Skip to main content

Constitution Act, 1982

Bill to Amend--Second Reading

November 17, 2026


Hon. Denise Batters [ + ]

Honourable senators, I rise to speak at second reading as the opposition critic for Senator Peter Harder’s Bill S-218, which places major limits around the federal use of the “notwithstanding” clause.

This clause, of course, is section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which allows the federal Parliament or a provincial or territorial government to temporarily suspend the application of only certain sections — section 2 or sections 7 to 15 — of the Charter. In other words, legislation would apply notwithstanding a particular provision of the Charter.

Bill S-218 dictates that an infringing bill — one that would invoke the “notwithstanding” clause — must be introduced in the House of Commons and by a government minister. It further stipulates that the Supreme Court of Canada must have ruled, either through a reference or through the court’s own ruling, that a law contravenes — or could contravene — a relevant section of the Charter.

In addition, Bill S-218 directs that the preamble of an infringing bill must give reasons for declaring the “notwithstanding” clause. The minister must also table a Charter Statement outlining the potential impact of the bill on rights and freedoms as well as the reasons the government contends those infringements cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

Bill S-218 also stipulates that the infringing bill cannot be limited by time allocation and cannot be studied in Committee of the Whole in either the House of Commons or the Senate. Finally, this bill instructs that an infringing bill can only be adopted in the House of Commons with a so-called supermajority, stated as two thirds of the members of the House consisting of members from at least two different political parties.

Senator Harder claims that the changes to the Constitution resulting from his bill would be allowed under section 44 of the Constitution Act, which allows the federal Parliament to unilaterally make “manner and form” amendments to the Constitution without requiring the use of the general amending formula usually required for changes to the Constitution. This is very much a matter of debate, as I will address later.

To evaluate the proposals in Senator Harder’s bill, it is necessary to first have an understanding of the genesis of the “notwithstanding” clause. The negotiation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms occurred during the first Trudeau government: the Pierre Trudeau Liberal government. As you may know, when Canada’s Constitution was eventually repatriated in 1982, it was the inclusion of the “notwithstanding” clause that broke the serious negotiating impasse with the Canadian provinces and paved the way for the adoption of the Charter. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that without the “notwithstanding” clause, there would be no Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Former senator Pamela Wallin, who worked as a broadcast journalist covering the entirety of the constitutional negotiations in the early 1980s, described the fight for the “notwithstanding” clause this way:

As a journalist who covered every moment of the constitutional negotiations, I was a willing witness to history. Still, I cannot begin to recount all the intricacies. These negotiations went on for years, but in the end, former prime minister Pierre Trudeau got his Charter of Rights, and the Western premiers got a workable amending formula and the “notwithstanding” clause, or section 33, as part of the patriated Constitution. The “notwithstanding” clause was hard fought and publicly and politically negotiated and became a defining characteristic of our unique document.

The “notwithstanding” clause was designed by its framers to be used when a rebalancing of rights is necessary. Even former prime minister Pierre Trudeau, in a 1981 media interview, said that it was to ensure “. . . that the last word is held by the elected representatives of the people rather than by the courts.”

The Western provinces proposed the clause as a compromise to negotiate a careful balance between the protection of rights and the democratic right to legislate for the electorate. From the perspective of the provinces involved, it also served to protect against federal overreach and the threat of unaccountable judges straying into law-making territory that rightfully rests with legislators.

The “notwithstanding” clause was initially proposed by the Government of Saskatchewan in 1980 and was quickly supported by the other Western provinces. Notably, it was not just Conservative governments who supported the clause. Saskatchewan’s former NDP premier Allan Blakeney was a major force in pushing for its inclusion. Blakeney, a former president of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, recognized the importance of protecting rights, but he also respected the need for a counterbalance with the will of the electorate. Looking back on the constitutional patriation negotiations years later in 2005, Premier Blakeney said:

There will always be folks who say you can’t trust the electorate. But the whole development of democracy is predicated on the belief that the people, for all their warts, can be trusted better than any elite.

If someone needs to make a final decision, the question is who. Your choices are democracy, aristocracy or meritocracy. Fifty years ago, you could hear people go on about the merits of technocracy. What we needed was specialized experts to make the decision. The new aristocracy is to be judges. This is folly. It has never worked. Judges should measure laws and government acts against a measured standard. The fundamental decisions should be left to the public.

Blakeney recognized the “notwithstanding” clause as a critical tool for navigating the delicate balance between the courts and the legislatures.

As a slight aside, in the last year of my undergraduate degree at the University of Regina, I was fortunate to have Professor Howard Leeson as my third-year advanced political science professor in a class that focused on constitutional federalism. Professor Leeson had been the deputy minister to Premier Allan Blakeney at the time of the 1981 constitutional negotiations, and he was one of the authors of the text Canada... Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution 1976-1982. The class was in the spring of 1991 against the backdrop of the constitutional conferences of the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord. Of course, I was glued to following all of that constitutional wrangling on television. As you might know, some of the Meech Lake Accord negotiations were held in this very building.

The final project in our course was a mock Meech Lake conference, where each of us played the role of either a premier or a deputy minister. I played Saskatchewan Premier Grant Devine.

Professor Leeson died recently in November 2024, after a brief battle with cancer, at the age of 82. It is an honour for me to have learned directly from one of the architects of the “notwithstanding” clause.

The “notwithstanding” clause is not absolute. The creators of the clause were mindful to place careful limitations around this power, recognizing that overriding Charter rights was not something to be done lightly. First, as I have already mentioned, it can only apply to certain categories of rights. It cannot be used, for example, to override mobility, language or democratic rights. Second, there is a five-year limit on the use of the power, as Senator Housakos noted in his speech on this bill. This ensures that the electorate will have the opportunity to express their views on the matter through a general election before the government renews or extends the clause. This is how it should be in a democracy: It is the people — the voters — who should have the say.

Finally, the intended use of the clause must be stated explicitly in legislation — that the measure will operate notwithstanding a given Charter right. This ensures there is no ambiguity.

The “notwithstanding” clause has been used many times in Quebec. For the first number of years, in fact, Quebec pre‑emptively put it in every piece of legislation they introduced. However, the clause has also been employed in Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, New Brunswick and the Yukon.

Senator Harder has stated that he was prompted to create this bill, in part, due to reactions to Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre’s 2025 election promise to use the “notwithstanding” clause to implement consecutive sentencing for mass murderers. Senator Harder called this “single-issue fervour.”

Let’s look at the facts of that so-called “single issue” that Mr. Poilievre was talking about during the election: the case of multiple murderer Alexandre Bissonnette. On January 29, 2017, Bissonnette approached a Quebec City mosque with a semi-automatic rifle and pistol. He killed two men outside the mosque, then entered the prayer room and opened fire on the worshippers there — Muslim men at prayer — emptying dozens of shots into the crowd over the course of two minutes, stopping only to reload his gun. By the time Bissonnette had finished his killing spree, 6 men were dead and 19 were wounded. They left behind 17 children who now grow up fatherless.

But Bissonnette’s regret, as he relayed to a social worker after the killings, was the following: “I regret not having killed more people.”

Bissonnette pled guilty to six counts of first-degree murder, each of which carries a sentence of life with no chance of parole for 25 years, but the lower court gave him some increased punishment for the killings, sentencing him to a 40-year minimum, making the 27-year-old Bissonnette eligible for parole at 67 years of age. The increased sentence was overturned on appeal, and he was given concurrent life sentences with the chance for parole after only 25 years.

That is the usual sentence for only one murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld that “volume discount” for Bissonnette’s six murders, ruling the original 40-year minimum to be “cruel and unusual punishment” and declaring consecutive sentencing to be unconstitutional. Canadians were rightfully horrified by this judgment. Bissonnette was a convicted multiple murderer six times over.

Correcting this situation was the underpinning of the recent Conservative election promise.

In Senator Harder’s second reading speech, he said Mr. Poilievre’s promise to invoke the “notwithstanding” clause for consecutive sentences “worried” him. I’ll tell you what worries me and what worries millions of Canadians: a man convicted of murdering six Muslim men at prayer, who will potentially get out of prison after serving a sentence of the length he would serve for killing only one person and then the Supreme Court of Canada saying that him serving any more jail time, even only 15 more years, is “cruel and unusual.” That worries me, honourable senators.

It seems the “cruel and unusual punishment” is reserved only for those men’s surviving families.

In a media interview on CBC’s “Power & Politics” that spring, Senator Harder framed Mr. Poilievre’s promise to invoke the “notwithstanding” clause to address this injustice as the Conservative Party “being tough on the little guy.” He was actually referring to a convicted mass murderer as the “little guy”? What about the murder victims, their grieving families and those severely injured by this killer? What about their rights?

Senator Harder alleged in his speech that Mr. Poilievre was “more concerned with politics than the Constitution,” but to examine the “political,” let’s look at some facts surrounding this bill, which is Senator Harder’s first Senate public bill.

Senator Harder has had substantial ties to the Liberal government. He served as the Trudeau Liberal government’s first transition team head in 2015, and immediately after that, Prime Minister Trudeau appointed him to the Senate and then as Trudeau’s first Senate government leader, where he served the Liberal government in that role for four years.

I am curious about the level of support within the Liberal government for Senator Harder’s bill. Some things strike me about the way Bill S-218 has rolled out. First, there is Senator Harder’s hesitation to answer about the origin of this bill. In a 2025 interview with The Hill Times, he was asked directly whether he had consulted anyone in the House of Commons and particularly Government House Leader Steven MacKinnon’s office in preparing the bill. He declined to answer, saying only “a number of members of Parliament have contacted me to indicate their support for the bill.” Minister MacKinnon’s office, on the other hand, refused to comment entirely.

Senator Harder introduced Bill S-218 right after the Carney Liberal government’s election win, using some constitutional reasoning to prevent the use of a section of Canada’s Constitution. He introduced it at the very first day he could, and this was the only new and consequential bill introduced that day. The others were bills reintroduced from the previous Parliament.

In the Senate Chamber debate and his media interviews, Senator Harder has mentioned his “delight” at the prospect of his Senate bill becoming a Liberal government bill. Meanwhile, the federal government’s submission to the Supreme Court of Canada on the Quebec case before it right now discussed placing limits on the use of the “notwithstanding” clause.

Is all of this unrelated? Time will tell.

If Bill S-218 is really a government bill, it would be fair to put it forward to us as a government bill, and we should debate it as such.

The “notwithstanding” clause is a legitimate part of our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms within the patriated Canadian Constitution. I wonder whether legislative initiatives like this Bill S-218 are meant to chip away at that — perhaps an end run attempt to renegotiate the original agreement while bypassing the significant constitutional process required to do so. I agree with now former senator Pamela Wallin, who stated in her speech on this bill:

If Ottawa wants to renegotiate yesterday’s deal today, there is an amending formula that allows for that. Use it and do so for all to see, not hiding behind the robes.

Senator Harder’s bill directs that federal legislation employing the “notwithstanding” clause could only be initiated in the House of Commons, not in the Senate. In fact, he called the Senate an “illegitimate starting point” for such a bill. Yet, curiously, he initiated this senator’s bill, which prevents the use of a section of the Constitution, in the Senate. Quite the contradiction. When I asked Senator Harder about this in the Senate following his speech, his answer was that “. . . we have to start somewhere.” Wow.

Senator Harder bases this on the fact that money bills must originate in the House of Commons, but that is because that is specifically established in the Constitution of 1867. This issue was not. To stipulate that this kind of “notwithstanding” clause bill can only be introduced in the House of Commons appears to be unconstitutional.

Senator Harder claims that, with his bill, the federal Parliament can unilaterally amend the Constitution under section 44 because this constitutes a “manner-and-form” change. That is to say, he suggests it changes only procedural matters, rather than a fundamental component of the Constitution itself. And so, he contends this type of change in his bill does not require the general constitutional amending formula in section 38 of the Constitution requiring the support of at least seven provinces with more than 50% of Canada’s population. I wholeheartedly disagree.

The changes Senator Harder proposes to the use of the “notwithstanding” clause would directly impact the powers of the Senate, clearly falling outside the scope of the unilateral federal amending procedure in section 44.

Section 42(1)(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982, stipulates that:

(1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1):

— that is, the 7/50 amending formula of the Constitution —

(b) the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators;

If the Senate passed Bill S-218 and it became law, limiting the use of section 33 of the Charter, we would actually be removing significant powers from the Senate’s own authority. As now former senator Raymonde Saint-Germain said in her speech, “This bill, colleagues, would make the Senate limit its primary purpose, which is to legislate.”

We would not be able to determine what we are going to debate and how. Since Bill S-218 requires that any infringing bill must be initiated in the House of Commons, not in the Senate, and must be introduced by a minister, we as a Senate would be undermining our own parliamentary authority in this place.

The bill prevents senators from bringing forward legislation, something that is well within our rights as legislators in one of the two federal chambers of Parliament. If a minister of the Crown is a senator, as was frequently the case until about 13 years ago, it similarly precludes that person, a member of the cabinet, from introducing legislation here. I submit that both of these scenarios improperly limit “the powers of the Senate” and, as such, would be unconstitutional.

The restrictions in Bill S-218 would mean that we could not debate Senator Housakos’s Senate public Bill S-240, for example, because it proposes to invoke the “notwithstanding” clause to restore mandatory minimum penalties struck down by the courts regarding possessing and accessing child sexual abuse and exploitation material. This is a measure supported by a lot of Canadians, honourable senators. And regardless of Senator Housakos’s vast experience of 18 years as a senator, his former tenure as Speaker of the Senate and his current position as the opposition Senate leader, he would be silenced in this way here.

Similar bills to Bill S-240 have been brought by official opposition members in the House of Commons as well. Those MPs may have knocked on thousands of doors during a federal election campaign to discuss their proposed private member’s bill with their constituents. What right do we as senators have to tell an elected member of Parliament that he or she can’t introduce a bill that is important not only to them but also to their constituents? That is an affront to democracy.

It is not clear to me whether Senator Harder’s definition of a “minister” who can introduce an infringing bill would include the Carney Liberal government’s secretaries of state, just like the one the Liberal government sent over here for ministerial Question Period in our last sitting week. They don’t have their own departments or attend cabinet meetings regularly, but would they be eligible to do this? This is an open question. But Senator Harder’s bill would definitely prohibit a government backbench MP from introducing a bill that proposes to use the “notwithstanding” clause, as well as all MPs on the opposition benches.

The provisions of Bill S-218 unbalance the separation of powers, giving the executive this major role in the legislative process. And it does so without requiring the general amending formula in the Constitution, which is seven provinces and 50% of the population.

Senator Harder also has not sufficiently explained why his Bill S-218 prohibits the study of a bill using the “notwithstanding” clause by a Committee of the Whole. He says it is to not limit debate. But we have seen scenarios in this chamber where a Committee of the Whole is used as a way for the entire Senate to question ministers about the subject matter of a bill before it is sent to a committee for in-depth study. Those of you who were here during the study of Bill C-45 on the legalization of marijuana and the original assisted suicide legislation, Bill C-14, will remember that the Senate handled those bills exactly that way. In fact, Senator Harder was the Liberal government’s Senate leader when those Committees of the Whole were held in the chamber. In some instances, a Committee of the Whole could be used to have more discussion around a bill, not less.

Both of Senator Harder’s speeches on the “notwithstanding” clause, first on his motion and now Bill S-218, decry populists for using the “notwithstanding” clause. But Saskatchewan NDP Premier Blakeney certainly was not a populist. He was a Rhodes scholar and a constitutional law scholar. Yet, if it wasn’t for him, there would be no “notwithstanding” clause in the Charter, and Canada then wouldn’t have a patriated Constitution. That was his demand. And in the early years after the patriation of the Constitution, the Quebec provincial government pre-emptively used the “notwithstanding” clause on almost all their bills as a matter of course. That wasn’t a populist government either.

In Senator Harder’s chamber speeches, he made some injudicious comments about the Canadian electorate. He said:

Today, Canadians often don’t understand Charter rights or what they mean, and they are largely ignorant of the “notwithstanding” clause.

He later said:

The “notwithstanding” clause is meant to check the courts, and the people are meant to check the government, but what checks an uninformed populace?

Regrettable.

Senator Harder also said:

Politics have turned into a blood sport. The rhetoric and histrionics used by political parties — some more than others — seek to divide and create an “us versus them” mentality. Where the party goes, the base blindly follows, and facts, logic and reason hold no persuasion.

Compromise becomes futile because there is no talking with the perceived enemy.

But what is Senator Harder doing by referencing an “uninformed populace”?

Bill S-218 sets an extremely high threshold for the “notwithstanding” clause to be used. To pass the House of Commons, it would require a two-thirds majority with members from no fewer than two recognized parties. I pointed out to Senator Harder that, in the current House of Commons, this would require both of the two largest parties, the governing Liberals and the official opposition Conservatives, to support such a bill. This seems extremely unlikely. As such, it seems quite clear that Senator Harder’s bill is designed to prevent the “notwithstanding” clause from ever being used.

Senator Harder has noted two of his inspirations for Bill S-218 as former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed and the Canadian Bar Association, or CBA. His proposals for amending the “notwithstanding” clause differ significantly from theirs, however. The threshold for passing an infringing bill required in Bill S-218 — 66% — far exceeds the 60% suggested by Peter Lougheed many years after the constitutional negotiations in which he took part. Senator Harder’s bill also requires the additional requirement for supportive MPs to come from two or more political parties.

The Canadian Bar Association’s letter to the Minister of Justice in October 2024 called for the requirement that “the notwithstanding clause not be used absent meaningful and transparent public consultation.” There is no mention of any such consultation in Bill S-218.

Additionally, the CBA letter also calls for a requirement that the “use of the notwithstanding clause require a two-thirds majority vote in the legislature or Parliament.”

Senator Harder’s bill only mentions the two-thirds vote required in the House of Commons. Obviously, “Parliament” means the House of Commons and the Senate, yet Senator Harder’s bill is silent on what vote percentage is needed in the Senate. Maybe Senator Harder thinks he has made passage of such a bill using the “notwithstanding” clause so utterly impossible in the House of Commons that it will never come to the Senate. This may be a definite oversight, particularly for an amendment to the Constitution.

Further, the Canadian Bar Association letter lists as one of their proposed requirements that “the notwithstanding clause not be used preemptively without prior consideration of the proposed legislation by the courts.” In contrast, in Senator Harder’s Bill S-218, a Supreme Court of Canada decision is required.

This is a major difference, given the massive amount of time and expense involved in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions.

Senator Harder suggests that the way his bill is written, it will only affect the federal government and not the provinces and territories and that, because of this, the default 7-50 constitutional amending formula would not be required. But this bill would affect the regions because it would affect federalism.

If two thirds of the House of Commons want something, and one third don’t, it may unfairly rewrite the balance of the House of Commons. A certain type of infringing bill could have the support of every province and region except Ontario, for example.

Also, it is a substantial component of our role as senators to represent our regions. A bill imposing dramatic limits on our ability as senators to legislate could definitely affect our provinces and territories.

The unilateral amendment procedure in section 44 that Senator Harder wants to employ in this legislation has limited jurisprudence. The carve-outs from the general amending formula that have been granted in the past have been very narrow.

As the majority held in the Supreme Court of Canada case Alford v. Canada:

. . . s. 44 . . . cannot be used to fundamentally alter the architecture of the Constitution by way of ordinary legislation . . . .

The “powers of the Senate” are carved out from section 44 by section 42(1)(b). This is part of the fundamental structure of the Canadian Constitution and cannot be unilaterally undone via section 44.

This confirmed the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Reference re Senate Reform of 2014, where the court held that changes to the fundamental architecture of the Constitution are always off limits from section 44, whether they affect the provinces or not. As the Supreme Court ruled, the section 44:

. . . unilateral federal amendment procedure is limited. It is not a broad procedure that encompasses all constitutional changes to the Senate which are not expressly included within another procedure in Part V. The history, language, and structure of Part V indicate that s. 38, rather than s. 44, is the general procedure for constitutional amendment. Changes that engage the interests of the provinces in the Senate as an institution forming an integral part of the federal system can only be achieved under the general amending procedure. Section 44, as an exception to the general procedure, encompasses measures that maintain or change the Senate without altering its fundamental nature and role. . . .

In our view, this understanding of the unilateral federal procedure applies to Part V. The Senate is a core component of the Canadian federal structure of government. As such, changes that affect its fundamental nature and role engage the interests of the stakeholders in our constitutional design — i.e. the federal government and the provinces — and cannot be achieved by Parliament acting alone. . . .

. . . the Senate’s fundamental nature and role is that of a complementary legislative body of sober second thought. . . .

All this was said by the Supreme Court of Canada.

By disempowering the Senate, Bill S-218 would make our Senate Chamber inferior to the House of Commons, undermining equality between the two parliamentary chambers. This clearly would alter the fundamental nature of the Senate’s role, meaning such a change would fall outside a limited “manner and form” amendment and, instead, would require a constitutional amendment agreed to by seven provinces representing 50% of the population under the general section 38 amending formula.

In his speech on Bill S-218, Senator Harder refers to an example of “manner and form” amendments. Senator Harder gave the example of a bill increasing the size of the House of Commons. Clearly, the subject matter of Bill S-218 — preventing the use of the “notwithstanding” clause, a section of the Canadian Constitution, by precluding many parliamentarians’ ability to legislate — is a far cry from that.

Section 33, the “notwithstanding” clause, is time-limited. It is up for renewal every five years, as I mentioned. Bill S-218 is not time-limited. But should it be? Why is it that Senator Harder’s restrictions on the “notwithstanding” clause would not be subject to the same metric as a bill seeking to employ it?

The Supreme Court ruled in the Reference re Senate Reform decision of 2014 that measures such as Senate consultative elections and even lengthy Senate term limits were beyond the scope of the unilateral federal amending procedure in section 44 because they “. . . fundamentally alter the architecture of the Constitution . . . .” But altering the application of the “notwithstanding” clause and removing the “powers of the Senate” to legislate also fundamentally alter the architecture of the Constitution.

Without the existing “notwithstanding” clause as it was negotiated, there would be no Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution. For the federal government to unilaterally change the terms of the “notwithstanding” clause, even if only for federal bills, is to change the terms that brought the constitutional negotiations to a successful conclusion.

As Sir John A. Macdonald said during the parliamentary debates during the time of Confederation, the Senate “. . . will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people.”

Similarly, this is why the “notwithstanding” clause was adopted in 1982 — to ensure that the courts, in rendering decisions about certain rights, cannot run roughshod over “the deliberate and understood wishes of the people.”

It is not for this Senate, this House of Commons or this federal government to limit the clause’s application without invoking the general amending formula required by the Constitution for such a significant change.

Bill S-218 is also troublesome in that it insists all infringing bills must have approval from the court, but not just any court — the Supreme Court of Canada. Not only is that impractical, as it’s very costly and time-consuming; essentially, Bill S-218 would insert the Supreme Court as a mandatory participant in the legislative process for section 33 bills, raising major issues of the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches.

Let’s recall that Bill C-7, the expanded assisted suicide law introduced in 2020, was brought forward by the Liberal government after only one judge on the lowest federally appointed court in Quebec ruled on the matter. The Trudeau government did not even appeal that judgment to the provincial Court of Appeal, let alone the Supreme Court of Canada, and there we were dealing with life and death.

Constitutional law scholarship has evolved a lot since 1982, so it is important not to just rely on scholarship from that time 45 years ago. We have seen an evolution in jurisprudence in recent years as the courts have continued to expand the rights agenda.

There has been a trend over the past several years from the courts to nullify mandatory minimum penalties, which has brought us to the point I described earlier. Now the courts are citing parole ineligibility as “cruel and unusual punishment” for convicted offenders.

Governments have started to push back. This is where we have seen more use of the “notwithstanding” clause. But this is exactly the friction the clause was made for.

Former Saskatchewan premier Allan Blakeney described the tension between the courts and the electorate this way:

Right now, the conventional wisdom is that our splendid parliamentary system, with a wise electorate, somehow elects only fools and knaves. Fools and knaves who appoint judges who are wise. Jean Chrétien is often portrayed as a fool and a knave, except somehow the judges — most of whom he appointed — are invested with superhuman wisdom. But these things come in waves. The day will come when the public will want more decision-making power back.

Many of the arguments Senator Harder has brought forth as fact on Bill S-218 are actually questions currently before the courts that have not yet been settled, including the matter of the pre-emptive use of the “notwithstanding” clause.

In fact, there are two cases currently on the docket of the Supreme Court that will deal with some of the constitutional issues we must consider on Bill S-218. One is the English Montreal School Board, et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec, et al, and the other is the UR Pride v. Saskatchewan case from Saskatchewan.

It is anticipated that we could have a Supreme Court decision on the English Montreal School Board case by about November 30, within the next couple of weeks. I submit it is premature for us to consider Bill S-218, as the Supreme Court of Canada may directly pronounce upon elements of what Senator Harder’s bill proposes.

In addition, there are several legal experts who disagree with Senator Harder’s notions about how the “notwithstanding” clause should or should not be used. Constitutional law professor Dwight Newman said this pre-emptive “. . . use of the notwithstanding clause is exactly what its framers intended.” Philip Cross said, “The notwithstanding clause helps maintain the balance of power in our federation.” Former premier Lougheed, frequently vaunted by Senator Harder, said the clause was intended “. . . to curb an errant court.”

Senator Dalphond and I seem to share some similar perspectives on this bill. He called Bill S-218: “. . . a Trojan horse, giving the impression of offering protection that, in reality, it does not.” I concur with many of Senator Dalphond’s concerns about this bill, including the requirement for a bill invoking the “notwithstanding” clause to proceed all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada for reference first. As Senator Dalphond points out, that would lead to major delays and would mean the federal government could not do anything on these issues in the last year of their mandate.

It is also a contradiction that Bill S-218 requires a supermajority in the House of Commons on “infringing bills,” yet a bare majority is needed for practically everything else, even time allocation and budget bills.

Honourable senators, here in the Senate, we pride ourselves on our sober second thought. I’m asking you to employ yours today as we consider how to handle Bill S-218. The Senate is supposed to be the guardian of the Canadian Constitution, the protector of minorities and the defender of our country’s regional interests. In that role, we must act prudently and judiciously.

But, honourable colleagues, I will be blunt: Bill S-218 is rife with problems. It attempts to circumvent the Constitution to make changes to a carefully negotiated deal that brought most of the country together. And it is a first step to dismantling the very tool — the “notwithstanding” clause — that led to a united Canada in the first place. Do we want that, having just come through a referendum in Alberta and facing the threat of another in Quebec?

It is remarkable that Senator Harder is asking senators to pass this bill in this chamber, inside the same building where the negotiations to patriate Canada’s Constitution occurred. Because if this bill is to ultimately pass this chamber and later this Parliament, it will disempower the Senate, make our chamber subordinate to the House of Commons and upset the delicate regional balance upon which our country was founded. No matter what you think of the “notwithstanding” clause, honourable senators, are you willing to pass a bill that takes away the power of the Senate? If you are, I ask you: What are you doing here? I submit this bill could be unconstitutional, and I believe it will ultimately find its way to the courts for that determination one way or the other.

The changes in Bill S-218 are far beyond what would properly fall into the simple procedural matters of a manner and form amendment to the Constitution. I submit to you that it is obvious that this type of constitutional change included in Bill S-218 would require the general constitutional amending formula to achieve — including not just the federal Parliament but seven provinces, representing 50% of Canada’s population. The “notwithstanding” clause was a compromise arrived at to protect Canadians from judicial overreach. To pass this bill — even just to pass it on to committee — would be doing Canada a grave disservice. I ask you to join me and please vote against sending this bill to committee since it improperly removes the powers of the Senate contrary to the Canadian Constitution.

Honourable senators, your stance on this bill should not even really be determined by how you feel about the “notwithstanding” clause — whether you like it, you don’t like it or you don’t mind it, but you don’t want it used pre-emptively. It’s really about whether you are going to stand up for the Senate and senators’ authority to legislate, which is clearly one of our most fundamental duties in this chamber for Canadians.

Thank you.

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore

Senator Ataullahjan has a question. Would you take a question, Senator Batters?

Senator Batters [ + ]

Yes.

Hon. Salma Ataullahjan [ + ]

Senator Batters, you raised the horrific terrorist attack on the Quebec mosque. As someone who visited that mosque, I feel compelled to stand up and ask you a question. We went to that mosque, and we heard from the imam who said that worshippers stopped coming because of the blood stains that they couldn’t get out of the carpets and about how the gun jammed when the killer tried to kill a nine-year-old. The stories go on and on. What message does this bill send to the Muslim community of over 2 million of us? Does it say that your life does not mean that much? How do you think the families of those who were killed and those who have life-altering injuries will feel when we — the house of sober second thought — pass this bill?

Senator Batters [ + ]

That’s an excellent point. In my speech, I thought it was important to indicate the actual facts that underlie why this bill is being brought because it was an election promise that our Conservative colleagues and Mr. Poilievre made in that election campaign in dealing with that horrific situation. This was not a minor crime committed. This was someone who murdered six people and shot up, as I indicated, a mosque for two minutes, targeting people who were praying and injuring so many others, many of them very seriously. That’s why it is important to know the underlying facts of this, which was something that really hasn’t been a big feature of this every time that I have been trying to speak about this bill when asking questions. It is important to honour those people because, yes, it is important that we realize: Sometimes there might be situations where you don’t agree with the “notwithstanding” clause. In this sort of case, I think it is exactly the type of situation where the courts have gotten a bit out of balance with the Canadian populace, and that’s why Pierre Poilievre suggested that we use it because we need to honour those victims. This was only a sentence of potentially 40 years without the chance of parole — slightly more than the 25 years that this killer would have received for just one murder. There should not be a volume discount, and that’s what we are trying to prevent. Thank you for putting forward those very poignant remarks.

Hon. Yonah Martin (Deputy Leader of the Opposition) [ + ]

Will Senator Batters take another question?

Senator Batters [ + ]

Yes.

Senator Martin [ + ]

Thank you so much for the speech. It was filled with very important history, including the professor whom you learned directly from. I know your interventions in the Senate are always very thoughtful and insightful. Not everyone will agree, and this is why debate is so important.

When we say the “notwithstanding” clause, it elicits a lot of reaction, and we have had different debates about it. There is so much more to say. You have limited time. If this were to go to committee, it could be an opportunity to actually hear more and really understand what this bill is intending and how it could limit our very powers as the Senate. Although I know you vehemently oppose this bill, do you think that a study could elicit and bring forward witnesses and information that will be useful for all of us for consideration?

Senator Batters [ + ]

Well, there are certainly a lot of legal experts who want to come to committee and tell us all about how unconstitutional this bill is, so it will provide that. I just think it sends, potentially, a terrible message, where the Senate is potentially willingly diminishing its own powers. We are supposed to be an equal, complementary chamber to the House of Commons. We shouldn’t be doing anything that takes away from that. There are certain very required limitations, like money bills, and that’s because it is in the Constitution.

Certainly, there is much discussion that can happen at committee. I worry about the signal that this sends, where we’re willing to diminish our own authority.

A second reading vote is supposed to be about the principle of the bill. I couldn’t more vehemently disagree with the principle of this bill that takes away the powers of the Senate.

Senator Martin [ + ]

I agree with you in terms of the importance of careful consideration, and we have various options. There are things we could do now. And at committee, the committee members will make decisions at clause by clause. There are many things that could happen to a bill at every stage. I was just thinking: Your speech was excellent, but there are so many more things that could be said. It would require certain expertise and real careful study. For me, I just think about the value of a committee looking at this from different points of view and hearing from experts. That will really inform us as to what we need to do. I trust the Legal Committee to which this bill will be sent, and you are the deputy chair, and there will be excellent witnesses called. If this does go to committee, as we vote on it at second reading, I will entrust our committee to do a very thorough job and thorough study of this bill.

Senator Batters [ + ]

All I would say is that I think a better way to study the “notwithstanding” clause is to actually have a study of that clause, not to bring a bill forward that deliberately limits the powers of the Senate, contrary to the Constitution.

The Hon. the Speaker pro tempore

Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

An Hon. Senator: On division.

(Motion agreed to and bill read second time, on division.)

Back to top