphere was elevated as priority number one and the Indo-Pacific as priority number two in the document, but the Trump NSS looks at China not as a systemic rival or through the lens of great power competition, as we’ve seen in other such documents, but, rather, through a lens of economic competition. The China language is primarily framed in the way of an economic competitor with which the U.S. is interested in competing, especially in the Indo-Pacific. That, again, has implications for Canada and our current recalibration of our relations with China.
In practical terms, Canada may face pressure from Washington for tighter guardrails, a reduced Chinese footprint in sensitive sectors — the ones I mentioned earlier — and a clearer alignment on economic security tools.
At the same time, I have to note that there is a lot of uncertainty in the U.S.-China relationship because President Trump, again, is not a traditional president and will likely make his own deals, especially as the summit with President Xi is approaching. Canada may find itself facing one set of U.S. demands one month and a very different U.S. pressure the next month, without much warning.
The bottom line is Canada must be aware of the U.S. strategy on China in this NSS but not allow it to eliminate Canadian agency. Engagement with China must be justified, first and foremost, on Canadian interests, Canadian security and Canadian values, not on a hope that the U.S. will be consistent or that alignment with the Trump administration is possible.
What should Canada do in light of all of this? Let me offer three practical things.
First, treat the NSS as an operational environment, not an instructional manual or a policy blueprint. Canada should use it to anticipate U.S. pressure points around investment screening, data, critical infrastructure, research security and critical minerals, while making decisions through a Canadian framework of risk, interest and sovereignty.
Second, Canada needs to urgently update its own national security strategy. We’ve been talking about this for a while. The comprehensive articulation that we have predates weaponization of supply chains and the erosion of assumptions about U.S. predictability, which I outlined earlier. The Canadian strategy must clarify our definition of national and economic security; define our approach to continental security in an era of U.S. hemispheric assertiveness; set parameters for engagement with great powers; and align our Indo-Pacific, Arctic, industrial and defence policies. The focus, obviously, must be on state capacity and resilience.
Third, engage in much more strategic discussions with our other partners in the Indo-Pacific — Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and Southeast Asian states — around our evolving approach to understanding U.S.-China competition but also to the changing security environment in the region.
NATO allies are critical, but Canada needs to do a lot more in our strategic discussions with the Indo-Pacific partners. Prime Minister Carney’s trip to the region offers a great opportunity, and I look forward to unpacking that in discussions with you.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Nadjibulla.
I would like to acknowledge that Senator Woo, from British Columbia, has joined the meeting.
Professor Cameron, you have the floor.
Maxwell A. Cameron, Professor, University of British Columbia, as an individual: Good morning, Senator Boehm and honourable senators. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak with you this morning.
My name is Max Cameron, and I come to you from UBC on Musqueam traditional territory in Vancouver. I teach in the Department of Political Science and the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, and I’m the President of the Latin American Studies Association.
Today, I would like to address three implications of the national security strategy of the United States: first, Canada’s response to the return of hemispheric power politics; second, the implications for relations between Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean; and, third, the erosion of democracy in the United States and how it threatens our security.
The National Security Strategy announced the so-called Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which was a 19th-century defence of republicanism against monarchy and colonization by European powers enunciated by President James Monroe in 1823. But Europeans were warned not to extend their political systems into the western hemisphere precisely so that the United States could expand into the south and the west.
In the 20th century, the Monroe Doctrine justified repeated U.S. interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, and today the “Trump Corollary” is used to justify intervention in Venezuela and the quarantine around Cuba. In addition, Trump’s trade war with Canada, his repeated disavowals of our sovereignty and his threats against Greenland suggest that the Monroe Doctrine extends northward, as, indeed, it did in the 19th century when Britain and later Canada, when we became a self-governing dominion, resisted U.S. expansionism.
In the face of the imperial ambitions of the Trump administration, Canada needs a clear statement of opposition to the National Security Strategy, and I think that was provided with remarkable clarity and coherence by our Prime Minister in Davos.
There is no question in my mind that we need to protect our borders, our Arctic, energy, water, critical minerals and other resources from U.S. encroachments, and we must avoid further integration that can be weaponized against us. It seems we can’t even build literal bridges these days without being subject to shakedowns by Washington.
In relation to Latin America and the Caribbean, for several decades, we’ve bet on the hope that democratic politics, liberal economics and hemispheric cooperation were possible. We joined the Organization of American States, or OAS. We negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, as well as other bilateral agreements with the region. We’ve been involved in Summits of the Americas. We’ve maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba, and I worry that we might disengage from the Americas at a time when we share, more than ever, perhaps, a common commitment to sovereign equality, non-intervention and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
We possess considerable soft power in the Americas, and we can use it to our advantage, and in this respect, I think it’s important that we sustain our diplomatic capacity for engagement with our allies, whether in Latin America or elsewhere.
Finally, democracies do not wage war on other democracies, and that’s because democracy depends on the rule of law, but the erosion of the rule of law in the United States is enabling the Trump administration to act lawlessly both at home and abroad, and this threatens our security and our democracy.
The most immediate risk to Canada lies less in direct military intervention than in more indirect influence, including the encouragement of separatism in Alberta. The absorption of Alberta into the United States would be consistent with the Monroe Doctrine as well as related notions of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism.
Our best defence is to strengthen our own democracy. We must remain strong and united to avoid the polarization that increases our vulnerability to foreign domination.
Recognizing that our security depends on the preservation of democracy in the United States, we must use every opportunity to remind our friends that the American Revolution was fought to resist the tyranny of kings and uphold the values of republicanism, liberalism and democracy.
Finally, of course, we must diversify our trade, mobilize new investments, deepen cooperation with other allies, strengthen our defence capabilities and avoid further integration with the United States. We must be willing to turn our backs on a bully that seeks to dominate us, even if that means short-term pain for long-term survival.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Cameron. We will now go to Professor Fitz-Gerald, far away in Ethiopia.
Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs and Professor of International Security, as an individual: Senator Boehm, honourable senators and members of the committee, I would like to share four observations today.
The first is that the U.S. National Security Strategy, or NSS, should not be read in isolation but rather as the capstone of a deliberately constructed system of policies designed to advance U.S. economic and technological supremacy, particularly in competition with China, through non-military instruments. This system includes the U.S. AI strategy, the GENIUS Act and related digital financial legislation, the National Standards Strategy, IP march-in rules, and the flexible use of authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA.
Taken together, these instruments form an arsenal of economic statecraft with power based on who owns the IP, who controls the data and who controls the standards. The NSS provides the strategic logic binding them together. The objective is dominance in the intangibles economy, achieved through rule setting, institutional control and value-chain engineering — and not tariffs alone.
The U.S. is operating systematically. Canada needs its own policy system. For example, a national AI policy is untenable if it leaves us vulnerable without a national data strategy which harnesses our data. If we are to defend our economic and strategic autonomy, we must move forward with a system-based approach.
Second, the NSS signals a strong emphasis on hemispheric defence and resource security. Despite limited references to the Arctic, adjacent documents and operational postures make clear that the U.S. is reorienting toward defending its northern approaches and the western hemisphere. At the same time, it explicitly highlights securing access to critical minerals and rare earth elements as a strategic priority. Recent events in Greenland underscore this objective, as do U.S. executive actions concerning stockpiling, allied coordination and supply-chain restructuring.
For Canada, this requires a comprehensive northern strategy linking defence, minerals, climate and ocean governance; clear articulation of how Canada will defend every square foot of its northern regions; transparency around capacity shortfalls and allied partnerships that will plug these gaps; and a defined position in the domestic and international critical minerals value chain, not just as an extractor but as a value creator.
Third, the NSS adopts calibrated language on China. Competition is explicit, yet the document leaves space for continued tactical reliance — particularly in areas such as magnets, rare earths and specific manufacturing inputs — while the U.S. builds domestic capacity. This is strategic ambiguity. It aligns with recent political messaging that foreign products, including Chinese electric vehicles, or EVs, are acceptable if produced within the U.S. industrial architecture. The message here is to control location, standards, IP and data, even when foreign capital is involved.
For Canada, proximity alone does not guarantee inclusion in future value chains. Canada must ensure that its participation in North American supply chains includes embedded IP standards and influence and downstream control, not just physical production.
Fourth, and perhaps the most underappreciated, is the emphasis on standards leadership. The document repeatedly signals U.S. intent to ensure that American technology and governance frameworks underpin global influence. It links directly to the U.S. National Standards Strategy and related institutional reforms. This week’s announcement by the State Department insisting that U.S. diplomats push for unrestricted access to national data is also part of this approach and a risk of a new form of neocolonialism and subsidiarity.
The document indicates that standards are no longer technical details; they are instruments of power. The U.S. has committed to driving U.S. patents into global standards, embedding IP as standard essential patents, or SEPs, and withdrawing from 66 international agreements, but remaining in three technical treaties, including the International Telecommunication Union, or ITU; the International Organization for Standardization, or ISO; and the International Electrotechnical Commission, or IEC, as these technical standards shape the market power and control.
This is competition at what I would call the “plumbing level” of the global economy — protocols, interfaces, legal definitions and technical committees. Whoever shapes standards embeds their patents. Whoever embeds patents captures royalties. Whoever captures royalties influences value chains. This is why the U.S. could withdraw from UNESCO but not from the ITU.
I would like to commend the Senate for its pivotal work in elevating standards to a matter of national strategy, and as this issue rapidly expands in scope and consequence, it is vital that your leadership in Canada and momentum continue. Passively adopting standards shaped elsewhere risks leaving Canadian firms downstream in value chains with limited rent capture. The issue is critical for the forthcoming review of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA.
In conclusion, the scale and coherence of the approach involving these four issues should not be underestimated. Canada must respond with a system of its own. If we remain rule takers, we will remain downstream in value chains. If we build capacity in standards, IP, data governance and Arctic security, then we will become rule makers, which, with our natural resources, will provide strength and leverage. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Fitz-Gerald.
Colleagues, we’ve heard three very interesting statements. We will proceed with our usual three-minute rule, but I ask you to be really concise with your questions and short preambles, as per usual. We really want to get a lot from our witnesses today, and if there is time, we will, of course, have a second round.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our guests for being here and being online on a very timely topic today.
I’d like to start with Professor Cameron and jump back to the Monroe Doctrine that you referred to earlier. As has been mentioned, the “Trump Corollary” to the doctrine very much includes Canada. And while it may not translate directly to military pressure, Canada’s efforts to diversify our markets — a must do — and to crawl out from the U.S. sphere of influence will be seen as a threat to this strategy.
So, as Canada goes about negotiating and signing these new trade deals and deepening alliances abroad, how realistic is it to think that the U.S. will try to exert pressure on those potential partners to back down and to see any deal with Canada as a liability to their own relationships with the United States?
Mr. Cameron: Thank you for that question; it’s a very important one. We’re already seeing the ways in which the Trump administration has regarded Canada’s closer ties with China and the recent visit of the Prime Minister to China as a threat to the strategy and to U.S. interests.
I don’t think there is any question that we are, to some degree, on a collision course. And that means we have to do, I think, two things. We have to pursue a strategy of not increasing our vulnerability and, as much as possible, reducing our vulnerability to the United States, but we have to do it with Machiavellian intelligence. In other words, we have to do it in ways that minimize the likelihood of blowback on us, and that is going to require a great deal of skill and effort. That’s obviously the challenge that faces the government.
For citizens, the best thing we can do is to be supportive of the effort of our country to change the nature of our relationship with the United States by remaining, as much as possible, strong and united in our insistence on our own sovereignty. Thank you.
Senator Harder: My question is for Dr. Nadjibulla, and it focuses on your comment that Canada needs to quickly revise its national security strategy. I want to argue against that and ask for your reaction.
I think the Trump NSS is the first articulation of the rupture that Prime Minister Carney spoke about, and I think it’s wiser for Canada to pursue individual pieces of the strategy rather than itself iterate a comprehensive strategy, because that can be more attacked than the individual pieces. And the pieces I see are the China piece, Asia, the engagement with our European allies, both in NATO and in the EU, and the pieces on ITU and yesterday’s AI conference.
In other words, wouldn’t it be better for us to move ahead to assert our interests in the context of our values, but our power relationship doesn’t allow us quite to have the comprehensive articulation you would wish, at this point?
Ms. Nadjibulla: I’m very happy to respond. Thank you very much, senator, for that great question. My position was more that we need to have an articulation internally — it doesn’t need to be public — that actually links the big picture we’re trying to achieve.
Because you’re right; Prime Minister Carney laid out that vision in the Davos speech, but that’s much more of a political declaration than a specific, detailed policy.
And the various pieces we’re assembling are important, but there are trade-offs and tensions within them, and prioritization becomes difficult when you have too many things but nothing sitting on top of that. Perhaps what is currently sitting on top of that is what Prime Minister Carney has in his head and what he’s trying to implement.
But in order to bring the whole system — both in Ottawa and across the country — and marshal the resources, not just of government but of the private sector and civil society, and have a whole-of-nation effort, there does need to be some articulation of that.
And timing will matter here. We don’t need to get too far ahead of ourselves, but this kind of a piecemeal approach cannot be sustainable, and it will have drawbacks as well.
So, for the moment, it’s working, and we’re navigating it, but it does run the risk of doing too many things and the system not knowing what we’re trying to achieve. So some change has to happen, and it can’t just be left to a speech.
And then, if I may, to the previous question asked, I think the critical issue here is not whether the U.S. will pressure other partners in terms of trade agreements with Canada; the critical issue is going to be what pressure Canada will be under as part of the CUSMA renewal process. In other words, if we are interested in that agreement continuing, what kinds of poison pills will be inserted in there to limit our ability to negotiate with others?
We saw this in agreements the U.S. negotiated with Malaysia and others in terms of economic security alignment — the point I was mentioning that what the U.S. cares about now is economic competition with China. So the CUSMA renewal process will be critical.
The Chair: Sorry to interrupt.
Ms. Nadjibulla: Apologies.
The Chair: That’s just fine.
Senator Al Zaibak: I would like, first of all, to commend all of our witnesses for very informative, comprehensive and complementary perspectives.
My question is to Professor Cameron. I understand, from your opening remarks, that under the National Security Strategy of the U.S., the U.S. government may be willing to interfere in the domestic politics of its allies, and, if so, what forms might such interference take, specifically in Canada?
Mr. Cameron: Thank you for the question, senator. I think we’re already seeing examples of this in the ways in which the U.S. administration, officials in the White House, are speaking favourably about the referendum on separation in Alberta.
It’s clear the separatists in Alberta are playing footsie with the U.S. administration. The possibility of a referendum opens the door to all kinds of forms of influence by the United States in our domestic politics. I think we have to monitor it very carefully, but it will be very difficult for us to do anything about, which again points to the need to rally public opinion against this.
But let me also stress, and this goes back to the previous question: the United States is in a position of decline. It looks very powerful right now, but there are a lot of sources of weakness of the U.S. government at this moment: It’s not very popular, there is widespread popular mobilization, pushback from the courts and an electoral calendar that is going to make things very complicated for this administration in short order.
So, I think we have to be very careful not to overstate the power of the United States vis-à-vis our country, as long as we remain strong and united. Thank you.
Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you so much.
Under these circumstances, how should Canada respond to potential political interference from the U.S. while maintaining as friendly a relationship with the U.S. as possible?
Mr. Cameron: I think we should be maintaining a friendly relationship with the United States in the sense of saying we’re interested in working constructively with the U.S. on all those areas in which we have common interests, including sustaining, as much as possible, a substantial trading relationship with the United States.
But I don’t think we should be at all passive or accepting of American meddling or interference. I think we have to monitor very closely the ways in which dark money, money from PACs, or political action committees, and money from U.S. interests will come into Canada, almost certainly, to try to influence the referendum. I think we have to look at the ways in which the platforms put us at a disadvantage in terms of trying to provide Canadians, particularly in Alberta, with fair and unbiased information so they can make up their own minds around the question of Alberta’s sovereignty.
Most of all, in dealing at the high political level with the United States, we need to send a very clear message. It is absolutely intolerable for U.S. government officials to —
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Cameron. We are having a bit of difficulty with your feed in terms of the interpreters. When you’re asked the next question, could you speak a bit more slowly and clearly, and we’ll see how that works? Thank you.
Senator Coyle: Thank you to our witnesses. This is incredibly helpful for us. This is such a critical topic we are engaging in today.
I will follow up on my colleagues’ questions to Professor Cameron. You talked about the erosion of democracy and the erosion of the rule of law at home and abroad with the U.S. You said our best defence is to strengthen our own democracy. You talked about rallying public opinion against what is happening in Alberta with the referendum on separation. Can you talk more about other ways to better defend and strengthen our own democracy at this time?
Mr. Cameron: Thank you very much for that question. We are an exemplary democracy, widely admired around the world. We have extraordinarily robust institutions. We have the best constitution in the world, one of the oldest constitutions. It’s really important for us to value those institutions but also to recognize that there are ways in which they are insufficient. In particular, they don’t provide Canadians with enough opportunity to participate directly in the decisions that shape our own lives.
At a moment when we are in an existential struggle over the existence of our country, it is critical to provide vehicles for Canadians to participate in the effort to strengthen our response, so participatory instruments of democracy. We have things like citizens’ assemblies and participatory budgeting. I’m, in fact, an advocate of electoral reform, as well, but those are longer-term solutions.
In the meantime, it’s important that our political parties engage the public as much as possible and look for venues to include the public in discussions around the future of our country.
Senator Woo: Thank you, witnesses. It is good to see you in person and on the screen.
I have a question for Dr. Fitz-Gerald on the arcane world of standards. I have been leading an initiative in the Senate to increase the use of standards in regulations. But in the context of trying to do that, there is a debate around whether Canada should pursue a standards sovereignty strategy or continue on its current path of essentially harmonizing with international standards.
It is a bit of a false debate, but these are the lines of the debate. I want you to comment on how to understand this debate and what it means for the continued development of the national standards system in this country. We have one. It is managed by the Standards Council of Canada. We’ve had a range of standards developed and organized. It’s very arcane, but it exists and it functions. How should that be changed along the lines that you are proposing, if at all?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thanks very much for the question, senator. We do have many good institutions. We have good, strong constitutional rights and mandates; good, strong human rights frameworks; good standards. They need to be interpreted for an intangibles world. They are largely interpreted for a tangibles world at the moment, but our economic model has changed profoundly. Factors of productivity are no longer labour and physical capital. They are prominently algorithms, AI, data, et cetera.
There’s a new general-purpose infrastructure — everything, even the most traditional sectors of society — that is made up of AI and the data that feeds it. You can think of a car. The driver is the intelligence. The data or the electrons go in to feed. The engine is computational power. The protections, the shell on the outside, are IP standards and cybersecurity.
You not only need standards around those, but you need governance frameworks. As we see with OpenAI and the tragedy that unfolded in British Columbia, we are operating in ungoverned space at the moment. Our children are plugging into content elsewhere. The standards that are being laid down with lightning speed within those three organizations are setting the rules for other countries that benefit the U.S. industrial strategy.
Senator Woo: In practical terms, I think the debate is about whether we should develop our own standards in these intangibles or follow the standards of other countries. I see the logic of developing our own standards, but, by the same token, developing our own standards, which then are not accepted by other countries, essentially means we are unable to export to the world those standards and the products in which the standards are embedded.
In many respects, we have to be a standards taker. Of course, where we can be a standards leader, we should be a standards leader. But how do we sort through the areas where we have a genuine chance of being a standards leader? Can you name a few that we should consider?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thank you. Setting standards in the strategic domain of our economy is important. Whatever strategic domains we have, we have to fiercely protect. We need a voice in there. We can also use a middle-power coalition that is coming together to emulate the standards that have already been set by a number of organizations to which we subscribe as middle powers. I would say use those two avenues.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: My question is for you, Ms. Nadjibulla.
You said in your opening remarks that the National Security Strategy, or NSS, looks at China primarily from an economic competition standpoint. Yet the federal government recently signed an agreement with Beijing to allow thousands of Chinese electric vehicles onto the Canadian market.
In your opinion, how did Washington view this agreement in the light of the NSS directions?
[English]
Ms. Nadjibulla: Thank you so much for the question and apologies for my poor French.
The initial reaction from the White House was very muted. President Trump said, “They made a deal. That’s what they should do. That’s what I want to do with China.” Subsequently, of course, things changed post-Davos speech. The focus was on the fact that Canada cannot negotiate a free trade agreement with China because that would be in violation of CUSMA. That’s a space we need to watch closely, how those discussions unfold.
When it comes to EVs specifically, the most interesting area will be Chinese investment in production here in Canada, potentially, and how that will be received by the U.S., depending on where the U.S. itself ends up on this question.
This will be something that President Trump and President Xi will be discussing during their meeting as well. A lot is still unknown. It will depend on how U.S. discussions go. If the U.S. also opens for potential Chinese investment, then you could say Prime Minister Carney was ahead of his time. If the U.S. does not and remains closed to Chinese markets, then it becomes an issue of tension between us and the U.S. in our CUSMA discussions. The future of that will depend on the future of the Canadian auto sector.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: How do you think that Canada should proceed? How should it adjust its economic relationship? Should Canada accept that it’s produced here, or will this harm the negotiation?
[English]
Ms. Nadjibulla: This was a big part of my message. When it comes to Canada developing a China policy, it has to very much focus on Canada’s interests, Canada’s values and how we would like to see our economy moving forward because alignment with the Trump administration is very difficult at this time — both because their policies are unpredictable and because they change at the level of the President rather than the whole institution. And, ultimately, they may not be in Canada’s interest. We are no longer in an era where alignment with the U.S. actually works in the way it did last time.
It is a much harder moment where you have to parse the policies and really focus on Canada. And I would add to that Canada’s trading partners through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, especially other democracies in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in Europe. In other words, this is part of what Prime Minister Carney is talking about in terms of building the middle powers’ coalition, especially in the economic domain: It’s through bridging CPTPP and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, and trying to have as much rules-based trade within that.
But when it comes to China, we are now in the Wild West territory of having to do our own thinking and our own policy-making.
The Chair: Thank you; that’s a good note to end on.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: My question is for Mr. Cameron and Ms. Fitz-Gerald. When we look at the strategy, clearly the United States plans to secure certain strategic sectors in a number of ways. You have all said so. These sectors include critical minerals, energy and Arctic resources.
When we look at the strategy as a whole, we can perhaps approach it in two ways. We can see it as an opportunity to identify areas for closer partnership with the United States. I’m thinking of critical minerals, which we have in large quantities in Canada. Is it an opportunity or a threat? The strategy can also be seen as increased pressure and a threat to Canada and our resources. Once again, we’re talking about energy and critical minerals. We aren’t talking about water, but water is also an issue. How should we view this strategy for our country? Is it a threat or an opportunity?
[English]
Mr. Cameron: Thank you, senator. You have put your finger on a critical thing. We have things that the United States wants, and that gives us leverage. And I think we have to insist that we get a fair price for the things that we have that they want.
What gives us power in this relationship is, firstly, that and, secondly, time and having alternatives. If we are patient in negotiations and cultivate alternatives, we are in a position of strength. So, we have what they want; we’re patient; we have alternatives to them — as long as we cultivate those three things, we have real power in this relationship.
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: I’ll just add to that, if I may, by saying we have to look at the future in determining leverage as well. The future is about data centres; data centres depend on water. The future is about quantum technologies; quantum computers are surrounded by freezers and need cold temperatures. We have an Arctic. We have a strong NORAD relationship that has been strong for many years. This is an area where we can add value propositions.
We also have an abundance of affordable energy that can prop up these data centres and nano- and quantum technologies moving forward. We’re talking about trans-Canada electrification projects. This would give us enormous potential, even with our wind farms in places like Nova Scotia, to get into energy storage and provide a value proposition with this. So we have a lot of value propositions we just need to identify, lock down as a strategic domain and ensure the trade negotiators are well versed on those levers.
Senator Adler: The panel will forgive me if I find it difficult to have a conversation about imperialism without discussing worst-case scenarios.
I want to put this to Dr. Cameron first. Worst-case scenario: We have a referendum in Alberta on October 19; we have an election in the United States just a couple of weeks later. If the Americans do whatever it takes to, rhetorically, sweeten the pot for the Alberta separatist project — what they call the “Prosperity Project” — and if the worst-case scenario Alberta Prosperity Project manages 50.01% in the referendum and declares that Alberta needs to be independent immediately, regardless of the Canadian Constitution and all of that, but if part of the Canadian response is that while Alberta may be doing a good job of managing oil, it’s Canadian oil, do you think there is a possibility that Trump would exercise the “Trump Corollary” to threaten military invasion of Canada, which he would call a “liberation” of Alberta and giving Albertans the sovereignty that they earned through the referendum?
I know that’s, once again, a worst-case scenario, but if you don’t mind, I would like to probe your mind on that.
Mr. Cameron: Thank you very much, senator. In international relations, there is a refrain which is if you want peace, prepare for war. So we have to think about the worst-case scenarios, and we have to be prepared for them. I think what you have spelled out is exactly the scenario that troubles me the most.
I think what, again, is going to be critical to us is our sovereignty depends on the preservation of democracy in Canada and in the United States.
There’s no reason, in principle, why you couldn’t negotiate a process of separation, as we know from the experience with Quebec. Within the framework of democracy, it could be done amicably. We could amicably take the country apart, but that is unlikely to happen. And it’s particularly unlikely to happen if we have an administration in the United States that is guided by the Monroe Doctrine, which could very well use the threat — or the reality — of a successful referendum. Again, I think it’s highly improbable, but were that to be the case, the United States could use that to drive a wedge within our country to weaken us in order to be able to dominate us. And we have to make that case very strongly in the run-up to this election: that the effect of a positive outcome of that referendum would be disastrous for our country.
The Chair: We’re at the end of round one, but this is usually where I ask a question. And I will ask a question, specifically to Professor Cameron.
I know you’re a Latin Americanist; that’s where we first crossed paths during my work in Latin America in my previous career. I want to bring forward two concrete examples: the situation in Venezuela and what may or may not happen with Cuba. My concern is that over the decades Canada has invested a lot in the multilateral system in this hemisphere — through the OAS, democratic development, election observation, human rights in particular — and yet we’re in a situation where the U.S. has taken away the head of government in Venezuela, basically leaving the structure there, without any coherent plan that I can see. And, in Cuba, there seems to be a wish for regime change while choking the government of Cuba and its people through an enforced embargo on oil.
So you won’t have much time to answer this question, but the concern here is what Canada can do. We have announced humanitarian assistance to Cuba, but it’s our hemisphere too. We’re the second-largest contributor to the hemispheric institutions, and those institutions are now at a crisis point as well.
Mr. Cameron: Thank you, Senator Boehm. I think we should work with countries like Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia and Spain, all of which have repudiated the intervention in Venezuela, acknowledging that intervention would be inconceivable if Venezuela were a democracy. The same is true of Cuba.
Our goal should be the democratization of those countries but not through intervention — rather within the framework of diplomacy and peaceful resolution of disputes.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Harder: My question is to Dr. Fitz-Gerald and is a follow-up on the conversation you had with Senator Woo and your observation about the importance of the ITU going forward.
Can you expand on what you think Canada could do? Twenty-five years ago, the ITU was a very important instrument for Canadian public policy. It hasn’t been in recent years, and I would like your advice.
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Thank you very much. I would say that we have to evaluate our new general-purpose infrastructure, look at the standards on which that is functioning and then bring a good democratic middle-power voice to the ITU: sensible standards that we work with others to bring together that build on what we have already and outputs that reinforce those standards. We can work with our U.S. partners on these standards too. It gives us leverage for when we’re being forced to accept other standards that are tethered to the U.S. industrial architecture. It gives us leverage to say, “Well, we can do it this way; in fact, we’re constitutionally mandated to do it this way.”
It is a game of leverage, but it also having a voice that represents a middle-power democratic coalition in that organization.
Senator Coyle: Dr. Nadjibulla, just back to China — I’m sure we can spend the whole time talking about China — your testimony was important to clarify that we’re not necessarily looking at warmongering here; it’s really economics and dominance we’re seeing. This is critical for Canada, given where we are. We know that Trump will make spontaneous deals, and it is unpredictable.
You said we should be aware and carefully watching what is going on there but shouldn’t limit Canadian agency. Can you talk a bit more about that?
Ms. Nadjibulla: Absolutely. Prime Minister Carney has laid out our desire to seek greater strategic autonomy and independence and agency for Canada in our ability to have an independent foreign policy. For a very long time, our foreign policy, especially on China, was linked with the U.S. because we shared many assumptions and values.
The rupture he speaks about has tremendous implications for how we navigate our relations with the other great power, which is equally challenging and also deploys coercion. That means we have to strengthen national power, national domestic resilience, everything we are doing to build our own economy, and then we have to build stronger partnerships with others, so diversification. Then we have to figure out where the risks and guardrails are when it comes to dealing with both the U.S. and China and the tensions that exist, while recognizing that we’re not equidistant.
At least for now, the U.S. remains our most important partner, both from a security and from an economic perspective. We have to do what was mentioned earlier in terms of being somewhat Machiavellian or being able to carry a big stick but speak softly when it comes to the U.S., so not necessarily always be provocative but understand what we have to do, build strength at home, diversify with reliable partners and manage the dependence that exists on the U.S.
Senator Al Zaibak: My question is to Ms. Nadjibulla. Shifting to the Middle East, specifically to the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the strategy signals a U.S. shift in the Middle East away from conflict management toward investment, technology and strategic partnerships, particularly with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In your view, what opportunities and risks does this create for Canada’s engagement in the region?
Ms. Nadjibulla: Thank you so much. My day job is not to work on the Middle East, so I’ll offer what Canada is doing with the Middle East, which is an opportunity for us.
We are rediscovering that region in the same way we are rediscovering many parts of the world, and partnerships around innovation and energy are critical. U.S. policies will continue as they are; in some ways, they bring baggage. I’m not sure we should be aligning with those when it comes to the Middle East. We should be charting our own path, and the visit of Prime Minister Carney to the region lays out that opportunity. We should be pursuing opportunities in innovation, AI and energy.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: I’m optimistic. I would like to think that the Americans will indeed see the value of signing agreements with Canada in strategic sectors. We’re living on hope, and we’re allowed to do so. To follow up on the comments made by Senator Adler earlier, I have a question.
[English]
To what extent do we have real leverage of power and where is it if we have one? There is also a worst-case scenario on the table, eventually.
Ms. Nadjibulla: It is a difficult question, senator. You’re right that we don’t have immediate leverage with the U.S., but we can do two things. We can hope that the pressures in the U.S., with time, will create course correction, and, in the meantime, we have to focus domestically.
Prime Minister Carney is right in terms of focusing on what we can control, which is domestic and building domestic power and then diversification. The only leverage we have with the U.S. is sequencing timing and how smart we play this and how well we understand the domestic dynamics in the U.S. Playing for that time and watching the direction of travel in the U.S. is our secret weapon.
The Chair: Dr. Fitz-Gerald, do you have a thought on that?
Ms. Fitz-Gerald: Yes, of course. Our strength is the way we are viewed by the American people, so the relationship with mayors, governors — not just with the nearshore states but with others — is exceptionally important at the moment. Our narrative and our declarations should not in any way irk the very people that love us and respect and value the friendship with Canada.
As an academic, I recently attended a big deans’ and directors’ meeting with all the Ivy League universities. Enrolments are down. They are up elsewhere around the world. There is a system at another level that is not quite coming together too well, and people are realizing that.
The Chair: Thank you. Dr. Cameron, you have the last word.
Mr. Cameron: I hate to say it, but, honestly, I think that the best advantage we have in the relationship with the United States, in this regard, is that what Trump is doing is simply unworkable. It is untenable. I don’t think his policies are going to work. His trade policies are going to be a disaster for the United States. His domestic strategy, his use of force against the domestic population, is already generating a backlash.
Strongmen look super powerful because they are showing will and exercising muscle, but, in the long run, that’s not where real power comes from. Real power comes from being able to convene people, to bring people together and to project a project. Trump’s project is the project of a failing hegemon, and I don’t think it will be successful. So, in some sense, part of our strategy has to be to let things unfold in the United States. The direction that things are going there will create opportunities for Canada to manage to avoid the worst consequences of American aggressive unilateralism and bullying.
The Chair: Thank you very much. On behalf of the committee, I’d like to say it’s refreshing to hear from three academics who are so knowledgeable. You have enriched us with your testimony and your commentary. I’d like to thank Dr. Nadjibulla, Dr. Fitz-Gerald and Dr. Cameron for joining us today.
Senator Woo: Can I make a public service announcement? Some of us will be meeting with the Cuban ambassador in W120 in about two minutes, which is very apropos of this discussion. All are welcome.
The Chair: We will now onboard a very important witness from the United States for our next panel. As much as I am interested in that subject, we will have an important meeting here as well.
Colleagues, for our second panel, we are pleased to welcome, by video conference from New York, Dr. Richard Haass, President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations. After 20 years as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Dr. Haass is currently a senior counselor with Centerview Partners, an international investment banking and advisory firm. He was a senior official with the rank of ambassador in the U.S. State Department, which is, in fact, where he and I first met, and also served in the Department of Defense, as well as on the staff of the National Security Council under President George H. W. Bush. I could go on.
Ambassador Haass, thank you very much for taking the time to be with us today. We are ready for your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions and your answers. Please go ahead.
Richard Haass, President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations, as an individual: Thank you, senator. It’s good to be with you in your new incarnation. It’s good to be with you all. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I’ll just make a few comments, and then I look forward to your questions and observations.
We meet, obviously, at a turbulent time. I am not referring to men’s hockey at the Olympics, but I could be. More seriously, the world has just marked the end of the fourth year of Russia’s second war of aggression against Ukraine. This war has been costly by any and every measure. That said, the only thing that would be more costly would be a Russian victory.
The good news is that it remains within the capacity of Ukraine and its partners in the West to see this does not happen. Indeed, the best way to bring about a constructive and lasting peace would be to prove to Vladimir Putin that more war will not give him what he wants, which is not just territory but the end of a Ukraine that is independent, with deep and lasting ties to the West.
Meanwhile, as we meet today, a powerful American military force has been assembled off Iran. An armada, though, is not a strategy, and U.S. strategic objectives remain unclear, as does the means for realizing them. Both a narrow diplomatic accord and a serious conflict are imaginable, as are various outcomes in between the two.
The area to our common south has been eventful. Leadership change has come to Venezuela and with it somewhat greater U.S. economic involvement. More recently, we’ve seen the killing of a significant cartel leader in Mexico, a killing that appears to reflect a welcome shift toward a more aggressive strategy by the current government of Mexico, but a shift that also opens up the possibility of wider conflict between the cartel and the Mexican government, as well as between the cartel and my own country.
This brief list could easily be expanded. Instead, though, I want to focus on what I see as 10 of the fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy under the second Trump administration, and I will go through them quickly.
First, there is a greater focus on the western hemisphere, which is viewed as an extension of homeland security and policy concerns relating to immigration and drugs.
Second, there is a much greater emphasis across the world on American commercial interests.
Third, there is a strategic shift away from Europe and from my country’s traditional allies, coupled with pressure that they do more to provide for their own defence.
Fourth, we are seeing little interest in promoting democracy or human rights.
Fifth, there has been a distinct lack of support for efforts to combat climate change and to develop select alternative energies, including solar and wind.
Sixth, there is a pronounced coolness toward international institutions of nearly every sort.
We are seeing a frequent resort to tariffs for a host of purposes, economic and non-economic, something that will survive to a to-be-determined extent in the wake of the recent Supreme Court decision.
Eighth, we are seeing a declared interest in Middle East peace, but I would say this interest has not yet been matched by policy.
Ninth, if my counting is correct, there is a willingness to invest in military force and to use it but in limited ways.
Tenth, there is something of an inconsistency toward China, an inconsistency perhaps to be sorted out when President Trump visits that country in late March and early April.
What does it all add up to? Let me just say a few things meant as observations, not criticisms. First, the second Trump administration is not isolationist, but it is unilateralist to its core.
Second, there is a pronounced amoral quality — not immoral but amoral — to American foreign policy, something that translates into treating traditional allies little better than traditional foes, and that translates into not pressuring other governments to meet standards on how they treat their own citizens.
Third, the second Trump administration represents a significant departure from its predecessors, including the first Trump administration, I would say, and many of the policies that have informed U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II.
All this obviously raises difficult but critical questions that go to the heart of the foreign policies and foreign policy choices of our allies, questions your Prime Minister began to address thoughtfully in his remarks at Davos, all of which makes your deliberations today timely and then some.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to share some thoughts about developments in U.S. foreign policy, and I look forward to any questions or comments you may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much for your comments, Ambassador Haass. Colleagues, as usual, we will have a three-minute window for your question and for our witness’s answers, so please keep your questions very precise and concise. We will start with our committee deputy chair, Senator Harder.
Senator Harder: Thank you, Dr. Haass, for being with us. Your list is compelling. I want to focus on Ukraine in part because, as you acknowledged, yesterday was the fourth anniversary, but there were two developments, one yesterday and one today, that I would like your comment on.
Yesterday, at the United Nations, there was a resolution with respect to Ukraine, and, for the first time, the United States abstained, along with China and Uzbekistan, I think. And this morning, Foreign Affairs magazine’s Michael Desch has a piece on how Ukraine is losing. Could you expand on your point about the importance of Ukraine as a test point for the West, and what the implications are for what, to me, appears to be a profound moving back from the Trump 2.0?
Mr. Haass: Ukraine matters, sir, I would argue, because, first, at stake is probably the most basic of all rules and norms of international relations, which is that territory ought not to be acquired through the use of force. It’s the reason we went to war when we did in 1990 and 1991 against Iraq when it invaded and conquered Kuwait, and a similar issue — indeed, the same issue is at stake now with Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine.
Then, in addition, at stake is European security, and even though Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance, obviously, what happens there will have a tremendous effect on European security and potentially on Russian behaviour. I don’t assume that Russian ambition, shall we say, is limited to Ukraine. I think the stakes are enormous, both, if you will, in the narrow and the large.
Let me just react, if I can, quickly to the two comments you made at the beginning. I thought the U.S. abstention was unfortunate in the United Nations. The only rationale I could imagine for abstaining on a resolution of this sort — and I find it hard to imagine any rationale — is that it was somehow central to American diplomatic efforts, that we are at a critical moment and people decided this would be tactically advantageous. I do not believe that to be the case, so, again, I would question, shall we say, the wisdom of what we did.
Second of all, I take issue with the idea that Ukraine is losing. That said, I haven’t read Mr. Desch’s article, but I read a lot about Ukraine. Obviously, there are a lot of factors or a lot of dynamics, questions of capability, of will, and there are also a lot of uncertainties and variables, what Donald Rumsfeld would have called “known unknowns.”
But I don’t buy it. I just don’t buy it. I think that Ukraine has held on remarkably well. The lack of territorial redistribution, shall we say, over the last four years is remarkable, and I don’t see any clear trends right now. I think Russia faces all sorts of pressures both on the battlefield and beyond, so I just simply take issue with those who put out that kind of strategic pessimism.
Senator M. Deacon: Hello, Mr. Haass. Thank you for being here. I’m still processing your answer and your top 10. Thank you for sharing that with us today.
You have mentioned in earlier remarks that when the NSS came out, it was a departure from one of America’s traditional goals of trying to rope or pull China into what we would deem the rules-based international order. Might one of the ironies of this NSS and a larger U.S. approach to international relations be that Western nations actually gravitate to China as a more predictable — hear me out — stable option and that the result of this American rupture will be bringing China into the maybe rules-based order, or am I dreaming?
Mr. Haass: Half of what you said I’m probably sympathetic to, and half I would not be. One out of two isn’t bad for either of us.
It’s quite possible that if the United States is judged to be a less predictable economic and strategic partner, other countries, including your own, will make some fundamental decisions about — how would I call it — diversifying their portfolios, whether it’s their trade portfolio, investment portfolio, strategic portfolio and so forth, and China could be, to a point, a beneficiary of that. That’s where I probably would agree, though I am sorry to see that possibility arise.
I don’t think that China is going to become a founding member of a rules-based international order. That is not their priority. Xi Jinping, at home and abroad, has other priorities, and it is still pretty clear that his principal external priority is about bringing Taiwan into the fold. So I think that would come way before any principles normally associated with the rules-based international order.
Senator M. Deacon: I do have another little piece I would like to ask you about, sort of hanging over from the last panel. It is kind of like, “What would you do?,” and this concerns the F-35s in the context of the “Trump Corollary.” We probably can’t dependably rely on the U.S. to maintain a fleet of F-35s in the long run, but we seem to have used every moment of leverage that can be used in the last year. So I appreciate the backing off of the purchases might just poke the bear, but with this administration, there is always unpredictability. So with the F-35s, my question is what you would do.
Mr. Haass: Okay. So let me be clear that I have not studied that issue — I assume you’re talking about Canadian F-35s, yes?
Senator M. Deacon: The purchase of them.
Mr. Haass: Your purchase, yes. I’m hesitant because I don’t know the details of the arrangement. But, again, for any country, you’ve got to ask yourselves questions about dependence and confidence in commitments, and compared to what. I know that’s a fairly abstract or academic answer, but I’m hesitant to go much beyond that. But the fact that you have to ask the question I actually find somewhat troubling.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Hébert: Mr. Haass, thank you for joining us today. I’ll ask you a simple question. How do you see the current status of Canada’s relationship with the United States?
[English]
Mr. Haass: Just so I understand, my vision of what it is or should be? Let me respond to your question with a question to make sure I understand.
Senator Hébert: Your vision of what it is. Thank you.
Mr. Haass: I knew that question would come up. The U.S.-Canadian relationship is in some kind of transition, but it’s still moving, to be perfectly honest. It hasn’t settled on a new plateau or a new anything. Obviously, there’s friction in the relationship at lots of levels, but I don’t think it has been resolved. So I can’t stand here and in confidence say, “This is exactly where we stand.” We’re still — our economic partnership is deep and wide. Our security partnership is also deep and wide. So the glass-half-full — the optimist in me — says, almost like Wagner’s music, the relationship is better than it sounds and seems, and many things are continuing.
That said, the fact that there are questions that have been introduced — the previous question about America as an arms supplier, tariff-related questions and so forth — is worrisome, but so far, at least, I think this is a relationship that is so profoundly in the interests of both countries that despite the frictions, despite the personality clashes and the like, there is a lot of momentum, a lot of strategic cooperation and a lot of trade and investment that go on despite, in some ways, the day-to-day frictions at the leadership level.
Senator Hébert: And on the second part of what you said at the beginning — what it should be?
Mr. Haass: Let me answer it as someone who is from the United States. One of the great strategic advantages of the United States over the last 80 years, where we’ve played this outsized role in the world, is we had relatively good relations with our two neighbours. We had extraordinarily good relations with Canada and good relations with Mexico much of the time.
Think about the luxury that provides. Normally, major powers have to worry about their borders and their neighbourhoods. We didn’t have to worry about them; instead, our neighbours became strategic assets. We didn’t have to allocate resources to deal with, if you will, negative challenges, and we could work together or imagine dealing with things together. What a strategic advantage for the United States. I would think it was not bad for Canada either.
That’s what I want. I want to, in some ways, go back. It’s always dangerous to say that your goals are restoration. Things change; I get it. Things have to change in order to stay the same, as Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa pointed out in The Leopard. I’m not saying the goal should be to go back to exactly where we were. For example, Canada needs to do much more in terms of defence effort. For specifics, I remember when I was in the European bureau at the State Department, and every weekly meeting began with debates about softwood lumber.
Yes, there are issues that I believe need to be addressed. What we need to bring back, though, is the sense that the assumption and the goal are that we are the closest of partners. That seems, to me, in both countries’ interests.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Here we refer to softwood lumber disputes as the hardy perennial in our bilateral relationship.
Senator Adler: Dr. Haass, we appreciate your visit and hope you will do this more often. I have one simple question: Will the United States-Israel coalition create regime change in Tehran?
Mr. Haass: I’ve thought a lot about regime change. I recently wrote about it for the Foreign Affairs magazine. History teaches one to be modest about it. There’s the question, in the case of Iran, about the ripeness of the situation for regime change.
I would simply say that even though this regime is probably at its weakest at any time since 1979, I do not believe it’s poised or on the cusp of collapse. If you look at the structure of the government, there are many institutions of governmental authority. Security forces are overwhelmingly supportive. They face no real internal military opposition. Until we see serious defections in either the political or security establishments, I do not think that regime change is a high likelihood.
I also think the ability of outsiders to trigger regime change from afar, as history would suggest, is extremely limited. So, I’m skeptical, which is not to say I wouldn’t like to see it, though I remind people that regime ouster is not the same as change. I can imagine forms of regime change that would not necessarily bring about a desirable Iranian leadership.
People hear the phrase “regime change,” and their assumption is that we will soon have a country of 90 million people reading The Federalist Papers in Farsi. Well, maybe, but maybe not. I can imagine the Revolutionary Guards essentially stripping themselves of the clerical layer and running Iran.
All of that is to say I don’t think regime change is imminent. I don’t think outsiders will be necessarily central to the process. I don’t assume, as desirable as it would be in principle, that in practice it would necessarily turn out the way one would want.
Let me say one other thing, and I’m sorry to go on so long. I remember when I worked with Colin Powell. Once the question came up, and he spoke to the President at the time, he said, “Mr. President, I oversee the military. Militaries are good at destroying things and, if we have to, we can kill people, but regime change is not a military mission. You can’t give me that as a mission, and I can’t instruct my troops to carry it out.”
I think that’s the situation we’re in now. The United States could use military force to degrade certain capabilities, but there is no way the United States could use military force with any confidence that it would lead to regime change. If we’re interested in regime change — and I think there are good reasons to be — then I would say the principal instrument may be less military and more economic. That is the Achilles heel of this regime because of their persistent economic mismanagement.
I would look for ways of increasing the economic pressures on the regime and do it over time. There’s no reason we need — how should I put it? It’s not clearly wise to press for regime change before the moment is ripe. When people came out in the streets in late December and early January, we saw tens of thousands killed in part because the moment wasn’t ripe. They were not sufficiently organized. They were obviously not strong, and the regime is not unravelling.
I’d say what we ought to be doing now is building a context where, down the road, regime change might have a better chance of taking place.
Senator Adler: What about military force right now?
Mr. Haass: Well, if the emphasis is either on negotiations or military force, negotiations are obviously not going to get you regime change. I don’t think military force will get you regime change. It’s just as possible that the use of military force could cause something of a rally-around-the-flag effect; I don’t know.
I’ve been in the Oval Office a lot. You can’t walk into the Oval Office as an adviser and say, “Mr. President, if you order this use of military force, regime change with this outcome will be the result.” There’s no way of knowing that. I would simply say it’s probably not a wise objective on which to base your policy and certainly not on using military force, given the military and political realities of the government. Ironically enough, you could have a different conversation in the not too distant future about Cuba. That might be because of societal, economic collapse. There might be some possibilities for regime change, and then you’d have to ask yourself, “What do we want to do encourage it? What do we want to do to bring about certain outcomes after it?”
I don’t think that right now in Iran — as desirable in principle as regime change would be — we’re in a position to make it the centrepiece of our policy.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Ambassador Haass, you said that President Trump’s mandate wasn’t isolationist, but rather unilateralist. Could you expand on this point and tell us what this means for traditional American allies, such as Canada, and for other countries, particularly the BRICS group?
[English]
Mr. Haass: Let me be clear: I wouldn’t say his mandate was to be unilateral. When Americans went to the polls 15 or 16 months ago and voted for president, foreign policy issues were not uppermost in their minds. They voted on the basis of economic issues, inflation, the border, what have you.
President Trump, after he won, made the determination or the decision to carry out a foreign policy that was unilateral in means for the most part. You see that the United States, for example, withdrew from international institutions and efforts — the Paris climate effort, the World Health Organization and literally dozens of other international undertakings. I think there is profound skepticism about the United Nations, which, for what it’s worth, I would argue, is well founded and more than justified.
There was no mandate of any sort for him to be isolationist, but I do think there was a mandate to do something about immigration. That has certain connections, as I suggested before, to stabilizing the western hemisphere and probably also to avoid large military conflicts.
This is an administration, as you’ve seen, that is willing at times to use military force. We used it in Iran last June, if my memory serves me right. We’ve used it in a limited way in Venezuela. We’ve used it elsewhere in Africa, but it has been very limited. That continues to be true, which is one of the reasons I’m skeptical that the administration has an appetite for a large military conflict with Iran.
Now, I think the implications of this for the rest of the world are that many international efforts will now have to take place absent the United States. We’re not going to be there, or we’re not going to be supportive, whether it’s the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, efforts to deal with climate and so forth. At the UN, our role will be minimal. Essentially, many trade agreements or regional trade arrangements — the world, for better or worse, will have to get used to collaborating or coordinating where the U.S. role will be limited or perhaps non-existent.
Also what we’re going to see — and we’ve seen it in parts of the Global South with the U.S. involvement in some areas, for example, what was done with the United States Agency for International Development — is the U.S. involvement on the ground in many parts of the world will be much lesser.
We have seen a pulling back from U.S. relations with parts of the Global South diplomatically, in the aid area and so forth. That will likely continue, with the exception that this is a president who clearly likes to get involved on specific disputes. It might affect this or that country that considers itself part of the Global South. All things being equal, I don’t think relations with the Global South will be anything like a priority for this administration. Since so much of the interaction with the Global South happens in large regional and global institutions, I don’t see the United States as being heavily involved.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much, Dr. Haass. Could you tell us what you believe the implications of the new U.S. National Security Strategy would be for Canada and, in particular, for Canada’s Arctic region?
Mr. Haass: I’m going to make a general point about U.S.-Canada relations. Allies have lost some of their pride of place. This administration clearly emphasizes, among other things, the use of tariffs. Questions have been raised about the future of the agreement formerly known as NAFTA. I think there is a greater emphasis on this part of the world.
In terms of the Arctic, there is a greater appreciation that goes beyond this administration about the importance of the Arctic. It’s ironic when you read the strategy. On the one hand, the administration is something of a climate change denier, yet it’s more than willing to deal with one of the consequences of it, which is the opening of the waterways and routes in the Arctic. It is an irony not lost on me.
I have not seen a formulated, detailed strategy about the Arctic. If you ever ask me back, I will prepare a bit more on that in terms of policies and capabilities. I do hear once in a while from the administration concerns about Russian and Chinese involvement in that part of the world, but I have not seen consistency in terms of, “Therefore, we are going to develop certain capabilities.”
Some justify what we wanted to do, as misguided as it was, with Greenland along those lines, and it’s not limited to this administration. There is a growing recognition in the strategic community that the Arctic matters more and over time will matter more, and the United States needs to think about capabilities, and that is everything from icebreakers and shipping to basing, to intelligence collection.
I would be all in favour of developing a closer relationship with countries that are well situated, whether that is looking at aspects of the U.S.-Canada relationship or Denmark. We just have to go about it, shall I say, in a smart way.
Senator Wilson: My question is more about the attitude of the U.S. administration toward Canada specifically. You said in your remarks that we have a deep and wide and mutually beneficial relationship. I’m paraphrasing there, but it was something along those lines. To us, it seems like the United States administration is completely acting against its own self-interest as to what would be best for the United States. You identified that Canada, from a border security point of view, is a great neighbour to have, and we have always felt the same way about the United States.
To what extent do you think there is an understanding of how important this Canada-U.S. relationship is? How much of this is bluster? Do these folks really not get it? Do you think there is an understanding of the damage that is being done to the relationship — that their strategy is having the reverse effect of what they might otherwise desire?
Mr. Haass: If the people with influence and authority understood how important the relationship was and how historically it has mostly worked in our common interests, then it would be hard to explain the policy directions we’ve now embarked on. It seems to me there are elements of our policy which are, shall I say, confrontational to a point that is in the interest of neither of our countries. I don’t understand it.
I will maybe get in trouble for this, but it seems almost like Canada has gotten under our skin a little bit, and I can’t explain what accounts for that, but it’s for whatever reasons where the silliness about the fifty-first state came from. I’m familiar with the complaints about levels of defence spending, trade frictions, as I mentioned before. That I get. That was the traditional agenda of U.S.-Canadian differences, and you had your problems with us about this or that issue. However, I can’t quite account for how this relationship has sort of gotten off on, whatever metaphor it was, but clearly neither side is happy with it. I can’t quite explain that; sorry.
To me, regardless, we are where we are, so the question really is how to mend it. That would be an interesting issue, and I would have to think a bit more about it, because I don’t think it’s in either country’s interest. It would be beneficial to make it a bit quieter. Both sides have talked too much in public — certainly, we have — about the relationship. Even though the speech in Davos was thoughtful, and I understand it, it doesn’t need to be repeated every other day.
The question is how we can quietly patch this up. That is why God invented diplomats. That’s why consultations are more important than negotiations. So, I don’t know where Americans and Canadians go these days to patch things up, whose side of the border, but we ought to go there and keep it away from the cameras and microphones and probably also find — not just settle some of the differences on defence or trade, but you have raised the Arctic, security issues, border issues, drugs — some issues where we can make some real progress so each side can brag about the relationship.
Senator Wilson: Sounds like good advice.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We are at the end of the first round and I am going to ask a question as chair as well.
I have, for the past few years, attended the Munich Security Conference. I know you’ve been there. I don’t know if you were there this year, but I saw your successor, and we chatted a little bit. I was there for the cold-shower speech by Vice President Vance, particularly directed at the Europeans. This year, Secretary of State Rubio had a similar message, although it was much more nicely packaged.
In the interval, we saw the National Security Strategy come forward with a term that I had never seen before: “civilizational erasure.” It didn’t go down too well in Europe, as you know. I wonder if you can offer some thoughts as to where all this is coming from and what its purpose is.
Mr. Haass: I could see why it wouldn’t go down so well in Europe. Not too many civilizations appreciate the notion of being erased. It’s a cultural issue.
I’m going to draw an analogy, and you might think it’s far-fetched, but bear with me. Many of the critiques of Europe remind me of some of the critiques of elite Ivy League universities coming from this administration; they are obsessed with diversity, not interested in security issues, obsessed with climate change and so forth. They represent almost a kind of effete elites. And there has been, beginning with Vice President Vance and since, a kind of a cultural attack.
I described facetiously that, for a lot of people in the administration, Europe is seen as a giant “Wokestan,” an area of values and preferences that don’t, shall we say, comport well with this administration’s world view. And the comfort level with Russia and Hungary I find extraordinary, not something I would have ever predicted.
But a lot of it is cultural, because it has continued, interestingly enough, even though many European countries have upped their level of defence effort. So I can’t explain it in narrow policy terms. And it’s not just because of trade issues and the rest. Also, by the way, Europe has been willing, at times, to stand up to the United States economically, and I expect that wasn’t always well received.
But I find it a bit head-scratching. It’s almost what I said about Canada applies more broadly to our Atlantic allies. This has been one of the great advantages of American foreign policy over the years, which is not to say it worked perfectly, and the allies couldn’t have done more, and we haven’t had our differences; God knows we have. But all things being equal, I like getting up in the morning with a pool of partners that we can draw upon. And I always thought it was one of the defining advantages of American national security.
But I do think there has been a cultural drift, also in the other direction. If you think about it, Europeans look at aspects of American society — whether it’s abortion issues or guns or some of the illiberalism that has come into our democracy, differences over that and real differences about the regulatory state. I think the societies and the economies, in many ways, have moved apart.
Probably one other thing, and it doesn’t explain the edge, is that just demographically we’ve changed, and experientially. The era of Americans who ran this country, who basically were forged by World War II, who came from Europe, many of them descended from Europe — those days are gone. The hold of Eastern, European-descendent elites in the United States is also gone. I think the United States has very much changed. So even though the Trump administration has introduced a real edge to its attacks on Europe, my guess is even though the edge will one day fade, I don’t think we’re going back to the kind of intimate relations that we’ve historically had. I think that both sides have changed.
Probably one other thing — sorry to go on so long, Mr. Chair — is that as we get more involved in other parts of the world, like the Indo-Pacific, I think the transatlantic, Europe-focused era of American foreign policy, for better or worse, is largely over, which doesn’t justify how we’ve gone about it but might explain it a bit.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Harder: I’d like to pursue your last set of comments. You’ve been part of a foreign policy elite in the United States over many years, particularly in Republican administrations. Canada has benefited greatly from personal and ongoing relationships with yourself and your counterparts, and that has led to a lot of common understanding, and good things have happened.
Where are the Republican foreign policy elites that believe in the rule of law, free trade, human rights and support for democratic institutions and multilateralism? Who are your friends these days, and will they ever come back?
Mr. Haass: Senator Harder, there are days, I think, you are going to see my face and those of a few others on postage stamps with the line “endangered species” underneath it.
When you take a step back and look at the run of — whether it was Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, even through Reagan and both Bushes — for all their differences, their commonalities, and you suggested several of them, were pretty large. So this is technically a Republican administration, but it couldn’t be more different.
Where are those people now? Some of those people are still Republican. I left the Republican Party a few years ago; I’m now an independent. Some are still Republican; some are independent; some have gone into the Democratic fold. You don’t see a lot of signs of it in the Senate or the House of Representatives.
Could it come back? I don’t know. I’m a bit skeptical. When I look at some of the underlying trends in American society, and I worry a bit about this — the polarization, the populism, the implications of AI and what you might call structural joblessness — I’m not sure we bring back, if you will, the president I was closest to, the forty-first, George H.W. Bush. I’m not sure that kind of Republicanism comes back. The United States may be too populist now for that. But that said, I still think there are differences.
One of your colleagues — it might have been the chair — referred to the difference between the speech a year ago by J.D. Vance and the speech this year by Marco Rubio. There are some similarities but also some differences. My guess is you might see more differences — between not just those two individuals but others — once Mr. Trump moves from the scene. There is a real concern or fear from Republicans that they will pay a price if they get on the wrong side of this President. But once he is no longer in such a powerful position, my guess is — even if we don’t come back to the status quo ante — the spectrum of permissible views that are politically viable will begin to grow again.
I don’t know if you will see the revival of neo-cons — maybe, maybe not — or of traditionalists — maybe, maybe not. But you could end up with some kind of a blend. I don’t think you’re going to have extreme MAGA foreign policy forever.
My guess is — particularly without Donald Trump, who has this unique personal appeal — Republicans will have to tack toward the centre if they want to regain the support of independents. My own sense is it may not go back to the kind of Republicanism you and I might be most comfortable with. I don’t want to speak for you; I’ll speak for myself. I don’t think what we’re seeing now is a permanent position because I don’t think, without Trump’s personal hold, it can command a majority of Americans.
Senator Hébert: I wanted to go back to something you said, Dr. Haass. You said, “Canada has gotten under our skin.” I was just wondering which skin you were referring to. Were you referring to the administration’s skin or to the population’s skin? Because if it’s the American population’s skin, it is another ball game.
Mr. Haass: No, I meant it in terms of the administration. You had the hockey finals, men’s and women’s. If they’d turned out differently, you might have gotten under the skins of most Americans. But under the circumstances, I think Canada is still well thought of by most Americans. To be serious for a moment, I haven’t noticed any vein of an anti-Canadian movement in our culture, but I do think the administration has issues. The good news and the bad news is that it’s concentrated there.
Senator Hébert: In that vein, what will be the impact of the mid-term elections, do you think, on our relationship?
Mr. Haass: In my last job in the State Department, I used to say my job was policy planning, not policy predicting.
Right now, the mid-terms seem a long way away, and my own preoccupations have very little to do with the policy outcomes and a lot more to do with whether we are going to be able to hold free and fair elections. I think the single most serious issue facing my country in its two hundred and fiftieth year as a democracy, ironically enough, is our ability to conduct a free and fair mid-term election, and I think there are serious questions about voter participation and the integrity of the electoral process. That is not the subject of your conversation today, but that is what a lot of us are focused on.
In terms of policy issues, I don’t think, for the moment, issues dealing with foreign policy are going to be front and centre unless something big were to happen, like we get involved heavily in Iran or something like that. If you look at the polls, what really matters are questions of the economy more than anything. The President went from a position of real popularity, with closing the border, to a position of marked unpopularity because of the deportation effort and the behaviour of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE. He’s going to have to deal with economic issues and those issues. The two issues that most got him into the office have now turned the majority of the American people against him. Foreign policy is not at the centre of things.
One other thing is that, by and large, foreign policy is not heavily influenced by Congress, so even if you were to have a House that was narrowly democratic, any president enjoys enormous latitude and discretion when it comes to the design and implementation of American foreign policy, so I don’t think it would have all that many consequences. It would still be evenly divided, but the other way. The President will still try to promote tariffs, using what authorities the courts will let him use.
Most of what he is going to do vis-à-vis Canada — no one can force him to extend a trade agreement. He is still going to enjoy tremendous latitude, for better or worse, when it comes to foreign policy or U.S.-Canada relations.
Senator Coyle: Getting back to the new U.S. National Security Strategy, are there particular elements of the strategy that, in your view, the U.S. will have a really hard time implementing?
Mr. Haass: That is an interesting question. I think some of the aspects of economic security, while desirable, might be hard to implement. I think the bigger questions are possibly with certain issues to do with a more capable defence. It’s one thing to call for it and another to do it.
I think the bigger questions are more of desirability rather than feasibility and whether the emphasis on the western hemisphere goes around the world. But it is more a question of feasibility than doability, if you will.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Mr. Haass, the 2026 National Defence strategy states that Canada and Mexico play a significant role in the defence of the hemisphere. Do you think that Canada should or could use this factor to improve its relationship with the United States? Do you think that this relationship with the United States and this president will continue after this president leaves office, if he ever does?
[English]
Mr. Haass: There are lots of things that Canada could do that would be welcome by any administration: border security, early warning for missiles and so forth. We talked about cooperation in the Arctic and a larger defence effort that could make forces available for western hemisphere or European contingencies. I think, potentially, there’s a role with Mexico. If things begin to get messier in Mexico, Canadian involvement might, at some times, be more politically acceptable than the involvement of the United States in certain situations.
I worry about a lot of things. That is kind of what I do for a living. In the long run, I don’t worry a whole lot about the U.S.-Canada relationship because I think there is a lot of momentum and the rationales for it being productive, constructive and close are powerful for both countries. Even if there is more than the usual friction with this administration, I don’t think that is permanent. I don’t think it’s necessarily permanent for this administration. I can imagine, as we talked about a few minutes ago, a bit of a coming together between the Prime Minister and the President and between Canada and the United States. Even if it doesn’t happen, I think that would be an issue that would be ripe for improvement for the next administration. There is nothing structural that argues for a more distant U.S.-Canada relationship.
In the long run, I’m pretty bullish. It’s just that to get to the long run, you have to get through the short run and the medium run.
The Chair: We have come to the end of the hour. Ambassador Haass, I would like to thank you on behalf of the committee for sharing your insights. They’re valuable for us. You mentioned in your remarks if we would like to have you back. We would, and maybe you can come in person the next time, at a time of the year of your choice, climatically speaking.
Thank you for being with us today. It’s much appreciated. Good luck in your endeavours.
Mr. Haass: Thank you, Peter. It’s good to see you in your new position, and thank you for a serious conversation to you and your colleagues. All the best.
The Chair: Thank you.
(The committee adjourned.)